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PREFACE 
My interest in 'Abd al-Jabbâr and his theology was aroused first 
by the late Professor Houben, who was himself steadily working on the 
manuscripts of 'Abd al-Jabbâr's Muhît His enthusiasm for this great 
Mu'tazili theologian was so contagious that I began to study his works 
myself, and in the course of this study my interest kept growing so that, 
finally, I decided to devote my dissertation to an explanation of his 
theology 
As a central topic for the present study I chose 'Abd al-Jabbâr's 
treatise on God's speech and the Qur'ân, which is found in the seventh 
part of his Mugni, I did so, not only because this subject was a much 
disputed topic in the history of Islamic theology, but also because it 
covers many aspects of 'Abd al-Jabbâr's theology and furnishes a fine 
example of his style of arguing 
I discovered that for a correct understanding of the contents and 
the argumentation of this part of the Mugni—as in fact for the totality 
of 'Abd al-Jabbâr's theological works—it was absolutely necessary 
to analyse profoundly the terms he uses and the concepts that lie 
behind this technical vocabulary Therefore, I devoted, after a general 
introduction, my second chapter to an analysis of the technical philo-
sophical and theological terms used before discussing in the third 
chapter his argumentations concerning God's speech and the Qur'ân 
I hesitated a long time how to divide the matter to be dealt with in 
the second chapter, since it was my intention to treat the underlying 
philosophical and theological substrata, I could not simply follow 'Abd 
al-Jabbâr's own division Finally, I chose a classical division, used in 
the European Aristotelian tradition, consisting in logic, cosmology, 
anthropology, and theodicy I believe that this division will be useful 
in the discussion of 'Abd al-Jabbâr's doctrine 
My principal aim in this study was to get a survey of 'Abd al-Jabbâr's 
basic system and an insight into the way he argues, not to compare it 
with the theological or philosophical systems of other Muslim or non-
Muslim scholars, this can be done later on In studying 'Abd al-Jabbâr's 
theology, I started from the technical vocabulary he uses and analysed 
this vocabulary throughout his theological works I hope this method 
too will prove to be useful in the present work 
χ 
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Having read the entire book, one might come to the conclusion 
that its title, "God's Created Speech", is not quite correct. I would 
agree, but, nevertheless, I gave it this title since it draws the attention 
to 'Abd al-Jabbâr's place in the evolution of Islamic theology. 
I realize that I have been able to write the present book thanks to 
the work of many scholars, particularly those who prepared the edition 
of'Abd al-Jabbâr's works and in this way made them accessible. I know 
from my own experience how difficult and hard this work can be, and 
I witnessed it during my frequent contacts with the late Prof. Houben, 
who was preparing the edition of the entire Muhit, but whom a sudden 
death prevented to complete the task. The reason why I shall refer in 
this study to his edition of the Muhil is, consequently, a personal and 
non-scientific one, and it does by no means imply that it is better than 
the edition prepared by 'Umar as-Sayyid 'Azmî. 
In the course of this book I suggest a number of corrections to be 
made in the texts edited. In the case of the seventh part of the Mugnî 
I always consulted a microfilm of the original manuscript; I shall add 
a remark indicating whether my suggestion is or is not in accordance 
with the text of the manuscript; when no such remark is made, both 
readings are possible in the manuscript. The corrections proposed for 
the other works are always made without consulting the manuscripts, 
on the sole basis of the context. Suggestions for the correction of the 
punctuation of the text are made only if this is absolutely necessary 
for a correct understanding of the text. When translating passages 
literally, I put them between inverted commas, eventually adding in 
brackets some explanatory words which are not found in the Arabic 
text. To keep the difficult text as clear as possible and not to overburden 
it, I omit all eulogies after the name of God, His prophet, or other 
people. I want to emphasize, however, that this is not due to a lack of 
respect, but only lo my wish to make the text as accessible as possible. 
In my translation of verses from the Qur'ân I have tried to render 
their meaning as 'Abd al-Jabbâr understood them, meanwhile following 
the Arabic text as closely as possible; therefore, I have not used one 
of the accepted English translations. 
For the transcription of Arabic words I make use of the trans-
literation used in Hans Wehr, A Dictionary of Modern Written Arabic; 
this transliteration is rather simple and offers the advantage of noting 
one single Latin character for any single Arabic character. Arabic 
proper names and technical terms are, besides some exceptions (I write 
"Islamic" instead oî ¡slami and "Muslims" instead of Muslimûn), also 
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transliterated in the above mentioned way. In quotations from the 
works of European scholars I usually (unless noted) kept the transcrip­
tion they used themselves; when referring, however, to Arabic books 
that also bear their title in Latin transcription I nevertheless use my 
own transliteration of the Arabic title. 
I wish to thank all persons and all organizations that made the 
publication of this study possible : the late Prof. Dr. J. Houben 
(Nijmegen), who suggested to me the subject of the present study and 
directed it as long as his health allowed him to do so ; Prof. Dr. J. van Ess 
(Tübingen), who after Dr. Houben's death spontaneously accepted to 
supervise this study, and who made many valuable remarks and sug-
gestions; the Catholic University of Nijmegen, which granted me a 
sabbatical year in order to complete my thesis, as also my colleagues, 
who were so kind as to take over during that year my tasks in the 
faculty; Prof. Dr. D.S. Alterna (Amsterdam), who gave me his advice 
and read part of the manuscript; Dr. W. Peters, who revised my English 
text and also made some suggestions to make the text more under-
standable for the interested reader who is versed neither in the Arabic 
language nor in the study of Islam; Drs. W. Stoelzer (Kairo), who 
procured for me a microfilm of the seventh part of the Mugnî; Dâr 
al-Kutub in Kairo, which made it possible to consult the text of the 
manuscript; the librarians of the universities of Nijmegen, Leiden, and 
Beirut (Université St. Joseph), who gave me all assistance needed; 
Prof. Dr. M. Allard, Prof. Dr. P. Nwyia, and other colleagues in the 
Université St. Joseph in Beirut, who stimulated me to continue my 
studies in this field, and with whom I have cooperated in a very friendly 
atmosphere; L. Pouzet and R. Lavenant (Beirut), who first aroused 
my interest in the Arabic language and culture. Finally, I wish to 
thank the Netherlands Organization for the Advancement of Pure 
Research (Z.W.O.), which by its subvention made the actual publi-
cation of this study in this form possible. 
It is my sincere hope that this work may help both Muslims and 
orientalists to get a deeper insight into the theology of 'Abd al-Jabbâr 
and through it also into the theology of the Mu'tazila, which may be 
—God willing —of some help in the great task of creating a modern 
Islamic thinking. 
Nijmegen, July 15, 1975 JAN PETERS 
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
1. ETERNITY OR CRFATEDNESS or THE QUR'AN, 
A CENTRAL TOPIC IN EARLY ISLAMIC RELIGIOUS THINKING 
The Qur'ân is God's speech. About this point of view there is no 
disagreement among Muslims throughout the centuries. The discus-
sions, however, centered upon the question whether the Qur'ân is 
eternal or temporal and created, have led to fierce disputes and even 
to the persecution of the adherents of one or the other of the two 
positions. The question at stake was : did the Qur'ân coexist with God, 
uncreated, in all eternity, so that God could send it down to His 
prophet and reveal it to mankind, or did God create it in time and did 
it have a beginning, "it was not, afterwards it was", ("lam yakun, tumm 
kán") as the traditional formula says. ' 
After the time of the great persecution (the so-called "Mihna", 
which lasted from 218 AH/ 833 AD till 234 AH/ 848 AD), in which 
this topic played a central part as it was used as a criterion to distin-
guish between orthodoxy and heterodoxy,2 it remained a very im-
portant question in Islamic theological discussions. Some 150 years 
later, one out of the twenty parts of the Mugni (the "Summa Theo-
logica") of the Mu'tazilî theologian 'Abd al-Jabbâr seems to be devoted 
to this subject; anyhow, the discussions around the eternity of the 
Qur'ân or its createdness fill many of that part's pages. 
The very origins of the discussion remain wrapped in darkness, nor 
can we know for certain why exactly this question became so central 
a topic in later disputes.3 But at the beginning of the third century AH 
1
 Cf, for instance, Mugni VII, 3 
2
 Al-Ma'mûn, who was a calif in Bagdad from 198 AH/ 813 AD till his death 
in 218 AH/ 833 AD, wrote in 218 AH a letter to Ishâq bn Ibrahim, ordering him 
to test all judges and transmitters of traditions (muhadduûn) as to their belief in the 
nature of the Qur'ân The text of this letter has been transmitted by Tabari (Annales ΠΙ, 
1112-1116) and translated by W M Patton (Ahmed ¡bn Hanbal and the Mihna, 57-61) 
This letter is considered to be the start of the Mihna 
3
 The question of the origins of this discussion is dealt with in most manuals of 
Islamic theology and in some monographs that m some way or other deal with 
the subject Cf for instance, J Bouman, Le conflit, 1-6, Watt, Formative Period, 143-145 
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we see the two contradictory doctrines firmly established It may 
suffice for the moment, just to give an example, to quote two texts 
dating from the beginning of the third century and representative of 
the two currents In an old creed, the Was'iyat Abi Hanifa, composed 
about 210 AH/ 825 AD,4 we read (article 9) "We confess that the 
Qur'ân is the speech of God, uncreated, His inspiration and revelation, 
not He, yet not other than He, but His real quality, written in the copies, 
recited by the tongues, preserved in the breasts, yet not residing there 
The ink, the paper, the writing are created, for they are the work of 
men The speech of God on the other hand is uncreated, for the 
writing and the letters and the words and the verses are manifestations 
of the Qur'ân for the sake of human needs The speech of God on the 
other hand is existing in Him, and its meaning is understood by means 
of these things Whoso sayeth that the speech of God is created, 
he is an infidel regarding God, the Exalted, whom men serve, who 
is eternally the same. His speech being recited or written and retained 
in the heart, yet never dissociated from Him " 5 On the other hand 
we have a letter written by the Calif al-Ma'mûn in 218 AH/ 833 AD,6 
this letter figures as the beginning of the Mihna, the inquisition, in 
which the belief in the createdness of the Qur'ân had to be used as the 
criterion of orthodoxy The calif is very fierce in his condemnation 
of who believes in the eternity of the Qur'ân "The masses and the 
great multitude of the mean people and the lowest classes do not 
think, do not reflect, and do not use the arguments and the guidance 
God has provided, they are not enlightened by the light and the 
argumentations of real knowledge, this is the situation in all regions 
and all territories They do not know God, they are blind for Him, 
and they err away from the essence of His religion, the acknowledge-
ment of His unity, and the belief in Him, they turn away from His 
clear signs and from His path, which they have to follow, they are 
and 242 245, Paret Der Standpunkt al-Baqtllâm s, 294 296 Becker, hìamstudien I, 
441-443 Bddawi, Histoire, 45-47 
4
 For a history of the Islamic creeds A J Wensinck, The Muslim Creed, and 
W M Watt, art 'Aktda in EI2 
The date mentioned in our text is given by Watt ('Akida, 315), Wensinck's conclusion 
about the time of its composition "So the Wasîya seems to have originated in a period 
between Abu Hanîfa and Ahmad ibn Hanbal and probably belongs to the latter part 
of that period ' (The Muslim Creed, 187) This roughly corresponds with the period 
mentioned by Watt 
3
 Wensinck translates in his book the most important Islamic creeds, for the text 
quoted 77ie Muslim Creed, 127 I used his translation with only slight modifications 
6
 Cf note 2 
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unable to understand the real greatness of God, to know Him as He 
really is, and to see the difference between Him and His creation; 
so weak is their insight, so defective their intellect, and so great their 
distaste for reflection and recollection. They show this most clearly 
by putting God—the Blessed and Exalted—on the same level with the 
Qur'ân, which He has sent down; they are all agreed, unanimously 
and unequivocally, that the Qur'ân is eternal, exists from the first 
beginning, and is not created nor produced nor originated by God."7 
When reading these two short quotations—many others might be 
added—one understands that the disputes and persecutions turned 
fierce and bitter, but the question remains how this problem became 
of so great an importance. But whatever may have been the causes, 
it is evident that the choice in favour of one of the two answers, 
eternity or createdness of the Qur an, had great implications for the 
believing thinking about God and world. 
The belief that the Qur'ân is eternal implies, for instance, that 
God preordained any event described in it and leads to a belief in 
God's absolute predestination; who wants to deny this predestination 
must believe the Qur'ân to be created. And, to mention yet another 
example, he who advocates the doctrine of God's absolute unity and 
unicity (a central Islamic belief) and wishes to take this in the strictest 
sense, denies the existence of an uncreated Qur'ân together with God 
in all eternity. 
In the course of time, however, the question looses some of its 
importance and we shall see that, for 'Abd al-Jabbâr, it is no longer the 
central topic of his discussion of the Qur'ân; for him this problem 
appears to be basically of historical interest. 
2. THE MUTAZILA 
'Abd al-Jabbâr's treatise on God's speech and the Qur'ân, the work 
we take as our starting-point in this book, is a theological study; 
it belongs to the category of the so-called "/ca/âm"-works. 
The kalâm often did not have a very good reputation both among 
Muslims and among orientalists; most authors hesitate to describe 
the kalâm as "theology". Some of them consider it to be a form of 
rationalistic thinking,8 others see in it a pure apology, which comes 
1
 Tabari, Annales III, 1112-1113. 
8
 So, for instance, Wensmck : "The mulakallimún (the writers of λ-α/ám-treatises) 
were thus characterized, not as theologians, but as rationalists and philosophers, 
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to be no more than a form of contradiction-making,9 nevertheless 
in our days we see a growing insight into the background of real 
concern for the (theological) truth concealed behind the sometimes 
very elaborate and far-fetched argumentations, which make these works 
often seem entirely uninspired.10 But when studying these kalâm-
treatises, one will discover that the kalâm really is a form of theological 
thinking, an attempt to arrive at a synthetic view of God and the 
cosmos ; this view is based on a double foundation : human intellect 
and divine revelation. Though the importance attached to these two 
"sources" vary among the writers of fca/ôw-works, they all elaborate 
the data of revelation and human intellect by means of speculative 
reflection. Therefore, I call this kind of theological thinking in the 
subtitle of the present work "speculative theology". 
Among the early "mutakallimm" (the scholars in the field of kalâm) 
we meet with an apparently coherent group of theologians, who, 
though they themselves preferred the name "ahial-'adi (wa-t-tawhid)" l ' 
are usually known by the name "Mu'tazila". About the origin of this 
name12 and about the history and doctrine of this intellectual 
movement much has been written in the far and recent past;13 hence, 
and the fact that the kalâm in the course of time received the meaning of dogmatic theology 
is an indication of the rationalistic direction which Muslim theology has gradually 
taken" (The Muslim Creed, 79) 
g
 "If the Kalâm is essentially no more than an elaborated polemics of apology without 
true and primary concern for the rational (i e dialectical and analytic) understanding 
of the totality of being that is subject of theology, then it is a kind of sophistry an art of 
making contradictions" (Frank, Kalâm, 295) Frank observes that even Allard in his 
book Le problème des attributs divins did not consider the kalâm to be a really theological 
discipline The here quoted phrase has been taken from his critical remarks on Allard's 
work 
10
 One of the great defenders of the kalâm and of its rightful place among the other 
Islamic religious disciplines as a form of really theological thinking is Richard Frank See, 
for instance, his Remarks on the Early Development of the Kalâm, his The Kalâm, 
an art oj contradation-makmg or theological science7, and his introduction to The 
Metaphysus of Created Being 
1
 ' By this name (the people of (God's) justice, or, in the longer form, the people 
of (God's) justice and the profession of (God's) unity), they refer to the central topics 
of their own theological system God's absolute unity and His absolute justice 
12
 The classical explanation of the name "Mu'tazila" is found, for instance, in 
a5-Sahrastânî, al-Milal на-n-nihal, 60-61 'Abd al-Jabbâr gives a slightly diiTcrent version 
in ¿arh 137-138 For a discussion of the data of the various sources Watt, 
Formative Period, 209-210 and 215-217 
13
 Cf the bibliography in this book for the more important works For contem-
porary or nearly contemporary information we are depending on the few works of 
Mu'tazili authors that have been preserved, especially the works of 'Abd al-Jabbâr, 
and on the works of the great heresiographers For the history of the Mu'tazila, 
as seen by the Mu'tazila themselves, the Fadl al-ΓηζάΙ by 'Abd al-Jabbâr is a rich 
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I will by way of introduction restrict myself here to some general 
remarks. 
The Mu'tazila, which as an intellectual and theological movement 
was born in al-Basra in the beginning of the second century AH 
and a century later even for some time was the official theological 
doctrine of the califate in Bagdad, in which time it instituted the Mihna 
or inquisition, is traditionally said to be based on five principles; these 
principles are: 1) God's unity {at-tawhîd); 2) God's justice (al-'adi); 
3) God's promise and threat (al-wa'd wa-l-wa'id); 4) the intermediate 
position of the Mu'tazila (al-manziia bayn al-manzilatayn); 5) the 
command to do what is approved and the prohibition to do what is 
reprehensible (al-amr Ы-l-marûf wa-n-nahy 'an al-munkar).iA This 
schematization, however, is not based on any intrinsic logic of the 
Mu'tazilî system, but it is called forth by apologetic motives.15 Intrin-
sically, the whole system is summarized under two heads : the belief 
in God's absolute unity and the belief in His absolute justice. 
But probably more than in these principles, the difference between 
the Mu'tazila and their opponents is to be found in their theological 
methods; for the Mu'tazila, theologians who had come to know the 
Greek philosophical tradition, the human intellect itself was a source 
of real knowledge. They brought the appreciation for the independently 
thinking and arguing human intellect into the religious sciences; in 
their thinking about God and cosmos 16 they fought for the right to 
source of knowledge, dala on the later Mu'tazila are added by al-Hâkim Abu Sa'd 
al-Muhsin al-Jusamî al-Bayhaqî, who died in 494 AH (cf Johann Fuck in OLZ 59 
(1964), 371-374 and 'Abd al-Karim 'Utmân, Qädi l-Qudât, 63). These texts are used 
by Ibn al-Murtadâ, Tabaqâl al-Mu'ta:ila. 
Among the books and articles written in our own century, I wish to point first to 
two classical studies : the studies of the famous Egyptian scholar Ahmad Amin, especially 
in the third tome of his work pulía ¡-Islam, and the article of Nyberg in the first edition 
of the Encyclopaedia of Islam In recent times we have the works of van Ess and 
Madelung about the history and "Ideengeschichte" of the Mu'tazila and the works 
of Frank, which are mostly concerned with the analysis of the philosophical and 
theological vocabulary 
For a general introduction, see, for instance, Badawi, Histoire, 18-261, Walt, 
Formative Period, 209-250; Nader, Le système philosophique. 
14
 Cf., for instance,al-Kayyât, Kitâb al-mtisár, 93 (Arabie text) and Sarh 123. 
15
 Cf. Sarh 122-125. where 'Abd al-Jabbâr admits thai the list of five principles is 
rather arbitrarily chosen, he himself sometimes mentions only two or four principles. 
The choice of the principles is mainly made for apologetic reasons. 
16
 Therefore, some authors see in modern developments in the field of Islamic 
thought, where we meet a growing appreciation of the human intellect, a kind of neo-
Mu'tazili current. As regards the situation in Egypt see · Caspar, Un aspect de la 
pensée musulmane moderne le renouveau du Mo'tazilisme, M ¡DEO 4 (1957), 141-201. 
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use the intellect as an independent source and not only as an instrument 
to study the revealed sources. This fight was, however, not a goal in itself; 
their first aim remained to describe their believing synthetic view of 
God and cosmos, a view which is in accordance both with revelation 
and with the data of the human intellect. 
3. ' A B D AL-JABBÀR 
The fourth century AH—corresponding roughly to the tenth century 
AD—witnessed a process of rapid disintegration of the vast Islamic 
empire and the rise of various independent or semi-independent states 
on the frontiers of the Islamic world; in the track of the decentraliza-
tion of the political influence and the building of new capitals followed 
the rise of new cultural and intellectual centres. The famous Mesopo-
tamian cities, Bagdad and al-Basra, remained centres of cultural life, 
but they had to share their leading position with cities as al-Qâhira 
(Kairo), Halab, Rayy, and the great cultural centres in Islamic Spain.17 
As to the Mu'tazila, they had been given a hard time after the period 
of their great political influence at the court in Bagdad had come to 
an end and the tables had been turned by the succession to the califate 
of the calif al-Mutawakkil in 232 AH. The so-called Sunni18 reaction, 
which was both political and doctrinal, followed the period of the 
Mihna and was supported by a developing Sunni theology, which was 
to fight the Mu'tazila with their own weapons : reflection and intel-
lectual argumentation. Their leading scholar was al-As'ari (260-324 AH/ 
873 (874)-935 (936) AD), whose theology was going to make a redoubt-
able attack on Mu'tazilî supremacy in matters of speculative theology. 
But in the fourth century the school flourished again, and this time 
especially in the eastern provinces of the Islamic world, the Persian 
districts. Especially the Mu'tazilî school of al-Basra, to which 'Abd 
Khâlid, Some aspect's of Neo-mu'lazilism, IS 8 (1969), 319-347 described the situation 
in modern Pakistan and India, and diso dealt with the Egyptian scholar Ahmad Amin, 
in this way his article forms a supplement to Caspar's 
17
 For the position of Bagdad during this century see, e g , M Canard, Bagdad au 
IV' siede de l'hegire (X' siede de l'ere chrétienne). Arabica 9 Π962). 267-287 
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 Sunni is an adjective related to the word Ahi as-Sunna, this is a name given 
to the so-called "orthodox" Muslims, who keep to the Sunna, the custom of the Prophet 
It is mostly used for the great body of Muslim believers, as opposed to the Si'a, it is 
also used as it is here for the traditionalists (the muhadditûn), the scholars in the 
science of the Islamic traditions about the Prophet, and their followers as opposed to 
the Mu'tazila and the Mu'tazilî theology 
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al-Jabbâr must be counted, greatly contributed to this resurgence, 
which was greatly favoured by the reigning princes of the Bûyid dynasty 
belonging to the Sî'a.19 This century has known some great Mu'tazilî 
thinkers, who were, however, not very favourably looked upon by 
the great masses of Muslims and by their traditional leaders.20 This 
is one of the reasons why their books disappeared and would have 
been lost forever, had not the Mu'tazilî school of Bagdad gradually 
been identified with the Zaydîya—a branch of the áí'a which survived 
in al-Yaman (Yemen)— : a most happy coincidence since we are now 
so fortunate as to reap the harvest, saved from ruin, of the Mu'tazilî 
manuscripts of al-Yaman, where the influence of the Mu'tazila re-
mained while it disappeared from the Persian scene in consequence 
too of the invasions of the Mongols. 
The greatest Mu'tazilî scholar in the second half of this century 
was without any doubt 'Abd al-Jabbâr. In the older European hand-
books of Islamic theology his ideas are scarcely mentioned at all, but 
since the rediscovery and publication of his works appreciation for 
him and for the later Mu'tazila has steadily been growing so that he 
is now numbered among the greatest Muslim theologians.21 
Ibn al-Murtadâ mentions him as the leading scholar of the eleventh 
generation of the Mu'tazila and records the saying of al-Hâkim : 
"I do not know any expression which might do justice to the place 
he ('Abd al-Jabbâr) occupied in matters of science and culture, for it 
is he who laid open the speculative theology and spread its coolness 
and wrote about it splendid books, which reached the Orient and the 
Occident. He includes therein a so accurate and splendid theological 
thought as no one ever reached. His whole long life he devoted to 
teaching and dictating (of his works) so that he covered the world 
with his books and his disciples; his fame reached far, and great was 
" For a general survey of the history of this dynasty· CI Cahen. Buwayhids or 
Büyids, EP, I, 1350-1357 with an enlightening sketch of the different rulers out of 
this dynasty on ρ 1351 
For a thorough and more elaborate investigation of their history and position 
Heribert Busse, Chalif und Grosskömg, Die Buviden im Irak 945-1055, Wiesbaden 
1969 
20
 The traditional leaders of the Islamic community accused the Mu'tazila of using 
rational argumentation in a field where no argumentation but only belief is required, 
the field of divine revelation Moreover, the scientific method and the basic 
presuppositions of the Mu'tazila were considered to be non-Islamic, as derived from 
the Greek philosophy Cf. L Gardet, Raison et foi en Islam, 450 and R. Arnaldez, 
Grammaire et théologie che: Ihn Hazm de Cordoue, 260. 
21
 R Caspar, Le renouveau duMolazilisme, 151-152 and R M. Frank, BIOR 29, 354. 
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his importance He got a leading position among the Mu'tazila so 
that he became their unmatched teacher and scholar, everybody based 
himself on his books and his 'questiones' so that his works replaced 
the books of the (Mu'tazilî) teachers of former generations" 22 
His life 
To gather trustworthy information about 'Abd al-Jabbâr's biogra-
phical data is a difficult task 23 The first difficulty already presents 
itself as soon as we try to reconstruct his full name Taking into 
account the items to which an amount of certainty can be attributed, 
we reconstruct it as Abu 1-Hasan 'Abd al-Jabbâr bn Ahmad al-
Hamadânî, frequently preceded by the honorific title Qâdî 1-Qudât.24 
22
 Ibn al-Murtadâ, Tabaqât al-Mu'ta:ila, 112, cf al-Hâkim, Éarh al-'uyûn, 365 
23
 The most important available sources for the life of 'Abd al-Jabbâr are 
al-Hdkim, Sarh al-'uvm, 365-471, Ibn al-Murtadâ, Tabaqât al-Mu'tazila, 112-113, 
Ibn dl-Atir, al-Kamilß t-tár¡k, VIII, 694, IX, 111 and 334, as-Subkî, Tabaqât as-Éáfüya, 
III, 114 and 219-220, al-Katib al-Bagdâdî, Tarik Bagdad, XI, 113-115, Yâqût, Mâd, 
I, 70-71, II, 312-314 and 335 
In recent years three monographs have been written about 'Abd al-Jabbâr and his 
theology 'Abd al-Karim 'Utmân, Qâdî l-Qudât 'Abd al-Jabbâr bn Ahmad al-Hamadânî, 
Bayrût 1386 AH 1967 AD, 'Abd al-Karrm 'Utmân, Nazariyat al-taklif, Àrâ' al-Qâdl 
'Abd al-Jabbâr al-Kalâmîya, Bayrût 1391 AH/ 1971 AD, George F Hourani, Islamic 
Rationalism, the ethics of'Abd al-Jabbâr, Oxford 1971 
The first book, which is based upon an extensive research of many manuscripts 
and printed sources, describes the life and works of 'Abd al-Jabbâr and gives a general, 
but rather superficial, survey of his theology In his second work 'Abd al-Karîm 'Utmân 
explicitly and in detail treats 'Abd al-Jabbâr's theology, this study is structured around 
the concept of the taklif, gives much attention to the text of the Muhil, and often 
literally keeps to 'Abd al-Jabbâr's words Hourani deals with 'Abd al-Jabbâr's ethics 
and compares them with modern ethical systemb, in my opinion the ethics of 'Abd 
al-Jabbâr should first be studied in the context of the whole of his theology 
2 4
 The core of the problem rests in the Arabic custom of inserting the ancesters' 
names, thus one finds for instance bn Ahmad bn 'Abd al-Jabbâr (Ibn al-Murtada, 
Tabaqât al-Mu'tazila, 112), as-Subkî continues this series of ancestors bn Ahmad 
bn 'Abd al-Jabbâr bn Ahmad bn al-Kalîl bn 'Abdallah (III, 219-220), without stating 
which source he used, 'Abd al-Karîm 'Utmân shortens this series bn Ahmad bn 
Kalîl bn 'Abdallah (Qâdi l-Qudât, 11), Brockelmann's choice for bn Muhammad bn 
'Abd al-Jabbâr (GAL, S I, 343) must be a mistake Most authors restrict themselves 
to bn Ahmad (Ibn al-Atîr, Yâqût) or to bn Ahmad bn 'Abd al-Jabbâr 
As regards the detail "al-Hamadânî", it is noteworthy that by most writers this is 
indeed read as "al-Hamadânî" (descendent from Hamadân, a region where probably 
also the birth-place of 'Abd al-Jabbâr is to be found, cf 'Abd al-Karîm 'Utman, 
Qâdi l-Qudât, 13), but by Prof Mustafa as-Saqqâ in the introduction to part XIV of 
al-Mugni, on the first page, as "al-Hamdânî" He traces this name back to Hamdân, an old 
Yememtic tribe Badawi (Histoire, 199) follows this vocalization In the edition of 
Ibn al-Murtadâ (112) we find (not vocalized) al-Hmdânî On account of the similarity 
between the consonants d and d in Arabic writing it remains difficult to decide which 
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The most characteristic part of his name, and that by which he is usually 
named, is 'Abd al-Jabbâr, but among Mu'tazila he is often called 
Qâdî 1-Qudât or al-Qâdî.25 
All historical data with regard to his birth are absent. But since the year 
of his death is given as 414, 415, or 416 AH,26 alongside with the 
fact that he lived to attain a high age surpassing even ninety years,27 
we can safely conclude that his birth goes back to around 320 AH/ 
932 AD, probably at Asad Àbâd in the region of Hamadân.28 
Having first applied himself to studies in his place of birth, he 
continued these in Hamadân and Isfahan, where he became a follower 
of the theological school of al-As'ari. 
Afterwards he went to al-Basra, where he became impressed by the 
teaching of the Mu'tazila and decided to become a Mu'tazilî himself.29 
His teacher there was Abu Ishâq. After a while he went to Bagdad, 
where he became a disciple of Abu 'Abdallah al-Basri.30 
After the year 360 the wazîr as-Sâhib bn 'Abbâd invited him to come 
to Rayy and appointed him to the important function of chief-judge 
in Rayy,31 within the direct vicinity of modern Teheran. He held this 
one has been the original name, but since it is practically certain that 'Abd al-Jabbâr 
was born in Hamadân (not the city but the region), the solution as therefrom derived 
appears the most acceptable Cf al-Hâkim, Sarh al-'uym, 366 
To the aforesaid name is sometimes added "al-Asad Âbâdî" to specify his place 
of birth, but where in regard to this denomination also a number of variations are 
brought up, it is advisable to see 'Abd al-Karîm 'Utmân, Qâdl l-Qudât, 26-27 
Hourani (Islamic Rationalism, 5) mentions yet another honorific title that was 
sometimes used for 'Abd al-Jabbâr 'Imâd ad-Dîn (Pillar of the Religion), cf al-
Hâkim, Sarh al-'uvûn, 365 
25
 Cf as-Subki. Tabaqâi as-Sâfi'îya, III, 219-220 For an example see Ibn al-Murtadâ, 
passim 
26
 Most sources offer 415 as the year of 'Abd al-Jabbâr's death, and this date is 
normally adhered to, for a discussion of the various possibilities 'Abd al-Karîm 
'Utmân, Qâdi l-Qudât, 26-27 
27
 Ibn al-Atîr, IX, 334 
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 Cf 'Abd al-Karîm 'Utmân, Qâdi l-Qudât, 11 Asad Abâd is a Persian city one 
day's journey from the city of Hamadân 
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 Cf Ibn al-Murtadâ, Tabaqât al-Mu'tazda, 112; al-Hâkim, Sarh al-'uyûn, 366 
30
 Cf Ibn al-Murtadâ, fabaqât al-Mutazila, 112 and 105-107, al-Hâkim, Sarh 
al-'uyûn, 366 
31
 Abu l-Qâsim Ismâ'îl bn 'Abbâd at-Jalaqânî, known as Ibn 'Abbâd or by his 
honorific title as-Sâhib, was born in 326 AH/ 938 AD He occupied a position as ivazir 
to the Bûyid prince Mu'ayyid ad-Dawla (366-373) and later to Fakr ad-Dawla His 
activity as иог/г was interwoven with the struggle for power between the different 
Bûyid princes He is known both as an eminent wazir and as a scholar and man of letters 
who wrote himself many works on various subjects, and managed to gather in the 
city of Rayy a circle of scholars and poets under his patronage. Following Mu'tazilî 
tendencies of thought, he invited 'Abd al-Jabbâr to Rayy there to take up the function 
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office till his promoter's death in 385; this office assured him his 
title of "Qâdî 1-Qudât". Since that time, no longer being able to 
continue his dedication to public duties, he henceforth probably 
consecrated his life to his studies and teaching until his death at 
Rayy in 414, 415, or 416 AH (1023-1025 AD). 
His works 
During his long life 'Abd al-Jabbâr composed numerous writings, 
many of them in dictating form, about the most diverse subjects of 
Islamic sciences. 
Ibn al-Murtadâ records al-Hâkim's saying that he has heard that 
the works composed by 'Abd al-Jabbâr came to a total of 400.000 
sheets of paper. He apologizes that it is not possible to mention them 
all, and that he has to restrict himself to some examples; but even then 
he mentions 27 titles.32 
'Abd al-Karîm 'Utmân has searched 'Abd al-Jabbâr's works and 
many other sources and manuscripts for titles of other books from 
his hand, mentioned in these texts, trying to make a list as complete as 
possible of all his writings. In doing so he arrives at a total of 69 
titles.33 
Out of the twenty-seven works mentioned by al-Hâkim according to 
him twelve are concerned with subjects of speculative theology (kalâm), 
among them the famous works al-Mugnî, al-Muhît, and Sarh al-usûl 
al-kamsa; four are commentaries, two deal with principles of legislation 
{usui al-fiqh), two books contain refutations of works written by his 
opponents, five give answers to questions posed to him, one is about 
points of disagreement {kilâf), and one contains religious exhortations 
(mawäiz).3* 
Among the sixty-nine titles listed by 'Abd al-Karîm 'Utmân, fourty-
of chief judge This function probably included the right to nominate the judges in 
the district and to this functionary one turned if one wanted to appeal to a higher 
court, which shows that this function was of great importance Ibn 'Abbâd died in 
380 A H'990 AD 
Cf CI Cahen and Ch Pelldt, art Ibn 'Abbâd, EP, III, 671-673 
32
 Ibn al-Murtadâ, Tabaqát al-Mutazila, 113 Badawi (Histoire, 201-202) comes to 
a total of 29 tules His number 29 is based on a misinterpretation of Ibn al-Murtadâ's 
text, further, he divides "An-Nthâ)a на-l-'amd" into two titles Cf, however, 'Abd 
al-Karîm 'Utmân, Qâdt l-Qudâi, 61-62 Cf also al-Hâkim, Sarh al-'mûn, 367-369 
3 3
 Cf 'Abd al-Karîm 'Utmân, Qádi l-Qudât, 55-72 He also mentions "Ar-Risâla 
fì 'dm al-kimiya" (Cf Brockelman, GAL S I, 343), but comes to the conclusion that 
this "letter" is not composed by 'Abd al-Jabbâr (Qâdi l-Qudât, 72) 
'
л
 Ibn al-Murtadâ, Tabaqát al-Mu'tazila, ИЗ 
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five refer to speculative theology and the principles of religion ('tlm 
al-kalâm на-usûl ad-din), the others are concerned with Qur'ân-
sciences (five), traditions or hadit (two), religious exhortations (two), 
legislation or fìqh (seven), points of disagreement (two), biography 
(one), others (five)3 5 
It is evident that his interest in theology has widened very consider-
ably, though he was famous too as a scholar in the field of Islamic 
legislation, but, according to his own saying, "there are many people 
who devote themselves to the study of Islamic legislation for worldly 
reasons, but speculative theology finds its one and only goal in God 
Himself"36 
Most of 'Abd al-Jabbâr's works are lost forever or are, undiscovered 
yet, hidden in some library At the moment thirteen of his works are 
known to exist in manuscript, completely or partly, seven of them 
have been published already 37 These seven books are 
1 Mutasâbih al-Qur'ân (or Bayân al-mutasâbih fi l-Qur'an, as 'Abd 
al-Jabbâr himself calls this work), this book has been edited by Dr 
'Adran Muhammad Zarzûr and was published in al-Qâhira in 1969 38 
The title of this book, which may be translated as "the non-clearly-
intelhgible passages from the Qur'ân", refers to a Mu'tazilî genre of 
Qur'ân-interpretation m which the authors react against the literal 
interpretation of every expression in the Qur'ân, and try to discover 
the true sense of these expressions, making use of linguistic arguments 
and placing these non-clearly-intelhgible passages against the back-
ground of the totality of the Islamic revelation As a conclusion of this 
work, 'Abd al-Jabbâr states that he has proved that his opponents 
(al-Mujabbira, the adherents of Ibn Hanbal, and all those who deny 
that human beings perform their own acts) do not have any argument 
in the text of the Qur'ân on which they can base themselves 39 This 
book has been dictated during the time 'Abd al-Jabbâr also dictated 
the Mugni (360-380 AH),40 and before he wrote his Tanzîh al-Qur'ân 
35
 'Abd al-Karim'Ltmân Qâdi l-Qudât 55 72 
36
 Quoted by al-Hâkim, Sarti al 'uyûn, 367 
37
 A hst of manuscripts is found in Sezgin, GAS I 625-626 Fourteen manuscripts 
are mentioned there, including, however, Ar Risala fi l-kimiya, the authenticity of which 
is very doubtful Cf note 33 
38
 This work has been published by Dâr at-turât in two volumes, it numbers 808 
pages 'Abd al-Jabbâr mentions this work in Mugni XX/2,258, and gives it the title 
Bayân al mulaSäbih fi I Qur'ân 
3 9
 MutaSâbih al-Qur'ân, 711 
4 0
 In Mugni XX/2,258 this book is said to have been dictated during the time the 
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'an al-matäin. In his introduction to this last book he briefly explains 
why he wrote the other one : "Many people err because they base 
themselves on (a literal interpretation of) the non-clearly-intelligible 
passages from the Qur'ân; ...therefore we have dictated a book that 
distinguishes between the clearly and the non-clearly-intelligible pas-
sages. We treated in that (book) all the suwar (chapters) of the 
Qur'ân in succession, we explained the meaning of the non-clearly-
intelligible verses, and we also explained how some people mis-
interpreted them, all this in the hope that more profit is gained from 
the reading of the Qur'ân."41 
2. Tanzîh al-Qur'ân 'an al-matäin, printed in al-Qâhira (1329 AH) 
and reprinted in Bayrût (n.d.).42 The title of this work can be translated 
as "demonstration that the Qur'âi^ is above all abusive attacks", but 
the word "tanzîh" is also a theological terminus technicus meaning 
"de-anthropomorphism". The book belongs to the literary genre of 
the "tafsir", the commentary on the Qur'ân. But though 'Abd al-Jabbâr 
in this work covers all the suwar (chapters) of the Qur'ân, he only deals 
with a restricted number of verses. Mostly he answers questions and 
reacts to opponents who make objections against the text of the Qur'ân 
or against his theology on the basis of a text from the Qur'ân ; some-
times 'Abd al-Jabbâr only explains a verse or shows that it constitutes 
an argument for his own theology. In his introduction he states that 
his main goal is to clarify the "meanings" (ma'âni) of the Qur'ân.43 
As we saw above, this work has been written after "Mutasâbih al-
Qur'ân", and, since the Mugni does not mention it among the works 
'Abd al-Jabbâr wrote during the time he dictated the Mugni, he 
probably composed it after the year 380 AH. 
3. Tatbît daläil an-nubûwa, edited by Dr. 'Abd al-Karîm 'Utmân 
and printed in Bayrût (1966 or later).44 In this book, "Establishment 
Mugni was composed, it is also mentioned in Mugni XVII,94 Cf also 'Abd al-Karîm 
'Utmân, Qâdi l-Quclât, 58 
41
 Tanzih al-Qur'ân 'an al-matâ'm, 3-4 (Egyptian edition) 
42
 The Egyptian edition was, without the mention of an editor, printed by Al-Matba'a 
al-Jamâlîya and numbers 392 pages, it was published together with the introduction to 
the tafsir by Abu 1-Qâsim ar-Ragïb al-Isfahânî The Lebanese edition is a reprint of the 
original Egyptian edition, it even reprints its introduction, it numbers 496 pages. 
I quote the Egyptian edition 
*•' Tanzih al-Qur'ân 'an al-matâ'in, 3 
4 4
 This work has been published by Dâr al-'Arabîya in two volumes (718 pages) 
The introduction to this edition has been dated 1386 AH; 1966 AD, Bddawi (Histoire, 
202) gives 1968 as the year of publishing 
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of the indications of (Muhammad's) prophetship", written in the year 
385 AH,45 'Abd al-Jabbâr, basing himself on the text of the Qur'ân 
and the traditions about Muhammad, argues from miracles and 
Muhammad's knowledge of hidden things that he was truly a prophet. 
This work is ranged by 'Abd al-Karîm 'Utmân among the works 
about traditions {hadît). 
4. Fadl al-Ftizâl, edited by Fu'âd Sayyid and printed in Tunis in 
1974. This book, which includes a general introduction to the doctrine 
of the Mu'tazila and 'Abd al-Jabbâr's " Tabaqât al-Mutazila", belongs 
to 'Abd al-Jabbâr's latest works and must have been composed between 
388 and 407 AH.46 
5. Sarh al-usûl al-kamsa, edited by Dr. 'Abd al-Karîm 'Utmân and 
printed in al-Qâhira in 1384 AH/ 1965 AD.47 This work, which was 
dictated by 'Abd al-Jabbâr during the time he also dictated the Mugni, 
has been preserved in two different versions made by two of his 
disciples; the editor used the version of Qawâm ad-Dîn Mânkdîm 
Ahmad bn al-Husayn bn Abî Hâsim al-Husaynî áasdiw.48 One might 
suppose that this work is a commentary ("sarh") on an older book, 
called "Al-Usûl al-kamsa", written by one of the older Mu'tazila; 
it is, however, very significant that al-Hâkim in his enumeration of 
some of 'Abd al-Jabbâr's works—although he has a special category 
of commentaries and although he mentions the title of this work as 
"Sarh al-usûl al-kamsa"—does not mention this book in his "sarh"-
category.49 In this book 'Abd al-Jabbâr does what the title promises : 
he gives a commentary on the five principles of Mu'tazilî theology. 
Like the next two books to be mentioned, this work too is a hand-
book of speculative theology (kalâm). 
4 5
 This date is given in Tatbit dalail an-nubmsa, 168 Cf 'Abd al-Karîm 'Utmân, 
Qâdi l-Qtidât, 60 
46
 Cf 'Abd al-Karîm 'Utmân, Qadi l-Qudât, 63-64 This work is the one he mentions 
in the category "biography" It has been published—together with passages from Abu 
1-Qâsim al-Balkî's Maqâlâl al-Islámivin and from al-Hâkim's Sarh al-'uyûn—under the 
title "Fadl al-itizâl »a-Tabat/âl al-Mu'tazila" 'Abd al-Jabbâr's text is found on 
pp 135-350 The work was published by ad-Dâr at-Tûmsîya li-n-nasr and numbers 
451 pp 
47
 It has been published by Maktabat Wahba and numbers 830 pages 
4 β
 Cf 'Abd al-Karîm 'Utmân in his introduction to the Sarh (Sarh 28-29) The 
other disciple who wrote a version of the Sarh was called Abu Muhammad bn 
Ismâ'il 'AH dl-Farzâdî Cf also Mugni XX 2, 258 
4
' Sarh al-'uvûn, 368, cf Ibn al-Murtadâ, Tabaqât al-Mu'lazila, 113 For a discussion 
of this question cf 'Abd al-Karîm 'Utmân in his introduction to the Sarh (Sarh 
26-28) 
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6. Al-Muhît Ы t-taklîf; this work, which probably was written after 
380, the year in which 'Abd al-Jabbâr completed his Mugni, exists in 
the version of 'Abd al-Jabbâr's disciple Abu Muhammad al-Hasan 
bn Ahmad bn Mattawayh. This version, which bears the title "Al-
Majmu β l-muhît bi-t-taklif\ has been edited under this title by 
Dr. J.J. Houben in Bayrût and by 'Umar as-Sayyid 'Azmì under the 
title "Al-Muhît bi-t-taklîf in al-Qâhira; both editions were published 
in the same year 1965. So far of both editions only the first of the 
four volumes has appeared; this volume contains the treatise on the 
tawhîd and part of the treatise on the 'adi. 
Of the original work of 'Abd al-Jabbâr some fragments seem to 
have been preserved in Hebrew transliteration.50. 
7. Al-Mugniß abwâb at-tawhîd wa-l-adl; 'Abd al-Jabbâr's elaborate 
summa theologica, dictated between 360 and 380 AH, originally con-
sisted of twenty parts, fourteen of which have been discovered, and 
edited by various scholars; they have been published in Egypt from 
1960 onwards. About this important work I speak in detail later on. 
His doctrine 
From texts of the last three works mentioned, 'Abd al-Jabbâr's 
doctrine in matters of theology can be read and reconstructed. By 
doing so we come to the conclusion that he was not an outspoken 
original thinker. He was a true and good Mu'tazilî : he knew the 
history of his school and its ideas and became the great "compiler" 
of the Mu'tazilî ideas as developed in former centuries by his great 
predecessors. But he did more than that : he built a comprehensive, 
coherent, and closed system of theological thinking on the foundations 
laid for him by the older generations of Mu'tazila. He himself con-
siders his greatest merit to be the making of a systematic approach to 
theological questions and the elaboration of the principles of argumen-
50
 The Lebanese edition, published by al-Matba'a al-Kâtûlîkïya, numbers 449 pages; 
the Egyptian edition, published by ad-Dâr al-Misrîya li-l-ta'lîf wa-l-tarjama. gives the 
original text in 422 pages My references will be to the Lebanese edition 
Recently Ben-Shammai in his article A Note on mme Kunnie Copies of Wu'taztltte 
Writings pointed to some fragments in the libraries of London and Leningrad and 
proved them to be transcriptions in Hebrew characters of parts of the Muhit in a 
version different from that made by Ibn Mattawayh According to Bcn-Shammai, 
it may very well be the transliteration of a copy of the original work of 'Abd al-Jabbâr. 
A thorough study of the fragments--ir possible also those in the library in Leningrad 
could be of much help both for the understanding of the Muhit as we have it in the version 
of Ibn Mattawayh, and for the study of 'Abd al-Jabbâr's theology. 
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tation in general,—the lack of these was, according to him, the cause 
of many errors—,51 and he was the more apt to do this since he had 
to respond to the attacks launched by the great opponent of the Mu'tazilî 
theology, al-As'ari, and his school. He is forced to sharpen his argu-
mentations and his terminology and to make his system as coherent 
and as defensible as he could. 
Although in the course of the present study we shall discover and 
elaborate the contents of 'Abd al-Jabbâr's system, it may be useful to 
sketch here very briefly some of its major features. They are chosen 
somewhat at random and are primarily introduced here to give an 
impression of 'Abd al-Jabbâr's place in the history of the philosophical 
and theological traditions of his time. I restrict myself to that part 
of his theology which forms the object of this study, and leave aside 
other subject-matters, such as the contents of the revealed theology, 
exegesis, legislation, and the organization of the Islamic society. 
'Abd al-Jabbâr's theology is a permanent attempt to make a synthesis 
between the data of the human intellect and those of the Islamic 
revelation : he really wants to build an "Islamic theology". 
This becomes clear where he considers human intuition—and here 
also perception finds its place -to be a source of true and reliable 
knowledge, which in fact is guaranteed by God Himself. In this way 
this kind of knowledge is as "divine" and as "theological" as the 
knowledge which is revealed by God to His prophets and transmitted 
by them. Consequently, both kinds of knowledge cannot really be 
contradictory; in the case of an apparent contradiction, the data of 
the revelation have to be interpreted according to the conclusions of 
human reflection on this intuition. 
For 'Abd al-Jabbâr the only way to arrive at real knowledge of God 
is to start from human intuition and to reflect upon this intuition; 
this reflection, consequently, is the first duty of every human being. 
Thus, man can know God without any assistance of revelation; a 
"natural religion" is very well possible. Reflecting in this way, man 
even must come to the conclusion that God is absolutely one and 
51
 He says so at the end of the diclalion of his Mugni M ugni XX/2. 255-257 
One small fragment "Maybe someone will say what this book contains is only a 
compilation of what was (already) known from the (other) books (Answer ) The 
question is not as he assumes, if you study it, there is no doubt that in every chapter 
of it nothing is left out a wide-spread collection and a miscellaneous compilation, the 
explanation of the correct issue, and the warning for sophisms (the arguments of the 
opponents), the study of the conditions of the indication (the basis of every argu-
mentation), and the definition of those things upon which (in Mugnl XX 2, 255, line 
19 read 'alayh instead of 'illaluh) the point and the correct issue are built" 
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indivisible and absolutely just; both principles of Mu'tazilî theology 
can be deduced by human reflection. But this God never becomes 
a purely "philosophical" god : He remains the personal God of the 
Islamic revelation, who sent His message to Muhammad and revealed 
the Qur'ân. 
Man is for 'Abd al-Jabbâr, in contradiction to the Aristotelian 
tradition, an absolute unity ; any distinction between a spirit and a body 
is rejected as is the case with the assumption that there are separate 
faculties, such as intellect and will. The human being is a material unity, 
which as a whole acts, thinks, or wills. But man is also thought of 
and described as the person who has to fulfil the duties imposed 
by God, and who is responsible towards God for all his acts. 
The world is built from substances and accidents as in the Aristotelian 
philosophy ; substances are composed of atoms, their smallest possible 
parts. Though 'Abd al-Jabbâr also seems to know a similar division 
of time into time-atoms, this does not lead to an absolute atomism in 
which at every moment of time all things have to be created anew. 
Things can remain, and in this way the principle of causality in this 
world is safeguarded so that the human being can be truly responsible 
for his own acts. 
Throughout 'Abd al-Jabbâr's theology we see, besides the attempt 
to realize a synthesis between the faith of Islam and the conclusions of 
an independently operating intellect, a permanent emphasis on the 
relation between God and man, an emphasis which certainly has 
to be reckoned among the main characteristics of 'Abd al-Jabbâr's 
theological doctrine. 
At the end of our study we add a final chapter describing some 
more characteristics of 'Abd al-Jabbâr's theology, its method and its 
contents. We suggest that one first reads those "conclusions" before 
studying our second and third chapters. Hopefully, this "summary" 
shows the great outlines of his theology and thus helps understand 
the other chapters. 
4. THE "THEOLOGICAL ENVIRONMENT" OF 'ABD AL-JABBÀR 
His teachers 
In the course of his theological works 'Abd al-Jabbâr often refers 
to "our teachers";52 from the passages in which he is a little more 
52
 I am referring here to the Arabic word saykunâ and its derivatives. The word sayk 
is a more general title of honour, which is used also as an epithet for an eminent teacher 
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specific and gives some names of the scholars referred to, it becomes 
clear that he is using this word not only when referring to his own 
immediate teachers, but also to indicate the totality of the former 
Mu'tazila or one or the other of their great scholars of the past.53 
As to his teachers in the strict sense of the word, the scholars with 
whom he studied in his youth : after his conversion to the Mu'tazilî 
way of theological thinking, he studied first with Abu Ishâq in al-Basra 
and afterwards with Abu 'Abdallah in Bagdad.54 In the Fadl al-I'tizâl 
'Abd al-Jabbâr declares to have studied with Abu Ishâq;55 concerning 
Abu 'Abdallah, we read in the Tabaqât al-Mu'tazila that his books 
were in the possession of 'Abd al-Jabbâr when the latter went to Rayy 
after his appointment as chief-judge by Ibn 'Abbâd.56 
As far as we know, these two scholars were the direct teachers of 
'Abd al-Jabbâr. Although Abu 'Abdallah lived and worked in Bagdad, 
he did not belong to the Bagdâdî school of the Mu'tazila, but, just as 
Abu Ishâq, he must be reckoned to be a member of the Basri school, 
both of them being disciples of Abu Hâsim, in his life-time the head 
of the Basri school.57 
About Abu Ishâq Ibrahim bn 'Ayyâs al-Basrî we know scarcely more 
than his name;58 Abu 'Abdallah al-Husayn bn 'Alî al-Basrî was a 
theologian and a jurist who spent the whole of his life in Bagdad. 
Ibn al-Murtadâ has handed down to us some anecdotal stories about 
his assiduity in working, his long dictations and short lessons (a habit 
contrary to that of his colleagues), his purity, and his piety.59 
and scholar Although it does not totally correspond with the English word "teacher", 
the addition of the possessive pronoun "our" (in English, -ná in Arabic) stresses the 
relation to the author 
In the works of 'Abd al-Jabbâr we find the singular îavkunâ (cf, e g , Mugm 
VII, 27) applied to individual scholars, and the plural forms myûkunâ (Mugni VII, 3) 
and masáytkuná (Sarh 307) mostly used for the whole of the Mu'tazila 
53
 For instance, Abu Hâsim (d 321 AH) in Mugni VII, 27 and elsewhere very often, 
Abu 'AH (d 303 AH) in Mugni VII, 31 and elsewhere very often, but it is also used 
for others, such as Abu 1-Hudayl al-'Allàf (d ±230 AH) in Sarh 307, and for Abu 
1-Qâsim al-Balkî al-Ka'bî (d 319 AH) in Sarh 434 
54
 Cf al-Hâkim, Sarh al-'uyún, 366 and Ibn al-Murtadâ, Tabaqâl al-Mu'la:ila, 112 
5 5
 Fadl al-ΓΐιζάΙ, 328 
5 6
 Ibn al-Murtadâ, Tabaqât al-Mu'ta:iìa, 107 
57
 Ibn al-Murtadâ, Tabaqât al-Mu'tazila, 94 and 105-107 
58
 Even about this name there is some disagreement Fu'âd Sayyid (Fadl al-Ttizál, 
328) reads 'Abbâs instead of 'Ayyâs Abu Ishâq worked in various places, he was 
very pious, ascetic, and learned He wrote some good books, among which one about 
the ¡mama of al-Hasan and al-Husayn and their superiority Cf Fadl al-Ttizál, 328-329 
and Ibn al-Murtadâ, Tabaqât al-Mu'tazila, 107 
59
 Ibn al-Murtadâ, Tabaqât al-Mutazila, 105-107 He followed Abu 'Alî bn Kallâd, 
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With regard to 'Abd al-Jabbâr and his theology, the main task of 
these two teachers, apparently not very important and anyhow not 
great or original thinkers, has been that they constituted the living link 
between 'Abd al-Jabbâr and the two great Mu'tazilî theologians who 
really were his "two teachers" : Abu 'Ali and Abu Hâsim. 
Abu 'Ali Muhammad bn 'Abd al-Wahhâb al-Jubbâ'î60 is generally 
known by his surname al-Jubbâ'î (the man from Jubbâ); 'Abd al-
Jabbâr, however, always calls him by his kunya Abu 'Ali, a custom 
we will follow in this book. 
Abu 'AH was born in 235 AH/ 849 AD in Jubbâ, a town and region 
in Kuzistân east of al-Basra;61 he studied and worked mainly in 
al-Basra; he died in 303 AH/ 915 AD and was buried in Jubbâ.62 Until 
his death he was the head of the Basrî school of the Mu'tazila; in this 
position he was the successor of Abu Ya'qûb Yûsuf as-Sahhâm, who 
also was his main teacher.63 
Abu 'Ali was himself the teacher of Abu 1-Hasan al-As'ari, who was 
to become later one of the principal opponents of the Mu'tazilî theo-
logy and took great pains to refute in his works the theses of his 
former teacher. Many of al-As'ari's works have survived until now 
and have already been published, whereas no original work of Abu 
'All, out of the numerous pages he has written,64 has been handed 
down to us in its totality. So he suffers from the disadvantage that 
modern scholars had access to his theology only and mainly by reading 
a refutation of it. 
The publication of 'Abd al-Jabbâr's works has recently changed this 
situation : his books contain much explicit information on the theology 
of his teacher, and we can be sure that many of the arguments and 
opinions recorded by 'Abd al-Jabbâr as being his own are in fact 
borrowed from the works of Abu 'Alî and Abu Hâsim. These two 
possible approaches to Abu 'All's theology may be the reason of the 
great divergencies in appreciation one finds among modern scholars 
later Abu Hâsim, and was the most serious and assiduous among Abu Hâsim's 
disciples He studied for quite a long time Islamic jurisprudence (Jiqh) with Abu 1-Hasan 
al-Karki He showed definitely ái'í tendencies and wrote a very good book about 
this subject Cf Fadl al-Ftizâl, 325-328 
^
0
 Cf. Fadl аІ-Гіі:аІ, 287 
6 1
 Ihn Khallikan's Bibliographical Dictionary И, 671. 
6 2
 Ibn al-Murtadâ, Tabaqát al-Mu'tazila, 85 
6 3
 СГ, for instance, Ibn al-Murtadâ, Tabaqâl al-Mu'tazila, 71 and 80, Ibn Khallikan's 
Bibliographical Dictionary II, 669 
'"
,
 Ibn al-Murladâ recorded the saying of Abu l-Husayn that the dictations alone 
of Abu 'Ali filled 150 000 sheets of paper ( Tabaqät al-Mu'tazila, 82) 
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concerning his theological work and his position in the history of the 
Mu'tazila and the history of Islamic theology in general Some authors 
see in him the beginning of a theological decadence, they strongly 
emphasize what they call his rationalistic tendencies and his verbal 
subtlety, 6 5 others consider him an original thinker, one of the greatest 
Muslim theologians, who greatly influenced later generations б 6 
Personally, I think it worth while trying to reconstruct Abu 'All's 
theology, making use of the now published works of 'Abd al-Jabbâr 
Abu Hâsim 'Abd as-Salâm bn Muhammad bn 'Abd al-Wahhâb 
al-Jubbâ'î67 was born the son of Abu 'AH in al-Basra in the year 
277 AH/ 890 AD He studied theology with his father in al-Basra, and, 
as so many Mu'tazila, he applied himself also to the study of Arabic 
grammar, here his teacher was the famous Mu'tazili grammarian 
al-Mubarrad After the death of his father in 303 AH' 915 AD he 
became the leading theologian of the Basri school Afterwards, he 
moved to Bagdad, where he died in 321 AH/ 933 AD 6 8 
Much of what has been said about his father applies to him no 
works have survived as far as we know, we have to deduce his ideas 
from quotations by other authors and from refutations by his opponents 
whose books met a better fate then Abu Hâsim's His ideas, still more 
than those of Abu 'AH, are explicitly or implicitly preserved for us in 
the writings of 'Abd al-Jabbâr 
There was a disagreement between him and his father about various 
theological topics, and Abu Hâsim has been attacked because of this, 
'Abd al-Jabbâr, however, takes his defence declaring that a disciple 
must have the right to disagree with his teacher and that, moreover, 
the topics about which he disagreed were not essential but only of minor 
importance 6 9 
His opponents 
'Abd al-Jabbâr is very often arguing in his works against one or 
more opponents, sometimes he calls them by name, but it is remarkable 
6 5
 So, for instance, Laoust, Les schismes dans //s/am, 128 Allard, who made 
a sludy of the theology of al-Aä'ari, runs the risk of seeing Abu 'All entirely through the 
eyes of his former disciple, cf Le problème, 132-133 
6 6
 Gardet, art Al-Djubbá'í, EP, II, 569 and Frank, Kalam, 299 
6 7
 Cf Ibn al Murtaçlâ, Jabaqát al-Mutazila, 94 
6 8
 According to Ibn al-Murtatfâ (Tabaqát al-Mu'tazila, 96), he moved to Bagdad 
in 317 AH for financial reasons, according to Ibn an-Nadim (Fihnst, 174) this happened 
m 314 AH For some anecdotes on Abu HâJim Fadl al ΓΐιζάΙ, 304-308 
" Recorded by Ibn al-Murtaçlâ, Tabaqât al-Mu'tazila, 95 
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how many times he speaks about them in very general and often 
impersonal terms. The reason may be that in some cases these oppo-
nents and the described oppositions are imaginary ones; in other 
cases, however, we are able to discover the scholars referred to. 
His main opponent appears to be Abu l-Hasan al-AS'arî. Al-AS-
'arî had followed the same road as 'Abd al-Jabbâr in the evolution of 
his theological thinking, but he did it the other way round. Whereas 
'Abd al-Jabbâr began as a follower of the As'arî theology and was 
converted to the Mu'tazila, al-AS'ari had been a Mu'tazilî until he 
decided to leave this school and turned to the doctrine of Ibn Hanbal, 
keeping, nevertheless, to the rational methods of the Mu'tazila, and 
thus inaugurating a relatively new form of Islamic theology,70 which 
has been called "Sunnite theology". 
Maybe because of this similarity in the life-history of both men, 
'Abd al-Jabbâr appears to have conceived an outspoken and almost 
personal aversion to al-As'arî although the latter died about the time 
'Abd al-Jabbâr was born. Often he argues against al-As'arî's ideas 
and he refutes his arguments, but he scarcely ever mentions his name; 
and when he does so, he evidently cannot help joining to it a qualifi-
cation expression his disdain.71 
Abu l-Hasan 'Ali bn Ismâ'îl al-As'arî72 was born in al-Basra pro-
bably in the year 260 AH/ 873-874 AD. Here he studied Mu'tazilî theo-
logy with Abu 'Ali, but around the year 300 AH/ 913 AD73 he was 
converted to the ideas of Ibn Hanbal, which he tried to formulate and 
to defend by means of the rational method of argumentation he had 
learned to use during his studies in Mu'tazilî theology. Later he moved 
to Bagdad where he died probably in 324 AH/ 935-936 AD.74 He 
wrote many books; a good number of them were refutations of the 
70
 The originality and newness of dl-As'ari's theology is often overemphasized, 
there already existed a tradition of Sanni theology in the days of al-As'arî, the so-called 
Kullâbîya 
71
 Sarh 183, 235, and 477 In the first chapter of the seventh part of the Mugni 
'Abd al-Jabbâr says "Al-As'arî committed the outrage to say " (Mugni VII, 4), and 
in the rest of this part his name will not be mentioned again 
72
 For all data about his life and his works and for a critical examination of 
information handed down to us by Islamic tradition, see the excellent study of Michel 
Allard Le problème des attribuii divins dans la dounne d'AI-A?ari et de ses premiers 
giands disciples, especially 25-72 
13
 The year 300 AH, traditionally given, may be symbolical For the various 
versions of the story of al-As'arî s conversion, see Watt, Formative Period, 304-306 
and Allard, Le problème, 37-39 
74
 Cf Allard, Le problème, 49 
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Mu'tazilî theology.75 Very generally speaking, we can say that he 
defends the literal interpretation of all Qur'ân-expressions; thus he 
affirms the reality of all God's qualities, of all eschatological images, 
even of the fact that God then will be seen by human eyes. 
Among al-As'ari's fore-runners and 'Abd al-Jabbâr's opponents is 
a most remarkable scholar, called Ibn Kullâb. His name is often 
found—just as the name of his "school", the "Kullâbîya"—when 
'Abd al-Jabbâr is recording the views of his opponents.76 
Ibn Kullâb, the same as al-As'ari, tried to fight the Mu'tazila of his 
time with their own intellectual weapons, the methods of rational 
thinking, meanwhile holding on to the pure doctrine of the tradi-
tionalists. In doing so, he created what might be called a third way 
of expressing the belief of Islam rather than a new school ; probably, 
al-As'arî's so-called "conversion" was in fact his feeling attracted to 
this already existing third way and his transition to it. Anyhow, this 
was how 'Abd al-Jabbâr saw it. In listing the opinions of his opponents 
about various subjects, he mentions al-As'ari's name—if it is mentioned 
at all—just after Ibn Kullâb's without much difference in the opinions 
recorded; and, evidently, al-As'ari and his followers usually are reck-
oned among the Kullâbîya.77 
Recently Josef van Ess published a very thorough study on this 
scholar and his doctrine, a study which saved him from oblivion and 
presented a remarkable synthesis of our information about this early 
Muslim theologian.78 So we cannot do better than make use of this 
work and summarize here some of its conclusions. 
His name is reconstructed with some probability—as : Abu Mu-
hammad 'Abdallah bn Sa'îd bn Muhammad bn Kullâb al-Qattân al-
Basri.79 About the course of his life and his activities—other than 
his theological doctrine—next to nothing is known 80 but we assume 
that he died in 241 AH/ 855 AD.81 This implies that he lived and 
75
 l o r a critical survey of the authenticity and the contents of these books see 
Aliarci, Le problème, 48-74, Watt, Formaiire Period, 306-407, summarizes Allard's main 
conclusions 
76
 The bulk of the discussions about the nature of the Qur'ân seems to be with 
the Kullâbîya, cf M ugni VII, 95-179 
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 Cf van Ess. Ihn Kullâb, 136. 
7 β
 Josef van Ess. Ihn Kulläb und die Mihw. Orient 18-19 (1967), 92-142 
' " Cf van Ess, Ibn Kulläb, 98-99 He also treats the questions of the vocalization 
of his name (Ibn Kullâb or Ibn Kilâb) and its meaning (a patronymic or an 
agnomen, deciding for the first solution) 
e o
 Cf Allard, Le problème, 146, van Ess. Ihn Kullâb, passim 
« ' Cf van Fss, Ihn Kullâb. 99 
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worked during the time of the Mihna, the Mu'tazilî "inquisition", 
which brought the questions concerning the createdness or eternity of 
the Qur'ân to the forefront. Therefore, it is not surprising that the 
information we have about his theology is mostly concerned with the 
nature of the Qur'ân and God's speech and with the more general but 
related question of God's qualities. 
Although he was almost forgotten in later centuries and al-As'arî's 
star seems to have eclipsed Ibn Kullâb's, he was an outstanding scholar 
among whose disciples are counted some great names of his time.82 
In his doctrine concerning the nature of God's qualities and the 
question of the Qur'ân Ibn Kullâb has been influenced by the Sî'î 
theologian Hisâm bn al-Hakam,83 whose name we find among the 
opponents listed by 'Abd al-Jabbâr.84. 
Abu Muhammad Hisâm bn al-Hakam85 lived during the second 
century AH, half a century before Ibn Kullâb and more than two 
centuries before 'Abd al-Jabbâr himself. He was born in Wâsit, south-
east of Bagdad, but mainly lived and worked in al-Kûfa and later 
on in Bagdad. The date of his death is differently given and varies 
between 179 and 199 AH (795 and 815 AD).86. 
Twenty seven titles of his works are enumerated in the Kitâb al-fihrist 
of Ibn an-Nadim, but, unfortunately, all are lost; so, for a reconstruc-
tion of his theological system we have to fall back upon the writings of 
later theologians and heresiographers.87 
Finally, we must mention two groups of opponents given by 'Abd 
al-Jabbâr in the introductory chapter of the seventh part of the Mugnî, 
the part about the Qur'ân : the Haswîya and the Ashâb at-Tabâ'i'.88 
Haswîya89 is a nickname used by 'Abd al-Jabbâr and other Mu'tazila 
to indicate the absolute traditionalists, who keep to the literal inter-
pretation of every hadit even if it is evidently anthropomorphic. The 
use of this term is very clear in the passage from the Sarh al-usûl 
S2
 So, for instance, Hârit al-Muhâsibî and Abu l-'Abbâs al-Qalânisî Cf van Ess, 
Ibn Kullâh, 99-100 and 135 On his "school" see van F.ss, /bn Kullâb, 97 
8 3
 Cf. van Ess, Ibn Kullâb, 112, see also Ibn an-Nadîm, Fihiiu, 175 and Watt, 
The Râ/idiles See also the register in Walt's Formative Penaci under Ra/iclne. 
»* Cf Mugni VII, 3 
8 5
 Thus in Ibn an-Nadîm, Fihnst, 175 
86
 Cf the discussions in Watt, The Ráfidiles, 114, van Ess, Ibn Kullâb, 115; 
Madelung, art Hishâm h. al-Hakam, El2. III. 496-497, Watt. Fórmame Penad, 187 
"^ Cf Ibn an-Nadîm, Fihnst, 175-176 and al-Kayyât. Kitäb аі-тіічаг, m the 
latter work see the indices under Hisâm bn al-Hakam and ar-Râ/ida. 
8 8
 Cf MugniVU, 4 
8 9
 Also vocalized as Hasawîya or Huswîya, cf EI2, III, 269 
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al-kamsa where he mentions "al-Haswîya an-Nawâbit (another nick-
name90) from the followers of Ibn Hanbal".91 
To some of the Haswîya 'Abd al-Jabbâr ascribes the view that the 
Qur'ân is the Creator Himself, to others that it is a part of Him.92 
They even assert that the Qur'ân in recited or written form is uncreated, 
unproduced, and even co-eternal with God.93 
The Ashâb at-Tabâ'i' or Naturalists believe in the causality of 
"natures" and deny the possibility of God's acting in this world.94 There 
is a relationship between them, the so-called Dahriya or Materialists, 
and the philosophers,95 but these terms are not totally identical.96 
According to 'Abd al-Jabbâr, some of them hold the view that the 
Qur'ân cannot be really God's act.97 
So, in these last two groups of opponents we discover the two extreme 
positions in the discussions about the nature of the Qur'ân. And with 
them the scala of opinions 'Abd al-Jabbâr had to cope with varies 
from an identification of God and the Qur'ân (Haswîya) on the one 
hand to the denial of the divine character of the Qur'ân (Ashâb at-
Tabâ'i') on the other. 
His disciples 
In his "Tabagât al-Mutazilά', Ibn al-Murtadâ has handed down 
to us the names and some biographical details of thirty-four of 'Abd 
al-Jabbâr's disciples, who form together the twelfth and last generation 
of the Mu'tazila as far as they are described in this book.98 I mention 
here two of these disciples, not because they have been the most 
important in their own generation, but because their theological 
writings have reached us and may help us understand the theological 
system of their learned teacher. 
The first is Abu Rasîd Sa'îd bn Muhammad 99 an-Nîsâbûrî. He was 
a member of the Bagdâdî school of the Mu'tazila, but afterwards he 
9 0
 Cf Watt, Formative Period. 270 and literature mentioned in the notes 
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became a follower of 'Abd al-Jabbâr; he had a theological circle in 
Nîsâbûr and after the death of his teacher directed his school in Rayy. 
He died in the first half of the fifth century AH.1 0 0 
The Tabaqât al-Mu'tazila gives us the name of only one work of 
his hand, called "Diwan al-usûr\101 But the title of the work which 
has been preserved in manuscript runs : "Al-Masâ'il β l-kilâf bayn 
al-Basriym wa-1-Bagdâdîyîn' From this manuscript some chapters and 
passages have been published and translated by A. Biram and M. 
Horten. This work has not yet been published in its totality, nor has 
it been the object of a thorough study.102 
The other disciple is called Abu Muhammad al-Hasan bn Ahmad 
bn Mattawayh 103 and died in 469 AH/ 1076 AD.1 0 4 He wrote a book 
"Al-Majmu β l-muhit bi-t-taklif in which he made a version of 'Abd 
al-Jabbâr's dictations about the taklif;105 possibly this is the same 
work as the one mentioned by Ibn al-Murtadâ as "Al-Muhît β usui 
ad-dîn". Ibn al-Murtadâ also mentions a second book "At-Tadkira 
ßlatifal-kaläm".10*' 
Finally, I cannot but mention the name of a theologian who certainly 
was not a disciple of 'Abd al-Jabbâr in the strict sense of the word, 
but who was very close to him in his theological thinking, and who 
was probably strongly influenced by 'Abd al-Jabbâr's writings. I mean 
100
 СГ Ibn al-Murtadâ, Tabaqât al-Mu'tazila, 116 Badawi, Histoire, 205, gives as 
the date of his death 1068 AD without mentioning his sources 
'
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 Cf Fadl al-1'tizál, 382-383 Abu Rasîd is said to have composed two versions 
of this work Abu Rida thinks it possible that this is the work found in San'â', and 
edited by him under the title Fi t-tanhíd According to Richard Martin in his 
dissertation at New York University (not yet published), the work edited by Abu 
Rida would be the Ztyâdât sarh al-usûl by the same author, in his dissertation Martin 
edited another manuscript of the same text (communication by Prof J van Ess, 
14-8-1975) 
102
 Arthur Biram, Die atomistische Substanzenlehre aus dem Buch der Streitfragen 
zmsihen Basrensern und Bagdadensern, Berlin 1902, this book gives the Arabic text and 
a German translation of the chapter on atoms Max Horten, Die Philosophie des 
Abu Raschid, Bonn 1910, this work contains a German translation of selected passages 
with explications without the Arabic text Apart from this book Horten wrote a short 
article Die Erkenntnistheorie des abû Raschid (um 1068), Arch» fìir Geschichte der 
Philosophie 24 (1911), 433-448 
103
 Badawi, Histoire, 206, vocalizes "ibn Mattûyah (ou Mattawaih)". 
104
 This year is mentioned by Badawi, Histoire, 206, 'Abd al-Karim 'Utmân, Qâdi 
l-Qudát, 51, proposes 468 AH No sources are given 
105
 Cf Houben, Muhit I, 8, where he gives the incorrect vocalization Ibn Mutawaih 
Maybe al-majmu is an indication of the redactional work of Ibn Mattawayh 
106
 Tabaqât al-Muta:ila, 119 In San'â' a work of him is found with the title At-
Tadkirafi ahkâm al-jawâhir wa-1-a'räd (cf Sezgin, GAS I, 627) 
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Yûsuf al-Basîr, a Jewish (Karaite 107) theologian who wrote in Arabic 
and was a younger contemporary of 'Abd al-Jabbâr.108 In our days 
his book "Kitâb al-muhtawr has been the subject of several studies 
especially by Georges Vajda,109 who frequently called the attention 
to the influence of 'Abd al-Jabbâr on Yûsuf al-Basîr and to the 
relationship between the two theological systems. Thus the study of the 
Kitâb al-muhtawî can make an important contribution towards the 
understanding of 'Abd al-Jabbâr's theological works, just as Vajda 
has already demonstrated in the opposite case.' ' 0 
5. AL-MUGNÌ 
The manuscripts and the edition 
Until a couple of years ago the "summa''' of 'Abd al-Jabbâr, his 
Mugnî, was known only by name, a destiny which had befallen many 
of the Mu'tazili writings apart from the Mugni, for ultimately this 
school had to capitulate in front of As'arî teaching; this tendency indeed 
has caused the gradual disappearance of nearly all Mu'tazili works. 
In 1950 the famous Egyptian writer and scholar, the late Tâhâ 
Husayn, was called to the office of Minister of Education in the royal 
Egyptian government. Among the many plans he inaugurated during 
the two years he held this high office (January 1950 till January 1952) 
was the decision to send a scientific expedition to al-Yaman (Yemen), 
in the hope that this expedition would be able to procure photographs 
of old manuscripts which now might come to the light after having 
been hidden for many centuries in the libraries of that country. 
He knew that there were many manuscripts, since long forgotten, 
which could be of the utmost importance for the history and for the 
renewal of Islamic thinking. The purchases of old manuscripts in 
al-Yaman by the German Ed. Glaser during his stays in 1882-1884 
and 1885-1886 and those by the Italian G. Capretti in 1903-1906 
" ^ Karaism is a Jewish school of theological and scientific thinking, roughly 
contemporary with the Islamic Mu'tazila and comparable with it in its goals and 
methods Consequently, it often has been called the Jewish Mu'tazila 
ioa ç{ Vajda, La démonstration, 285 (also note 3) 
109
 See our bibliography under Vajda and also under Sirat 
110
 In his various articles Vajda always refers to the works of 'Abd al-Jabbâr, and 
the study of his articles shows that these references aid very much in understanding the 
work of Yûsuf al-Basîr 
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had proven the immense wealth of the Yamanî libraries ' ' ' especially 
as regards Mu'tazilî manuscripts This restriction is not unexpected 
since the Zaydîya in al-Yaman had always maintained a strong relation-
ship with the Mu'tazilî school of thinking 
In 1951 the expedition left for al-Yaman This expedition of which 
Fu'âd Sayyid, conservator of the Arabic manuscripts in Dâr al-Kutub 
(the national library) in al-Qâhira, was a member, was headed by 
Kalîl Yahyâ Nâmî, professor at the university of al-Qâhira They 
stayed in al-Yaman for three months and, in spite of many difficulties, 
succeeded in their task of drawing up a first simple inventory of some 
libraries and copying some important manuscripts 1 I 2 
Among the very rich harvest of this expedition was a manuscript of 
'Abd al-Jabbâr's Mugnî, comprising the parts IV to IX (partially), 
XI to XIV, XVI and XX out of the twenty parts which constituted 
the totality of this work This manuscript is generally referred to as 
the manuscript s and was, according to the closing paragraph of the 
twentieth and last part of the work, completed on Friday, the first of 
Rajab 606 AH (1210 AD) 113 Consequently, we have a span of more 
than two hundred years between the composition of the Mugnî by 
'Abd al-Jabbâr and its present copy, whereas nothing is known about 
its multiplication during the interim 
Other manuscripts114 of the Mugnî have been discovered after-
111
 f-or these earlier finds and the history and descriptions of the thus purchased 
manuscripts R Caspar, Le renomeau du Mo'tuzilnme MIDEO 4 (1957), 198 
' '
2
 СГ the official report ol this mission written by the director, Kalîl Yahyâ Nâmî, 
Al-Bata al-misrha li-lasn¡r al-maktûtât al-'Arabt\a fi hilad al-Yaman, al-Qâhira 1952 
For a description of the photographed manuscripts Fu'âd Sayyid Maktùlat al Yaman, 
in Majallat ma had al-maktûtât al-'arabî\a, I (1955), 194-215 
113
 About this first manuscript sec Anawati, G , One œu\re mu'tazilite medite le 
Mugnî du Qâdi 'Abd al-Jabbâr, in Akten des \ierund:\\an:igsten Internationalen Onen-
taliiten-Kongresses, Wiesbaden 1959, 288-292 G С Anawati, R Caspar, Mahmûd 
el-Khodein, Une somme medite de theologie то' tazilite Le Moghm du Qadi ' Abd al-Jabbâr, 
MIDEO 4 (1957), 281-316 The article gives the headings of all chapters found in 
this manuscript 
The colophon here referred to is found in Mugnt XX 2, 262 The article of Anawati, 
Caspar, and el-Khodein mentioned above gives the following supplementary information 
about the manuscript "Seule la section seizième a ete copiée par Ja'far b Ahmad 
al-Jârnî Les onze autres sections sont de la main du copiste Mohammad b Ahmad 
b 'Ali b al-Walîd, mohyi 1-dîn wa-/ayn al-mowahhidîn L'ensemble du livre a ete 
copie pour la Bibliothèque de 'Abdallah b Hamza b Solaymân b Rasûl, al-Mansûr 
billâh, imâm solaymanite alide, mort en 612 de 1 H " (p 284) Cf also Mugnî VI 1, ρ \ 
1 1 4
 According to el-Khodein (see next note) there are at least three different 
manuscripts, one containing parts XV and XVI, the second part XV, the third the 
fragment from part XVII El-Khodeirfs informations were, unfortunately, not complete 
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wards, they comprise parts V, VI, XV, XVI (partially even in two 
versions) and XVII (partially) This text (which is not dated but 
roughly from the same time as the manuscript s) is mostly referred to 
as / 
So, till now the parts I-III, IX (partially), X, XVII (partially), XVIII 
and XIX are still missing 1 I 5 
Tâhâ Husayn, who realized the importance of this work, took care 
of the means necessary for the publication of this big work and gathered 
a group of Egyptian scholars who were willing to take the responsibility 
for its restitution in print, and who distributed among themselves the 
various parts of the work In 1957 the work of publication could take 
a beginning, and in 1960 the first volume, containing part sixteen, was 
printed and published by the Egyptian ministry for culture and 
national guidance The volumes followed each other until 1969 when 
the sixteenth and last volume was completed 116 
The work of publication was very difficult 'Abd al-Jabbâr's personal 
style is not easy and is complicated by the fact that this work was not 
written personally but dictated, the manuscript, which is written in old 
naskî script, is not always clear, has few diacritical points, nearly no 
punctuation and no division of the text other than the division into 
chapters, the subject of the book is specialised too, and one has to be 
versed in Mu'taziH theology to understand all the author's arguments 
Thus, it is understandable but regrettable that the published texts 
are not without mistakes and misinterpretations, while the lack of 
registers is a serious handicap for every scholar who wishes to study 
this important work 
Its outline and contents 
"MugnT"—the root of the word means that it procures all that is 
necessary and makes other things superfluous—, might be rendered 
by the Latin word "summa" the work gives all the information about 
115
 Cf Mahmoud El-Khodein, Deux nouvelles sections du Moghni du Qâdi 'Abd 
at-Jabbár, M/DEO 5 (1958), 417-424 Bul cf also Mugni VI'l , ρ s and ρ I and 
Mugni V, 8 about some parts of this manuscript not mentioned in El-Khodein's 
article In Mugni V the manuscripts ? and < are marked by the editor respectively m 
and к (Mugni V, 8) 
* According to a note of Ben-Shammai (A Noie, 302-303) some passages from 
Mugni IX and X (and from parts which are already known) are found m Leningrad 
1
 " Part VI and XX both have been published in two volumes We quote them 
as respectively VI/1, VI/2, XX/1, and XX/2 
28 INTRODUCTION 
the subject concerned. The contents of this subject are made explicit 
in the title given to the Egyptian edition of the work : "Al-Mugni β 
abwâb aî-tawhîd wa-l-'adl"oT "al-Moghni in Monotheism and Equity"l *7 
as it is rendered in English on the reverse side of the printed books. 
This is the title which we find upon both the larger (s) and the smaller 
(ƒ) manuscript.118 Apart from this name, the work of 'Abd al-Jabbâr 
is known also by another name : "Al-Mugniß usui ad-din", "the summa 
in the principles of religion".119 The most commonly used title for this 
book, mentioned in the Mugnî itself,120 in other writings by 'Abd 
al-Jabbâr,121 and in old written sources,122 is the simple "А1-Ми£пГ. 
The Mugnt has not been written down by 'Abd al-Jabbâr personally ; 
he dictated and the text was taken down by a secretary or a disciple. 
This fact is mentioned by 'Abd al-Jabbâr himself at the end of the 
Mugnî when he speaks about the· twenty years he has worked on this 
book and the many other works he dictated in the meantime;123 it is 
confirmed by the headings on the manuscript124 and by a statement 
of Ibn al-Murtadâ.125 'Abd al-Jabbâr began the dictation of this 
work in the year 360 AH (970-971 AD) in the mosque in Râmhurmuz, 
where he was teaching, and finished it twenty years later in 380 AH 
(990-991 AD) in Rayy, in the presence of as-Sâhib Ibn 'Abbâd, who 
had invited him to Rayy and appointed him qâdî l-qudât.126 
The Mugnî consists of twenty parts (juz'; plural : ajza),121 and the 
manuscript s was composed of sixteen volumes (mujallad; plural : 




 Meaning for a Mu'tazilî the whole of his theology. 
I I β
 For the manuscript ν see the photographcopy of the manuscript on page t of 
MugniVW For the manuscript t see Mahmoud El-Khodeiri, Deux nouvelles sections, 417. 
1 , 9
 This is the name used by 'Abd al-Karîm 'Utmân, cf Qâdt l-qudât, 70; 
introduction to 'Abd al-Jabbâr's Sarh, 23 
120
 Cf Mugni, VII, page : and Mugni XX/2, 262 
121
 Sarh 122-123 
122
 Ibn al-Murtadâ, Tabaqât al-Mu'taziIa, 113 
123
 Mugnt XX'2, 258 
124
 See the photographcopy of the manuscript reproduced on page / of Mugnî VII : 
after the title of the book is marked Imlâ' al-qâdi Abi l-Hasan 'Abd al-Jabbâr bn Ahmad, 
dictation by the qâdî Abu l-Hasan 'Abd al-Jabbâr bn Ahmad 
125
 Tabaqât al-Mu'taztla, 113, the Mugni is mentioned among the works dictated 
by 'Abd al-Jabbâr 
126
 Cf Mugni XX 2, 257 ff Cf also 'Abd al-Karim 'Utman, Qâdî l-Qudâl, 70 and 
245-247 
121
 The end of the twentieth part, which bears the heading "the twentieth part of the 
Mugni", runs "lamm al-kilâh al-\1 ugni", "the Mugni is finished" (Mugni XX 2, 262) 
128
 Cf Anawati, Caspar, El-Khodein, Une somme inédite, 283, where the authors 
INTRODUCTION 29 
generally are headed by "al-kalâm fì . . ."; the parts and sections are 
again subdivided into chapters {fasi; plural \fusui). 
The composition of the Mugnt is—at first sight—unclear, the more 
so because six of its parts (among which the first three) are missing, 
and two other parts (nine and seventeen) are not complete. 
Fortunately, we are informed by 'Abd al-Jabbâr in his Sarh that 
—contrary to the five principles (al-usûl al-kamsa) of the Sarh—the 
Mugni only knows two basic principles which every adult believer has 
to know: tawhid (God's unity) and 'adi (God's justice).129 In the 
Mugni, he continues, prophecy and legislation are mentioned under 
the 'adi (justice), and the same holds true for "the promise and the 
threat", "the intermediate position", and "the command to do what 
is approved and the prohibition to do what is reprehensible". There-
fore the Mugni justly restricts itself to two principles.130 So we might 
presume that the Mugni is composed around these two principles, just 
as the Sarh is around its five, and that we have to look for the matter 
usually found under the three other principles under the heading of 
the 'adi. 
This conclusion is reinforced by a remark at the end of the fifth 
part of the Mugni where we read : "tamm al-kalämß t-tawhîd wa-yatlûh 
al-kalâm β l-'adF', "the treatise on the tawhid is finished, follows the 
treatise on the 'adr.131 
Let us concentrate first on the five parts apparently dealing with the 
tawhid. As we have said already, parts I to III are missing; part IV 
deals in its three sections with three propositions about God that have 
to be denied, and arrives at the conclusion that God cannot need some­
thing, that He cannot be seen or perceived, and that there can be no 
second one like Him (He is unique). Part V refutes the doctrines of the 
opponents who do not accept the unity and unicity of G o d , 1 3 2 and it 
ends with some chapters discussing the names that are given to God 
on the basis of His qualities which have been discussed before.1 3 3 
refer to the text written on the last volume of the manuscript saying that it is the 
sixteenth and last volume (mujaiiad) of the Mugni 
1 2 9
 Sarh 122. 
'
J 0
 Sarh 123 The last three principles form together with the tawhid and 'adi the 
five traditional principles of the Mu'tazila 
1 3
 ' Mugni V. 259 
1 3 2
 Cf Wugni IV, 349-351, Mugni V. 261-263 
1 3 3
 In these chapters, devoted to the names of God (Mugni V, 204-258), the 
references to matters already proved are very frequent, thus it becomes evident that 
the qualities themselves have already been dealt with in a much more elaborate way. 
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This chapter on God's names proves, together with frequent references 
to the "èâo as-sifât" which are found in the later parts of the Mugni, 
that God's qualities have been discussed in the first three parts of the 
Mugnt. If we compare the structure of the treatise on the tawhîd in 
the Muhit and the Sarh, we discover a great resemblance, and we 
suppose that the Mugni knew the same structure. After a general intro-
duction, both works show that this world with all its bodies is temporal, 
that it needs someone who produced it, and that this someone must 
be eternal. In this way 'Abd al-Jabbâr argues that a god must exist. 
Next he deals in both works with God's qualities, His being able, 
knowing, living, hearing, seeing, perceiving, existent, and eternal, and 
with the way in which God is entitled to these qualities.134 Afterwards 
he discusses what has to be denied about God (here he concludes with 
the three propositions discussed in the Mugni), and he ends with a 
refutation of those who do not accept the absolute unicity of God. 
When we try to reconstruct the composition of these first five parts 
of the Mugni, we assume that part I after a general introduction proved 
the existence of an eternal able producer of the bodies and accidents 
in this world; part II may have been the chapter on God's qualities 
(bâb as-sifât), while part III may have dealt with the way in which 
He is entitled to them, and how we can know them; in this part also 
qualities that have to be denied about Him will have been discussed; 
part IV continues the discussions of qualities that have to be denied 
about God; part V contains, besides the refutation of non-monotheist 
opponents, a discussion about the names we give to God because of 
all that has been discussed before. 
Parts I-V dealing with the tawhîd, the remaining fifteen parts (VI-XX) 
must be consecrated to the 'adi. This is confirmed by a statement at 
the end of part V, where 'Abd al-Jabbâr announces that He will speak 
about God's names which are related to His acts at the end of his 
This is confirmed by 'Abd al-Jabbâr's statement in Mugni V, 258 that it is only 
possible to speak about names after treating the reality behind these names, one 
has to deal with the ma'ânî before dealing with the aima. Moreover, part XX of 
the Mugni ends in a similar way with the discussion of some names that can be applied 
to God, this time on the basis of all that 'Abd al-Jabbâr has said before in his 
treatise on God's Justice (Cf Mugni XX'2, 186-237; this was already announced in 
Mugni V, 258). So we can safely assume that the first three parts contained an elaborate 
discussion of God's (essential) qualities 
l i i
 The verb "to be entitled to" is used as a translation of the difficult concept of 
istahaqq (to merit) It indicates the reason why a subject can and must be given 
a certain descriptive qualification I treat this matter in detail when discussing the 
qualities in the course of my second chapter. 
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treatise on God's 'adi; in fact he deals with those names at the end of 
part XX.135 
The general goal of these parts of the Mugni is to show that God 
only does what is good, that without any doubt He does what is 
obligatory, and that He only invites to serve Him in a way which is 
good.136 First, 'Abd al-Jabbâr has to define the technical meaning of 
the terms he uses and to prove his basic principles; he defines the 
"act" (/?'/) and the qualifications which are given to acts, as, for 
instance, "good", "evil", "permitted", "supererogatory", and "oblig-
atory".137 He also proves that God really is able to do what would 
be evil if He were to do it; finally, he must prove his basic principle 
that God actually will not do something evil.138 To all these subjects 
Mugnî VI/1 is devoted. 
Another problem arises : some of God's acts are not recognized as 
such by 'Abd al-Jabbâr's opponents; consequently, before being able 
to draw his conclusions from the fact that they cannot be evil, he 
must prove that they really are God's acts. In this way he proves that 
God's will is His act, and he draws his conclusions from the principle 
that as God's act it cannot be evil (Mugni VI/'2);139 in a similar way 
'Abd al-Jabbâr proves that God's speech is His act, and he draws his 
conclusions from the principle that also this act cannot be evil (Mugni 
VII). Other acts are considered by his opponents to be God's acts, 
whereas in fact they are human : the direct and indirect human acts 
(Mugni VIII-IX); since these acts are not God's acts, they can be evil 
and their evilness cannot be attributed to God.140 
135
 Cf, respectively, MugniW, 258 and Mugni XX/2, 186-237 
136
 In his introduction to the sixth part of the Mugni 'Abd al-Jabbâr summarizes 
what he is going to say in his treatise on God's Justice He does not give many details 
but mentions only some subjects he will have to discuss Cf Mugni VI/1, 3 " la 
yafal ilia 1-hasan, wa-lâ budd mm an yafal al-wâjib, ча-lá yata'abbad bi-mâ yata'abbadbih 
ilia 'ala \\ajh yahsin" 
137
 The Arabic terms used here are Hasan (good), qabih (evil), mubâh (permitted) 
nadb (supererogatory), ио/іЛ mudayyaq (obligatory, not freely chosen), nâjih mukayyar 
(obligatory, freely chosen). These judgements about acts are discussed in our next 
chapter 
138
 God's being able (qädir) will be dealt with in our chapter on God's essential 
qualities, the second section of Mugni VI/1 is devoted to the thesis that God is also 
able to do acts that would be evil if He were to do them {Mugni VI/1, 135-176), 
in the third section (Mugni VI/I, 177-231) 'Abd al-Jabbâr proves that God actually will 
not do something evil 
139
 The question at stake is is God's being willing an essential quality (sifat ad-dât) 
or a factual quality (sifat al-fì't), does it indicate an aspect of God's essence or only 
that He did somcthing1' Cf Mugni VI/2, 3-7 
1 4 0
 In these parts are also treated the famous questions about the kasb and the 
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The tenth part of the Afugni is still missing, but from the fact that 
'Abd al-Jabbâr announces, both in the sixth and in the eighth parts 
of his Mugni, a chapter on the "power" or "ability" (bâb al-istitaa)141 
and the fact that a similar chapter can be found in the Muhit at exactly 
the same place, we conclude that the missing tenth part of the Mugni 
is in fact the chapter on the (human) ability, in which 'Abd al-Jabbâr 
shows that man can choose freely his own acts, that they are not 
necessitated, and that consequently, he is responsible for his acts. That 
these really are the contents of this part might be confirmed by a 
fragment of the Mugni found in the library of Leningrad.142 
In Mugni XI 'Abd al-Jabbâr first discusses in three short sections 
three other kinds of acts in order to decide whether they are God's 
acts and what are the consequences. These acts are death and similar 
things (al-â/аГ), sustenance and means of life (ar-rizq), and prices 
(al-as'âr). 
Having proved that God can do no evil, 'Abd al-Jabbâr comes to 
a second principle saying that all God's acts necessarily must be good; 
the question to be answered now becomes in which way they are good. 
After having discussed creation, 'Abd al-Jabbâr comes to a very im-
portant topic : God's taklif. His imposing duties on mankind. This 
taklifis good since it implies a reward. 
To be good, however, the taklif presupposes the fulfilling of a 
number of conditions; some of them concern the person who is obliged 
by this taklif, some concern the imposed duty, and others concern God 
who imposes it.143 All this is dealt with in Mugni XI. 
tan lid, questions related to the topic of the causality of human acts and man's responsi-
bility for these acts For the contents of these parts VIII and IX, cf also Mugni 
VIII, 335 
141
 Cf Mugni VI;2, 351 and Mugni VIII, 59 Mugni X is still missing and so is the 
end of Mugni IX (the last nine chapters, see Mugni IX, 8-9 where a complete list of the 
chapters of the original text is given, these missing chapters appear to be found in 
a manuscript in the library of Leningrad, cf Ben-Shammai, A Note, 303) At the 
moment we do not know a possible indication at the end of Mugni IX, the beginning of 
Mugni XI does not mention what was discussed before 
142
 Cf Ben-Shammai, A Note, 303, concerning fragment no 13 As for his fragment 
no 9, I do not think that this found its place in this part ten, as for Ben-Shammai's only 
argument being that it terminates with the phrase "lamm al-juz' al-'ástr", I want to remark 
that the subject of this fragment ("the criteria for assessment of belief and unbelief, 
obedience and disobedience, reward and punishment") does not belong in a bâb al-istitâ'a 
but in a discussion on the promise and the threat or eventually a discussion on the 
intermediate position, as one will easily see when comparing the structure of the 
Sarh Both the promise and the threat and the intermediate position have been dealt 
with in the also missing parts XVIII-XIX of the Mugni, as we will see below 
143
 Cf. Mugni XI, 426-432 
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A most important duty imposed by God is the use of the human 
intellect : the duty to reflect in order to acquire in that way true 
knowledge about God. This duty also constitutes the basis for the 
knowledge of the other duties.144 In Mugni XIII 'Abd al-Jabbâr 
discusses the divine assistance (al-lutf) which makes the performance 
of the imposed duties possible,145 and in a second section the pains 
(al-âlâm) and the way in which they can be good, namely by a com-
pensation (at-'iwadf). Thus the three ways in which God's acts can be 
good (as favour, reward, and compensation 146) have been discussed. 
After having proved that God does no evil and that all His acts are 
good, the last aspect of His justice is that He necessarily does what 
is obligatory. Therefore Mugni XIV is consecrated to the "wâfib", the 
obligatory; here 'Abd al-Jabbâr discusses what is obligatory for God. 
Finally, this part also deals with the "takli/ 'aqir (the duties God 
imposes upon us in so far as we can know them independently of 
the data of divine revelation) and its consequences.147 
Having dictated the text of Mugni XIV, 'Abd al-Jabbâr makes the 
following remark "We now begin with the section on prophecies 
because we have mentioned all about the taklif 'aqlî; what we did not 
mention about it belongs to the chapter of the (promise and) the threat 
and to other chapters. We postponed these subjects in order to mention 
them in the appropriate place in this book. Follows—God willing—the 
section on prophecies."148 After having discussed a number of subjects 
which the human intellect can know without the assistance of divine 
revelation, 'Abd al-Jabbâr comes to speak about the "taklif samT 149 
and other subjects that suppose a divine revelation in order that man 
can know and understand them. 
In parts XV and XVI, which clearly belong together,150 prophecy is 
, 4 4
 Cf. Mugni XII, 3 and MugnîXW, 149 
" ^ Cf Mugni XIII. 3, for the meaning of Ihe term tulj see Mugni XIII, 11. 
146
 Cf Mugni XI, 134 for Ihe three aspects of goodness to be found in God's acts : 
favour (tafaddul), reward (¡anâb), and compensation ('mad) 
1
*"' Especially the consequences of neglecting what is obligatory are discussed : blame 
and repentance Hor the distinction between the various consequences of God's 
justice, cf. Mugni VI '1, 3. 
148
 Mugni X\\, 461 
1 4
' This term is mentioned, for instance, in Mugni XIV, 150. 
150
 Part XV is announced at the end of part XIV' (p 461) as the section on pro-
phecies Part XVI at its turn ends with the following statement "The end of the book 
on prophecies, follows- God willing—the section in which we explain the aspects of 
the knowledge of the meaning of God's and his prophet's words" (Mugni XVI, 433) 
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discussed, followed in part XVII by a treatise on the sources of revealed 
knowledge. ' 5 ' 
In parts XVIII and XIX, which are missing, 'Abd al-Jabbâr must 
have treated the promise and the threat, the intermediate position, 
and the command to do what is approved and the prohibition to do 
what is reprehensible; in any case he intended to do so.152 
Finally M ugni XX deals with the imâma (the leadership of the Islamic 
community),153 and it ends with a summary about the names one 
may apply to God because of the acts He did, a section on the prayer 
of supplication, and a nine page long concluding paragraph.154 
If we try to reconstruct schematically the composition of 'Abd al-
Jabbâr's Mugní, we come to the following outline : 
TAWHÎD 
introduction part I 
establishing God as the eternal producer of this 
world part I 
God's qualities part II 
how God is entitled to His qualities part III 
what has to be denied about God parts III-IV 
refutation of the non-monotheist opponents part V 
conclusion : the names of God related to His essence part V 
Moreover, the section about the "kabar" is divided, the first half is found at the end 
of part XV, the second half at the beginning of part XVI, part XVI, therefore, does 
not have the usual heading "al-kalâmfl " 
151
 The only manuscript of this part is not complete beginning and end are 
missing, about the probable length and the contents of the missing chapters of this 
part, cf Amin al-Kûlî in his introduction to the edition of this part (Mugní XVII, 3-4) 
The manuscript is marked "Aï-Sar'ivât mm al-Mugnî' (cf Mugni XVII, 4), but 'Abd 
al-Jabbâr himself says at the end of the Mugni that he did not treat the mr'ivâl in this 
book since it would have made it too long According to him, this was the only subject 
from the many related to God's 'adi that he did not deal with in the Mugni (cf Mugni 
XX/2, 259) We already mentioned the way in which 'Abd al-Jabbâr introduced this 
part at the end of part XVI (see note 150) In Mugni XVII, 92 he says that he deals 
here with the "indications in matters of divine legislation" (al-addla as-sar'iya) 
because he needs these m his chapters on the principles of divine legislation (ufûl 
as-sarai'; the subject of this part), the promise and the threat, names and judgments 
(another name for the principle of the intermediate position), the command to do 
what is approved and the prohibition to do what is reprehensible, and the ¡marna 
Cf also Mugni XV, 8 
152
 Cf Mugni XIV, 461, Mugni XV, 8, Mugni XVII, 92 
153
 Mugni ХХП, 11-15 
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 The concluding paragraph (Mugni XX/2, 254-262) gives some details about the 
actual composition of the Mugni and a summary of the general contents of the laklif 
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'ADL 
introduction : terminology 
God does no evil act 
God's will is His act and cannot be evil 
God's speech is His act and cannot be evil 
direct human acts are human and can be evil 
indirect human acts are human and can be evil 
man's power over and responsibility for his acts 
death, sustenance, and prices 
God's acts must be good 
God's creation must be good 
God's taklif must be good 
reflection and knowledge (as a duty and a 
source) 
God's assistance to fulfil duties 
sufferings and God's compensation to make 
them good 
God does what is obligatory 
contents and consequences of the taklif 'aqli 
REVELATION 
sources of revealed knowledge 
prophecy parts XV-XVI 
others sources and principles part XVII 
the promise and the threat parts XVIII-XIX 
the intermediate position parts XVIII-XIX 
the command and the prohibition part XIX 
the imâma part XX 
conclusion : the names of God related to His acts part XX 
Appendices : prayer of supplication part XX 
conclusions and remarks about the 
Mugni part XX 
6. KALQ AL-QUR'AN, THE SEVENTH PART OF THE MUÓNÌ 
The seventh part of the Mugni,155 with its manuscript of 127 double 
pages one of its smaller parts, will have our special attention, and our 


































 About this part of the Mugnt a study has been published, not long after its 
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The manuscript of this part was entrusted by Dr. Tâhâ Husayn, who 
had the supervision of the enormous task which was indeed the re-
edition of the entire Mugni, to Dr. Ibrâhîm al-Abyârî I56 in al-Qâhira,· 
who actually prepared its edition. In doing so he met with all the 
difficulties we described above when speaking about the edition of the 
whole Mugni : the lack of indications for the beginning and the end 
of sentences and paragraphs, the obscure and complicated style in 
which the work has been composed, the rather difficult manner of 
argumentation used by 'Abd al-Jabbâr, and, possibly in the first place, 
the absence of diacritical points. As a consequence of this lack of 
diacritical points, the interpretation of the text is left to a great extent 
to the reader of the manuscript and in the present case to its editor, 
who has to make a choice since he is forced to fit the text with dia-
critical points, without which the signs for several letters coincide. 
Dr. al-Abyârî himself mentions the problems he met with during the 
preparation of this publication in the introduction to this part of the 
Mugni;151 he mentions problems related to the obscurity of the 
manuscript—the fact that the work had to be done on the basis of one 
sole extant manuscript made the work even more difficult—and 
problems related to the subject-matter of this work. All this accounts 
for the fact that some misinterpretations have crept into the text of 
this edition, mainly as regards its division into sentences and para-
graphs.158 
The text, which had been prepared on the basis of the sole manuscript 
(to be found in the larger manuscript of the Mugni, the one marked s) 
by Dr. Ibrâhîm al-Abyârî, was published by the General Culture 
publication by J. Bouman, it is entitled The Dottrine of'Abd al-Djabbär on the Qur'ân 
as the Created Word of Allah and was published in Verhum. essays on some aspects of 
the religious function of words, dedicated to Dr. H.W Obbink, Utrecht 1964, 67-87. 
1,f
' The title-page of the edition (both the Arabic and the English one) gives the 
name of the editor incorrectly as al-lbyârî, the correct vocalization al-Abyârî is found 
at the end of the introduction. (Oral communication during the month of October 1970; 
during this meeting Dr al-Abyârî laid very much emphasis upon the difficulties he 
had met with while preparing the edition of this part of the Mugni) 
' ^ Cf Mugni VII, the pages marked / and d 
1 , 8
 With all respect for the difficult task Dr al-Abyârî has undertaken and for 
the way in which he prepared the edition of this complicated manuscript, I propose in 
this book some corrections to be made in the text I do not intend to give an exhaustive 
list, but I shall point only to corrections which are in my opinion necessary for a correct 
understanding of the texts to which I give my attention This especially holds true 
of the division of the text into sentences and paragraphs, I shall only suggest some 
correction to be made when the inlerpunction in the printed text suggests an incorrect 
interpretation of 'Abd al-Jabbâr's work 
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Administration of the Ministry of Culture and National Guidance of 
the (then called) United Arab Republic.159 It appeared in 1380 AH/ 
1961 AD in al-Qâhira under the title "Kalq al-Qur'ân" (the createdness 
of the Quran).1 6 0 
The original name of this part of the Mugnt was not "Kalq al-
Qur'ân"; in its manuscript, both in the text and in the table of 
contents,161 one finds the title "Al-Kalâm β l-Qur'ân wa-sair kalâm 
Allah ta'âlâ" (treatise on the Qur'ân and God's other speech). In 
practically the same way this part was announced at the end of part VI 
of the Mugnî according to the text of the manuscript marked /.162 
So, we safely assume that we have found here the original title of 
this part of the Mugnî. This could imply that the createdness of the 
Qur'ân was not such a central topic in this work as the title of the edition 
actually suggests. 
If we consider the place of this seventh part in the composition of 
the entire Mugnî, we come to a similar conclusion. This subject (the 
Qur'ân and God's other speech) is not treated in one of the first five 
parts, which deal with God's tauhid, where we would expect to find 
it if its real subject were the question whether the Qur'ân is 
created or not, since 'Abd al-Jabbâr would argue that an eternal 
Qur'ân would be a threat to the absolute unity and uniqueness of God. 
In fact it is treated in the parts devoted to God's justice (al-'adf), amidst 
the other acts God has performed or still performs for the benefit of 
mankind. We already saw that this part in the composition of the 
Mugnî aims to show that God's speech really is His act, and to draw 
the conclusions from the general principle that His acts cannot be evil. 
Therefore the title "Kalq al-Qur'ân" over-emphasizes one aspect of the 
discussion. 
This is confirmed by the contents of the concluding chapter of this 
part of the Mugnî; this very short (only ten lines in manuscript) chapter 
, 5 g
 Now the Arab Republic of Egypt The English transldtion of the data mentioned 
in the text is taken from the English title page on the reverse side of the book 
" ^ The book contains an introduction by Dr al-Abyâri, dealing mainly with the 
problems he met in preparing its edition and with the question whether the manuscript 
was complete or not Further, it contains photographcopies of six pages of the 
manuscript, the text itseK covers 224 pages and is divided into 23 chapters, just as the 
editions of the other parts of the Mugnt, it has a table of contents but no registers 
161
 Cf diligili VII. 3 and the page marked г 
'^
2
 Part VI of the Mugnî has been preserved in two manuscripts, in the manuscript 
referred to as t the seventh part is announced as "al-kcilàin ft I-Qiir'än na-fi sá'ir 
kalâm Allah suhhânah" whereas in the text of the manuscript ? it is announced as "al-
kalâm l'i l-Qur'ân" Cf Mugnî VI 2, 351 
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mentions as a conclusion—after a chapter on the createdness of the 
Qur'ân—that God created it for the benefit of His servants, and after 
creating at least one of them ; this is a condition that had to be fulfilled 
to make His speech really His good act. 
For someone who reads this part of the Mugni, but without the 
context of the whole work,163 the most remarkable feature will be the 
emphasis laid upon the discussions about the being eternal or being 
created of the Qur'ân and of God's speech in general; for such a 
reader the final chapter of this part must come as a surprise. But also 
through further inquiries into the composition of this part—even 
without paying attention to the composition of the entire Mugni—one 
must come to the conclusion that, in spite of all emphasis placed on the 
question of the being eternal or being temporal and created of the 
Qur'ân, the fact that it is God's act, which cannot be evil and therefore 
is characterized by some judgements about it, virtually is the central 
theme of this book. 
On the basis of this seventh part of the Mugni, chosen for the broad 
range of philosophical and theological topics it covers and for its being 
representative for 'Abd al-Jabbâr's style of thinking and arguing, an 
effort to elucidate the dark corners of his philosophical and theological 
building will not be out of place. 
163
 So did Bouman, when he wrote his article, the publication of the Mugni just 
began, the seventh part being among the first ones to be printed The same holds 
true of Dr al-Abyârî, this may have been the reason why he considered this work 
to be a study on the createdness of the Qur'ân Also, when speaking about the probability 
that the manuscript of this part is not complete, he may have been influenced by this 
view on the subject matter of this book Actually, I do not think his arguments to be 
decisive The fact that we have the end of the manuscript (the last page is not entirely 
filled), that 'Abd al-Jabbâr has dealt with all the subjects mentioned in the introduction, 
and that more parts of the Mugni end without a formal conclusion are arguments against 
dl-Abyârî's point of view Moreover, the beginning of the last chapter does not 
suppose that a lengthy chapter is following 
CHAPTER TWO 
SOME REMARKS ON 'ABD AL-JABBÀR'S "PHILOSOPHY" 
In this chapter I present a bird's-eye view of what, with much 
hesitation and between inverted commas, I have called 'Abd al-Jabbâr's 
"philosophy", the basic outlines of his system in as far as it is inde-
pendent of knowledge gained by divine revelation. To make a clear 
distinction between the "philosophical" and "theological" aspects of 
a A:a/üw-system is not always possible, but, fortunately, 'Abd al-Jabbâr 
makes this distinction himself in dividing knowledge based on human 
intuition ('aqf) alone from knowledge based on revelation, and in 
dividing the taklîf known by intuition from the taklî/ known by 
revelation;* so I feel entitled to follow in his footsteps. 
It will be a bird's-eye view, not a systematic and exhaustive analysis 
but rather an attempt to lay bare some of the basic structures. 
A. LOGIC 
The first subject to be treated here is 'Abd al-Jabbâr's logic, the 
logic forming the cornerstone of the building erected by architects 
of a system of human thinking. As most Wám-writers, 'Abd al-
Jabbâr did not compose a special treatise on logic and the structures 
of argumentation, but in the course of his works much emphasis is 
placed on the discussion of the sources of knowledge, especially those 
of revealed knowledge,1 and although he does not deal with the 
structures of logical argumentation as such, 'Abd al-Jabbâr discusses 
at length the essence of human2 knowledge and reflection. He does so 
* The "intuitive" knowledge is discussed by 'Abd al-Jabbâr in M ugni XII, whereas 
he deals with the sources of revealed knowledge especially in part XVI1 (and also 
in parts XV and XVI) 
For the distinction between taklij 'aqli and taklîf sant'i, see ρ 33 
1
 In the Mugni especially in part XVII, a special genre of theological works is 
devoted to these sources the Usui al-jiqh, 'Abd al-Jabbâr wrote some monographs 
about them Cf 'Abd al-Karîm 'Utmân. Qâdi l-Quâât, 61-62 
2
 'Abd al-Jabbâr's doctrine about God as knowing is rather simple, God is 
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in two different contexts * when he deals with God's qualities and 
speaks about God as knowing,3 and when he speaks about the duties 
God imposed upon mankind (taklif) and discusses human reflection 
and knowledge as the principal duties, which also constitute the basis 
for the knowledge of the other duties 4 
With these data furnished by 'Abd al-Jabbâr I shall try to sketch the 
structures of knowledge, a serious handicap is found in the fact that 
the "bâb as-sifât" (the chapter on God's qualities) of the Mugnî, 
in which he discussed some of these basic structures, had its place in 
the first three, still missing, parts of the Mugnî5 
Successively I describe in this paragraph 'Abd al-Jabbâr's views on 
knowledge and its implications, the way to reach it, the manner in which 
it is expressed, and, finally, its sources 
I apologize for using in this paragraph a number of technical terms 
which in their full technical meaning will be explained only in later 
paragraphs 
1 KNOWLEDGE 6 
In dealing with knowledge, 'Abd al-Jabbâr starts from the direct 
human experience, as he often tries to do, and he compares two of 
these experiences 
It is beyond all doubt, he says, that we sometimes notice that we are 
"mutaqid" and sometimes that we are "nâzir" ,7 these are direct 
essentially knowing and ihercfore He has no 'knowledge' , moreover, the way human 
beings iomctimes have to go to arrive at this knowledge (by way of reflection and 
argumentation) docs not apply to God So all that is said about knowledge іь said about 
human knowledge About God we can only say that He is knowing Cf pp 241-244 
1
 Sarh 156-160 and 182-213, Wuhit, I 113-120 and 170-197, the corresponding 
part of the M ugni is missing 
4
 MugniXU, Sarh 39-75, Muhit I, 1-25, 'Abd al-Jabbâr discusses this subject more 
in detail in the not yet published parts of the Muhit, see his remark in Muhit I, 17 
5
 Cf Wu^m XII, 5 and XII, 23 
6
 Many books and articles have been written about the definition and function of 
knowledge in the kalám, most of them, certainly the more recent ones, deal with 
'Abd al-Jabbâr's views too I want to mention here one book and two articles which 
have very much contributed in recent times to a better knowledge of this subject 
These are Josef van Ess, Die Erkenntnislehre des 'Adudaddin al-îti, Wiesbaden 1966 
(with excellent indices), Georges Vajda, Autour de la connaissance chez Saadia, REJ 
126 (1967), 135-189 and 375-397, Marie Bernand, La Notion de 'Ilm chez les premiers 
Muiazihtes, SI 36 (1972), 23-45 and SI 37 (1973), 27-56 
7
 Mugnî XII, 5 "Know that the reflecting (subject) finds himself reflecting because 
he intuitively realizes the difference between his being reflecting and between the other 
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experiences, which do not need any form of proof or argumentation 8 
Their evidence is as strong as the evidence of a perceived object 9 For 
these direct experiences 'Abd al-Jabbar uses the term "мa/ad nafsah", 
to find oneself It is a kind of necessary knowledge ' 0 
If we analyse these "experiences", we find in both cases (in being 
mu'taqid and in being nâztr) a connection between the subject ' 1 and 
a thing (sav') in its qualities If the subject has this connection with 
one quality of that thing in a stable way, he is "mutaquT, if he 
is asking whether there is a quality, and if so which one, he is 
"nâzir" 12 This description is rather obscure; but the experiences 
described are being convinced {mu'taqid) and reflecting (nâzir), we are 
convinced that something has a certain quality or we are reflecting 
about the qualities a thing may have The first forms the basis of 
human knowing, the second is a way to human knowing 
When analysing the experience of "being convinced", we discover 
that we are not always and not necessarily convinced, therefore wc are 
not essentially convinced being convinced is not an integrating part 
of our human essence 13 Consequently, there must be a "cause" ('dia) 
which causes us to be convinced when we are so This cause, which 
causes us to be "mutaqιd', (convinced), we call "t'tiqâcT (convic-
states (ahuâl) by which he is chdractenzed likewise, he intuitively realizes (ya'qi!) 
the difTcrence between his being reflecting and (his being) willing (murid)" Cf \fugni 
XII. 23 and XII, 29 
8
 Mugn! XII, 29 "Man finds himself reflecting and docs not need an indication 
(¡ialif) to arrive al the knowledge of this 
4
 See Mugni XII, 5 'There is nothing more evident (zâhir) than the (perception of the 
state) in which one of us finds oneself, its knowledge is as strong as ihe knowledge of 
a perceived object" 
10
 For the different kinds of necessary knowledge ρ 54 
1
 ' The term connection" is a translation of the Arabic word ta'alluq. which also 
has the concrete meaning of ' linkage" 'Abd al-Jabbâr sees this "connection" as a 
linking up of the subject and the connected object The same holds true of the term 
i'liqää from the root 'qd, meaning "to lie" So Sarh 190 'The word i'tiqád is mcla-
phoncally used and resembles the tying of a cord" And Mtiçn! XII, 28, recording 
the opinion of the two teachers 'The subject convinced is qualified Ihus because he 
is tied with his heart (qalb, the substrale of ihe intellectual acts) to the object of his 
conviction" 
12
 Hugni XII, 9 "Know that the reflection resembles the conviction as far as they 
both must be connected with something else and that they are both connected with 
things in all their aspects, but the reflection difTcrs from the conviction as far as this one 
is connected with the thing having a (certain) quality, whereas the reflection is not 
connected wilh only one quality, but is connected with (Ihe question) whether it has 
a quality or the opposite quality or does not have the quality" 
, 3
 Cf MugniXU, 5 
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tion) 14 So the definition of'i'tiqâd" (conviction) is "what causes the 
subject to be mutaqid (convinced)" We call this l'ttqâd a ma'ná 15 
What is the relation between this conviction, the subject, and his 
being convinced9 It is not because he made the conviction that the 
subject is called convinced, for in that case one would know the act 
first and then conclude to a certain qualification of the acting subject 
(so for instance, one first perceives a movement and then concludes 
that a subject is moving it) 1 б Therefore, this i'tiqäd must be something 
existing in the subject which by its very existence in him makes him 
to be in a state (hâ[)17 of being "mutaqid'\ convinced (So one finds 
oneself "living" and concludes to the existence of something called 
"life") 
Summarizing the human subject perceives sometimes that he is 
convinced, the cause of this state is a "conviction" which exists in him 
It is clear that the translation of i'tiqäd as "belief and mutaqid as 
"believing" 18 is evidently wrong and the result of a misunderstanding 
of 'Abd al-Jabbâr's texts and those of other mutakallimûn The i'tiqäd 
being a firm and stable connection between the subject and the object 
in one of its qualities (the doubt, "sakk", is expressly excluded by 'Abd 
al-Jabbâr from the genus i'tiqäd,19) we have to choose the English term 
"conviction" or one of its equivalents 2 0 
14
 Ftiqad is the infinitive of the verb of which mutaqid is the active participle 
We have here a pure formal explanation of the "state ' So e g , when something is 
red, there must exist in it a "redness ' that causes it to be red We can deduce the 
existence of this "redness", but it remains indescribable The same holds true of this 
t'uqád 
15
 We deal with this maná— and also with the 'tila—in our paragraph on 'Abd 
al-Jabbâr's cosmology For the moment suffice it to say that it is something which causes 
an object to have a certain qualification 
16
 The primary perception here consists in the human subject "finding himself 
convinced" Qualifications arc given because of an act done, in this case the first 
known is the act Or the qualification is the first known, and from the qualification one 
concludes to the presence of the cause of this qualification 
17
 About this "stale" (hai), see our paragraph on 'Abd al-Jabbâr's cosmology 
pp 145-148 
1B
 So recently by Hourani (Islamic Rationalism, 17) and by Rosenthal (Knowledge 
Triumphant, 63) Both give neither argumentation nor other details about the meaning 
of this term 
" Cf MugniXU, 116, SarhW 
20
 So e g Vajda, La connaissance chez Saadia, 138 "conviction" (en français), so 
also Bernand, La notion de 'Um, SI 36, 24 Frank, Kalâm, 355 gives in English convic-
tion" Van Ess, Erkenntnislehre, 71 chooses ' Überzeugung" and describes it as "jedes 
Urteil ohne Rücksicht, ob wahr oder falsch, welches durch das Wahrheitskriterium 
zum Wissen werden kann" We shall see thai for 'Abd al Jabbâr—contrary to the view 
of some other Mu'lazila (cf Mugni XII, 13-14 about the position of Abu 'Alt and 
Abu Hâaim)—this criterion is not sufficient to make a conviction into a knowledge 
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According to 'Abd al-Jabbâr, the genus i'tiqad can be subdivided 
into various species. Thereby he distinguishes between two differentiae 
specificae. 
First he mentions an objective criterion, the criterion of truth : is 
the subject connected with the object as it really is (according to the 
reality) or not?21 The second criterion seems to be rather subjective 
and much more difficult to verify; 'Abd al-Jabbâr calls it the "tran-
quillity of the soul", "sukûn an-nafs'\22 
So, in consequence of the presence or absence of one or both of 
these differentiae specificae, he distinguishes among the following 
species : 
Jahl : the truth is absent, the "sukûn ап-па/з" too. This word, jahl, 
is generally translated as "ignorance". Ignorance, however, implies a 
lack of knowledge, a "blank" in the mind, whereas the jahl as it is used 
here indicates a conviction that does not correspond with reality, a 
"mis-conviction".23 The Arabic word jahl has the two meanings; to 
make a distinction between them in English, I propose the translation 
"positive ignorance" for the jahl described here by 'Abd al-Jabbâr, and 
the translation "negative ignorance" for the "blanks" in the human 
mind.24 
Taqlid and Tabkit : the criterion of truth is present, the tranquillity 
of the soul {sukûn an-nafs) is not.25 This means that the contents of the 
Van Ess also deals with the relation between the Greek "doxa" and the Arabic l'Iiqâd 
(71-72), see also Pollak, Die Hermeneutik des Aristoteles, 47 
2
 ' Mugnî XII, 25 "Our teachers say that knowledge belongs to the genus conviction, 
when it (conviction) is connected with something according to how it is ('ala ma hun bih) 
and so happens that it supposes the tranquillity of the soul, it is knowledge When it 
(conviction) is connected with something not according to how it is ('ala ma ¡ays bih), 
it is positive ignorance When it is connected with something according to how it is 
('alâ ma hun bih, the edition reads—evidently wrong1—'alâ ma yaqnih, which brings 
Hourani to his translation "in a way that confirms it", evident nonsense, see his ρ 17) 
but does not suppose the tranquillity of the soul, it is neither knowledge nor positive 
ignorance" 
Vajda translates (La connaissance chez Saadia, 143) "lorsqu'elle s'attache à la chose 
telle que celle-ci la fortifie " and he remarks in a note that he did not find a plausible 
correction, although the meaning of this sentence is not clear 
22
 About the meaning of this tranquillity we come to speak later pp 48-49 
2 3
 Translated, as "ignorance" e g , by Hourani, Islamic Rationalism, 17 Cf note 21 
2,4
 For the different meanings of this word, cf Lane II, 477 Van Ess, Erkenntnislehre, 
273 makes the same distinction and suggests the German words "komplexe Unwissen-
heit" for our "positive ignorance" and "einfache Ignoranz" for our "negative 
ignorance" 
2 5
 Cf MugniXU, 25, translated in note 21 
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conviction correspond with reality, but that the soul did not wholly 
come to rest. 
The taqlid is described by 'Abd al-Jabbâr as "the acceptance of the 
words of someone else without demanding from him a proof or an 
evidence".26 The word is used as a technical term for the uncritical 
adherence to the doctrine of a school and all its traditions; in this 
sense we translate it as "traditionalism". 
The word tabkît, which is less used, has a cognate meaning; among 
theologians it is used to indicate a belief at first view without further 
consideration;27 we translate it as "uncritical belief". About every 
time 'Abd al-Jabbâr uses this word tabkît, he does so in combination 
with the word taqlid. 
Taqlid is for him the central term here ; it is against the implications 
of this idea that he fights and thdt he puts into the field his second 
criterion for real knowledge, the tranquillity of the soul. According 
to 'Abd al-Jabbâr traditionalism {taqlid) is not a religious duty, as his 
opponents say; it even is a failing in the fulfilling of these duties: 
God Himself has imposed as a duty on mankind to acquire real 
knowledge,28 and real knowledge cannot be reached by uncritical 
adherence to traditions. 
As a matter of fact, traditionalism includes the possibility of errors; 
'Abd al-Jabbâr explains this by saying that in the field of tradition-
alism there are only two possibilities : either one follows all traditions 
existing, how contradictory they are (and, evidently, this is not 
possible), or one makes a choice and accepts some traditions while 
rejecting others. But, if one makes a choice, one can never be sure to 
have made the good one because no criterion is possible; neither 
the authority of the majority, nor the authority of ascetics, nor the 
authority of another traditionalism can guarantee the correctness of 
the choice.29 Another argument against traditionalism is found in the 
26
 СГ Sarh 61 He adds "so that he uses it like a necklace (qilâda) around his 
neck", playing with the etymology of the word taqlid 
27
 СГ Lane, 158 
2 8
 To this subject is devoted the third and last section of the twelfth part of the 
Mugni Mugni XII, 347-533 
2 4
 Cf Mugni XII, 123-126 The opinion of the majority, is not evidently true, 
arguments are given on pp 123-124, arguments from the Qur'ân and the argument that 
Muhammad's followers were in the beginning a small minority as also the Muslims in 
Christian countries, nevertheless their conviction is true For the ascetics see Sarh, 61. 
Possibly this is also the meaning of Mugni XII, 123, line 7 Claiming the authority of 
traditionalism to justify traditionalism leads to an endless series (Mugni XII, 124) 
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fact that even God Himself does not demand blind adherence to His 
message, but proves it by arguments and by miracles.30 
To show systematically the difference between traditionalism (taqlid) 
and real knowledge {'Urn), and to show that traditionalism is not 
knowledge, 'Abd al-Jabbâr makes the tranquillity of the soul (sukûn 
an-nafs) a second differentia specifica delimiting the species knowledge 
inside the genus conviction. In doing so, he brings the two—tradi-
tionalism and uncritical belief—together and combines them with 
assumption (zann) against knowledge (V/m).31 
Zann : assumption. Assumption is defined by 'Abd al-Jabbâr in the 
same formal way as he defined the conviction : assumption is what 
necessitates that the subject in which it exists is assuming. This state 
of being assuming is something a subject who is compos mentis "finds 
himself' (wajad nafsah) in. The subject "finds himself' assuming and 
concludes to the presence of a maná "assumption".32 
It is not knowledge because—contrary to knowledge—it may be 
not-corresponding with the reality as the examples given by 'Abd al-
Jabbâr in his Mugni clearly indicate.33 But in some cases one has to 
be satisfied with an assumption because it is impossible to arrive at 
real knowledge, for instance in questions concerning the future;34 but 
30
 Cf. Mugni XII, 124-125; Stirh 63. See also van Ess. Erkennmislehre, 45-46. 
31
 Vajda (La connaissance che: Saadia, 140-141) tries lo draw up a hierarchical order 
of the degrees of knowledge or certitude in 'Abd al-Jabbâr's system ("un ordre 
hiérarchique des degrees du savoir ou plutôt de la certitude"). His draft comprises the 
following five terms in their hierarchical order : 'Um, zann, labkii, sakk. taqlid. 
Some remarks have to be made here. First : according to 'Abd al-Jabbâr no degrees 
of knowledge exist, there is no more or less; if the tranquillity of the soul is present, 
knowledge is; if this tranquillity is not present, knowledge also is not. If with 
"certitude" the subjective certitude is meant, it corresponds with the tranquillity of the 
soul, which admits no degrees; if objective certitude is meant (degrees of chance that 
the contents of the conviction are corresponding to reality) I must object that the 
division into different forms of conviction made by 'Abd al-Jabbâr is a qualitative. 
not a quantitative one. 
Second; Tahkh and taqlid constitute a species in the genus conviction; this species 
is characterized by the absence of the tranquillity of the soul. 
Third ; the sakk (doubt) docs not belong in this list. It is not a ma'nâ as the others, 
but an act of the subject who is wavering between two or more possibilities. See note 43. 
-
,2
 Cf. Sarh 395 : "Assumption (zann) is the ma'nâ which, when it exists in one of 
us, necessitates that he is assuming". 
13
 So the two examples in Mugni XII, 43 : the assumption a sleeping person has about 
what he witnesses and sees in his dreams, and the assumption of somebody who sees 
a fata morgana and assumes that it is water. 
31
 Here especially matters of religious legislation are concerned; see e.g. Muhit I. 
12 and M ugni WW, 359-360. This is only justified when the acquiring of real knowledge 
is not possible. 
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always there must be a sign {amara) that leads to this special assump-
tion.35 As kinds of assumption are mentioned by 'Abd al-Jabbâr, for 
instance, "suspicion" (tawahhum) and "melancholic assumption" (zann 
sawdâwi); the latter forms the basis of fear (kawf).36 
Among Mu'tazila there was a disagreement concerning this "assump-
tion" being a kind of "conviction" (i'tiqâd) and belonging to the genus 
conviction, or constituting a genus of its own on the same line as the 
conviction.37 'Abd al-Jabbâr himself hesitates between the two possi-
bilities. Sometimes he states that assumption is a kind of conviction 
and shows some likeness with traditionalism and uncritical belief: 
here also the tranquillity of the soul is not present, while the criterion 
of truth may be present and may be not. Sometimes one even gets the 
impression that traditionalism and uncritical belief are both sub-species 
falling under the species "assumption", which again falls under the 
genus "conviction".38 But in other places 'Abd al-Jabbâr explicitly 
states—on the basis of a not very convincing argument39—that assump-
tion is a genus of its own, although it is necessarily linked with a 
special kind of conviction which he calls "tajwîz"' : "admitting that it 
may be otherwise".40 
'Abd al-Jabbâr's discussions about traditionalism (taqlid), uncritical 
belief (tabkit), and assumption (zann)—if this last is considered to be 
a kind of conviction—point to the clear possibility of their not-being 
corresponding with reality. He also said that he calls every conviction 
not corresponding with reality "positive ignorance" (jahf);*1 conse-
" Cf Mugni XII, 43 and XVII, 357, Muhit I, 12 The word used here amara
 1s 
less used than the word da!!l, indication, dalil is used when man comes to knowledge 
via reflection upon an indication So, the sign (amara) has not the cogent force of proof 
which has the indication (da/if) 
36
 For suspicion Sarh 395, for melancholic assumption Sarh 73 
37
 Cf Sarh 73 and 395 Abu Hâaim seems to have been the only important propagator 
of the thesis that assumption is a special kind of conviction, i'tiqâd maksûs 
3 8
 In Magni XII, 43 he explicitly states " (that kind of) conviction that is 
assumption, traditionalism, and uncritical belief' (al-i'tiqád allodi hun zann на-taqlid 
wa-iabkil) On the same page he mentions twice az-zänn al-mubakkit, the second participle 
apparently constituting a specification of the first "who assumes on the basis of uncritical 
belief' This could indicate that uncritical belief (and traditionalism) are subspecies 
of "assumption" 
39
 Éarh 395 God imposes sometimes "assumption" as a duty, a conviction can 
be not-corresponding with reality Therefore, God cannot impose it In other places, 
'Abd al-Jabbâr admits himself that also assumption can be not-corresponding with 
reality So it does not make any difference 
*
0
 Sarh 73 
41
 Cf Mugni XII, 25 
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quently, we observe in this case an overlapping of both terms. There 
are forms of traditionalism and uncritical belief (and assumption) 
that are also positive ignorance, and others that really are the tertium 
mentioned by 'Abd al-Jabbâr, neither knowledge nor positive igno-
rance; they are corresponding with reality. 
Together with the assumption, also the "doubt" (sakk) is mentioned 
by 'Abd al-Jabbâr.42 The doubt, however, is not a maná causing the 
subject to be in a certain state (hai), and, therefore, does not fall under 
the conviction or its likes.43 
'Ilm (knowledge)44 also belongs to the genus conviction, and inside 
that genus it is characterized by the criterion of truth and by the tran-
quillity of the soul.45 
This description of what knowledge is has been used with some 
variations by many Mu'tazila, among them Abu 'Ali and Abu Hâsim, 
as a definition of knowledge. 'Abd al-Jabbâr himself admits to have 
used it, saying that knowledge is "the conviction by which the soul is 
tranquil (and certain) that the reality is corresponding with the con-
tents of its conviction."46 But later, in the Mugni and the Sarh, he 
gives a definition of his own ·47 "knowledge is the maná that supposes 
42
 See e g Mugnî XII, 12 and XII, 69 
43
 'Abd al-Jabbâr does not follow the majority of scholars who assert that it is a 
maná Sarh 49, Mugni XII, 116, Muhh I, 20 
4 4
 For a summary of what 'Abd al-Jabbâr says about knowledge, especially about 
its existence and définition, see 'Abd al-Karim 'Utmân, Nazarlyat at-laklif, 45-58 See 
also Houram's chapter about knowledge, especially about its place in 'Abd al-Jabbâr's 
ethical system, in Islamic Rationalism, 17-37 Both texts are descriptive rather than 
analytical 
45
 Cf Mugni XII, 25 "Our teachers say (and 'Abd al-Jabbâr quotes them with 
approval) that knowledge belongs to the genus conviction, when it (conviction) is 
connected with something according to how it is and so happens that it supposes 
tranquillity of the soul, it is knowledge" 
"Thus knowledge has both objective and subjective specific differences (a) an intel-
lectual content corresponding to reality in the manner of truth, and (b) an emotional 
state of satisfaction and tranquillity Both characteristics are necessary to constitute 
knowledge" (Hourani, Islamic Rationalism, 17) See also Frank, Fundamental As-
sumptions, 6 
4 6
 So he did in his book called "Al-'Umad" Cf Sarh 46 It is somewhat surprising 
that Rosenthal chooses exactly this definition to explain 'Abd al-Jabbâr's point of view, 
a definition rejected by him later on Cf next note 
47
 The reason is that 'Abd al-Jabbâr does not mention in his definitions genus 
(or species) and differentia specifica, but tries to restrict himself to a pure differentia 
specifica "The goal of defining is to include the object which must be defined and 
to separate it from everything else, in a way that nothing else can be mixed up with it 
and nothing belonging to it can remain outside, therefore, it is man's duty in 
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the tranquillity of the knowing subject's soul at what he has obtained"48 
or, shorter yet, "knowledge is what supposes the tranquillity of the 
soul" which may be amplified as follows : "and the quiet of the breast 
and the calmness of the heart".49 
Hereby we have to bear in mind that knowledge is not directly 
known and defined from experience ; as in the case of every conviction, 
the subject finds himself "knowing" and, in the case of human subjects, 
one has to deduce that he is knowing because of a 'ilia or maná, and 
this we call "knowledge".50 
This concept of the tranquillity of the soul (sukm an-na/s) plays an 
important rôle in 'Abd al-Jabbâr's views on knowledge and in the 
distinction he makes between real knowledge and the conviction based 
upon uncritical belief or traditionalism. The concept of the soul being 
tranquil may at first sight be somewhat strange and its significance 
not very obvious. On the contrary, 'Abd al-Jabbâr remarks, it is self-
evident and every subject reflecting on himself necessarily discovers 
this state.51 
"The distinction one of us finds in himself, when watching himself, 
between his being convinced that Zayd is in the house because he 
sees him, and his being convinced that he is there because an unknown 
somebody informed him; he finds in one of the two situations a more 
and a state he does not find in the other situation; it is this more we 
point to by saying 'tranquillity of the soul' ".5 2 
"One of us finds himself convinced about something, his soul being 
tranquil at what he is convinced about—as for instance the perceived 
objects—, and he distinguishes between his being in that state and 
defining to give the most specific expressions" (Mugni XII, 15-16) Consequently, one 
must not mention the expressions which the defined object has in common with 
others (as here being a conviction), this only can be done as a prologue (Mugni XII, 14 
muqaddtmât) to the real definition or as a description 'Abd al-Jabbâr mentions a 
number of definitions of knowledge which he rejects and refutes in Mugni XII, 17-22 
More definitions, gathered from the Islamic theological, philosophical, and scientific 
tradition, are found in Rosenthal, Knowledge Triumphant, 52-69, 'Abd al-Jabbâr's 
views and his place in the tradition is discussed on pp 211-212 
4 8
 Mugni XII, 13 "al-ma'nä allodi yaqtadi sukûn naß al-'âhm ¡là ma tanâwalah". 
4 9
 Sarh 46 "lalj as-iadr iva luma'ninal al-qalb" 
50
 Cf ρ 41 God is always knowing and therefore essentially knowing So He has no 
"knowledge" He is 'âhm li-dâlih, là bi-'ilm Cf Sarh 201-213 
5
 ' For a discussion of this tranquillity of the soul, see also van Ess, Erkermtmslehre, 
75-77 
52
 Sarh 46-47 
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his being (in the state of) uncritical belief, assumption, or tradi-
tionalism. " " 
'Abd al-Jabbâr refers here to what for him is a clear experience, an 
experience of certitude. The term he uses, however, is very vague and 
ambiguous; the word sukún means "immobility", "rest", especially 
after a movement.54 One might be led by this terminology to assume 
that the process of acquiring knowledge is a kind of movement in 
the human soul, which comes to an end by reaching the final stage of 
this process. 
This, however, is not the case. The process of acquiring knowledge 
is not a movement,55 and the word sukûn is used metaphorically. It is 
not usual to use metaphors in definitions, but the word sukûn in 
connection with the word nqfs is called a terminus technicus; its contents 
being clear, it is permitted to use it in a definition.56 
'Abd al-Jabbâr chooses a vague term and uses it metaphorically. 
In my translation, tranquillity of the soul, I made an attempt to render 
the "technical" meaning of this expression.57 
What 'Abd al-Jabbâr has in mind here is not a purely intellectual 
tranquillity or certitude. He deliberately uses the term nqfs (soul) 
and not qalb (heart), nafs indicating the whole subject, while qalb is 
the substrate of a number of "interior" acts.58 
After all these explanations the question has to be put, a question 
53
 Mugni XII, 23 See also Mugni XII, 20 "when man does not find unrest and 
confusion of his soul concerning the object he is convinced about, as he finds in the case 
of assumption and conviction (we call it tranquillity of the soul)" 
5
* Cf Mugni XII, 22 m a discussion about a definition of knowledge by "move-
ment" 
55
 Cf Mugni ΧΠ, 22, where 'Abd al-Jabbâr makes a distinction between the use of 
"immobility" and of "movement" in this matter, with the term immobility metaphorically 
used one points to something that is known before and deduced from a perceived 
state of the human subject That is not the case with "movement" 
56
 Cf Mugni XII, 20-21, Sarh 47 
' ' Vajda (La connaissance che: Saadia, 139) and Bemand (Le '¡Im chez les premiers 
Mu'la:ilite4, SI 36, 24) translate "tranquillité de l'âme" Van Ess (Erkenntnislehre, 75) 
gives "Seelenruhe" and for the longer formula (sukûn an-nafs ilâ l-ma'lûm) "ruhiger 
Hingabc der Seele an das Wissensobjekt" Frank (Fundamental Assumptions, 6) explains 
it by translating "a secure sense of certainly", so does Rosenthal, less correctly, 
"satisfies" (Knowledge Triumphant, 211) and "one's own satisfaction" (Knowledge 
Triumphant, 49), Hourani (Islamic Rationalism, 18) chooses "repose of the soul" 
58
 Mugni XII, 22 "When the tranquillity of the soul is connected with the soul, 
the totality is meant (al-jumla) because we call that the soul Don't you see that one says 
my soul is tranquil at what I said, and my soul is desiring this matter or abandoning" 
Note. these paraphrases are generally translated in English by "I (myself)" So, one 
might translate "tranquillity of the subject" 
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frequently put already by his opponents, whether this criterion is not 
too subjective to base upon it the distinction between what is real 
knowledge and what is not. 'Abd al-Jabbâr answers in the negative 
and says it is a really truthful human self-experience; this experience 
is disputed, however, by his opponents, and therefore it is not easily 
used as evidence prima facie as 'Abd al-Jabbâr tries to do.59 
A second question which might be asked is about the relationship 
between knowledge and tranquillity of the soul; are they identical, does 
one cause the other or suppose the existence of the other? 'Abd al-
Jabbâr's answer is that there does not exist a direct relationship between 
the two of them; the tranquillity of the soul is not related to the 
knowledge but to the knower, the knowing subject (al-'âlim).60 
Man knows from his own inner experience that, when he knows, he 
necessarily is tranquil in his soul (sâkin an-nafs); from his being knowing 
with the real possibility that he sometimes is not he deduces that he 
has a state (hai) "knowing", which is caused by the ma'ná "knowledge", 
and that this knowledge makes it necessary (yûjib) that he is tranquil 
in his soul too. In the same way he concludes from his being tranquil 
in the soul to the presence of a maná "tranquillity of the soul". Con-
sequently, there is no direct relationship between the two "та'апГ 
(plural of ma'nä), but they characterize the same subject; so 'Abd 
al-Jabbâr says all he can in defining knowledge as : the ma'nâ that 
supposes iyaqtadî) that the knowing subject is characterized by tran-
quillity of the soul.61 
Having dealt with the definition of knowledge, we now come to the 
matter of how to establish its existence in a subject and how it 
originates. 
Concerning the first of these two questions, we remark that knowl-
s
' See e g Mugni XII. 36-37. 
60
 Mugnî XII, 20 · "Therefore, we said in the definition of knowledge : it is what 
supposes iyaqtadî) tranquillity of the soul Thus we made the tranquillity of the soul 
attributable (râji') to the knowing subject and not to the knowledge, to show in this 
way that knowledge is characterized by the fact that it makes necessary (yùjib) this 
judgement (hukm) on the knowing subject". 
61
 Cf. Mugni XII, 13. Hourani apparently does not understand the function of these 
ma'âni, where he says · "In the present case we are not enlightened as to what this 
ground (ma'nâ) is which is present in the knower and gives him repose of mind". But 
there is no more to say about this ma'nâ, apart from the fact that it causes the subject 
to be knowing Houram's supposition "perhaps it is the deliberate and rational process 
which his mind goes through", is diametrically opposed to the essence of a ma'nâ 
Cf. Hourani, Islamic Rationalism, 18. About ma'nâ, see our chapter on 'Abd al-Jabbâr's 
cosmology, pp. 156-158. 
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edge is not directly perceptible by the senses,62 one has to deduce its 
presence from the data furnished by perception 
How is this to be done9 'Abd al-Jabbâr notices in the twelfth part of 
his Mugni that he has dealt with this question in his "chapter about the 
qualities" (bâb as-sifât), which had its place in the first three, missing, 
parts of the Mugni6i Fortunately, the chapters about the qualities 
have been preserved both in the Muhit and in the Sarh 6 4 There are 
mentioned two ways to establish the existence of knowledge and its 
presence in a subject, one based on introspection, the other on external 
perception 
The first argumentation starts from the fact that man finds himself 
knowing and can deduce - as we already explained above—the presence 
of a maná "knowledge" in himself65 
The second is based on outer perception, and only in this way can 
we conclude to the presence of knowledge in someone else "The 
precise act is an indication that the subject for whom it is possible 
differs from the subject for whom it is not possible, and the (first) 
subject is characterized by it in a way which supposes that this quality 
is due to him by a cause ('///«)", as 'Abd al-Jabbâr summarizes it 
himself 6 6 So the possibility of the "precise act" (fi'I muhkarn) shows 
that the acting subject is knowing, and human beings are thus by a 
maná, "knowledge" 
A "precise act" (fi'l muhkarn) is "every act which proceeds from an 
acting subject in a way in which it does not proceed from other 
subjects"67 or "what does not proceed from every acting subject in 
that methodical order" 68 It is an act that requires more than the 
pure ability to act, it requires knowledge in order to produce mostly 
a certain composition or order in this act, which is characteristic of it 
and which is the reason that not every able subject can perform this act 
62
 Abu 'AH held that it is perceptible, and he is refuted by 'Abd al-Jabbâr in Mugni 
XII, 23 
" Cf Mugni XII, 5 and 23 
6 4
 Cf Muhtl I, 97-226 and Sarh 151-298 
6 3
 This argument is summarized by 'Abd al-Jabbâr in Mugni XII, 23 "One of us 
finds himself convinced about something, tranquil in his soul at what he is convinced 
about—e g perceived objects—and he distinguishes between his being in that state and 
his being (in the state of) uncritical belief, assumption, or traditionalism If that is 
so and we know that he is only characterized by it because of a maná, this maná 
must be what our terms knowledge ('dm) and cognition (ma'rifa) mean" 
" Mugni XII, 23 
67
 Sarh 156 
" Muhit I, 113 
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As examples 'Abd al-Jabbâr gives speaking and writing.69 A subject 
who can do these acts in a way which is really precise must be 
characterized by the corresponding knowledge. Evidently, the concréte 
application of this general rule will meet with many difficulties. 'Abd 
al-Jabbâr's main goal, however, is to demonstrate that God is knowing, 
and therefore this argumentation fulfils the conditions. 
Concerning the second question—how knowledge originates in a 
subject—much has been said again by 'Abd al-Jabbâr in his chapter 
on the qualities in the missing parts of the Mugni.10 But his con-
clusions are summarized in the twelfth part : knowledge belongs to 
the genus "conviction" and is characterized by its involving the tran-
quillity of the soul; the reason why it is characterized by it and, con-
sequently, the reason why it is a separate species cannot be found 
in something attributable to the genus,71 nor can it be a quality of it,72 
nor the intention of an acting subject.73 When 'Abd al-Jabbâr thus 
has excluded all other possibilities, he arrives at the conclusion—by 
way of exclusion—that conviction becomes knowledge because of the 
way in which it happens; it is knowledge when it happens in a way 
which supposes tranquillity of the soul.74 
'Abd al-Jabbâr gives five of these "ways" (wujûh) in which conviction 
becomes knowledge :75 
the conviction occurs to someone who reflects (nâzir) upon an 
indication (dalil) in a way which corresponds with this indication (and 
really uses it as an indication);76 
69
 Sarh 157, Muhil I. 113 
7 0
 СГ Mugni XII, 34 
7 1
 If it was something attributable to the genus, whatever belongs to that genus 
must be characterized by it, also uncritical belief, traditionalism, and even positive 
ignorance would be knowledge Therefore, knowledge cannot be knowledge because of 
its genus, its existence, or its coming into existence (Mugni XII, 34), Sarh 190-191 adds 
"a quality of its genus" and "its non-existence" 
7 2
 In the text of the Sarh he also excludes the possibility of the non-existence of 
a quality being the reason of the origination of knowledge, and he argues on the basis 
of inner perception. (Mugni XII, 34, Sarh 190-191) 
7 3
 Man, in fact, is not able to decide a conviction he reaches to be uncritical belief 
or knowledge Sarh 191 
^* Cf also Mugni XII, 13 where 'Abd al-Jabbâr mentions this already in his 
first description of knowledge 
"^ In Mugni XII, 34-35 he mentions six ways and all of them with approval. In 
Sarh 191-192 he first mentions three ways about which his "two teachers" are agreed; 
the fourth and fifth are from Abu 'Abdallah, 'Abd al-Jabbâr's immediate teacher 
We give them in this order Finally, he mentions a sixth one, from Abu Hâsim, 
—concerning the transformation of a conviction which first was not knowledge, into 
knowledge which is accepted in the Mugni but rejected in the Sarh 
~
6
 Thus in Sarh 191 The Mugni summarizes "if it proceeds from reflection" (XII, 34) 
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the conviction occurs to someone who remembers a (former) reflec-
tion and argumentation;77 
the conviction results from an act of Him who knows the object of 
the conviction Himself (especially said about knowledge God directly 
gives to man);78 
the conviction occurs to someone who deduces concrete judgements 
from general rules; 
the conviction occurs to someone who remembers a former knowl-
edge. These are the only five ways in which knowledge originates in a 
subject. 
If we look into the characteristics of these "five ways", and especially 
into the question who in fact is the producer of the knowledge, we 
restrict this distinction to two basic ways : one resulting from the activity 
of the subject who by it becomes knowing, the other coming from 
someone else, in fact from God. It is the difference between "given" 
and "worked" knowledge; the difference between knowledge as a gift 
and knowledge as the fruit of an effort.79 The first of these two ways 
corresponds with the third way given above (the conviction results 
from an act of Him who knows the object of the conviction himself), 
the other four are put together in this second way. This distinction 
between two kinds of knowledge according to the way it is produced, 
corresponds with the classical distinction80 between "necessary" 
(danûrî) and "acquired" (muktasab) knowledge, which has been used 
and elaborated by 'Abd al-Jabbâr too 81 
'Ilm darûrî (or : 'Urn al-idtirâr) : necessary knowledge. One has some-
times translated this term by the English "immediate knowledge";82 
this, however, is not quite correct. As we will see presently, 'Abd al-
Jabbâr distinguishes inside the category of necessary knowledge between 
77
 In Sarh 191 he adds "for instance, the conviction which proceeds from someone 
who wakes up from his sleep". 
78
 Sarh 191 lacks the word "act" (fi'l) (this word is found in Mugn! XII, 34), but 
adds "for instance, the convictions which occur in us from God"s side", because these 
come from Him who really knows all objects; therefore it is knowledge. 
74
 Cf van Ess. Eikenntmslehre, 114 "ob Geschenk oder Frucht der Mühe". 
"" Cf Hourani, Islamic Rationalism, 20, van Ess. Erkenmnislehre, 114. 
81
 For a discussion of these two categories of knowledge in the works of 'Abd 
al-Jabbâr MugniXW, 41-68 and passim, Sarh 48-51 ; 'Abd al-Karîm 'Utmân, Nazariyat 
at-takli/. 59-64, Hourani. Islamic Rationalism, 20-26; van Ess, Erkenntmslehre, passim 
(see index), especially 114-121. 
82
 So e g Hourani, Islamic Rationalism, 20, approved by Frank in his review article 
in BIOR 29, 355 
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direct or immediate and indirect knowledge, so it is preferable to use 
here the word "necessary" knowledge. 
As its definition 'Abd al-Jabbâr gives "the knowledge which occurs 
in us, not from ourselves" or "the knowledge we cannot in any way 
banish from our soul" 8 3 
There are two kinds of necessary knowledge 8 4 direct and indirect 
knowledge,85 the indirect one supposing something else before God 
can give this knowledge This indirect knowledge again has two sub-
categories first, what occurs "by way of something" and second, what 
occurs in a manner that is analogous to such a "way" As for this first 
sub-category, the "way" to go mentioned here is sensory perception 
(idrâk), this perception is not in itself knowledge, nor does it generate 
(callad) knowledge, but it is a way to it 86 If the perceiving subject is 
"compos mentis" Çâqil) and there is no ambiguity in the perceived 
object, God creates knowledge in the perceiving subject 87 Thus per-
ception here is human, knowledge an act of God As for the second 
sub-category, this refers to two "knowledges", one forming the basis 
(asf) of the other {far'), so one must know, for instance, the essence 
of something to be able to know its state (hai),8" and God must give 
the asl before He can give the far' 
The direct knowledge comprises first of all what we call the direct 
inner experience, the knowledge of the state (hai) one is in, this 'Abd 
al-Jabbâr calls "to find oneself' (najad nafsah\ for instance to find 
83
 For these definitions see Sarh 48-49 'Abd al-Jabbâr first combined the two 
definitions given here into one the knowledge which occurs in us not from ourselves, 
and which wc cannot in any way banish from our soul" Then he adds that half of it is 
superfluous because the two halves of this definition are coextensive So, for a correct 
definition one has to restrict oneself to one of the two He also gives some variants 
with only slight modifications 
1,4
 Hourani (Islamic Rationalism, 20-21) gives another subdivision into two sub-
categories perception and rational intuition This subdivision however does not 
correspond with 'Abd al Jabbâr s it makes Hourani e g take together the inner 




 Direct knowledge what occurs "beginning" (mubtaili'), without conditions which 
have to be fulfilled Sarh 50 Indirect knowledge what occurs "generated" (mutawallid, 
Mugni XII 57), or what occurs in us "by way of something ( an tanq) or analogously 
(ma ia/n ma/rá l-iariq)", Sarh 50 
86
 Not a necessary way, God is able to create knowledge ol perceptible objects in 
a human subject without the perception (idrâk) taking place, this is not the case in the 
second sub-category, God cannot create knowledge of a state of something without 
creating knowledge of its essence ( Sarh 50) 
^ Cf Muf>m XII 59 
"" Cf Sarh 50 Sec also note 86 
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oneself convinced, knowing, willing, desiring, etc.89 Further, he dis-
tinguishes in the direct knowledge—and in the indirect knowledge—-
between two sub-categories : first, what is considered (to belong) to 
the completeness of the intuition and second, what is not considered 
to belong to its completeness. This latter sub-category is a kind of 
knowledge some persons have and others have not without this having 
any influence on the completeness of their intuition and their being 
"compos mentis" Çâqif). By way of example he mentions recognizing 
somebody.90 The other sub-category again comprises two kinds of 
knowledge:91 what is based upon experience92 and what is not. The 
latter concerns the knowledge of general rules of argumentation and 
its basic axiomata, the other comprises general rules concerning acts 
and also the basic ethical rules.93 From what has been said above, it 
is clear that these are axiomata every person who is compos mentis 
necessarily knows because God Himself has given them. 
'Ilm muktasab ('i/m iktisâbî) : acquired knowledge. Contrary to neces-
sary knowledge, which in its different aspects is a pure gift from God, 
man has to work to acquire this second kind of knowledge, and he 
does so by means of reflection (nazar) and only by means of reflection. 
"There is nothing in the acquired knowledge the basis of which is not 
attributable to reflection".94 About reflection and related concepts we 
speak in our next paragraph, which deals especially with this way 
to acquire knowledge. 
89
 See pp 40-41 and notes 7-9 Cf Sarh 50 
50
 Sarh 51 
^
1
 'Abd al-Karîm 'Utmân, who does not make the distinction between what is 
considered to belong to the completeness of the intuition and what does not a subdmsion 
of the direct knowledge (as 'Abd al-Jabbâr does in his Sarh 50-51), but of knowledge 
in general (Nazariyat аі-іакЩ, 61, where he identifies what is considered to belong 
to the completeness of the intuition with the direct knowledge), gives also another 
subdivision of this sub-category According lo a still unpublished part of the Muhit 
(II, 258 A, see also Sarh 50, note 3) this sub-category comprises the knowledge of the 
principles of argumentation (usui al-adilla), the knowledge of the rules of argumentation, 
and what is supposed by these two kinds of knowledge, as, e g , experience, usage, 
memory, general principles 
9 2
 The text of Sarh 51 reads khr, in a note also the possibility of khra is mentioned 
The meaning of the word must be here, as is clear from the context, "experience" and 
not "information" (kahar) So, we prefer the reading kihra, if one reads kbr, this has 
to be vocalized kuhr 
9 3
 Hence Hourani (p 22) is right when he says that knowledge of general ethical 
rules is not "innate", prior to experience, but he goes too far when he says (p 21) that 
all knowledge of general truth is preceded by perception Cf Sarh 50-51 
9 4
 Cf Muxni XII, 67-68 
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Ma'rifa: cognition95 is for 'Abd al-Jabbâr a synonym for knowledge 
(Ί/m); by other authors this term is sometimes used to indicate an 
intuitive form of knowledge, especially concerning hidden and divine 
things, even God Himself.96 For 'Abd al-Jabbâr, who holds as a 
principle that we can only speak about the other world (al-gayb) on 
indications furnished by the evident reality of this world (as-sâhid), 
and according to whom God can only be known by reflection and 
acquired knowledge and not by direct and necessary knowledge,97 
this form of human knowledge, which may be expressed by the term 
"cognition" (ma'rifa), has to be emphatically rejected. He does so 
repeatedly, and apparently with much emphasis he affirms that 'ilm 
and ma'rifa, knowledge and cognition, are synonyms.98 
We have dealt with a conviction which has neither the criterion 
of truth nor the tranquillity of the soul (jahl, positive ignorance), with 
a conviction which has both ('ilm, knowledge), and with a conviction 
which has the criterion of truth but not the tranquillity of the soul 
[taqlid, tabk!t,— and maybe zann—when they are in harmony with the 
reality : traditionalism, uncritical belief and assumption). 
Theoretically, there remains a fourth kind of conviction, which has 
the tranquillity of the soul but not the criterion of truth. This possibility, 
however, is only theoretical because the tranquillity of the soul is suffi-
cient to delimit the knowledge as we have seen. Consequently, "what 
Abu 'Utmân asserts—that the soul of a subject in ignorance is tran-
quil—is only a supposition of the subject himself; in reality he is 
not tranquil in his soul."99 
95
 For various suggestions for a correct translation of the two terms 'i!m and 
ma'rifa. sec Rosenthal, Knowledge Triumphant, 4 
96
 Cf Peters, Aristotle and the Arabs, 151 · "But there is another type of intuitive 
knowledge which knows the intelligibilia that are separated from matter This type 
of intuition, generally knowa as ma'nfah (gnosis), opens into the problem of prophecy 
and sufism". 
97
 See Sarh 52-60. 
9 8
 See Mugnl XII, 16: "This ma'nâ which supposes the tranquillity of the soul 
is called cognition as it is called knowledge; there is no difference between the meaning 
(Jäida) of these two (words): therefore, every knowing subject is called having cognition 
('an/)" See also Sarh 46 and Mugni XII, 16, where also other terms for knowledge are 
dealt with and considered synonyms of 'ilm. 
99
 Cf. MugniXll, 37. The Abu 'Utmân mentioned by 'Abd al-Jabbâr must be al-Jâhiz. 
Among the Mu'tazila bearing this name he is the one whose ideas of knowledge 
correspond with the objection formulated here. See also van Ess, Erkenntnislehre, 77. 
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2 T H L W A Y TO A C Q U I R E KNOWLLDCfc 
The way to acquire knowledge—other than necessary knowledge 100— 
goes via the nazar and only via the nazar, there is no acquired knowl-
edge which is not ultimately based upon nazar l0i 
Na?ar : reflection It is neither perceptible by the senses 102 nor directly 
known by necessary knowledge, what we know by direct necessary 
knowledge is that we are "názir" when we are thus, we perceive this 
by way of direct self-experience "Being nâzir" belongs with "being 
convinced" to the states the subject "finds himself' (wajad nafsah) in, 
the similarity between the two states being that in both cases the 
subject has a connection with a thing with regard to its qualities, 
a difference is found in the fact that he, being convinced, has this 
connection with regard to one quality in a stable way (he is convinced 
that the thing has this quality), whereas, being nâzir, he is looking 
whether this quality is present or not or maybe its opposite 103 
50 we necessarily know that we are nâzir, when we are thus, and 
we know also that we are not always and not essentially nâzir, conse-
quently, we must be so because of a cause, a ma'nâ, and this ma'nâ 
we call "nazar".10* What is described here by 'Abd al-Jabbâr is 
rational, discursive thinking in its most general form, I have chosen 
the English word "reflection" as an appropriate equivalent 105 
'Abd al-Jabbâr himself had the choice out of many equivalents and 
synonyms of the word nazar,106 and his preference for this word, one 
100
 Necessary knowledge also knows its "ways", especially sensory perception, see 
ρ 54 Knowledge based upon perception, however, is not "acquired" knowledge 
generated by this perception, but a gift from God 
1 0 1
 Cf Mugni XII, 67-68 "As for acquired knowledge we ha\e demonstrated 
that one of us (a human being) can only make it, for instance, as a result of ('an) nazar 
or memory of nazar, or when he knew (before) ihe object of his conviction, or because he 
knows that what is characterized by a certain quality must have another one too There 
is nothing in acquired knowledge the basis of which is not attributable to nazar" 
1 0 2
 So said Abu 'Ali, this is denied by 'Abd al-Jabbâr Mugni XII, 5 
103
 See pp 40-41 and Mugni XII, 9 
104
 MugniXU, 5 
1 0 5
 The French equivalent of this word is given bv Vajda (La connaissance chez 
SaaJia, 145) "reflection discursive", Bernand (Le '¡Im chez les premiers Mu'lazihles, 
51 36, 24) renders examen rationnel", Hourani (Islamic Rationalism, 14) gives 
"inquiry", and Frank (fundamentalAssumptions, 8) gives it as "enquire", Peters renders 
"speculation" (Aristotle and the Arabs, 151), and is supported by van Ess (Erkenntnis-
lehre, 238) "Spekulation und Diskursives Denken" 
106
 Cf Èarh 45 "Reflection (an-nazar bi-l-qalb) has (many) names, among them 
thought (taflcir) investigation (baht), contemplation (ta'ammul), consideration (tadabbur), 
inspection (ru'ya)" 
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of the most ambiguous he could choose— the word originally means 
"to look" 107—is apparently based upon the tradition of his school and 
ultimately on the vocabulary of the Qur'ân.108 
When he has to give a definition of reflection, he renders it by 
"thought" i/ikr) because both these terms are coextensive : nobody is 
reflecting but he is also thinking, and nobody is thinking but he is 
reflecting too.109 Now he has to explain the term "thought", which 
he describes as follows:110 "contemplation (ta'ammul) of the state 
(hai) of a thing and comparison between it (the thing in question) and 
other (things) or comparison (between its state and) other (states) which 
come into existence."1 ' ' 
From this definition, it becomes already clear that 'Abd al-Jabbâr's 
reflection will be built upon a two-tcrms-argumentation rather than 
on the three-terms-argumentation which we know as the syllogism. 
According to the objects of the reflection 'Abd al-Jabbâr makes a 
distinction between a reflection about the things of this world (umûr 
ad-dunyâ) and one about the things of "religion" (umûr ad-din). This 
distinction does not coincide with our western distinction between 
philosophy and theology : for 'Abd al-Jabbâr the first form of reflection 
is concerned mainly with the matters of daily life, it is a rather practical 
reflection ; the second form is the one he himself practises in his works, 
ί0Ί
 СГ Sarh 44-45 and MugniXW, 4 'Abd al-Jabbâr mentions five meanings of the 
word nazar the original meaning, "to look", turther, "to await", "to be kind and 
merciful", "to be face to face", "to reflect" (nazar bi-l-qalb, literally • to look by means of 
the heart). 
I0
" Cf. van Ess, Erkenntnislehre, 238-239 "Die Tradition der Mu'tazila hat in 
diesem Bereich starker als sonstwo weitergelebt . Nazar ist ihr ein Licblingswort 
gewesen Ihre Anhänger nannten sich stolz ahi an-nazar Der Begriff nazar stammt 
aus dem Koran Verse, in denen nazara als das Schauen auf die Wunder der 
Schöpfung verstanden ist, sind Legion aus der Ordnung des Kosmos erschaut man Grosse 
und Almacht Gottes, in weiter ausgreifender Dialektik auch seine Ein/igkeit" 
109
 'Abd al-Jabbâr adds "and in this way realities (haqäiq) are known" (Mugni 
XII, 4) He does not use here the word "definition" (Ααι/</) but the word "reality" (haqiqa) 
As far as I have been able to ascertain, I did not find a direct definition of nazar 
1 1 0
 In his Sarh (p 45) he defines "thought" just as he defines other ma'áni it is 
the ma'ná which makes it necessary (yûjib) that man is thinking 
111
 The Arabic text is not very clear, it reads "ta'ammul hai os-íai' на-t-tamtU 
haynah no bavn gaynh aw tamtil hátlita mm gaynliâ" Vajda (La connanvame diez 
Saadia, 146) proposes the following translation "considérer l'état d'une chose, la 
comparer à une autre, ou (examiner) un phénomène en prenant pour terme de 
comparaison un autre phénomène" The last four words of 'Abd al-Jabbâr's description 
are the reason of all difficulties Here only one term of the comparison is given, without 
the preposition "between" (bayn), and the suffix used here is in the feminine and 
not in the masculine form In my translation this suffix corresponds with the word 
hai already used, which may be feminine and masculine. 
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and it is centred upon the essential questions of human life, which 
are essentially related to God, and as such belong to the "matters of 
religion".112 
He then makes a subdivision inside this latter form of reflection; 
one may reflect to refute the theses and arguments of the opponents, 
—and this only is the task of some scholars who fulfil this task in the 
name of the whole Islamic community— or one may reflect to acquire 
knowledge about God (and also about the other matters of religion), 
and this is the task of every adult Muslim.1 ' 3 
According to the definition 'Abd al-Jabbâr gives of "thought" (//Ar), 
his argumentation is a two-term-argumentation He confirms this point 
of view when explaining the way a reflecting subject has to follow to 
arrive at real knowledge; the reflection goes from the indication to 
the thing indicated by it, from the "dalìF' to the "WÖÉ/ZM/".114 This 
implies that there are in our world "indications" intentionally'15 
placed there (mainly by God Himself) to indicate something else, the 
thing indicated (madlûf); if the reflecting subject follows these indica-
tions in the way meant by the one who placed them, he will arrive at 
the knowledge of the thing indicated (madlûf). 
Not every reflection (nazar), however, will lead to real knowledge 
In order that the reflecting subject arrives in fact at the knowledge of 
the madlül, the reflection has to be "correct" (sahîh). The criterion for 
its correctness is found in its leading to tranquillity of the soul, the 




 See Sarh 45 "It (the reflection, nazar) is divided into two kinds first, reflection 
about matters of this world (umûr ad-dunxà), such as reflection about forms of medical 
treatment and forms of commerce, second, reflection about matters of religion (umûr 
ad-din)" Cf also MugniXU, 4 
113
 See Sarh 45 " first, the reflection about sophisms (subah, the false arguments 
of the opponents) in order to refute them, second, the reflection about indications 
(adula) in order to arrive by them at knowledge" 
I I
 * See Sarh 87 "The principle is that the way (lariq) to knowledge of something 
else when this is not necessarily known, is only the "indication ' (dolala) - which 
is identical with "indication" (dalil)—; the meaning of both is what, if the reflecting subject 
reflects upon it, makes him arrive at the knowledge of something else, if he who has 
placed this (indication) has placed it in this way" 
Cf also MugniXU, 10 
115
 'Abd al-Jabbâr firmly stresses the necessity of this intentionality, see e g 
Sarh 88 
116
 Cf Mugni XH, 11; XII, 69-70 "Know that our teacher Abu Hâ§im makes it a 
sign ('alâma) for the correctness (sihha) of the reflection, that it generates knowledge 
He says the tranquillity of the reflecting subject's soul at the correctness of what he 
is convinced about, and the difference between him and the subject who is in positive 
ignorance, in doubt, or assuming, supposes the correctness of his reflection" Mugni 
XII, 69 
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although 'Abd al-Jabbâr does not admit this. He mentions, however, 
also some objective conditions which certainly have to be fulfilled 
if the reflection be correct. 
First, the reflecting subject must be compos mentis Çâqil);111 
second, there must be a connection with an indication (daltf);118 
third, the reflecting subject must know this indication ('âlim bih),119 
fourth, the reflecting subject does not know the "thing indicated" 
(madlûi) before, nor must he be in positive ignorance (jahl) based on 
sophisms about it, but there must be some form of uncertainty;120 
fifth, the reflecting subject has to follow the way indicated by the 
indication, just as it has been meant by the one who placed it as an 
indication 121 
If all conditions are fulfilled, if the reflection really is correct (sahîh), 
and there is no hindrance (man'), reflection necessarily generates 
(yuwalhd) knowledge Thus the relation between reflection and knowl-
edge is expressed by the term "generating" (tawlid), it is the relation 
between a cause and its effect, when the cause directly falls under the 
"We ('Abd al-Jabbâr) have shown already that the tranquillity of the soul supposes 
that conviction is knowledge, and that, consequently, there can be no doubt or wavering, 
and that his stale differs from the state of the subject who is assuming or doubting 
If this quality is really present (sahh) in the conviction which comes into existence at 
(as a consequence of) the reflection upon the indication, it (the reflection) must be 
correct" Mugni XII, 69-70 The interpunction of the printed text is misleading here 
Vajda (La connaissance chez Saadia, 145-154) deals in detail with the problems arising 
from the criterion of correctness of the reflection which 'Abd al-Jabbâç uses in this 
text Vajda's translation of the first text quoted above—"La tranquillité d'âme de celui 
qui soumet au contrôle de l'examen rationnel l'authenticité de ce qu'il admet en sa 
creance " (ρ 147)—is, however, not correct 
1 1 7
 Cf Mugni \\\, 11, Sarh 87-88 
1 1 B
 Cf Mugni X\\, 100 "mulaalhq Ьі-сІаІіГ 
' " C f Mugni XII, 101 for the pure possibility of the reflection, it suffices that the 
subject is convinced about the indication (dalil), but if the reflection must generate 
knowledge and thus be correct, the sflbjecl must know the indication 
1 2 0
 Cf Mugni XII 102 if one knows the "thing indicated" (madlul), one can reflect 
upon an indication, in order to know whether it is an indication or not, but a reflection 
in order to acquire knowledge is in this way not possible 
See Mugni XII 11-12 "Reflection is only possible if the subject admits that the 
indicated object may ha\e a (certain) quality or may not, this admission must be joined 
with it This may occur with doubt, this may occur with assumption, this may occur 
with conviction as uncrilical belief But it (reflection) is not possible with knowledge, 
not with positive ignorance which happens as a result of sophisms, for the knowing 
subject has in common with the sub|ect in positive ignorance—by this knowledge and 
this positive ignorance that they both do not admit something other than what they 
are convinced about" (Mugni XII, 12) 
1 2 1
 Cf Mugni XII, 11 
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ability (qudra) or power of an acting subject, and the efîect necessarily 
follows without intervention of that subject or anybody or anything 
else, on condition that there is nothing that hinders the occurring of 
the effect.122 
"An indication for this is that at the reflection upon an indication 
the conviction about the indicated object results always in the same way 
('alâ tarîqa wâhida), if there is no hindrance (man); this conviction 
results at (simultaneous with) it (the reflection), in accordance with it 
(the reflection); no other conviction will result than that about the 
indicated object... (at a reflection upon the coming into existence of 
the bodies no conviction about the prophetship of Muhammad can 
result)... If it (the conviction) necessarily exists at (simultaneous with) 
it (the reflection), always in the same way, and 1 2 3 in accordance 
(bi-hasabih) with it, in the way we explained, its 124 state as generated 
from it (mutawallid 'anh) is like that of other generated (objects)."125 
If not all the above mentioned conditions are fulfilled, the reflection 
does not generate something else; it does not generate anything at 
all.126 
The reflection upon matters of religion, consisting not in the reflec-
tion upon the sophisms of the opponents to refute them but upon 
the indications God Himself has placed in creation, in order to acquire 
in this way knowledge about God (and other matters of religion) is 
the first duty of every adult Muslim.127 "If somebody asks : 'What is 
the first duty God imposed upon you?', you have to answer : 'The 
reflection leading to the knowledge of God', for God cannot be 
known by necessary knowledge, nor by sight; consequently. He must 
be known by thought and reflection." So 'Abd al-Jabbâr began his 
Explanation of the Five Principles (Sarh al-usûl al-kamsa), stressing 
the importance of this duty, refiection.128 
122
 About the law lui от generating in general, see the "Wft at-tawlid" Mugni part 
IX (and also part VIII, passim) About the tanlid in the relation between reflection 
and knowledge Mugni IX, 161-163 
'
2 3
 Read wa-bi-hasabih where the edition gives /a-bi-hasabih 
1 2 4




 MugntXii. 77 See also Mugni IX. 161 
1 2 6
 'Abd al-Jabbâr discusses this problem of reflection generating, e g , assumption, 
doubt, positive ignorance, when not all the conditions to make it correct (sahih) are 
fulfilled, in detail in Mugni XII, 104-118 
127
 See Sarh 45 Cf Wuhit I, 17 The third and last section of part XII of the 
Xfugni (p '547-533) is devoted to this subject 
, 2 e
 Sarh 39 
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Fikr (tafkïr, tafakkur 129) can be translated as "thought" and is, as 
we have seen, according to 'Abd al-Jabbâr a synonym of the word 
nazar (reflection).130 
Tadakkur131 or remembrance may play its part in the process of 
acquiring knowledge132 and might also be confused with reflection; 
the difference between reflection and remembrance, however, is that 
by reflection one seeks knowledge about an object having a certain 
quality or not or its opposite, and that by remembrance one seeks the 
knowledge of something one once knew.133 
Hadit an-nafs: talk of the soul.134 Another human act which might be 
confused with reflection and thought135 is the "talk of the soul" 
(hadh an-nafs). 'Abd al-Jabbâr nowhere explains the rather obscure 
meaning of this term, probably because he never directly uses it in his 
own argumentation; the term plays its part in the refutation of his 
opponents' views. 
It is "hidden speech" (kalâm kqß),136 which might be heard by 
angels and demons;137 it really is speech, not thinking about speech, 
129
 The three words (fikr, tafkir, and tafakkur), respectively the infinitives of the 
first, second, and fifth form of the verb, are used by 'Abd al-Jabbâr without distinction 
in their meaning Thus he uses also the participles of the second and fifth forms mufakkir 
and muta/akkir. See Mugni XII, 4 and Sarh 45. 
'-
,0
 See p. 58 
131
 Also the word dtkr occurs and the participle of the first form däkir. although 
this form of the verb also has the meaning "to mention". See Mugni XII, 7 
132
 Cf Mugni XII, 34-35 : Sarh 191-192 
133
 Mugni X\\. 7 
134
 Among modern authors, van Ess most clearly described what we know about 
this rather obscure concept. Erkenntnulehre. 240-241. 
135
 Mugni VU. 16. XII. 7. 
'
3 6
 Mugni VII, 16 In this context we have to mention a rather obscure remark in 
Mugni VII, 16, where 'Abd al-Jabbâr says· "All this remains the speech we know 
(consequently not a different kind of speech, a maná in the soul), although it is hidden 
by the thought about it (bi-t-lafkir /ih)" If we study the manuscript, we come to the 
conclusion that we have to read на-1-la/akkur (eventually tafkir) fih. This sentence, 
in consequence, has to be translated as follows "Maybe the thought about the letters 
of speech is confused with the talk of the soul by the subject, but all this (thought about 
the letters of speech, talk of the soul, and maybe also the kâtir mentioned earlier) remains 
the speech we know, although it is hidden, and the thought about it" Consequently, 
also in this sentence the basic distinction between thought and talk of the soul 
remains intact. This explanation is confirmed by Mugni VII. 19, where it is stated that 
all such things are either speech or thought 
'
, 7
 Mugni VII, 16· "In our opinion it is not impossible, it (the talk of the soul) 
being as it is. that demons and angels hear it as they hear each other's speech, although 
we (read nasma'h and not tasma'h) do not hear it because of its being hidden" He also 
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and therefore it is no longer possible for a human subject when his 
breath is taken away;138 it occurs in two ways: either it (this term) 
points t o 1 3 9 the arrangement of letters man forms in his soul—so that 
he is qualified by it—or he makes in the breath,140 which penetrates in 
the direction of his breast, what is analogous to the articulation of the 
letters (speaking while inhaling?141}—so that he is qualified by it.142 
Anyhow, one cannot say that being reflecting is attributable to this 
"talk of the soul".143 
Concluding, we say that this "talk of the soul" must be an act which 
has the form of the spoken letters and speech, and is similar to speech 
to such a degree that it even needs the breath, but which is not audible 
to human ears. 
Kâtir (plural : kawâtir) : warning. A third and last phenomenon that 
might be confused with reflection is the so-called kafir.14* The 
definition of its exact meaning is as difficult to give as that of the 
talk of the soul. But contrary to 'Abd al-Jabbâr's almost complete 
silence about this talk of the soul, he discusses at length the impli-
cations of the kâtir.145 
states that, if one would try to show it {izhárah), it becomes normal audible speech 
(MugniVU. 16) 
138
 Mugni П, 16, especially by this remark the talk of the soul is placed on the side 
of speech and its similarity to speech stressed Thus it is no longer possible to see 
it as an inner act which prepares the uttering of the letters 
" ' T h e text (Mugni XII, 7) reads \usarik, no logical meaning being possible for this 
word in this context, I propose to read yusâr 
'
4 0
 The word used here has the same form as the word for "soul" η ft Although naft 
(soul) is frequently used in this context, I think we have to vocalize in this case nafas 
(breath), a word used also in Mugni VII, 16 in a similar context A vocalization as 
nafs does not give any sense 
1 4 1
 This appears the only acceptable explanation of the expression 'Abd al-Jabbâr 
uses here an-nafas aliad! yanfud // nähiyat as-часіг 
, 4 2
 Cf \fitgniXM 7-8 
1 4 3
 Cf Л/ысш"ХІІ.8 we know this "talk of the soul" not in the way we know a ma'nâ, 
but in the way we know acts 'Abd al-Jabbâr continues "There is no difference between 
somebody who says 'his being reflecting is attributable to talk of the soul' and somebody 
who says his being willing is attributable to motives (danai) and free choice of the 
act" This manner of argumentation is very frequent in the Mugni and can be rendered 
as "the first sentence is as stupid as the second' It goes too far to look for an analogy 
between the two sentences (so van Ess, ЕгкепптічІсНге, 240). one cannot deduce from 
it that for 'Abd al-Jabbâr this talk of the soul is related to the subject's being 
reflecting, just as the motives and the free choice of the act are related to the subject's 
being willing 
144
 Mugni VII, 16, XII, 142 
145
 Mugni XII, 386-443 
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It is mostly mentioned together with the "ciaf, the motive or 
summoning.146 It is hidden speech just as the talk of the soul,147 but 
this speech is not the act of the human subject in whose soul it 
exists but the act of God Himself;148 it is hidden speech that God 
produces in the soul of man. There are three kinds of hidden speech 
in his soul : the talk of the soul (made by himself), the kafir (made 
by God), and the "whispering" (waswâs, the temptation made by the 
demon).149 
In a non-technical meaning, fçâtir is everything that occurs or arises 
in the soul,150 but here it is used in a technical sense which is 
restricted to the field of religion.151 Its function, as described by 'Abd 
al-Jabbâr, and the fact that a man in whose soul God produced this 
kafir is called "muktar", which word might be translated as 
"warned",152 justify a rendering of this term by "warning", the 
warning God produces in the human soul. This warning warns the 
human subject against blame and punishment (coming from God) 
which await him if he does what is evil and fails to do what is his 
duty.153 In this way, the warning secures man's knowledge that 
reflection is his duty. For 'Abd al-Jabbâr, having described reflection 
as man's first duty, has to show how man can know this duty. This 
happens by way of the warning; in this way God reveals the obligation 
(wujûb) of reflection since failing to do it might cause blame and 
punishment. So man becomes afraid and begins to reflect.154 I believe 
146
 See, с g , Mugnl XU, 386, where this combination occurs in the title of the chapter 
"Reflection is only obligatory and the subject who is compos mentis only knows 
that it is obligatory if there is a warning and a summoning or something analogous" 
1 4 7
 Cf. Mugni VII, 16, XII, 401-413 
1 1 8
 M ugni XII, 406 
1 4 9
 Cf Mugni XU, 412 
1 5 0
 Cf Mugni XII, 410 First, in its most general meaning, the root kir in its first 
form indicates anything which arises in the human mind, any thought, any conviction, 
etc , more specifically, it is used for "what a man is convinced about at a certain 
"sign" (amara) so that he becomes afraid in matters of this world"; but this is 
not yet the most specific meaning in which 'Abd al-Jabbâr uses it as a terminus technicus 
151
 Cf Mugni XII, 410, although it may be used metaphorically even in this field 
('alâjihal al-majâi) 
152
 It is the passive participle of the fourth form of the verb Cf. Mugni XII, 403 
153
 iWi^niXII, 387 
154
 Mugni XII, 386-387 · "If this is correct and the obligation of the reflection upon 
the knowledge of God follows upon the fear to fail to do this, and this fear is, without 
any doubt, a fear of harm which is related to religion, as e g punishment, blame, and 
similar things—and in the intuition of the subject who is compos mentis this is not 
the result of a habit so that the subject has it by his background and experience and 
practice, just as he (read yumâni) practices handicaft and human behaviour, in this 
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that we justly compare this kâtir with what we know as God's voice 
in our heart, our conscience. 
Methods of reflection 
Just as there is no acquired knowledge which has not in some way 
been generated by reflection (лагяг),1 5 5 there is no reflection which 
can generate this knowledge without being connected with an "indica­
tion" or "ώιΙΐΓ.156 
Dalil and dalâla—both words are often used as synonyms by 'Abd 
al-Jabbâr and are expressly declared to be synonyms 157—mean "indi-
cation". In their non-technical meaning these words are used for some-
body or something guiding into the right direction ; for concrete persons 
("guides") and concrete things (e.g. road-signs) the word dalîl is 
preferred; the other word, dalâla, is mainly used for less concrete 
indications and for the act of indicating, and also for the quality "to be 
indicating" which is found in the indication.158 
As a technical term, it is used for an indication intentionally placed 
in this world, which has a connection with something else it indicates; 
so the indication in itself, without intervention of any reflecting sub-
ject indicates (dall) something, which "something"—be it a body, an 
accident, or a conclusion—is then called madlûl, "indicated". So, to 
be a dalil in this technical meaning of the word, the indication must 
fulfil two conditions; first, it must be placed intentionally; otherwise 
it may guide into the right direction, but it is not called dalil.159 
way he knows the intentions, and knowledge about handicraft results hereby in his 
soul -without any doubt a sign (pointing) to it must come in order that he is afraid at 
it (the sign) so that the reflection becomes his duty This sign is the admonition by the 
summoning and the warning" 
155
 Cf Mugm XII, 67-68 
156
 Cf Mugni XII, 10, XII, 100; Sarh 87 
157
 In Sarh 87 'Abd al-Jabbâr makes the two words synonyms Van Ess 
(Erkenntmslchre, 358) makes a distinction between dalil "Zeichen" and dalâla "demon-
strative Kraft", cf also his Logical Struiture, 26. A similar distinction is found, e g , in 
Muhîl I, 49 There he uses the combination dalálat al-adilla, which might be rendered 
as "the being indicating of the indications" in accordance with van Ess's suggestion, 
but three lines later he uses the combination dalâlal ad-dalâla in the same way. So 
we conclude that for 'Abd al-Jabbâr there exists no clear distinction between the two 
terms, although for the "demonstrative Kraft", the "being indicating", he only uses 
the word dalâla. 
'
5 S
 Cf Lane, 900-901 
159
 Cf Sarh 87-88 "Therefore, one does not say about the trace a robber left 
behind that it is an indication (dalâla) (pointing) to him, although it is possible to infer 
(istadaW) from it the place where he stays" 
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Second, there must be a connection between the indication and the 
thing indicated;160 without such a connection there would be no 
reason why an indication indicates the thing indicated and not some-
thing else. This connection is, in fact, the cause of its "being indi-
cating".161 According to 'Abd al-Jabbâr,162 there are four kinds of 
connection between indications and things indicated; one occurs in 
matters of divine revelation, the other three in matters of human 
intuition.163 
In matters of human intuition 'Abd al-Jabbâr distinguishes three 
kinds of relationship between the indication (dalîf) and the thing 
indicated (madlül); in these relations the "initiative" lies with the 
thing indicated : the thing indicated is said to be, in one way or the 
other the cause of the indication. So, man with his human intellect 
can follow this way back and go from the "result" to the "cause". 
Consequently, in this relation the cause is the thing indicated and the 
effect is the indication.164 The first kind of relationship is called 
"'alâ wajh al-wujûb", "in the way of necessity" : the thing indicated 
necessitates the indication by its very presence; the 'ilia (cause) by its 
very presence necessitates a certain qualification or state (hat), the 
presence of "knowledge" in a subject necessitates him to be knowing.165 
The second kind of relationship is described as "'ala wajh as-sihha", 
"in the way of possibility" : the thing indicated brings about that the 
160
 In Sarh 87 'Abd al-Jabbâr remarks that there arc two conditions mentioned 
in his definition of dalil or dolala This definition runs as follows "what, if the 
reflecting subject reflects about it, makes him arrive at the knowledge of something 
else, when he who has placed this (indication) has placed it in this way" There appears 
to be only one condition, but according to the example given in the text the second 
condition must be "the possibility to arrive by it at the thing indicated (madlül)" the 
falling of snow in its time is not an indication of the prophctship of Muhammad because 
it is not possible to arrive through it at the prophctship of Muhammad I think that the 
cause of this possibility is described by 'Abd al-Jabbâr in Muhit I, 49 where he 
mentions as a condition that there must be a "connection" (ta'alluq) between the 
indication and the thing indicated Only if this connection is present, the "arriving" 
(lawassut) at the thing indicated (madlût) is possible So we assume that the conditions 
mentioned respectively in the Sarh and the Muhit are in fact one and the same thing 
161
 Cf Muhit I, 49 
162
 Muhit, I, 49 This text has also been discussed by van Ess (Erkenntnislehre, 359) 
163
 Respectively in the sar'îvât (literally matters of divine legislation, in opposition 
lo 'aqliyát it is used for matters which we only know because they have been revealed by 
God) and the 'aqliyát (what the human subject can know without intervention of divine 
revelation) 
164
 The words "cause" and "effect" are used here in their non-technical meaning 
165
 Muhit 1,49 
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indication is possible; man's being 'able" (qâdir) makes it possible 
that he acts.166 
The third kind of relationship is "'alâ tarîqat ad-dawai wa-l-iktiyâr", 
"in the way of motives and free choice" : because a subject is in a certain 
state (e.g., knowing, ignorant, needing, etc.), he makes a certain 
choice; the motives and the state of the choosing subject bring about 
that he performs an act which may be used as an indication.167 
In these three forms of relationship we can by means of our human 
intellect follow the way back : from the state (hai) or qualification {was/) 
we deduce the cause ('ilia) of that state; from the real possibility of an 
act we deduce that a condition is fulfilled; from certain acts we 
deduce the motives the acting subject had, or the state he was in. 
In the case of matters of divine revelation, and especially of divine 
legislation, the relationship is somewhat different because here enters 
the argument on the basis of someone's authority. Because God is 
wise, He can only command, prohibit, impose in the Qur'ân, by the 
Sunna от the Ijmâ' (the general consensus of the believers) '68—this is 
the dalil—what in fact is, respectively, good, bad, and obligatory— 
this is the madlûl—. So, when we know that God revealed something, 
we know the reality behind this because we know that He is wise.169 
So every indication, to be an indication, must have one of these four 
relationships with something indicated. 
There are four kinds of indications; one is concerned with 'aqlîyât : the 
authority of the human intuition (hujjat al-'aqf); the other three are 
concerned with matters of divine revelation : the Qur'ân, the Sunna 
166
 MuMt I, 49-50· "without his being able, the act would not be possible (sahh)" 
Van Ess (Erkennlntslehre, 359) does not hit the exact meaning of this "sihha" and the verb 
"sahh", he renders "besässe man nicht Handlungsfreiheit (qudra), wurde das Tun (/VI) 
nicht in rechter Weise zustandekommen" I discuss the meaning of these words later on 
in my paragraph about 'Abd al-Jabbâr's anthropology For the moment it suffices to 
quote the translation of the term sihha given by Frank "objective possibility" (Maná, 
252) or "the original ontologica! possibility" (Some Fundamental Assumptions, 10) 
161
 Muhit I, 50 "without the subject who performs an evil act being ignorant or 
needing, he would not choose it" Cf pp 269-270 
168
 Qur'ân, Sunna (the "way" of Muhammad), and Ijmâ' are for 'Abd al-Jabbâr 
the three indications in the field of revealed knowledge, according to Sarh 88 
169
 Muhit I, 49 . "He (God) who made them (the indications in the field of 
divine legislation and revelation in general both the word sar'i and the word som'i 
are used in this paragraph) is wise (hakim), consequently. He only imposes what is 
obligatory, He only commands what is good. He only prohibits what is bad" Muhit I, 50 
"without the prayer being obligatory, God's imposing of it would not be good". 
Therefore he calls this also the "way of the good", tariqat al-hasan 
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(the "way" of the prophet Muhammad), and the Ijmâ' (the general 
consensus of Muslims).170 
If a human subject follows one of these indications in the way it 
has to be followed, he arrives at the "thing indicated" {madlûl) on the 
condition that the indication is really known. This activity of the 
human intellect is called "reflection" (nazar); also the verb "istadair, 
tenth form of the root to which also belong the words "daliF' and 
"dolala", is used for this act, meaning : to establish an indication and 
acquire in this way knowledge, or to infer.171 
For these structures found in our world where one "thing"—what-
ever it may be—indicates something else, and for the process of fol-
lowing these indications in the right direction, the direction into which 
they point, 'Abd al-Jabbâr has a number of technical terms which 
may indicate a difference in the relationship between indication and 
thing indicated (dalil and madlûf)—we have already seen that 'Abd 
al-Jabbâr distinguishes four basic forms of relationship172—or em-
phasize a certain aspect in the human reflection (nazar) which generates 
the knowledge of the thing indicated. I mention here briefly the most 
important among these terms. 
rtall: to mention as the cause.173 This word is from the same root as 
the two words 'ilia (cause) and ma'lûl (effect). In fact, in this case the 
relationship between the two "things" concerned is the relationship 
between the 'ilia and its ma'lûl; although we translate these Arabic 
words by "cause and effect", not every cause and every effect are 
called by this name. It is a special causal relationship 'which we will 
treat in our paragraph on 'Abd al-Jabbâr's cosmology ; for the moment, 
it may suffice to quote Frank :1 7 4 "the 'ilia is most often an intrinsic 
cause; it is interior to the thing and automatically produces its effect." 
It is the relationship we have already met in the conviction which 
causes a subject to be convinced, in the knowledge which causes 
the subject to be knowing, and in the reflection which causes the 
subject to be reflecting. When 'Abd al-Jabbâr uses this term i'tall, 
170
 See for this division : Sarh 88. 
' ^ For "¡stadair see, e.g., Мн^ш ІІ, 15; cf. Lane, 901. 
ιΊ2
 The four kinds of "connection" (taallucf) mentioned on pp. 66-67. 
1 7 3
 This verb is constructed as follows: "i'tall Ji ... hi" or "i'tall fi ... min hayt" : 
to mention as the cause of something (or: that...). In the English translation 
one has to say "the cause" and not "a cause", because the relationship concerned 
is always the immediate one-cause one-effect relationship. 
1 7 4
 Frank, Ma'nä, 251. 
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he means : to deduce from the effect {ma lût) which is known, the 
existence of the cause ('ilia), and to use in this way the effect (ma'lûl) 
as an indication (dalif) to the cause (ΊΙΙα). So, for instance, from the 
(perceptible) way in which speech occurs in our world one concludes 
that the cause of this way of occurring (and not occurring) is that 
speech "needs" (muhtâj) something, such as movement or a special 
structure;175 from the concrete, perceptible reality one deduces the 
existence of non-directly-knowable "things" which constitute the cause 
of the reality's being so. 
Atbat : to establish. This term points, not to a certain relationship 
between the two "things" concerned, but to the result of the reflection 
upon the indication. When this reflection results in the knowledge of 
the existence of something, 'Abd al-Jabbâr calls it "atbat", to prove 
the existence of something, to establish.176 What is "established" is 
the existence of the accidents (a'rad), modes of being (akwân), or acts 
(afâf).177 He establishes these in general in order to prove the existence 
of God as the One who produces some of them. In this case the absolute 
form atbat is used.178 Or he establishes an accident or substance as 
having a relation to a certain subject so that this subject is qualified 
(mawsûf) by it. To indicate this he uses several formulae : "atbatah 
mawsûf' (he established him being so and so) or "atbat lah si/a" (he 
established for him a quality; he established that he had a quality).179 
114
 Sec, e g , Mugnl VII, ì\. 32, 33, 41 The relationship is very clear in Mugni 
VII, 32 "He (Abu ΆΙΐ) mentioned as the reason (kan ui'ialf) ol the need of speech 
for (a special) structure that it exists in the same wa> in what is characterized by strutture 
and cannot exist in what has no structure, although the ability for it exists in both 
substrates, consequently, this indicates (\culiili) its need for it (the need of speech for 
structure)" In this sentence the relationship between the terms dall and i'lall is very 
obvious 
1 7 6
 Rosenthal (Knowledge Triumphant, 223) renders this word as "asseveration", 
van Ess is more specific when he renders "die Existenz bestätigen" (Ihn Kullâb und 
die VI ihna. 111) The term is related to the term "nafy" (to deny the existence of something), 
which is used as its opposite, cf Sarh 153 \ìugm VII, 14 "When it is certain that 
there is no way to establish it, by no kind of know-ledge, it is necessary to deny it" 
See also Mugni VU. 62 
' " See Sarh 92-93 and 96, Mugni VII, 82 
'^* See Smh 92-94 Sarh 92 "If you want to infer (xaitadd!) from the accidents 
(a'rdd) (the existence of) God. you first have lo establish (tutbil) them, then to know-
their coming into existence (hudûl). then to know that they need a producer (muhdit) 
and maker (fad) different from us (human beings) and that is God" 
'"* About the general principles of this iihât (establishing), especially the fact that 
it needs the knowledge of the object the existence of which one tries to establish, 
'Abd al-Jabbâr wrote in Mugni VU. 14 For the establishing that a subject has a quality, 
see, tor instance, Mugni VII, 58, 62, 82 
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Bayyan : to explain. The use of this word, which is very frequent in 
the works of 'Abd al-Jabbâr, is still determined by the basic meaning 
of the root "byn", to which it belongs as the second form of the verb. 
This basic meaning can be described as : to be separated from other 
things and to become in this way clearly visible.180 More obviously 
than in the second form this basic meaning appears in the fourth 
form of the verb, "abân", which is used together with the preposition 
"min" (from) in the sense of "to set apart from, to distinguish 
from".181 
This meaning is also apparent in the use of the verbal noun "bayân", 
which can be rendered by "explanation", but has, when used in 
combination with the preposition "min" (from), a sense comparable 
with that of "abân"; therefore, it is used in combination with the 
words "hadcf (definition) and "haqîqa" (reality), which indicate the 
distinction between the thing defined and everything else.182 
Also the second form, bayyan, has this connotation : to explain 
something by distinguishing it from other things. It is used both for 
the relationship between the indication and the thing indicated (the 
indication "explains" the thing indicated) and for the act of the 
human subject who follows the indication and, in doing so, "explains" 
the thing indicated. So it appears to be often used as a synonym for 
"to indicate" (da//);183 a difference may be found in the fact that, when 
more arguments for something are given, 'Abd al-Jabbâr uses "to 
indicate" (dall) for the first argument and "to explain" or other verbs 
for the following arguments.184 This difference can be caused by 'Abd 
al-Jabbâr's belief that for a correct reflection, which generates knowl-
edge, the thing indicated (madlûl) cannot be known before. So, possibly 
the fact that the thing indicated (madlûl) is already known through 
the first argumentation prevents 'Abd al-Jabbâr from using the words 
180
 Sec Lane, 285-286 
" " Cf Mugni VII, 7 " to distinguish it (h-nubinali) from other generd and 
from its own genus when it happens in another way, as we distinguished (ahannâ) 
knowledge by the fjet that it (read ma where the text has mimmâ) is what supposes the 
tranquillity of the soul at its known (object) from other different and corresponding 
accidents" It is the definition which explains the contents of a concept and distinguishes 
its contents from anything else 
11,2
 Cf Mugni VII. 6 and 8 ("bmân haqiqul al-kalâm mm gayrih" the explanation 
of the reality of speech (which distinguishes it) from anything else) 
183
 Cf Mugni VII, 26, where the verbs Jail and haivan are used in the same 
sentence and in apparently the same meaning 
'
8 4
 Sec, for instance, the succession of the different verbs (dall, bavyan, audah) in 
Mugni VII, 26 and 27 
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"indication, to indicate, indicated" for the second time, in a second 
argumentation. 
Awdah : to elucidate. This word appears to be used by 'Abd al-Jabbâr, 
not so much as a terminus technicus, but more as an alternative for 
dall and bayyan, but it is less frequently used.185 For its specific 
meaning we have to look into the basic meaning of the root "wdh", 
to which it belongs (as the fourth form of the verb), and which can be 
described as : being clear, lucid. Therefore, I propose as a rendering 
of the fourth form : to make clearly visible or to elucidate. 
Some forms of reflection (nazar) and argumentation are more com-
plicated than the direct indication-indicated relationship we treated 
above. We now want to speak about the deduction by analogy (qiyâs), 
about the deduction by "division" (taqsîm), and about the argumen-
tation 'Abd al-Jabbâr uses when attacking his opponents (ihâm). 
Qiyâs : analogy or deduction by analogy.186 The strict form of this 
kind of deduction is described by 'Abd al-Jabbâr in the seventeenth 
part of his Mugnî, when he deals with the sources of our revealed 
knowledge and the forms of argumentation used there.187 Conse-
quently,'his attention is directed mainly to analogy in matters of (divine) 
legislation (sar'lyât), but he often refers to the use of this form of 
argumentation in matters of human intuition ('aqlîyât).188 
We describe this deduction by analogy (qiyâs) as follows : if the 
object about which one seeks knowledge (Jar) resembles the object 
about which one has knowledge (así) in what necessitates a certain 
judgement (hukm) on the ash the far' is entitled to the same judgement 
(hukm).ie9 "What necessitates a certain judgement" is the cause, the 
'ilia of this hukm. Consequently, if we know that a certain cause 
'"* See, for instance, Mugm VII, 26. 
" ^ Cf. the pages devoted to the qiyâs by van Ess m his Erkenntmslehre, 381-394 
187
 Cf MugnîXVU, 276-335 
188
 Cf, for instance, Mugni XVII, 280: "The form of the method of deduction 
by analogy in matters of divine legislation (al-qiyâs as-sar'î) is the same as the form 
of the deduction by analogy in matters which are known on the basis of intuition 
(al-qiyâs al-'aqli). ." 
" " Cf Mugni XVII, 280 and 320-321 The terminology used here, asl and /ar\ 
the principle and the branch of the knowledge, is also used for the general principle (a?/) 
and the concrete derivatives (Jar', plural furu). the deduction by analogy is, however. 
not restricted to this form of it. The hukm or judgement is a qualification necessitated 
by the cause ('ilia) This relation cause-judgement can be used in this form of argumen-
tation because the 'ilia always produces its effect automatically and immediately 
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necessitates a certain judgement, we know that in other cases too this 
cause will necessitate this judgement, if in person A the presence of 
knowledge necessitates the judgement "knowing" and we know that 
in person В there is knowledge, person В is also entitled to the judge­
ment "knowing" 1 9 0 'Abd al-Jabbâr does not use this strict form of 
deduction by analogy very frequently in his discussions about 'aqlhât 
The most important rôle it plays in these discussions we find in the 
analogy between this world and the world of God (as-sâhid na-l-gavb) 
For instance, a man's being speaking (the cause, 'ilia) necessitates that 
he is "making speech" (the judgement, hukm), consequently we know 
that God, when He "is speaking", is also "making speech" I 9 1 
But far more than this strict form of qiyâs, 'Abd al-Jabbâr uses in 
his books a form of qiyâs which does not follow the rules of this 
deduction as given above In that case it is a three-term-argumentation, 
which resembles our syllogism from a general truth and a concrete 
datum he draws the conclusion He uses various words to indicate 
this scheme, one of the most frequently used being "íítá sahh 
wa-tabat fa-vajib", "if it is correct that (a general truth) 
and it is a sure fact that (a concrete datum) , it must be (the 
conclusion) 192 For instance, if it is correct that the giving of a defi-
nition of something is a derivative from the knowledge of that thing, 
and it is an established fact that the knowledge of speech is necessary 
knowledge and comes via the sensory perception, it must be possible 
to define it in this way 193 
Taqsim or qisma: division 194 This method of argumentation tries to 
solve a problem and to find the right answer by enumerating all 
possible answers, which are then subsequently dealt with, and, conse-
quently, it consists in the division of the problem concerned into 
various sub-problems Frequently such a division is introduced by the 
words "/â yaklû mm ", "it is not without ", followed by the various 
^
0
 Brunschvig (Rationalité 216) describes the "indication' in this form of argu-
mentation as follows "Tout qiyâs correct doit ce caractère scientifique' a 1 indice probant 
(dahl) qui designe le moyen terme et incite a 1 analogic There are some conditions 
the cause has to be known both in the asl and in the far', the judgement ' (hukm) of 
the asl must be known there must be no hindrances (танапі') All these and other 
data about this ilia are found in Wugm XVII, 276-335 
1 9 1
 Cf \fugni VII 53 
1 9 2
 Cf for instance Mugm VII, 6 9, 24 
1 9 3
 Cf MugniVn,6 
1 9 4
 For the history of this terminology and the use of this method of argumentation 
in philosophy theology, and jurisprudence, see van Ess, Erkenntnislehre, 394-396 
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possibilities: A or В or С... When one has made ihis division, there 
are three different ways to continue this argumentation according to 
the goal one wants to reach. One may try to show that all possibilities 
enumerated are correct; this method is used when one wants to show 
the different ways in which a certain thing can happen, or to prove 
that, for instance, all conditions are fulfilled.195 
One may try to show that all possibilities are false and that, conse­
quently, the presupposition must be false. To give an example : the 
opponents say that everybody knows that there exists speech in his 
heart; 'Abd al-Jabbâr answers that this knowledge must be cither 
necessary or acquired knowledge; then he shows that one cannot know 
this through necessary knowledge nor through acquired knowledge. 
Consequently, the supposition of his opponents must be incorrect.196 
One may try to show that one solution is the correct one by proving 
all others to be false; this method of argumentation supposes, as a 
matter of course, that the starting-point is correct, and that all possible 
solutions are enumerated. 
We distinguish two forms of this last method, the first being the 
more sure, the second being an easy target for the attacks of the 
opponents. The first form is comparable with the method used in 
our days in computational logic : every question is divided into sub-
questions, until every sub-question only has two alternatives : yes or 
no; 'Abd al-Jabbâr calls them "itbât wa nafy", establishing and 
denying.197 By following always the yes-line of the alternatives, one 
ultimately arrives at the correct answer. In fact, 'Abd al-Jabbâr in 
every alternative shows that one of the two possibilities is false, and 
that consequently the other must be the correct one.198. 
To give an example of this form in 'Abd al-Jabbâr's own words : 
"If somebody says : 'Why did you say that this ("combination") matter 
only is the presence of a ma'nâT, we say : it cannot be without (one of 
the following possibilities); it is attributable either to itself or to its 
1 , 5
 As an example 'Abd al-Jabbâr gives the enumeration of the various things which 
hinder (танапі') the seeing. Cf. Éarh 99. 
196
 Cf. M ugni VU. 17. 
197
 Cf. Sarh 98. 
1 9 8
 This form van Ess has in mind when he writes : "Kalâm, craving for certitude, 
favored the first variant, truth derived from the mutual exclusion of two contradictory 
statements : the world is either eternal or created ; if it is then not eternal (which has, of 
course, to be proven), it must be created. One sometimes called this "datala bil-mudâdda", 
argumentation by establishing a contrast, but mostly qisma or taqsim". (Logical 
Structure, 40). 
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qualities, or to something else It cannot be attributable to itself nor 
to its qualities If it is attributable to something else, it cannot be 
without (one of the following possibilities), either its influence is in 
the manner of making possible like the influence of the maker on 
what he makes—or its influence is in the manner of necessitating Its 
influence cannot be in the manner of making possible If its influence 
is in the manner of necessitating, it cannot be without (one of the 
following possibilities), it is non-existing or existing It cannot be non-
existing The only possibility that remains is that it is existing, as 
we say у ч 
The second form tries to enumerate all different possibilities, and 
in this lies its weak spot how to prove that this enumeration is 
complete9 
As an example of this form I quote 'Abd al-Jabbâr, in his argu-
mentation about "knowledge" "(Conviction becomes knowledge) 
either because of its genus and essence, or because of a quality of its 
genus, or because of its existing, or because of its non-existing, or 
because of the existence of a maná, or because of its coming into 
existence, or by an acting subject, or because it happens in a certain 
way " 2 0 0 When he has proved all possibilities except the last one to 
be false, he concludes this one to be the correct one It is easy to see 
that the opponents will try to show that this division is not complete, 
that there are other possibilities, and that, consequently, the argu-
mentation is not valid 2 0 1 
Ilzâm : argumentum ad hominem In the strict sense of the word, this 
method of argumentation is only used in the dispute with the oppo-
nent, it consists in taking the thesis of the opponent for granted, and 
in drawing from it conclusions which the opponent cannot by any 
1 , 9
 Sarh 98 
2 0 0
 Sarh 190 
201
 To summarize all this in 'Abd al-Jabbâr's own words "This division (the 
one translated in our text concerning combination ijtima) is hesitating (mutaraddida) 
between denying and establishing in the same way the Qâdî 1 Qudât gave it in the 
Muhit- , it is better than the other divisions which the teachers gave in their books 
because, if a division does not hesitate between denying and establishing, it implies that 
additions might be possible, and the opponents can make some trouble about it 
Know that one may use a division, aiming to show that some (possibilities) are false 
and others correct —as we mentioned here—, one may use it aiming to show that all 
(possibilities) are false—as what we say about the indication that God cannot be 
knowing because of a knowledge—, and one may use it aiming to show that all 
(possibilities) are correct -as what we say about the things about which we know by means 
of our intellect that they hinder the seeing they are six' (Sarh 98-99) 
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means accept, either because he must admit that they are absurd, or 
because they are obviously in contradiction with his own doctrinal 
position and his own theses 'Abd al-Jabbâr uses this method very 
frequently in his disputes although he seldom uses the verb alzam 
or the noun ilzâm 2 0 2 He also uses a similar method of argumentation 
when no discussion with his opponents is given, he uses it, for instance, 
to show that a certain possibility in a division (taqsîm) has to be 
excluded because it is not correct He may do so by showing that the 
acceptation (tajnîz) of this possibility leads to the necessity of accepting 
also other things or theses which evidently are absurd, in other cases, 
the accepted thesis itself would "necessitate" (anjab) something else 
that is, in fact, absurd 2 0 3 In this form of argumentation the verb 
anjab (or the first form \iajab) is very frequently used, therefore, one 
could call this form "îjâb" от "reductio ad absurdum" (reduction to 
something absurd) 
In this context we like to mention the term "subha" sophism It is 
the word 'Abd al-Jabbâr uses to indicate the arguments of his oppo-
nents 2 0 4 It is, in a way, the contrary of the "indication" {dalîl) When 
somebody supposes something to be a dalli and follows it, while in fact 
it is not a dalil, it becomes a subha, just as the argumentation based upon 
it Who is in "positive ignorance" (jâhil) thinks that he has an indi-
cation, but in fact he has a sophism It is the task of the Muslim 
theologians to refute these sophisms in the name of the Islamic com-
munity 2 0 5 
By way of conclusion we summarize acquired knowledge is always 
generated by reflection (nazar) upon an indication (dalil) For 'Abd 
al-Jabbâr the term dalil still has its original meaning something 
indicating something else Nevertheless he also uses it for more complex 
forms of argumentation, where the meaning of this word shows a 
tendency to melt with more general terms such as proof or demon-
stration But he always remains far from the strict forms and rules 
202
 For a series of these "argumenta ad hominem ' (ilzâmâi), where 'Abd al-Jabbâr 
also uses this term in indicating them, see Mugni VII 148 150 
203
 See, for instance, Mugm VII, 21, where m the context of a division (taqsim) 
different terms are used in an argumentation based on this ¡jab But instances of the 
ilzám and the ijâb are found in almost every chapter of the Mugm 
2 0 4
 Cf for instance, Mugm VII, 133-179, where the subah of the opponents their 
arguments for their thesis that God is speaking by eternal speech which exists in Him 
are refuted 
2 0 3
 See Sarh 45 and M ugni VII, 14 
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of demonstration as built up by the philosophers of the Aristotelian 
tradition. 
3. THE MANNER IN WHICH KNOWLEDGE IS EXPRESSED 
Under this vague and somewhat ambiguous heading we intend to 
deal with three different manners in which we express what we know 
(in the vocabulary of 'Abd al-Jabbâr we cannot say that we express our 
knowledge, 'Urn, this knowledge being only the maná which causes 
us to be knowing, but we have to say that we express what we know, 
al-malûm) : first, the definition, in which one tries to circumscribe the 
object of one's knowledge; second, some qualifications we give to 
propositions when we use these in the course of our argumentation, 
such as "correct", "evident" propositions; third, other qualifications 
by means of which we express what we know about an object, such as 
"good" and "evil". 
As a matter of fact, especially the terms treated in the third category 
may give the impression to have been rather arbitrarily chosen (the 
terms in the second category may suffer from the same defect, but 
in a lesser degree). Many words, also words of some importance in 
the works of 'Abd al-Jabbâr, will not be discussed. My choice was 
determined by the texts of 'Abd al-Jabbâr about God's speech. All 
words that play an important part in his argumentation on this 
subject are treated presently. 
Definition 
Hadd : definition. To give a definition or to define {tahdîd) something 
is a derivative (far', branch) from the knowledge one has about that 
thing;206 one has to know the thing concerned before being able to 
define it, for "to define" can be rendered by "to circumscribe", and in 
order to circumscribe something exactly, one has to know what 
belongs to it and what does not. "By defining something one aims at 
circumscribing it in a way that does not enter into it what does not 
belong to it, and that docs not remain outside it what does belong to 
it",207 or, to put it in a more poetical style, a definition is "fami' 
mani'", "gathering and hindering".208 These are instances of the first 
2М
 Cf Miigni VII, 6 
2 0
" Mitgm VII. 6 
20,< Sarh 494 
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and most generally used description of the definition as found in the 
works of 'Abd al-Jabbâr.209 
We also find other descriptions, which are less formal in describing 
definitions as being purely circumscriptions, but which furnish some 
more material aspects : the definition is "more clear (than the pure 
name of the thing to be defined), it reveals its meaning, and circum-
scribes its sense; and this is the goal of defining."210 
So, two conditions have to be fulfilled to constitute a good definition : 
it must be more revealing about the meaning (than the pure name) and 
it must give an exact circumscription. 
For the external form in which the definition is presented 'Abd 
al-Jabbâr gives some strict rules. 
First, it is not allowed to insert in the text of the definition anything 
that the object to be defined has in common with other things. The 
definition has to be restricted to the specific peculiarities of the object 
to be defined.21 ' Consequently, a definition constituted by the mention 
of the genus proximum and the differentia specifica—as, for instance, 
"man is a reasonable animal" (animal rationale) or "knowledge is con-
viction which involves tranquillity of the soul"—is rejected by 'Abd 
al-Jabbâr since "being an animal" does not circumscribe man, and 
"being conviction" does not circumscribe knowledge.212 'Abd al-Jabbâr 
looks for a pure differentia specifica, which has to function against 
the background of pure existence or even the background of existence 
and non-existence. 
Second, it is not permitted to choose for the definition any expression 
one likes; one has to use the most characteristic qualifications (akass 
al-awsqf) or the most characteristic expressions (akass al-'ibârâl), 
which are at the same time the most apt to gather all that belongs to 
the object to be defined and to distinguish it from other things.213 
204
 This form of description, which aims at a pure coextension, is described in 
Mugni XII, 4 (though here the word haqiqa is used), here "reflection" is rendered 
(denned'') by "thought" because both arc coextensive, and "in this way hoqaiq arc 
known" See also Saih 40 This formal concept of a definition (the word hadd is used in 
a non-technical vocabulary for a border) is not a peculiarity of 'Abd al-Jabbâr; see, for 
instance, al-Bâqillânî. Tumhid. 6. 
-
1 0
 Sarh 40-41. One may ask whether the definition given in note 209 (reflection 
is thought) comes up to these requirements 
21
 ' Cf MugniWl. 8 and MugnîXU, 13 Therefore, many of his definitions begin with 




 Sec Sarh 46 
213
 Cf MugniXU, 15-16 
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Third, it is not allowed to mention in the definition more than is 
strictly necessary. In a certain case, it may be allowed to mention two 
things which are really coextensive for reasons of "disclosure" (kasf); 
thus we find : living is he for whom it is not impossible {la yataddar) to 
be knowing and able";214 both qualities (being knowing and being 
able) are only possible because the subject is living; therefore, to make 
the definition more "disclosing" (aksaj), it is permitted to mention 
both. If the two are not coextensive (e.g. speech is articulated sounds 
and arranged letters; but not every articulated sound is arranged 
letters),215 it is not permitted to mention in the definition the ex-
pression which is too extensive. One might add it afterwards as an 
explanation (tafsir) of the definition.216 
Fourth, it is not allowed to mention in a definition something that 
the object to be defined needs, nor the cause (sabab) of the object, nor 
the instrument (ala) by which it is produced.217 The same holds true 
of other circumstantial data. 
Summarizing, we say that for 'Abd al-Jabbâr a definition is evidently 
not a description; but more than at a disclosure of the essence of the 
object to be defined, it aims at a circumscription of this object. One 
has to admit, however, that 'Abd al-Jabbâr's attempts to restrict his 
definitions to the pure mention of the differentiae specificae, often run 
the risk to obscure rather than disclose the meaning of the things 
concerned.218 
Haqîqa : reality. This word is not a synonym of the word hadd, defini-
tion, although one may get this impression when reading 'Abd al-
Jabbâr's theological works. Sometimes the two words are used to-
gether219 and sometimes the word reality (haqîqa) is used when 
one expects the word definition (hadd).220 In a passage where the 
3 1 4
 M ugni VII. 8 and Mugni XII, 14 "if one would restrict oneself to one of these 
two (knowing and able), it would be correct" In Mugni XII he is more positive than 
in Mugni VII, in Mugni XII he prefers (it is an la) the mention of both qualities because 
this is more disclosing (акт/) 
2 1 5
 Cf \fugni VII, 7 and 8 
2 1 6
 Cf MugniXU, 14-16, where'Abd al-Jabbâr discusses the definitions of knowledge 
given by his teachers What they meant (maqsaduhum) was correct, but what they did 
was in fact to give an explanation of this definition 
2 1 7




 Cf van Ess, Logical Strut Hire, 37 
21
* Mugni П. 7 "the distinction of its (speech's) definition and reality" 
(hayan huildih wa-haqiqatih), see also Sarh 39 
2 2 0
 So, с g , in the title of the chapter in Mugni VII, 7 "The mention of the reality of 
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term haqiqa is used several times, the original meaning of this term 
appears to be the real meaning of a word, in opposition to the wider 
sense ('alâjihat al-haqîqa aw at-tawassu').221 For 'Abd al-Jabbâr there 
is an obvious relationship between words and the realities behind 
the words ; so this word haqiqa comes to stand for both : the real 
meaning of the word and the "reality" of the thing concerned. 
Consequently, the "reality" is something in the thing and in its 
name, the hadd is one of the ways in which we express this 
"reality";222 hence 'Abd al-Jabbâr can call a definition "the mention 
of the reality of something" or, still more frequently, "the distinction 
of the reality of something from other things."223 
So, this "reality" is not the essence of the thing nor an accident, 
but it is "what a thing really is" ; as vague as that. 
Qualifications given to propositions 
The first distinction to be made when we consider the qualifications 
of propositions that 'Abd al-Jabbâr uses in his argumentations, is the 
distinction between "correct" and "incorrect" propositions, between 
propositions the contents of which correspond with "reality", and 
propositions the contents of which do not correspond with it : between 
"sahih" and "Ьа(іГ\ This is a complete "division" (taqsim); there exists 
no third possibility because it is a "yes-no-division".224 
Bâtil : incorrect. This qualification is given to every proposition the 
contents of which do not correspond with reality {al-haqq) : it is used 
to indicate a logical untruth. It is also used, in the form of a substantive 
"аІ-Ьа{іГ, "the incorrect", as the opposite of "al-haqq" (the ontolo-
speech", Mugni XII, 4 "the reality of that (the reflection) is thought", see also 
Sarh 43 "the reality of the reflection" (haqiqat an-nazar) and ρ 45 "the reality of 
knowledge" (haqiqat al-ma'nfa) 
221
 Mugni XU, 4 
2 2 2
 It is only one of the ways, the way which uses the most characteristic expressions 
and which meets all the requirements of the real definition But in Mugni VII, 8 
'Abd al-Jabbâr states that his teacher Abu HâSim mentioned the reality of speech 
by way of disclosure and elucidation ('ala lariqat al-kaif на-l-idâh), and therefore he 
mentioned more details than is allowed in a definition Possibly, this is the reason why 
in Mugni XII, 4 and Sarh 43 he calls his rendering of "reflection" by "thought" 
not definition but haqiqa See the whole context in Mugni XII, 4 
2 2 3
 For the combination with the word "mention" (dikr) see Mugni VII, 7 (the title 
of the chapter) and Sarh 39 The word hayan (explanation, distinction, see ρ 70) 
is used in Mugni VII, 7 and 8, Mugni XII, 3 and 4, the verb bav\an (to explain, to 
distinguish, see ρ 70) is used in Sarh 43 and 45 
2 2 4
 Cf Sarh 98-99 
80 SOME REMARKS ON 'ABD AL-JABBÁRS "PHILOSOPHY" 
gical reality, the ontological truth), and in that context it is used to 
indicate the ontological untruth.225 
The quality of being incorrect is called "butlân" (incorrectness), the 
demonstration that a proposition is incorrect is called "ibtâl".226 
Instead of the above mentioned forms of the root "ft//", 'Abd al-Jabbâr 
sometimes uses terms derived from the root "/к/"; so we find "fâsid" 
(wrong) instead of "ftâ/г/" (incorrect), and "/asâif ' (wrongness) in the 
place of ''bullan" (incorrectness),227 without difference of meaning, 
without difTerence in the context or in the emotional function of the 
words. 
Sahih : correct. This is the most general term to qualify a proposition 
which is true, the contents of which correspond with reality. The noun 
"being correct" is rendered by "sihha" (correctness), and the act of 
demonstrating that a proposition is correct by the verbal noun 
"tashih'"·,22% to be correct is rendered by the verb "sahh". One has, 
however, to be very attentive when meeting one of these words in 
'Abd al-Jabbâr's works, because he uses them in two different ways 
and with two different meanings; at first sight, they are not always 
easy to distinguish. Besides being used in a logical context- as is done 
in the cases we presently discuss—as a qualification given to a propo-
sition (but not only to propositions; it is also applied to other things 
in order to indicate that they are "correct" 229) they are also used in 
an ontological context, and in that case they indicate the ontological 
possibility of the thing concerned.230 
225
 Sec Mugni XII, 55 
2 2 6
 The term bullan is used to indicate that concrete propositions, statements, and 
definitions are incorrect (cf e g Mugni VII, 59), but also in a more general way to 
indicate that a doctrine (madhab) or demonstration (dalâla) is incorrect (See Mugni 
VII, 197 and 100) The same holds good of the verbal noun ibtâl and the corresponding 
verb abtal {Mugni VU, 14) 
227
 Cf, eg , Mugni VII, 14, 24. 99, 185, 197 There appears to be no reason why 
'Abd al-Jabbâr does not use the words from the root bil in these (and other) cases In 
Mugni VII, 49 he uses the two roots in the same context "What we have said before 
shows the incorrectness (yublif) of these words Explains the wrongness (fasâd) of 
what they said " 
228
 For the use of this verbal noun (the corresponding verb is mhhah) see, e g., 
Sarh 99 The words sahh, sahih, and iihha are used with great frequency 
2 2 9
 So, e g , for knowledge "Know that the meaning of our proposition 'knowledge 
is correct' is that the soul of the knowing subject is tranquil at what he knows ." 
(Mugni XII, 36), and for speech (kalâm) Mugni, VII, 10 
2 3 0
 About this meaning of the words sihha and sahih we speak later in more 
detail In the works of 'Abd al-Jabbâr the logical and the ontologica! meaning of this 
word even occur in one and the same sentence "It is not correct (la yasihh) to define 
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Propositions which are qualified by 'Abd al-Jabbâr as being "cor-
rect" {sahîh) have other qualifications too, according to the kind of 
knowledge by which the contents of this proposition arc known (for 
instance : malum, malum hi-l-idtirâr, ma'lùm bi-l-iktisâb, ma'rûf, 
ma'qûl), or according to their function in 'Abd al-Jabbâr's argumen-
tation and to their evidence (tâbit, zâhir). 
Malum: known.231 The proposition is correct because it is based on 
knowledge, either on necessary or on acquired knowledge. When it is 
based on necessary knowledge, it concerns a truth which is necessarily 
known by every person who is "compos mentis" {'âqif), and which 
"occurs in us, not from ourselves, and which we cannot in any way 
banish from our soul."232 Such a proposition is qualified as "malum 
bi-1-idtirâr" (necessarily known) in order to specify the kind of 
knowledge concerned.233 In this case, the evidence of the proposition 
is founded on the fact that nobody can honestly deny it because it 
concerns a knowledge common to all sane persons.234 When the 
proposition is qualified as "correct" because the truth expressed by 
it is known through acquired knowledge, 'Abd al-Jabbâr usually first 
mentions the indication (dalif) and describes the way by which he 
inferred (istadalf) the thing indicated (madlui); then he concludes that 
the proposition expressing this madlûl is ma'lum235 or, still more 
specifically, "ma'lûm bi-l-iktisab" (known by acquiring, known by 
acquired knowledge). The evidence of this kind of proposition is 
founded upon the argumentation given. Since 'Abd al-Jabbâr does 
not admit any difference between the meanings of the two nouns for 
speech as what comes into being from a knocking in special exits because of what we 
have explained about the possibility (sihha) of the existence of speech coming from 
God in another way" (Mugni VII, 12) 
2 3 1
 Also other expressions are used to indicate that a certain proposition is known; 
for instance, на-qacl 'alimná (see Mugni VII. 33, 50, 180) and qad 'uhm (see Mugnì VII, 
180) 
2 3 2
 Cf Sarh 48-49 
2 , 3
 Cf Mugni VU, 13. 
2 3 4
 The problems arise when an opponent nevertheless denies, and keeps on 
denying, that he has this knowledge For this problem 'Abd al-Jabbâr has no appropriate 
answer Sec. с g , Mugni XII, 37 (where his opponent denies a knowledge 'Abd al-Jabbâr 
deems necessary) and Mugni VII, 17 (where 'Abd al-Jabbâr denies a knowledge his 
opponents consider to be necessary). 
2 3 5
 He also uses this term ma'lum by way of introduction to his argumentation 
(this is known because ), in this case he also uses the imperative form t'lam (know 
that ). This expression is often used at the beginning of a new chapter, see, eg., 
Mugni Wl, 14, 26 
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knowledge 'ilm and ma'rifa, nor between the meanings of the two 
verbs indicating "to know" 'alim and 'araf,23b he can call a proposi-
tion ma'rûf instead of malum. 
Ma'qûl : intuited, known by intuition. The word ma'qûl is clearly 
related to the noun 'aql, intuition,237 which belongs to the same root 
('ql). Provisorily, one could render the term ma'qûl as "what falls 
under the 'aql". The use of this term 'aql may easily lead to a misunder-
standing of 'Abd al-Jabbâr's intentions. The reason is that for him 
—contrary to the use of this word by philosophers and thinkers in the 
Aristotelian tradition—the 'aql is not a human faculty, nor a substance, 
nor a sense, nor an instrument,238 but "a special aggregate of 'things 
known' ('ulwn; literally: knowledges);239 when they occur in a 
'responsible subject' (mukallaf; a subject upon whom God imposes 
His duties), reflection, inference, and execution of the imposed duty 
become possible for him."240 
This "intuition" belongs to the genus conviction (i'tiqâcf); it is 
a form of conviction over which man has no power; it occurs in him 
independently whether he wishes this to happen or not; it falls under 
the power of God alone.241 It belongs—inside the genus conviction — 
to the species "knowledge" ('ilm), as 'Abd al-Jabbâr indicates making 
"intuition" ('aql) and "things known of the intuition" ('ulûm al-'aql) 
synonyms.242 Consequently, we have to look for this intuition in the 
category of knowledge that we called necessary knowledge. 
Not all knowledge is called intuition ('aql) since the Arabic word 
2 3 6
 See Mugni XII, 16 and our page 56, where we rendered ma'nfa by cognition 
2 3 7
 I have hesitated for quite some time between two possible renderings of the word 
"'aqF' either "intuition" or "intelligence" When considering the meaning of this 
word in the philosophical discussions in 'Abd al-Jabbâr's days (see also Mugni XI, 
375-379 for 'Abd al-Jabbâr's own position in this discussion) and Us meaning in the 
Aristotelian tradition, one easily prefers the translation "intelligence" So does, for 
instance, Frank in Fundamental Assumptioni, 6 But considering the meaning 'Abd 
al-Jabbâr himself gives to this word, I came to prefer -notwithstanding the above given 
arguments—the rendering "intuition" 
23B
 Cf Mugni XI, 375 'Abd al-Jabbâr uses the following Arabic words jawhar 
(substance), ala (instrument), hässa (sense), and qûwa (faculty) All these alternatives 
are rejected in Mugni XI, 375-379 
2 3 9
 Mugni XI, 375 reads "jumla mm al-'ulûm makmsa", Mugni XI, 379 reads. 
"al-'ulúm al-maksûsa" In the rendering of jumla by "aggregate" I follow Frank 
(Fundamental Assumptions, 6-7) 
2 4 0
 Quoted from Mugni XI, 375 "Jumla mm al-'ulûm maksûsa, mata haialat β 
l-mukallaf, sahh minh an-nazar на-1-tstidlâ! ча-l-qiyâm bi-ada ma kullif' 
2 4 1
 Cf Sarh 90 
2 4 2
 See Muhit I, 28 and Sarh 90 
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'aql is metaphorically used here; its original meaning is : the hobbling 
of the feet of a she-camel to hinder its moving; consequently, its use 
in a philosophical context needs a special connection or indication.243 
There are only two kinds of "things known" Çulûm) which can be called 
thus; first, the intuition that some concrete things are evil, a knowledge 
which hinders the human soul to move m the direction of these things 
when it desires them, as the hobbling of the feet of the camel hinders it 
from going where it likes; second, some basic principles, basic "things 
known", which bring about that the knowledge of other things is firm 
and immovable (tâbit), as the hobbling of the camel's feet makes it 
stand firm and immovable.244 We conclude that intuition ('aql) 
consists in an aggregate of things intuitively known, directly given by 
God, forming the basic principles (usui) which make possible reflection 
and inference and also the execution of the duties God imposes upon 
mankind. Consequently, they form a condition for God's imposing 
duties to be "good" (hasan) and therefore also of its being possible.245 
Every human being, who has this intuition, who knows these basic 
principles, and who, consequently, is bound (mukallaf) to fulfil the 
2,11
 See MugniXW, 16-17 Cf Lane, 2113 "he bound the camel's fore shank to his 
arm" or "he folded together the camel's fore shank and his arm and bound them both 
in the middle of the arm with the rope called '¡qaV' 
2 4 4
 Mugni XI, 386 "As for the 'aql, it is qualified thus for two reasons, first, 
because it hinders to move in the direction of the desired things to which the soul 
aspires, and which are deemed evil m his (the person's) intuition ('aql), thus a comparison 
is made between this knowledge and the 'aql of a she-camel, which hinders it to move 
as it desires Second, because with it stand firm all things known ('ulûm) which have 
a connection with understanding (fahm) and inference (istidlât) Because it supposes 
the standing firm of all things known which have a connection with understanding 
and inference, a comparison is made between it and the '¡qál of the she-camel (see previous 
note) which supposes its standing firm" 
2 4 5
 For the last remark in the text Mugni XI, 379 and 386 'Abd al-Jabbâr gives 
some examples of 'ulûm which belong to the intuition the knowledge of what we 
perceive and the knowledge that others must know it also in the same circumstances 
(Mugni XI, 380), the knowledge of some basic principles concerning the perceived 
substances that they are combined or divided (mujlami'a ои muflanqa), that they 
cannot be in two places, that they cannot be eternal and produced at the same 
time, nor existent and non-existent at the same time (Mugni XI, 383), some basic 
principles about living beings, some principles in matters of ethics (Mugni XI, 384-385) 
Frank, Fundamental Assumptions, 6-7 holds the opinion that 'aql "is directed 
essentially and primarily towards action, specifically towards those actions which are 
morally good and best in terms of achieving benefit and well-being and avoiding harm" 
In my opinion, the most important character of the 'aql is that it furnishes all basic 
principles man needs for his further reflection, thus it forms the basis for all human 
knowledge, the acquired knowledge included 
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duties God imposed, is called by 'Abd al-Jabbâr 'âqil (compos 
mentis).246 
Tâbit247 : certain. In the preceding paragraph we saw how 'Abd 
al-Jabbâr makes a comparison between a she-camel "standing firm 
and immobile" (tâbita) and a certain kind of knowledge.248 In both 
cases the same verb "tabat" is used, a verb we met in the fourth form 
{albat, infinitive : itbât)249 with the meaning of to establish the 
existence of something. This qualification, given to a proposition, 
indicates that the proposition concerned "stands firm and immobile", 
expresses an established fact, and, consequently, is certain. 
"Abd al-Jabbâr happens to use this term sometimes by way of 
conclusion, to indicate that a proposition because of the argumen-
tation given has become to express an established fact.250 Generally, 
however, he uses it in the premises of his argumentation; in a two-
term-argumentation he can qualify the first term, the indication (dalil), 
as certain so that the conclusion (madlûf) necessarily follows.251 In 
a three-term-argumentation it is very frequently used to qualify the 
second term; against the background of this second term, established 
and certain (often a general truth), the first term becomes an indication 
(dalîl) which leads to the conclusion (madlûl, indicated).252 
Zâhir: self-evident. This word, which does not belong to the most 
frequent terms in 'Abd al-Jabbâr's vocabulary, indicates a proposition 
which "is apparent" 2 5 3 and therefore needs no further proof. A descrip-
tion of this kind of evidence is found in the Muhit, where 'Abd al-Jabbâr 
says that "we are not able to make a sophism against it".254 It is 
so self-evident that it is quite impossible to fabricate any argumentation 
that could attack this self-evidence.255 
2
** Mugni XI, 486 For a survey of 'Abd al-Jabbâr's opinion about the 'aql, see 
also 'Abd al-Karim 'Utmän, Nazunwil at-laklij, 74-77 
'"'
,
 More yet than the form given in the text (tâbit. the active participle) the past tense 
of this verb (¡abat) is used by 'Abd al-Jabbâr 
-'"
,
 CT \ïugm XI, 386 
244
 СГ ρ 69 
2 , 0
 Mut-ni VII, 59 
2 M
 Mugni VII, 9, 28, 99 
2 , 2
 Mugni VII, 6, 24, 208 Especially the combination "«/a sahh .. (proposition A) 
na-lahal (proposition В). /Λ-ΚΙ/ΙΛ (the conclusion)" is very frequent as form of the 
three-term-argumcntation 
^ Cf Lane, 1926-1927 
2 < 4
 Muhit, I, 38 "na-lá subha fi qudramâ 'alaihâ". 
2 , 4
 Some instances of the use of this word arc found in Mugni VII, 12-13 
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Other qualifications 
A very general kind of qualification, applicable to nearly every-
thing, is expressed by the words "good" and "evil", in Arabic "hasan" 
and "qabih".256 The English words, however, do not exactly corre-
spond with the Arabic words as they are used by 'Abd al-Jabbâr, but 
for lack of better ones I use these two terms, which, moreover, are 
current in English translations of Arabic texts. 
When one of these two words is applied to a substance, it generally 
indicates an opinion of the subject about its outer form : the subject 
desires to look at that form or he tries to avoid seeing it;257 in this 
case we translate these words as, respectively, "beautiful" and "ugly". 
But we restrict ourselves here, as does 'Abd al-Jabbâr, to the more 
philosophical use of these qualifications. Used in this way, they 
may give the impression of being purely ethical qualifications, having 
no relation with the subject of the present study. But because 'Abd 
al-Jabbâr's ethics tend to be objective,258 and since for him there is 
no clear distinction between the activity and its result, he uses these 
qualifications (good and evil) also in an ontological sense. For this 
reason, and because these words have in his works a meaning slightly 
different from the way we usually understand them, we must give our 
attention to these qualifications. 
The distinctions, made in the present context by 'Abd al-Jabbâr, and 
the definitions given are based upon the subject's deserving either 
blame (damm) or praise (macih), either when doing or when omitting 
the act which is to be qualified.259 The meaning of the words "blame" 
and "praise" and the essence of their relationship with the act's 
being good or evil - a relationship expressed by the verb "deserve" 
256
 To thib matter—the meaning of "good" and "evil" and related problems— 
the first volume of the sixth part of the Mugni is devoted M ugni VI 1 Sec also Muffii 
I. 230-242 and Sarh 39-42 and 301-313 Houram has written a monograph on this 
subject, especially on Us ethical aspects, called hlumii Rationalem, and bearing the 
subtitle The Elina of 'Abd al-Jabbâr Sec also 'Abd al-Karîm 'L'iman, Nazarhat 
al-laklif, 440-449 
257
 According to 'Abd al-Jabbâr these qualifications (the "aesthetic" ones) are 
based on sub|ective criteria, while the ethical qualifications arc based on objective ones 
See Mugni VI 1, 25 and 'Abd al-Karîm 'Ulmân, \'azan\at at-taklij. 447-448 
258
 Acts are qualified as good and evil in themselves, these are objective realities 
which man can come to know This is one of the conclusions reached by Houram in his 
hlamu Rationalism 
2
" Cf , for instance. Magni V I I . 7-8 
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{istahaqq)—are not further explained by 'Abd al-Jabbâr but supposed 
to be self-evident According to him, these belong to human intuition 
('aqi), consequently, every person who is compos mentis must know 
them 2 6 0 
With the two criteria given above, 'Abd al-Jabbâr defines four 
categories of acts 
Mubâh: permissible 261 The doer of this act does not deserve praise 
nor blame, nor does the omitter We, in our own vocabulary, which is 
different from 'Abd al-Jabbâr's, could call this act "neutral" As 
instances of this kind of act 'Abd al-Jabbâr mentions · to breathe or 
to eat (when there are no special circumstances) 262 
Nadb : recommended 2 6 3 The doer of this act deserves praise, the 
omitter does not deserve blame If such an act is directed towards 
another person who profits by it, it is called favour (tafadduf), doing 
good (ihsân), benefaction (m'âm), or voluntary good deed (tatanuu),26* 
if it is not directed to somebody else, but the acting person himself 
2 6 0
 Houram, Ічіати Rationalism, 44-47 questions the meaning of these words, 
especially the relation expressed by the term "deserve" Therefore he analyses one of 
the very few passages in which 'Abd al-Jabbâr speaks about the meaning of this 
word, Vf ugni XIII 144-147, where he is attacked for his use of the verb "deserve" 
(istahaqq) in a definition of ethical terms Houram's conclusion runs ' Whether these 
terms (e g ' corresponding' and "requital' ) can adequately express the meaning of 
"desert without any expression or implication of fittingness (a value concept) in the 
relation, ma·, be questioned, but we can credit him at least with being aware of the 
problem and struggling to solve it" 
In M ugni XI, 384 the question is mentioned in the context of a discussion on human 
intuition ('aqi) among the "things known' Çulûm) forming together the intuition are 
mentioned ' the goodness of the blame lor the evil when there are no hindrances, and 
the goodness ol the blame for the omitting of the obligatory when the hindrances are 
taken awav" (husn ad-damm 'ala l-qahih idâ lam \akun hunâk man' на-hitm ad-damm 
'ala l-iklál bi-l-wâith ma irti/â' аі-танапі Here he evidently uses the goodness 
of for ' instead of "deserve" 
•"'' A synonym of this word mubâh is Λα/α/ ctr Giugni VI I, 32 
2 6 2
 Sec M ugni VI I 31-32 There he states that we only use the term mubâh 
(notwithstanding the contents it expresses) to indicate the act ol somebody who has 
been inlormed or knows by wav of an indication, that the act has this qualification 
Therefore, we do not use this term when we speak about God's acts or the acts of 
animals but only when we speak about the acts of a person who is compos mentis 
Çâqil) 
2 6 J
 The meaning of this word nadb recommended is "that a recommending person 
recommends it and incites to do it' ( Uugni VI 1 38 it is evident that one has to read 
there na-hatt 'alenh instead of the non-sense wa/ah 'ahnli) 
2 6 4
 See M ugni VI 1 17-42 Other suggestions for names to give to this kind of act 
are also discussed there 
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profits in some way by it, it is called "nadb", as, for instance, works of 
supererogation (naß).265 
Wâjib: obligatory. The doer of this act deserves praise, the omitter 
of it deserves blame. This kind of act occurs in three forms : wâjib 
mudayyaq: the concrete act concerned has to be performed; wâjib 
mukayyarfìh : the subject can make a choice between several acts, and 
perform another act instead of the act concerned ; furûd al-kifâyât : 
another person can perform the act in the place of the subject 
concerned.266 
Qabih : evil. The doer of this act deserves blame. "Evil" is defined 
by 'Abd al-Jabbâr more exactly than in the summing up given above 
as "(an act) by which an able subject when he does it, in some respects 
deserves blame".267 The restriction "in some respects" is made by 
'Abd al-Jabbâr, as he explains immediately after having given the 
definition, because there are two exceptions to the rule, two cases where 
the doer of an evil act does not deserve blame : first, when he does not 
know and cannot know that the act is evil (young children, animals, 
lunatics), and second, when besides a smaller evil a larger good is 
2 6 5
 This second category "is characterized by some 'advantage' (saiâh) and the 
facilitating of religious duties, by doing them one deserves praise, and thus they are 
analogous to the.doing good {ihsân) and the favour (tafaddul)" This second category 
-the strict "naclb"—is only known to be so by divine revelation. Cf. Mugni VI 1, 37 
•""Ь The Muhit (I, 231) gives three forms of nä/ib, Mugni VM, 3 only gives the first 
two forms Instances of the first form are to give back a deposit and the reflection 
generating knowledge about God (Muhit I, 231), for the second form if one has to 
pay back a debt, one can choose oneself the pieces of money with which one pays it 
back {Sarh 42, Mugni VI 1, 43 uses the same example, but the text is distorted possibly 
one has to read ma instead of mata); the third form consists in the duties of the 
Islamic community (the raising of an army, defending the frontiers, governing), all 
these duties can be delegated 
267
 "Mû, idâ fa'alah al-i/âdir 'aiaìh iitahaqq ad-damm 'ala ha'd al-HU/úh", this is 
the definition given in Sarh 41 Hourani uses in his book the definition given by 
'Abd al-Jabbâr m Mugni VI/1, 26, which says the same but in a very difficult way 
Houram's translation of this definition runs as follows "That (act) for which, if it 
occurs in any way in the part of one who knows it will occur from him in that way, 
and who lets it happen, he deserves blame, unless there is a restricting reason" 
{hlamic Rationalism, 50). I think that it is better not to translate in this definition "in any 
way" (Arabic 'ala wajh). but "in a certain way"; 'Abd al-Jabbâr indicates here the 
various ways in which an act may be evil, for instance, by occurring in the way it is 
wrongdoing or positive ignorance Cf Mugni VI/1, 61, where the different HU/H/I of being 
evil are mentioned 
For a simpler form of the definition of evil, but evidently not as complete as the 
texts given above, see, e g , Mugni XII, 14 and 34 (on page 14 read taharruz instead of 
tahrir) 
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performed, and consequently the praise dominates the blame 2β8 But 
in both cases, 'Abd al-Jabbâr emphasizes, the act remains evil although 
its doer does not deserve blame So there is an objective being-good 
and being-evil in acts, independent of the concrete desert of blame 
or praise 2b9 
Hasan : good The concept of "being good" does not belong as such 
to the enumeration given above This term comprises the first three 
categories (permissible, recommended, obligatory), and is the opposite 
of the last one (evil) It is even defined as the opposite of evil "what 
happens in a certain way so that its doer, by doing it, if he knows it, does 
not deserve blame for it in certain respects" It is evident that this 
definition has been formulated by 'Abd al-Jabbâr as the exact counter-
part of his definition of evil (qabih)270 As is the case with the definition 
of evil, the definition of "good" (hasan) describes the being good of 
an act independently of the knowledge of its doer, and makes it an 
objective qualification 
The defining of "good" as the exact counterpart of "evil" seems to 
express a complete yes-no division (taqsîm) of all acts some acts 
are such that their doer deserves blame (if some conditions are ful-
filled), and the other acts are such that their doer does not. There can 
be no "neutral" acts since the acts we could qualify in this way by the 
fact that their doer deserves neither praise nor blame, are called by 
'Abd al-Jabbâr "permissible" (mubâh) and consequently "good" 
{hasan) 
Nevertheless, 'Abd al-Jabbâr knows some neutral acts The division 
(taqsîm) given above is not a division of all acts which exist, but only 
of the acts which above their existence have another quality which 
makes them form a special category, these we call "value acts", acts on 
which the qualification of "deserving" is applicable 
Some acts are always value acts because they cause benefit (naf) 
2 6 8




 hor the various ways in which an act may be evil, cf Mugni VI/1, 61-69 and 
Hourani Islamic Rationalum, 69-70 As instances are mentioned there wrongdoing 
(zulm) uselebsness ('abat), lying (kadib), ingratitude for a favour (kufr an-m'ma), positive 
ignorance (jahl), willing evil (irädat al-qabih), commanding evil (amr bi-l-qabih), and 
imposing unattainable duties (taklif ma là yutâq) 
2 7 0
 Mugni VI/1 31 "ma yaqa' 'ala но/А là yastahiqq fâ'iluh bi-fì'lih ida 'ahmah 
'alayh ad-damm 'ala и α/Λ" Cf the definitions of "evil" given by 'Abd al-Jabbâr and 
mentioned in note 267 For more details about 'Abd al-Jabbâr's ideas about "good", 
see Mugni VIM, 31-51 and the descriptions of his position by Hourani and 'Abd 
al-Karîm 'Utmân (see note 256) 
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or harm (darr); these acts are always, independently of the doer, and 
of his being under constraint,271 good or evil. Other acts, however, 
become good or evil—and consequently value acts—only through the 
knowledge, conviction, and intention of the doer. If these acts proceed 
from someone who does not know and has no conviction (a sleeping or 
unconscious person; a little child; an animal), they are neither good 
nor evil, they are not value acts, but neutral acts.272 
Finally, we discuss three terms which, in 'Abd al-Jabbâr's doctrine, 
are ways (wu/ûh) in which an act is good or evil, and which also play 
an important role in his argumentation about the problem of God's 
being speaking and the essence of His speech. These terms are : 'abat, 
salâh and naf. 
'Abat : uselessness. 'Abd al-Jabbâr considers 'abat to be one of the 
ways in which an act may occur, and which causes it to be evil.273 
The best definition for 'abat I have been able to find in 'Abd al-Jabbâr's 
works is from his Sarh : "Know, that useless ('abat) is every act which 
271
 About the constraint (ilia) Gimaret, La notion (¡"'ітриічіоп irrésistible" (ilga) 
dam l'éthique mu'iazilite. JA 259 (1971), 25-62. and Schwar/. Some Notes on the Notion 
of Ilja (wnwamt) m Mu'tazilite Kalâm. ¡OR II (1972), 413-427 'Abd al-Jabbâr uses 
here the combination "il/á' на-ikrâh", constraint and compulsion 
2 7 2
 In the words of 'Abd al-Jabbâr· "It (an act) may come into existence and have 
no quality above its pure coming into existence (Mugnl VI 1, 9 uses the word "existence", 
Hujùd, instead of hitdùt) or have a quality above its pure coming into existence. The 
first is the simple (jiasir) movement (read with the Egyptian edition, p. 232 mm and 
not 'ala) and simple speech proceeding from an unconscious and sleeping (person), 
when there occurs in it no benefit (naf; absent in the Lebanese edition) and no 
harm (darr), for, if one of these two is there, one can call it evil and good according 
to our choice, although there is no question of blame and praise. It is known that 
from an unconscious and sleeping (person) things may proceed by which he benefits, 
as the removal of fleas, the breaking of something (kair say', maybe better, kasr 
sayyi', the breaking of something bad), or the scratching of an itch and similar things; 
all this does not fall under the meaning of our words 'have no quality above its pure 
coming into existence'. 
If it has a quality above its pure coming into existence, it may proceed from 
someone who knows it or it may proceed from someone who does not know it If 
it proceeds from someone who does not know it and cannot(know)it. it has no judgement 
(hukm), this is not what we mean in our problem, for this is analogous with what 
proceeds from a sleeping or unconscious (person), and we have excluded that already 
from this totality 
When it proceeds from someone who knows it, it may occur without constraint 
(¡Ila') and compulsion (ikrâh). or it may happen when there is constraint and compulsion ; 
this second (category) also belongs to what has no judgement (hukm)" Muhit I, 230-231. 
See also MugniWA, 9-17. 
2 7 3
 "Uselessness is evil just as wrongdoing is evil" : Mugnl XI, 64 See also Mugni 
VI/1,61 
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the acting subject does without a proportional recompense " 2 7 4 It is 
an act characterized by a clear disproportion between the act and the 
result reached by it, either because the result is too small in proportion 
to what is invested in the act,275 or because the same result could 
be reached with less investments,276 or because no result is reached at 
all,277 or because the act even has no reasonable goal 278 In all these 
cases the act is useless and consequently evil 
Salâh: advantage 2 7 9 In the Islamic discussions about God's acts, this 
word has played an important role and it was generally used in a very 
broad and intensive meaning · all that is really good, appropriate. 
'Abd al-Jabbâr, however, makes it a synonym of "benefit" (naf) : 
"Salâh is the benefit (naf) . these are two expressions for the same 
meaning",280 and he adds that both are coextensive and are used in 
exactly the same way. 
2 7 4
 "Пат aim al-'abat Lull fi'l yafaluh al-fail mm dun 'mad miilth" Sarh 514 
Hourani has discussed this concept in his hlamu Rationalnm on ρ 75-76. and he 
based himself in those paragraphb especially on the thirteenth part of the \fugnl. where 
'Abd al-Jabbar gives some examples without giving a real definition The result is that 
it remains rather obscure Frank, in his review of this book in BIOR 29 (1972), gives 
some additional material from the eleventh part of the Mugni. among which two 
definitions 
The first definition he quotes is not very clear "any act in which the agent intends no 
rational aspect" (the translation is Frank's) "hull fi'l lam \aqsud bili fâ'iluh na/han 
ma'qûlan" {Mugni XI, 191), I translate against the background of the definition given 
in the Sarh "any act in which the agent (us doer) does not intend a reasonable aspect 
(goal)", the reasonable (ma'qùl) goal being in this case an effect which is in proportion 
with the act The other definition quoted by Frank and found in Mugni XI, 64 runs 
"if an agent who knows what he is doing does not perform his act lor some purpose that 
entails its being good, it must be useless" Here the "reasonable aspect" is explained as 
"a purpose (garad) that entails its being good", which corresponds with my opinion 
about the first definition 
2 7 5
 Cf the example in Sarh 514 somebody engages himself in difficult and dangerous 
affairs to gain only one dirham, this is useless 
2 7 6
 Cf the previous note, the dirham could be gained in a much easier way See 
also Mugni XII, 312 to rescue a drowning person by pulling him out with a broken 
hand, although one could do the same with the other hand 
2 7 7
 Cf Mugni XIII, 312 at good pay bring water from one part of the sea to 
another, or from one river to another, without any purpose (Sarh 514) 
2 7 8
 Cf the examples in note 277 and Mugni VII, 224 if God would speak before 
the creation of other beings, His speech could have no goal at all and would be useless 
Cf note 274 
2 7 9
 Cf Brunschvig, Mutazilisme et Optimum (al-aslah), SI 39 (1974) 5-23. the 
author discusses in this article the use of the term aslah and other forms of the same 
root and the disputes about God s acts being the best (aslah) possible 
2 β 0
 Mugni XIV, 35 See also Brunschvig, Mu'tazihsme et Optimum, 15 
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Naf : benefit. Besides naf also manfaa is used by 'Abd al-Jabbâr, in 
the same context and with the same meaning, as becomes clear from 
the definitions he gives of both terms.281 And, as we have seen above, 
the word salâh (advantage) is also used as a synonym. They are defined 
by 'Abd al-Jabbâr as : "pleasure, happiness, or what leads to both or 
to one of them".282 Pleasure {¡adda) is based on perception; it is 
a sensual feeling of well-being, whereas happiness (surûr) is mental 
and based upon an imagination of these pleasant things.283 Also the 
repulsion of harm (daf ad-darr) is called a benefit because it leads to 
happiness.284 
4. S O U R C E S O F H U M A N KisowLtDGE 
The knowledge a man has has come to him in various ways. Some 
knowledge has been given to him, other knowledge has been acquired 
by way of reflection upon things one already knew; this latter kind 
of knowledge may be based directly upon other acquired knowledge 
but ultimately upon some form of given knowledge. If we accept this 
distinction between necessary (darûri) and acquired (iktisâbî) knowl-
edge, we can call the necessary knowledge and the way it is given 
a source of human knowledge.285 
According to another criterion, all knowledge can be divided into 
'aqliyât and sam'îyât, the knowledge of the 'aqlîyât being based ulti-
mately on the 'aql (intuition), and the knowledge of the sam'îyât being 
based ultimately on the sam' (revelation; literally: hearing).286 Thus 
2 8 1
 See the definition of naf in Mugn! XIV, 34 and the definition of manfa'a in 
Sarh 80 
2 8 2
 See Sarh 80 He gives some examples • it is pleasure (¡adda) when one scratches 
an itch of someone else, gives him some good food in his mouth, or clothes him with a 
very expensive garment It leads to both of them when one gives money to someone else 
to buy whatever he wants It leads to happiness when one guides someone else to 
a treasure. All these examples are concerned with benefit 
In MugnilW, 14 a restriction is made after the définition given above "if it does not 
lead to harm which outweights it" 
2 8 3
 Cf Mugni XIV, 33-34 See also Mugni IV, 15 "a happy (masrûr) subject is only 
happy because he knows, or assumes, or is convinced that a benefit will reach him" 
2 8 4
 See Sarh 80 and Mugni XIV, 34. Harm (darr) is defined by 'Abd al-Jabbâr 
as the opposite of benefit (naf) every pain (sensual), sorrow (mental), or what leads to 
both of them, provided they are not the cause of a benefit which outweights them 
Cf. Mugni XIV, 41. 
2 8 9
 'Abd al-Jabbâr speaks about them as the kinds of "indication" (dolala) See 
e g Sarh 88, where he says that there are four kinds • "fa-'lam ann ad-dalâla arba'a 
hujjat al-'aql wa-1-Kitâb на-s-Sunna wa-l-Ijma". On the same page he calls them dalil 
too. 
2 8 6
 Cf., for instance, Muhil I, 14: "The purpose (garad) of 'aqli is the way to the 
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there are two basic sources of human knowledge : 'aql (intuition) and 
sam' (revelation). 
As we mentioned before,287 intuition is an aggregate of necessary 
and, consequently, "given" knowledge, given directly by God.288 
This leads to the conclusion that not only revelation (sam') but also 
intuition ('aql) directly comes from God. Hence, in the eyes of 'Abd 
al-Jabbâr there is no purely human knowledge; the only thing man 
can do and even has to do (because it belongs to the duties God 
imposed upon him) is to reflect (nazar) upon the knowledge God gave 
to him, and to acquire in this way further knowledge, which is as 
certain as the knowledge God gave to him; this reflection is always 
based upon an "indication" (dalîf) which God has placed for mankind. 
By way of conclusion we say that God gives knowledge to mankind 
in two ways : either directly in the'heart of every single individual—and 
this we call intuition or 'aql—or through His prophets and the 
community of believers—and this we call revelation or sam'—, but 
ultimately all human knowledge is divine. 
'Aql : intuition. Intuition is an aggregate of things known, given by 
God; it forms the basis of our further knowledge because it makes 
possible reflection (nazar), inference (istidlât), and also the execution 
of the duties God imposed upon mankind.289 In the broadest sense 
of the word, it comprises the whole of necessary (darûrî) knowledge, 
but not every detail of this necessary knowledge is really indispensable, 
especially where the knowledge of concrete things (individualia) is 
concerned. To indicate what really is indispensable 'Abd al-Jabbâr uses 
the term "completeness of the intuition" (kamál al-'aqf).290 Without 
the knowledge of a certain amount of individualia, and without the 
knowledge of the ethical qualifications of a certain amount of indivi-
knowledgc of which is the 'aql (intuition), though there can be a difTerence because one 
sometimes reaches it necessarily and sometimes by acquiring The meaning of .ïam'î 
is the way to the knowledge of which is the sam' (revelation); here always inference 
(ічшііаі) is absolutely necessary" 
2 8
" See pp 54 and 82-83. 
2 B e




 Cf pp 55 and 82-83. 
290 çf j o r ^ 5| a n ( : | MUgn¡ χ ι .179-387. I chose the translation "completeness" 
because the term "kamál" is used here to indicate that the intuition concerned 
encompasses every concrete knowledge that is needed to make it complete (it has 
everything that is really necessary); this does not imply a kind of "perfection", but 
rather indicates the indispensable minimum 
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dualia,291 one cannot be really "compos mentis" Çâqif), and the 
intuition ('aqf) cannot be complete, but it is not necessary to know 
all these individualia and their ethical qualifications. We can be 
compos mentis and our intuition can be "complete" without our 
knowing everything that can be known by intuition. To the "com-
pleteness of the intuition" belongs, besides the knowledge of the 
principles of indication,292 general ethical axiomata,293 and other 
things,294 also the knowledge of a number of perceptible295 objects 
(mudrakât). This last form of knowledge forms part of the intuition 
and is given by God, just as is the case with the knowledge of the 
axiomata. Perception (idrâk) does not generate (wallad) this knowledge; 
it is not the cause of this knowledge, but it is nevertheless, as 'Abd 
al-Jabbâr calls it, "a way" to knowledge, a "tariq".296 Therefore we 
reckon it, if we use the term "source" in a broader sense of the word, 
among the sources of human knowledge. 
Idrâk : perception.297 'Abd al-Jabbâr does not define perception {idrâk), 
but he appeals to general human experience, and states that everybody 
knows what it is and also the difference between perception and 
knowledge and between the different kinds of perception.298 He has 
full confidence in the reliability of perception, and it is because of this 
absolute confidence that he can say that perception is a way to knowl-
edge. Against this kind of knowledge no sophism, no argument, no 
doubt is possible; it is necessary knowledge we cannot by any means 
banish from our soul.299. 
2 9 1
 Cf Mugni XI, 380 "Therefore, we did nol deem it necessary that in the subject 
who is compos mentis ('âqil) comes the knowledge of many of the perceptible objects 
(mudrakât) because they have no connection with (are not indispensable for) the 
completeness of the intuition" "therefore, he (the subject who is compos mentis) 
surely musi know what he perceives" MugniXl. 384 "it belongs to the completeness of 
the intuition that one knows some things deemed evil, some things deemed good, and 
some obligatory things" 
2 4 2
 Cf Muhit I, 6-7, not all principles belong to the 'aql, some belong to the îam' 
293
 Cf Mugni XI. 384 for a list ol these general principles 
2 9 4
 Cf 'Abd al-Karîm 'Utmân, \azari\at at-taklîf, 61 
^ Cf M ugni XI, 380 
2 9 6
 Cf eg UugmXl 381 and XII, 59 
2 9 7
 For the discussion of knowledge based on sensory perception, see Bernand. 
Le MIÌOII entre la wlonlé et la spontanéité selon an-\az:ám et al-Oâhiz. SI 39 (1974), 
25-57 
2 9 8
 Cf MugnlW, 81 
2 9 9
 Cf Xfugnl IV, 70 "Know that perception is only connected with an object 
as it is, and Ihercfore it becomes a way (tariq) to knowledge, otherwise, if it was 
not such, it could not be a way to il" and "What proves (уиЬаумп) that it is a way to 
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In the fourth part of the Mugnî 'Abd al-Jabbâr deals in detail with 
perception and especially with seeing,300 and he summarizes many 
of his conclusions in the twelfth part of his Mugnî as follows : "We have 
already explained that perception is a way to knowledge (tarîq li-l-'ilm) 
if the perceiving subject is compos mentis Çâqif), and the perceived 
object no longer has any vagueness.301 We explained that perception 
is not a ma'nâ,302 in which case one could say that it generates 
knowledge; and (we explained also) that it cannot be generated by 
the soundness (sihha) of the eye, or the movement (talqîb) of the 
eyelid, or something else. And (we explained) that the knowledge 
which occurs about the perceived object must be God's act, on His 
initiative (ibtida), although He always makes it when the perceiving 
subject comes to be perceiving."303 
From this description of the perception as a way to knowledge it 
becomes manifest why 'Abd al-Jabbâr so frequently, and so easily, 
appeals to the data of sensory perception as a source of knowledge 
and as one of the main pillars of his theological edifice ; for, perception 
leads to a certain and necessary knowledge, which is guaranteed by 
God Himself. If one really is perceiving (this supposes for a subject 
who perceives by way of his senses that his sensory instruments are 
intact and there is nothing that hinders the perception)304 the object 
knowledge is that one, when perceiving something, is convinced that it is as one 
perceives it to be, one's soul becomes tranquil at it, and one becomes in one way in what 
one is convinced about (one has a firm, unchangeable conviction about it), and to 
examine something one takes refuge to its perception by the senses, and one cannot 
banish this conviction from one's soul by sophisms or doubts (bi-s-subah wa-Iâ 
bi-s-sukûk), so it is certain that it is a way to knowledge" 
3 0 0
 The second section of the fourth part is given to the argumentation that God 
cannot be seen (na/y ar-ru'va), in that context much is said about perception in general 
The section is found in Mugni IV. 33-240 
30
 ' See also Mugni IV, 70-79 For the word "vagueness" in 'Abd al-Jabbâr's text 
labs is used and also ilnbds, which might be translated as "ambiguity" The object must 
be clearly perceptible The perceiver must be "compos mentis", animals, little children, 
and lunatics may perceive without getting any knowledge This is one of the reasons 
why 'Abd al-Jabbâr denies that perception generates knowledge 
302
 The text runs "al-tdrâk lays vamtani' /a-iuí/á/ mnah \imallui al-'ilm" this results 
in a contradiction according to 'Abd al-Jabbâr perception does not generate knowledge 
Basing myself especially on the text of Mugni IV (e.g ρ 50-58), I suggest to read here 
instead of yamtam' • bi-ma'nâ 
103
 Mugni XU, 59 
3 0 4
 God does not perceive by way of senses, consequently. He has no instruments 
which can be afflicted, the hindrances of perception (darkness, a veil, distance, etc) 
are related also to the instruments Therefore, God perceives all perceptible things when 
they exist Man can only perceive by way of his five senses Cf Giugni IV. 36-38 
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¡s clearly perceived, and ohe is also compos mentis ('aqil) so that one 
can have knowledge, God must produce this knowledge. 
Sam* : revelation. For 'Abd al-Jabbâr, knowledge based upon the data 
of divine revelation is not direct knowledge and is not self-evident 
since it must always be based on reflection and inference : at least, one 
has to show that its sources are trustworthy, and in many cases one 
needs an argumentation to deduce the real meaning of the data of 
divine revelation. 
Revealed knowledge, by its very essence, is never necessary knowl-
edge; it is always acquired.305 One must prove its sources to be true, 
and this can only be done by way of a rational argumentation which 
is ultimately based on the human intuition Çaqi). Only then these 
sources can function as real sources. 
Revealed knowledge is based on prophecy and on the information 
transmitted306 by a prophet (rasûl or nabi301), and every discussion 
of the sources of revealed knowledge must start with a discussion of 
prophecy. 'Abd al-Jabbâr's opinion in points of revelation, and his 
thesis that these have to be proved by argumentation become manifest 
in the way in which he arranges his chapters on revelation and 
prophecy in the Mugni.308 First, he shows that prophecy can be good 
(hasan) and consequently is possible; then he shows that prophecy is 
necessary and obligatory (wájib) for God. After this introduction, 
which is entirely based on data furnished by human intuition and 
reflection upon these data, he comes to the question of how we can 
305
 See, e g , Muhit I, 14 
3 0 6
 Hourani (Islamic Rationalism, 26) uses this aspect of revelation, its being 
transmitted by a prophet, to translate sam'i, he uses the word "transmitted" 'Abd 
al-Jabbâr's own terminology expresses the way in which it is mostly received (by 
hearing) 
307
 'Abd al-Jabbâr comes to the conclusion that these two words are coextensive, 
though in both cases a different aspect of the function of the prophet is emphasized, 
cf Sarh 567 and Mugni XV, 9-19 The rasûl is the man God has sent to mankind, the 
word nabi is differently explained according to its etymology if it goes back to the 
root nb' (to inform), he is the man who brings God's information to mankind, but 
if it is brought back to the root nftit, it indicates "high rank" and "greatness" Cf 
Mugni XV, 16-19 
308
 In his introduction to the fifteenth part of the Mugni, he gives a short 
description of the order in which he arranged his materials (Mugni XV, 7-8), he 
distinguishes among three sections (ajnäs, literally "kinds") The first is about the 
possibility of prophetic missions and the obligation (nujûh) of this mission, the second 
about the occurring of such a mission and the way one recognizes it (miracles), 
and the third about Muhammad's being a prophet and the details of the Islamic 
revelation 
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recognize true prophets, and how we can know that Muhammad 
is a true prophet, and that the "information" transmitted by him forms 
a source of knowledge. The criterion he gives here, the showing of 
a miracle, is a rational criterion. The whole arrangement of this argu-
mentation, from possibility and necessity to the reality, shows his 
efforts to base revelation and revealed knowledge on the necessary 
knowledge of the intuition, and so to make it as cogent and inevitable 
for all human beings, also for his unbelieving opponents, as the direct 
data of the intuition. 
Revelation is good (hasan) because309 there are things we cannot 
in any way know without this supplementory information given by 
God and transmitted by prophets. These things we cannot know, 
neither by necessary knowledge nor by acquired knowledge based on 
intuition; nevertheless, it may be for our benefit to know them. 'Abd 
al-Jabbâr deals with this question when speaking about the taklif, 
the duties God imposes, and his attention is directed mainly to the 
"sana", the divine legislation. It contains rules for human behaviour, 
which are for the benefit of mankind, but which we cannot know by 
reflection upon the data of intuition. 
"It is stipulated in the intuition of every subject who is compos 
mentis that it is obligatory to repulse harm from the soul; it also 
is certain that what urges to (do) the obligatory and averts from 
(doing) what is evil is by all means obligatory, and that what averts 
from (doing) the obligatory and urges to (do) the evil is by all means 
evil. If that is correct, and we admit that there are acts by doing which 
we come closer to the execution of the obligatory things and the 
avoidance of things deemed evil, and acts by doing which we are in 
the opposite situation, and if it does not fall under the power of the 
intuition to know that and to know the difference between what is 
benefit and favour (maslaha wa-lutj) and what is not so, God makes 
3 C
' 'Abd al-Jabbâr records in Mugni XV, 19-21 a discussion between Abu 'All 
and Abu Hâaim about the way in which God's revelation must occur to be good. The 
principle remains and is accepted by both participants that there must be no evil 
in it and, to make it really good, there must be some "purpose" (¿arad) in this reve-
lation. (This argumentation was originally directed against the Brahmans, who stated 
that there was always an aspect of evil in every form of revelation). The question disputed 
by the Mu'tazili theologians was whether God reveals things which are already known 
through human intuition, or has His revelation a strictly separate field of its own? 
When God reveals things which are already known by intuition, with the purpose, for 
instance, to affirm these things or to stimulate man to do acts he already knew to be 
obligatory by means of his intuition, would not such a revelation be superfluous {'abat) 
and therefore evil (qabih)"! 
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us know without any doubt the state (Λα/) of these a c t s . . . " 3 1 0 Such 
things as have been mentioned in this text from 'Abd al-Jabbâr's 
Sarh, where he has in mind, for instance, the ceremonies of the haj/ 
(the pilgrimage) and the prayer3 ' ' and, in general, things which are 
for the benefit of man because they help him fulfil his duties and 
so acquire reward from God,312 form the contents of divine revelation. 
If this is the case, it would be evil when God did not let us know these 
things because according to 'Abd al-Jabbâr God's taklif, His imposing 
duties, makes it obligatory for Him to give man all he needs to fulfil 
these duties.313 And because it is impossible to know these things by 
necessary knowledge and by acquired knowledge based on the intuition, 
God has to send a prophet to us and prove that that man is a prophet 
by a "sign" Çalam), a miracle, which is an indication of his trust-
worthiness.31* This prophet can give us the information we need, and 
his information functions as a source of knowledge. 
For 'Abd al-Jabbâr the message of Muhammad, which has been 
confirmed and authorized by God Himself by way of miracles, becomes, 
in consequence of these miracles, a source of knowledge. But here 
again, and now for the last time, the assistance of human argumen-
tation based on intuition has to be invoked to distinguish real miracles, 
and to furnish the criteria to do so. 
Etymologically spoken (/7 l-luga) a mu'jiz (the Arabic word used 
here, and rendered by us as "miracle") is he who makes someone else 
J 1 0
 Sarh 564 Here 'Abd al-Jabbâr immediately concludes to God being obliged to 
send prophets In the Mugni he deals with all these questions separately, these things 
(described in Mugni XV, 19-23) cannot be known by necessary knowledge (p 23-26) 
or by inference based on intuition (istidlál 'aqli, ρ 26-29) 
3 1 1
 Cf Sarh 563 See also Mugni XV, 30-50 
3 , 2
 According to the text of the Mugni (XV, 30) especially acts which lead to other 
acts, he uses here the verb da'á, to invite, and he continues that an act can only invite to 
perform another act on the condition that the relation between the two acts is known 
And therefore we need divine revelation 
3 1 3
 Cf Mugni XI, 426-432, especially ρ 431 
3 , 4
 Cf, e g , Mugni XV, 17-18, where the various signs and indications which point 
to someone being a prophet are given "Know that there must be a message he 
bears, authorized by God, he must accept that and make up his mind to carry it 
out in as far as he has to do it, he must endure everything that forms an obstacle of 
it When he bears that (message) and does what we mentioned, he must proclaim the 
message as such and invite the (people) to whom he was sent to accept it from 
him In that case God will show for him what forms an indication for his state (of being 
a prophet) in order that U becomes a duty for the others to accept (it) from him, by 
showing a miracle which indicates that they are the people to which he is sent 
(literally for a matter which goes back to the one to whom is sent) and not only that he 
is a prophet" (Mugni XV, 17) 
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unable (man yu'jiz al-gayr); used as a terminus technicus <Jì l-mustalah 
'alayh), however, it is used for the act which indicates the truthfulness 
of him who claims to be a prophet. It resembles the etymological 
meaning since human beings are unable to produce what happens in 
this way, and so it is as if it makes them unable.31 ^ 
'Abd al-Jabbâr mentions five criteria, five conditions which have 
to be fulfilled to make an act a miracle ·316 it must come from God 
or has such a quality that it presents itself as if it comes from God,317 
it must occur following the claim of him who claims to be a prophet,318 
it must correspond to that claim, it must break the "usage" (al-'âda),319 
the normal course of events in this world,320 and it must come from 
someone who performs it and is just and wise (Jail 'adi hakim) because 
only in that case the authorization proves the truth of the message.321 
One can distinguish between two kinds of miracles, two ways in 
which God can indicate that a prophet is to be trusted, and that 
a message really is His message.322 He may do it through the message 
315
 Cf Sarh 568 The etymological meaning of a word is always very importanl for 
'Abd al-Jabbâr, when dealing with the miraculous character of the Qur'ân (in Arabic 
l'jâ:, literally "to make unable"), he strongly emphasizes this meaning 
116
 In this summing up I follow the text of the Éarh, which mentions these five 
criteria In the Mugnl 'Abd al-Jabbâr deals with the characteristics of the miracles in 
XV, 168-181, he expressly mentions two criteria (Mugni XV, 171), which are the first 
and fourth among the criteria mentioned in the Sarh. but the other three are also 
mentioned in the Mugni Cf Sarh 569-572 ' 
3 , 7
 Sarh 569 The addition "or has such a quality that it presents itself as if it 
comes from God" is made by 'Abd al-Jabbâr because some miracles consist in the 
fact that a man who has power over the genus of an act but not over a special manner 
in which it occurs nevertheless performs it by a special assistance from God 
3 1 8
 Sarh 569 A sign which preceded the claim cannot be an indication for the 
claim 
3 1 9
 About the meaning of this 'âda or "usage", see especially Mugnl XV, 182-196 
This "usage" is concerned not with the acts of human beings, but with God's acts, 
it is the normal course of events in this world, which is changed by God alone 
It corresponds, qua contents, with what we call the laws of nature As an example 
of such a usage 'Abd al-Jabbâr mentions that the sun rises in the east and sets in the 
west God alone can change this usage, and that is a miracle Sec Sarh 570 
320
 Sarh 570 The edition reads "that it is breaking the usage of him in whose midst 
(it is)" (li-'âdal man havn zahránayh) In a note as a variant is given li-l-'âda, in 
that case we render "that it is breaking the usage in the midst of it (the world as it 
goes)" 
321
 Sarh 571 This condition is not given by 'Abd al-Jabbâr in the same series with 
the other four This fifth condition constitutes, as it were, ihc basis of the other four 
Only when we know that the one who works the miracle is reliable and wise, can 
we know that it is a miracle in the sense 'Abd al-Jabbâr has given lo this word 
an indication to the truthfulness of the prophet 
322
 Cf Mugni XV, 164 'Abd al-Jabbâr first proves here by way of a taqsim (division) 
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(kitâb) itself, by creating it so that it is a miracle (mu'/i:) and fulfils 
the five conditions mentioned above, or He may confirm the claim 
of the prophet by other miracles, which we could call "circumstantial" 
Muhammad's claim that he is God's prophet and the bearer of a 
message coming from God is confirmed by miracles of both kinds 
The message itself, the Qur'ân, is a miracle, it even is the greatest and 
most important miracle indicating Muhammad's truthfulness because 
it surpasses the human possibilities in its eloquence (jaiâha) It is 
mujiz it "makes unable", other beings are unable to come forward 
with something similar to it, which they really made themselves and 
not by way of imitation or reproduction of the Qur'ân 3 2 3 This brings 
us to the much discussed problem of the "l'jâz al-Qur'ân", the inimi-
tabihty of the Qur'ân 'Abd al-Jabbâr consecrates many pages to this 
subject, showing in which way the Qur'ân is inimitable, the way in 
which one can prove that it is so, and how it is an indication (daliï) 
to the truthfulness of Muhammad and of his claim that he is God's 
prophet3 2 4 But this question falls outside the scope of our present 
study For our purpose it suffices to say that the Qur'ân is a miracle, 
and in this way an indication (dalli) to Muhammad's truthfulness 
Besides the inimitabihty of the message itself, God has also shown 
other miracles, circumstantial miracles, to confirm Muhammad's claim 
that he really is God's prophet These miracles too, and the way in 
which they constitute an indication, are dealt with in detail by 'Abd 
al-Jabbâr325 
Because of all these miracles, we know that the message of Mu-
hammad and other things he said are sources of knowledge, and 
constitute what 'Abd al-Jabbâr calls "sam"', revelation 
The principle of indication (asl ad-dalâlà) in matters of revelation 
and revealed knowledge is, as we have seen, that we know who is the one 
who gives us this information that it is God Himself, who is wise 
that God can only indicate someone to be His prophet by way of a miracle This miracle 
is either in the message itself or connected with it 
3 2 3
 See Mugni VII, 187-208, where 'Abd al-Jabbâr treats the hikâya, the reproduction 
of the speech of someone else, and argues that the inimitabihty of the Qur an is not 
concerned with such a reproduction, but only with the real making, the 'invention" 
{iktira) of it 
3 2 4
 When 'Abd al-Jabbâr in part sixteen of the Mugni gives his proofs for the 
prophetship of Muhammad, he devotes nearly all the pages he composes on this 
subject to the inimitabihty of the Qur'ân, so the edited text of this part bears, wrongly 
but understandably, the title "l'jâz al-Qur'ân" See Mugni XVI, 143 406 
3 1 5
 Cf Mugni XVI, 407-423 and Sarh 595-597 
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—and consequently knows the truth—, and just—and consequently 
cannot deceive—. The fact that it is God who gives us the information 
concerned, is the guarantee that it is true. 'Abd al-Jabbâr calls this 
principle : "the knowledge of who informs by the information" (al-'Urn 
bi-mukbir al-ikbâr or al-akbâr).326 
In the field of 'aqlîyât, knowledge based ultimately on human intui-
tion, there is only one "indication" (dalil), the human intuition itself;327 
in the field of sam'îyât, revealed knowledge, however, three different 
"indications" or sources are distinguished by 'Abd al-Jabbâr : the 
Qur'ân, the "5ип«а" or "way" of the prophet, and the "Ijma", the 
general consensus of the Islamic community.3 2 8 On these three sources 
the totality of our revealed knowledge is based. 3 2 9 
Qur'ân : This is the message (kifâb)330 the prophet Muhammad trans-
mitted from God to the people to whom he was sent. It is the speech 
(kalâm) of God Himself. When we know that it is God's speech and 
that God is just and wise, we know His speech to be a source of 
knowledge; then the Qur'ân can function as an indication (dalil) on 
which man should reflect to acquire further knowledge.331 
The truthfulness of the text of the Qur'ân has been proved by 'Abd 
al-Jabbâr by means of a rational argumentation based on the data 
of the human intuition ('aql) : from his insight into the structures 
and laws of our world, he concluded that there must be a God, and, 
always by means of rational argumentation, he deduced the qualities 
of this God and the necessity of His revelation. Finally, he recognized 
this revelation in the mission of Muhammad and in the Qur'ân he 
transmitted. 
Consequently, it is not possible to use the Qur'ân as an indication 
, 2 6
 C f MuhU I, 7 
3 2 7
 Cf Sarh 88 See our pages 9.1 and 92 
3 2 e
 СГ Sarh 88 
3 2 9
 Other sources as "qi\â4', "analogy", generally mentioned in this series are 
according to 'Abd al-Jabbâr not separate sources, but fall under the three sources 
mentioned by him and recorded in our text. 
* Cf Sarh 88 In Mugni XVII, 275, however, qtväs is called an "indication" (dalit) 
in the Sar'hai 
3 3 0
 The term used by 'Abd al-Jabbâr in this context, "kuâh", which is translated as 
"message", is more general than the term "Qur'ân" It is used for the message of every 
prophet But because the Qur'ân fulfils and even can abrogate what is said in the former 
prophecies (cf XVI, 49-142, where an entire section of that part of the Mugni is 
devoted to this subject), in fact for 'Abd al-Jabbâr the message meant here is the 
Qur'ân 
3 3 1
 Cf с g V i e w X V l l , 93 Π" and Sarh 88 
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to God's existence and to His qualities or to the basic structures of 
our world and the qualities of substances. All this has been used to 
prove the truthfulness of the Qur'ân, and to use the Qur'ân as an 
indication to it would be going the other way round, from the 
derived to the basic knowledge, from the far' to the as/.332 In this 
way it would constitute a circular reasoning. 
Nevertheless, the Qur'ân speaks about these things, but, 'Abd al-
Jabbâr says, when it does so, this does not constitute a real indication; 
it only gives a confirmation (ta kid) of what was already known by 
intuition.333 It is the way in which 'Abd al-Jabbâr arranges his argu-
mentations when not sam'iyât but 'aqlîyât are concerned : he proves 
the truth of his own theses by way of rational argumentation based on 
intuition only, and at the end he quotes texts from the Qur'ân to 
confirm his statements. 
But, besides this "confirming" function of the Qur'ân, it really 
indicates other things; it constitutes an indication (dalîl) to things which 
are not yet known by intuition and reflection upon this intuition. These 
things are summarized by 'Abd al-Jabbâr as follows : 
"From all this follows that the message only indicates by way of 
free choice.334 If it indicates by way of information, it indicates what 
was and what will be and is as it were absent (al-gayb : the world of 
God, which is not here and hidden for mankind); it indicates the 
qualities of acts so that one knows by it that they are obligatory or 
evil etc. ; it indicates what is connected with these qualities such as the 
cause (sahab), intrinsic cause ('ilia), condition (sart), time (waqt) etc., 
as we will explain. What is not information, but resembles a command 
or prohibition (amr or naliy), only indicates the qualities of the acts; 
the promise and the threat (al-wa'd wa-1-wa'îd) also come under this 
head because they both indicate His choice to do what is deserved 
by the person under His obligation. We have, indeed, explained that 
the doing of reward is known by intuition, but the doing of the 
punishment of him who deserves it is known only by revelation, because 
3 3 2
 Cf M ugni XVII, 9.4 and Sarh 88 
3 3 3
 Cf Mugn! XVII. 94; 'Abd al-Jabbâr refers here to the introduction of his book 
Mulasâbili al-Qur'ân, cf. its edition pp. 1-5 
3 3 4
 The indication "by way of free choice" is one of the three ways in which 
something can be an indication which indicates something else Sec ρ 67 · because we 
know that God is just and wise, we know that what he chooses in His free choice must 
be good and must be true In fact, what is meant here is the fourth way of "indication" 
given by 'Abd al-Jabbâr, which resembles the third one, but is only applicable to 
revealed knowledge 
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it would be possible—considered from the point of view of the 
intuition—to drop and to forgive it."335 
In this way the Qur'ân forms an indication (dalîF), especially in 
moral questions. But not every verse (âya, sign) of the Qur'ân forms 
an indication in itself; some verses need something else which has to 
be linked with it (a "qarina") to constitute together the indication. 
A verse which is clear, which constitutes an indication by itself, and 
by its form or external sense alone reveals its meaning is called 
"muhkam", "precise".336 A verse which needs а "дагта" to consti­
tute an indication, and which does not reveal its real meaning by its 
external sense alone is called "mutasâbih", "obscure".337 The qarîna 
which is needed to reveal its real meaning may itself be revealed—a 
part of the Qur'ân, a datum from the Sunna or the Ijma—or it may 
be something based upon human intuition, something 'aqli.338 This 
leads to the necessity of interpreting the Qur'ân, which has become in 
Islam a science of its own ; 'Abd al-Jabbâr himself wrote books in this 
field of science, some of which have survived until our days.339 
Sunna : the "way" of the prophet.340 This term comprises everything 
Muhammad has said besides his transmitting the Qur'ân, or has been 
silent about, everything he has done or omitted, everything he has 
approved or rejected. The Sunna is the second of the three revealed 
indications, the three sources of revealed knowledge.341 Its truthfulness 
is based upon the knowledge that the Sunna is the way of the prophet 
and that the prophet is just and wise and, consequently, has to be 
trusted. That the prophet is just and wise forms the subject of disputes 
among Muslim theologians on the "qualities of the prophet" (sifât 
ar-rasûf). The point of view which we find in 'Abd al-Jabbâr's works 
3 3 5
 MugniXVU, 94 
3:)f
' In Sarh 600 he gives the following definition of muhkam "ma ahkam al-
murâd bi-zahmh", "what precisely gives the meaning by its external sense" See also 
M ugni XVII. 81, where 'Abd al-Jabbâr refers lo what he said in VI ugni XVI 
3 3 7
 Cf Sarh 600, where he gives the following definition of muta\âbih "ma lam 
\uhkim al murad bi-zâhinh, bal \ahlâi ft dähk ilâ qar'ma" "what docs not precisely give 
the meaning bv its external sense, but needs therefore something to be connected 
with it" 
3 3 8
 Cf MugniXVU, 81-86 and Sarh 600 
3 3 9
 These books arc Tanzih al-Qur'ân 'an al-matâ'in, Mulaiâbih al-Qur'ân, and in 
a less strict sense also Tatbil dalail an-nubm\ a Cf the short description of these books 
on pp 11-13 
•
,40
 Instead of the word as-Swma, also the combinations Smnat an-nabi. Sunna! 
аг-гачШ, or similar expressions are used 
3
' " See, e g , Sarh 88 and 600 and our page 91 
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is that it is God's purpose that the mission of the prophet is accepted 
by mankind; therefore He must avoid all that may harm this accep-
tance, and make His prophet an ideal of human goodness so that he 
is just and wise and trustworthy. This argumentation forms the basis 
of the Sunna. 'Abd al-Jabbâr puts it as follows : "The prophet must be 
absolutely free from everything which is repelling (al-munafßrat), be 
it great or small ; for the purpose of his mission is only favour and 
benefits for mankind, and what is (conceived) thus must be made by 
its instigator {mukallif; God, who imposes it) in the most effective way. 
Therefore God must absolutely, as we have said, avert from His 
prophet what repels (his hearers) from accepting out of his hands (the 
message), for, if He would not avert from him what is thus (repelling), 
the acceptance out of his hands would not occur. And because man 
to whom it is directed (al-mukallaf) only comes closer to it in the 
way we mentioned, God must avert for them (the prophets) all other 
things which play a part in the (process of) repelling."342 "The entire 
Islamic community is agreed that who is sent is surely better (afdaf) 
than who is not sent."343 
Ijmâ' : Consensus.344 This term is generally used to indicate that the 
agreement of the entire Muslim community in a certain age constitutes 
an indication, a source of knowledge, when it concerns religious 
matters; such a "//ma'" has to be accepted by all Muslims, also those 
of later ages.345 
'Abd al-Jabbâr states that this term is used for every agreement 
between people about a certain thing which is to be the object of their 
consensus, on the condition that it is expressly and intentionally made 
in this way.346 There are two kinds of Consensus : Consensus of the 
whole community (the common people and the erudite) when it 
concerns matters which everybody can think about, or Consensus 
3 4 2
 Sarh 573. 
3 4 3
 Sarh 576. СГ. Mugni XV, 279-316, especially ρ 278-279 for a list of some of 
these qualities which characterize a prophet. 
1 4 4
 See especially the two articles M Bernand wrote about the /jmâ' in the works 
of 'Abd al-Jabbâr: L'igmâ' the: 'Abd al-Cabbâr et l'objection d'an-Nazzâm, SI 30 
(1969), 27-38; Nouvelles remarques sur l'igma chez le qâdi 'Abd al-Gabbâr, Arabua 19 
(1972), 78-85 See also Mugni WW, 153-245. 
3 4 5
 Cf. Hourani, The Basis oj Authority of Consensus m Sunnite Islam, SI 21 (1964) 
13-60. 
3 4 6
 Cf Mugni XVII, 153: "the occurring of an agreement (musâraka) with each 
other in what is described as their consensus, what is so is qualified as consensus when 
it comes from them on purpose and intentionally" 
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of only the erudite ('ulama) when technical points or decisions are 
at stake.347 
It is not possible to base the value of the Consensus on a rational 
argumentation, nor is it confirmed by God through special miracles; 
the only basis it has is the Qur'ân and the Sunna : these two sources 
of revealed knowledge indicate that also the Consensus (Ijma) is a 
source and indication of revealed knowledge.348 
347
 Cf Mugni XVII, 243 
348
 This question is examined, with all its consequences, by Madame Bernand. Cf. 
the two articles mentioned in note 344 See also Sarh 89, where 'Abd al-Jabbâr states that 
the truthfulness of the Consensus can only be based upon the Qur'ân and the Sunna. 
В. COSMOLOGY 
Like other Mu'tazila, 'Abd al-Jabbâr at bottom is a theologian; 
the studies he made, the books he wrote are really theological works. 
He is not a philosopher, nor primarily interested in metaphysics; 
his books must not and cannot be read as a description of the cosmos, 
the world in which we live. His main attention is directed towards God 
and towards His relationship with man and the answer man gives 
to God. The world is the place of God's absence (He is in "al-gayb", 
the other world), but which at the same time is the field where we 
gather the indications (dala if) which lead us, if we reflect upon them, 
to knowledge about God ; the world also is the place where we believe 
in God, and where we serve Him. 
But, notwithstanding all this, 'Abd al-Jabbâr's theology is based 
upon a firm foundation of insight into the structures of our world. 
It even is exactly because the cosmos furnishes the indications we 
need for our reflection, and which point to God, and because - ac-
cording to 'Abd al-Jabbâr—man needs the use of his intellectual 
faculties to arrive even at the smallest amount of knowledge about 
God, that an insight into the structures of the cosmos is absolutely 
necessary. 
In 'Abd al-Jabbâr's theological works, an underlying metaphysical 
doctrine is discernible, which sometimes comes to the surface and 
is expressly dealt with. This is the case when he discusses the way in 
which a reflecting human subject, starting from these structures, finally 
arrives at the knowledge of God;1 it also appears when he deals with 
the way in which we express our knowledge about God in terms we 
use for the description of our world too.2 Now the importance of these 
underlying metaphysics for the structures and the expression of his 
theological doctrine becomes immediately manifest. 
These metaphysics are not of his own making; he has his place 
1
 How we can—and must—acquire knowledge about God is described by 'Abd 
al-Jabbâr in Muhil I, 28-93 and in Sarh 89-122 The corresponding part of the 
Mugni (it is highly probable that this subject was treated in one of the first parts of the 
Mugn! as it is found m the beginning of the Muhil and the Sarh) is missing. 
2
 When 'Abd al-Jabbâr deals with God's qualities, his argumentation is based 
upon the meaning and the function of these qualities in the cosmos (Muhtt I, 97-226 and 
Sarh 151-298; the latter part of these discussions is preserved in Mugni IV and V) 
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in the tradition of the Mu'tazila, and his metaphysics are a continua-
tion and adaptation of the line of this tradition of religious and 
metaphysical thinking We must credit him with the fact that he 
consistently and systematically used these basic metaphysical data, 
every time 'Abd al-Jabbâr appeals to the structures of the cosmos m his 
theological argumentation, it becomes clear that there is a meta-
physical substrate, the result of a real reflection upon the world 
Because, according to the metaphysics of our cosmos as seen by 
'Abd al-Jabbâr, the world is existent and can be divided into substances 
and accidents, I shall deal successively with existence, with substances, 
with accidents, and with the relation between substances and accidents 
1 EXISTENCE 
When first we direct our attention to the most fundamental struc-
tures of the world, to the most basic qualification we can give to the 
cosmos, we call the cosmos "manjûd muhdat" or, more basically yet, 
"manjûd hâdif\ the second terms (muhdat and hâdil) being a stricter 
determination of the contents of the first one (mawjûd) The cosmos 
is existent (maujûd) but not from all eternity, it once began to exist 
(hâdit) 
Existence being the most fundamental quality of all existent things, 
the primary distinction 'Abd al-Jabbâr makes is that between what is 
existent and what is non-existent, between al-mawjûd and al-madûm 
Mawjûd : existent The meaning of this word is self-evident, says 'Abd 
al-Jabbâr, it belongs to the human intuition (it is ma qui) Therefore 
it is not necessary to explain or to define it, it suffices to point to 
the experience every human being has, and that experience is the 
knowledge that what we perceive is existent This knowledge is 
necessary Not all existent things are, however, perceptible, besides the 
perceived or perceptible things (al-mudrakât), there ate other existent 
things (manjûdât) the existence of which we can only know by acquired 
knowledge and, consequently, by argumentation and inference 3 
3
 Cf Muhil I, 131 and Éarh 176 The most general term, comprising both the 
existent and the non-existent, is "thing" (iay', plural aiyá'), this term is applied to 
everything that can be known and about which information can be given (Sarh 221), 
but some discussion arose as to its use to indicate God God is existent, but we cannot 
know Him by necessary knowledge, we can only know Him and His existence through 
argumentation and inierence (isndlâl) 
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Because the term "mawjûcT' itself is evident, it is even not possible 
to define it because a definition must, by its very essence, be clearer 
and more revealing than the term to be defined;4 it is, however, not 
possible to find a term or a description which in fact is more revealing 
than the simple word mawjüd.5 Nevertheless, in the Sarh 'Abd al-Jabbâr 
gives a definition of mawjûd, a definition rejected by his disciple 
Mânkdîm, who wrote the published version of this work on the 
dictation of 'Abd al-Jabbâr. The definition mentioned runs : "what 
is characterized by a quality at which appear the qualities and judge-
ments {tazhar 'mdahâ s-sifât wa-1-ahkâm)".ь When something is exis­
tent, the quality of its essence ("what it is") appears, and by it also 
other qualities by which the thing concerned is characterized; one 
can say that this is made possible by its being existent.7 The crux of 
this definition or description lies in the meaning of the term "zahar", 
to appear. 'Abd al-Jabbâr uses a non-technical term, probably on 
purpose, to leave the manner in which these qualities "appear" as 
vague as possible. What 'Abd al-Jabbâr exactly has in mind when 
using this term mawjûd, will become manifest when we look into the 
meaning of its opposite "ma'dum", non-existent, and the way he 
describes it. 
Ma'dûm : non-existent.8 This concept is not meant by 'Abd al-Jabbâr 
to be the absolute contrary of mawjûd ; not everything, possible or not, 
4
 See pp 76-78, where we have given the conditions which have to be fulfilled to make 
a definition correct Cf also Muhil I, 133, where it is stated that the definition must 
be "more lucid" (awdah) than the term to be defined, and Sarh 176, where it is said 
to be "more manifest" (azhar), "more disclosing" (aksaf), and "more lucid" (awdah) 
5
 'Abd al-Jabbâr rejects the definition given by his teacher Abu 'Abdallah al-Basrî 
and by "our teachers from Bagdad" This definition has that mawjûd is "what is and 
stands firm" (al-kâ'in at-tábit) According to 'Abd al-Jabbâr, this definition is less clear 
than the term to be defined, the terms kam and tábit are coextensive so that one is 
superfluous, and not every existent thing is also kâ'm See Sarh 175-176 
6
 See Sarh 176 About the composition of the Sarh see ρ 13 Mânkdîm adds 
"Although this is true, it is not correct to give this as a definition because it is more 
complicated (askal) than our term mawjûd, and it belongs to the essence of a definition 
that it is more manifest than it (the term to be defined). Therefore, it is better not to 
define al-mawjûd by way of a definition because our term mawjûd is more disclosing 
and more lucid than everything he mentions in its definition" 
7
 See Muhit I, 135-136. Something existent cannot be existent by an accident 
"existence" (wujûd), it is existent because someone made it: it is existent "because of 
an acting subject" (bi-jâ'it) 
8
 See especially Muhit I, 133-138 and Sarh 175-181. 
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conceivable or not, that is not existent is ma dûm non-existent.9 So our 
English translation (like also the Arabic word) may be confusing.10 
Ma'dum is not the purely possible, not everything one might imagine 
or conceive, but it is the really possible, the metaphysically possible. Its 
existence cannot be in all circumstances incompatible with the con-
clusions of the human intellect. Al-ma'dwn is what can exist under 
certain circumstances, but in fact now does not exist. Therefore, 
a second god besides God is not non-existent because we know that 
there can be only one God; so also annihilation (fana') is not non-
existent, although it is not existent, because this is a purely negative 
concept which under no circumstances can exist.11 And, since in this 
world only substances and accidents exist, only substances and acci-
dents can be non-existent. 
'Abd al-Jabbâr in his definition emphasizes another aspect of this 
non-existence by saying that al-ma'dûm is "al-ma'lûm allodi lays bi-
mawjûd" : what is known, or knowable, and is not existent.12 This 
implies that God knows all ma'dûmât, all non-existent things, for He 
knows everything that can be known because He is essentially knowing 
and not knowing by knowledge as human beings are.13 So, what 'Abd 
al-Jabbâr places special emphasis upon is that all non-existent things 
are already known, even when they do not exist. This implies that they 
already have a kind of "essence" : they can be described and they 
can be used in an argumentation as 'Abd al-Jabbâr often does. They 
are "known" (ma'Iûm) in the strict sense which this word has for 'Abd 
al-Jabbâr : they are known with certainty. They are known by human 
beings, either because they once existed,14 or because they are known 
9
 Cf Sarh 176-177 
10
 One might be lempted to translate the word ma'dûm as "absent" and manjûd 
as "present" This translation corresponds with a normal use of these words and seems 
to be confirmed by the combination ma'dum 'an (see Sarh 102) On studying the text of 
'Abd al-Jabbâr, one becomes convinced that these words are used indeed in a meta-
physical and not in a physical context so thai the correct translation must be in 
terms of existence and not in terms of presence 
" Sarh 177 
12
 The text of this definition is found in Sarh 176 The participle (ma'Iûm) can 
have both meanings what in fact is known and what can be known 
13
 We discuss this question in more detail when we deal with God's qualities in 
our paragraph on 'Abd al-Jabbâr"s theodicy Cf pp 241-243 
14
 The definition given by 'Abd al-Jabbâr's teacher Abu 'Abdallah al-Basrî is 
rejected by his disciple because in his opinion this definition comprises only the ma'dûmât 
which once did exist, it reads the non-existent is "the lacking (al-muntaf!) which is not 
being nor standing firm" For 'Abd al-Jabbâr the use of the word muntafi implies that 
the thing in question did exist before Cf Sarh 176 
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by argumentation as metaphysically possible things. They are meta-
physically possible and only need the producing act of an able subject 
to come into existence and to be in fact what they are. 
Kâ'in : being (in space). The meaning of this word, the participle of the 
verb "kâiï\ to be, in the works of 'Abd al-Jabbâr is fully determined 
by the importance of etymology and other linguistic arguments through-
out his rational argumentations. He is convinced that the structures of 
language and the structures of reality run parallel with each other. 
Consequently, just as a human being is 'âlim (knowing) by 'Urn 
(knowledge), just as he is murîd (willing) by irâda (will), just as he is 
nâzir (reflecting) by nazar (reflection)—and many other instances may 
be mentioned where 'Abd al-Jabbâr combines in this way the active 
participle and the infinitive of a verb to describe structures in this 
world—the same human being (and other beings too) is käin by 
kawn. The meaning of this term "kawn", handed down to him by the 
Mu'tazilî tradition,15 makes him define kâ'in (being) as "being in a 
given place", "occupying a given amount and form of imaginary space". 
"Kain, he says, is only used for a substance which originates in a 
(occupying a given amount of) place."16 
So, it becomes evident that this word käin, which can be translated 
very literally as "ens", does not correspond with the meaning of "ens" 
in our European Scholastic tradition, nor with the meaning of our 
term "a being". Besides the fact that käin can be used only for 
a being which occupies a place, there is yet another difference between 
the two terms. The word being or "ens" is too static to use it as a 
translation for käin; the Arabic verb kán expresses both the beginning 
and the continuation of what we call "to be" : it expresses both 
"becoming" and "being". According to 'Abd al-Jabbâr, this word 
when used without further determination means "beginning"; used in 
combination with one of the four "akwm" (modes of being),17 it can 
become a more static term.18 The inchoative character of this term 
15
 bor a discussion of the term kawn, sec later in this paragraph, where we speak 
about the accidents, the акмап are for 'Abd al-Jabbâr the accidents which determine 
the situation of a substance in space 
16
 See Sarh 176 "al-kam mnamâ vuita'mal β /-/ан/шг (iliadi hasal /7 hay viz" 
See also Muhit I, 33 
1 1
 Cf note 15 The four "modes" of being in space are movement, immobility, 
combination, and separation See Muhit I, 33 
1 8
 See Muhit I, 33 "Sometimes we call it kann without addition because it exists 
as beginning Ubtitla), not after something else, this is only the case in the existent 
thing at the moment of the coming into existence of the substance (hâl huclût al-/anhar)" 
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is also found in the use of the verb "originate" in the quotation given 
above; 'Abd al-Jabbâr uses there the verb "hasaP'. 
Concluding : kain is used only for substances which occupy place 
(not for accidents, not for things that do not occupy place) and 
expresses especially their becoming in that place. "A body is surely 
'spatial' {mutahayyiz) at its existence; it can only be spatial if it is 
'being' {kam), and it is only 'being' (kam) by a 'mode of being' 
{kawn)".i9 
Inside the category of existent things (al-mawjûdât) one should make 
a further distinction between things the existence of which had a 
beginning and things the existence of which did not have a beginning. 
It is the doctrine of 'Abd al-Jabbâr that the whole of our cosmos did 
not exist from all eternity and is not eternal (qadîm); it once came 
into existence : it is "hâda". This coming into existence, moreover, 
had a cause, someone who produced and made; our cosmos is muhdat 
and mafúl. And if it is God who made something by His decision 
(taqdîr), it is also maklûq, created. 
Hâdit: coming into existence, temporal.20 For 'Abd al-Jabbâr this 
term hâdit is the absolute contracy of the term qadlm (eternal); 
together these two terms cover all existent things; every existent thing 
is either eternal or temporal, there is no third possibility, and nothing 
can have both qualifications. The reason is that this division is a yes-no 
division, which necessarily is complete, and where no third possibility 
can be imagined.21 
The difference between what is eternal (qadîm) and what is temporal 
{hâdit) is expressed by 'Abd al-Jabbâr in different ways : whereas 
eternal {qadîm) is something existent "the existence of which has no 
" Sarh 112 
2 0
 'Abd al-Jabbâr docs not make a clear distinction between the terms hmlit (the 
active participle of the first Torrn of the verb hadat) and muhdat (the passive participle 
of the fourth form) This may be influenced by the fact that both terms are co-
extensive СГ Sarh 114 "al-hádit »a-l-muhdal mtá '" Tntton. The Speeih of God. Sf 
36 (1972). 8 makes a distinction between hâdit and mahdût (this is the passive participle 
of the first form, the first form being intransitive, we probably have to read here muhdat), 
and renders these two terms respectively as "coming into being" and "brought into 
being" 
21
 Muhit I, 138 "The intuitively known diMsion supposes in the existent thing 
that its existence is either from a first or not from a first, that is a hesitation (taraddud) 
between denying and establishing (no or yes) In what is thus no medium (between these 
two) is conceivable" See also our pp 72-74 
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first"22, "the existence of which is not from a first",23 or "for which 
non-existence is not admittable (possible)",24 "temporal" (hâdit) is 
described as its contrary and said to be something existent "the 
existence of which has a first", "the existence of which is from a first", 
or "for which non-existence is admittable". 
The term hâdit has for 'Abd al-Jabbâr a double meaning; originally 
the verb "hadat" indicates : to occur or to happen.25 As a technical 
term it is used—and especially the verbal noun "hudût" and the active 
participle "hâdit" have this technical meaning—for the "coming into 
existence" of something, "the momentary state of coming into exis-
tence".26 In a more remote sense, it is used also—and this is very 
frequently done--for the result of this coming into existence: the 
temporal being; in this case "huduf means "the existence of something 
after it was not",27 and "hâdit" something that exists now, but once 
did not exist. This twofold meaning of the term, as used by 'Abd 
al-Jabbâr, may lead, depending on the context, to a translation as 
"coming into existence" or as "temporal". 
The whole of our world, which is built up from substances which 
carry accidents,28 is temporal (hâdit). This point, which evidently is 
of the greatest importance for theology, is proved by 'Abd al-Jabbâr 
both in his Sarh and in his Muhit,29 while the corresponding part of 
the Mugnî is missing. 
That the accidents {arad) are temporal is, according to 'Abd al-
Jabbâr's ideas as they are expressed in the Sarh, very simple to prove : 
accidents can be non-existent (ma'dum); in fact they disappear and 
fall into non-existence whenever their opposite (didd) comes into 
existence, and we, human beings, can even in some cases be the cause 
of this, for instance in the case of movement and immobility. Because 
non-existence is not possible for what is eternal, the accidents must be 
22
 Sarh 181 • "ma la an wal lt-wujûdih" 
2:>
 Muhit I, 138 "an yakûn »ujûduh 'an awwal aw la 'an awwal". 
2,1
 Sarh 93 "i/ad labal annah yajû: 'alayh al-'adam na-1-bullán, Ha-l-qa<Hm la yajüz 
'alayh al-'adam на-1-butlân". 
2 5
 See, e.g., Frank, Metaphysics, 13. 
26
 Sarh 100: "hâlat al-hudût" 
^ Sarh 100 " . . wujûdah ba'd an lam yakun". 
28
 Fora discussion of "substances" (/an har; pi. jawähir) and "accidents" ('arad, pi.. 
a'râd) sec the corresponding sections of this paragraph. 
29
 Cf Sarh 89-122 and Muhit I, 28-67 Because a necessary knowledge of God is 
not possible, this remains for 'Abd al-Jabbâr the only way to come to an acquired 
knowledge of God. 
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temporal.30 In his Muhit 'Abd al-Jabbâr realizes, however, that this 
argumentation is not as simple as it appears to be; many arguments 
against it are brought into the field by his opponents, and because 
they are based on entirely different views upon the essence of the 
accidents, they are not easy to refute.31 This is one of the reasons 
why he starts there with an argumentation to prove that bodies (ajsâm) 
and not accidents are temporal.32 
In his argumentation, which indeed is very detailed, aimed at demon-
strating that bodies are temporal,33 'Abd al-Jabbâr starts from the 
body's being in space. That a body is in space, occupies an amount 
of (imaginary) space, is evident by force of its essence; a body is 
defined as "what is characterized by length, breadth and depth",34 
and this implies that it occupies space. This has as consequence that it 
is moving or immobile, combined or separated, for these qualifications 
are given to existent things in their being in space. The body is thus 
(moving or immobile, combined or separated) because of ma'ání which 
are called—in this case—akwân, "modes of being (in space)"; there 
are four akwân : movement, immobility, combination, and separation.35 
These modes of being (akwân) are not eternal but temporal because it 
is possible for them to be non-existent, whereas this is not possible 
for what is eternal.36 And because a body cannot exist without these 
3 0
 See Sarh 93-94. 
31
 Sec Muhil I, 29 some consider the accidents to be an expression (t'ubar) about 
the bodies, others say that they happen from the nature of the substrate in which they exist, 
and others again that they do not come into existence and fall into non-existence, but 
that they are hidden or appear (the doctrine about the "китйп" and "zuhúr" and 
the "interpénétration" of bodies, the so-called "mudâkala", of which especially an-Na7zâm 
was a propagator, can be seen as an alternative for the doctrine of substances and 
accidents) 
32
 Other reasons given in Muhit I, 29 are · the argumentation to prove that the bodies 
are temporal comprises also the knowledge that the accidents are temporal, the 
temporality of the bodies has to be known to prove God's umcity and uniqueness 
Ua»Md) 
3 3
 This argumentation is found in Sarh 95-118 and in Muhit I, 32-67 Both works 
give argumentations which run in their general outlines parallel with one another 
3
* See, e g , Mugni VII, 6 
35
 Cf Muhit I, 32-46 See also Sarh 112 and the translation on our ρ 110 In both 
the Sarh and the Muhit 'Abd al-Jabbâr argues by way of a division (taqsim) that the 
body only can be moving etc because of a maná which here is a kawn 
He proves that there is no other reason why a body can be moving etc This taqsim 
is translated on our pages 73 and 74, the example used by 'Abd al-Jabbâr in that 
argumentation is the "combination", one of the four акнап 
3 6
 Cf Muhit I, 49-55 What is eternal is eternal because of its essence (li-dâtih or 
li-nafsih), and therefore it cannot be non-existent (see, e g , Sarh 107) That the аЫап 
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temporal modes of being (akwân), it must be itself temporal too.37 This 
argument, which was current among Mu'tazilî scholars, was—according 
to the indications given by 'Abd al-Jabbâr—first used by Abu 1-
Hudayl.38 
When 'Abd al-Jabbâr in this way has proved that the bodies are 
temporal, he continues his argumentation showing that they must have 
been produced and made; because human beings do not have the 
power to produce bodies, they must have been made by someone 
else, by God. When he has proved further God's uniqueness, always 
by way of arguments based on human intuition, he can conclude that 
besides God nothing can be eternal so that everything in our world 
must be temporal. 
Muhdat : produced, brought into existence 39 Our dealing with the 
terms hâdit and muhdat under two different headings may suggest a 
clear distinction between the two terms, which in fact is not present in 
can be non-existent is evident because it is known by experience We see that something, 
if it becomes immobile, is no longer moving The канп "movement" cannot remain 
in its place, it cannot disappear by transition to another place, and, consequently, it must 
disappear by falling into non-existence It is the only remaining possibility See, e g , 
Sarh 104-106 
3
" See Muhit I, 55-56 That a body cannot be without these modes of being (я/сиan) 
becomes apparent from its impossibility at this moment We know that now bodies 
cannot exist without akwân, consequently, they can never exist without them For the 
conclusion, see Muhit I, 57-67 
38
 See Sarh 95 The argument is summarized by 'Abd al-Jabbâr as follows "The 
bodies were never without the temporal things (al-hanâdil) and did not precede them, 
and what was not free from a produced thing (muhdat) which it preceded, must be 
produced (muhdat) just as that (thing)" In the text of the Sarh 'Abd al-Jabbâr gives two 
more arguments to prove that the bodies arc temporal, both arguments being based 
upon the being temporal of the accidents, in these cases the arguments for the 
temporality of the accidents precede In both cases he argues from this datum that 
God must exist, be unique, and be just Then the two arguments separate, the 
first continues that this proves that the revelation is trustworthy, also when it says 
that the bodies are temporal, the second deduces that there can be no second eternal 
thing besides God, for that thing would be like God and that is impossible, consequently, 
the bodies cannot be eternal and must be temporal The argument 'Abd al-Jabbâr 
prefers is the argument given in our text Cf Sarh 94-95 
39
 Various English words are used to translate the term muhdat and the words related 
to it, such as the verb ahdat, the verbal noun thdât, and the active participle muhdit 
Hourani (Ethics, 37) translates "generated" (a word I use to render the Arabic 
verb Hallad) and explains it as "an event coming into existence after non-existence" 
Tntton, Speech of God. 5, renders it as "originated", and so does Watt (Formative 
Period, 282) "originated in time, that is, kána ba'd an lam yakun, it existed after it did 
not exist", and because 'Abd al-Jabbâr also uses it as an equivalent of "hâdit", he 
also translates it as "temporal" (Formative Period, 245) Rosenthal (Knowledge 
Triumphant, 128) docs not reach the right solution when he makes it an equivalent of 
maklûq and translates it as "created" 
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'Abd al-Jabbâr's works. The term muhdat is generally used as an 
equivalent to hâdit and as the contrary of qadîm, "eternal" 4 0 Although 
the grammatical form of the word is a passive participle, and although 
one might 'Abd al-Jabbâr expect to say that something being produced 
already implies that there is a producer, he states that "one may know 
that something produced is produced (temporal) without knowing that 
it has a producer".41 Nevertheless, it is his conviction that all that is 
produced {muhdat) or temporal (hâdit) has a producer (muhdit). 
In his argumentation that every temporal thing in fact is brought 
into existence and is produced {muhdat)*2 and therefore needs a 
subject who has once brought it into existence and produced it 
(a "muhdit" or "producer"), 'Abd al-Jabbâr again finds his starting-
point in the evidences of human experience.43 He appeals to our 
experience that whatever comes into existence from our side, from 
our free choice {tasarrufâtunâ), and especially the four "modes of 
being" {akwân), needs us in order to come into existence. It is known 
by necessary knowledge that an act (//'/) needs an acting subject (/a';/)44 
What comes into existence from our side needs us because our state 
{hâlunâ), the state in which we are, has influence {ta'tîr) upon that 
thing. We discover this because it happens according to our motives 
{dawai)*5 and intentions {qusûd); but also in other cases we can 
conclude that such a thing happens according to our state.46 This 
influence we have upon the thing coming into existence shows that it 
needs us. 
But for what does it need us? 'Abd al-Jabbâr says : it needs us to 
4 0
 See note 20 and the text from Sarh 114 we quoted there "al-hâdit na-l-muhdat 
siwâ"\ "'temporal and produced are the same" 
4 1
 See Sarh 324-325 " ann al-muhdat yu'lam muhdatan »α-m lam yu'lam ann lah 
muhditan' 
4 2
 I use here the word muhdat not in the general sense of "temporal", but as the 
passive participle of the verb ahdat, to bring into existence Every time I make a distinction 
between hâdil and muhdat, it will be the distinction between "temporal" and "brought 
into existence", independently of the less strict use of both terms in the works of 
'Abd al-Jabbâr 
4 3
 See Muhit I, 68-93 and Èarh 118-119 
4 4
 "The knowledge of the connection between the act and its actor (fäilih), this is 
the knowledge, in general ('alâ tariq al-jumla), of the coming into existence from the 
side of the actor and (the knowledge) of its (viz the act's) need for him (viz the 
actor)" Muhit I, 69 "The knowledge that this act is characterized by it m a way in which 
it is not characterized by something else, is necessary (knowledge)" Muhit I, 70 
4 5
 These motives are described by 'Abd al-Jabbâr in Muhit I, 70 
4 6
 See Muhit I, 71-72, where he deals with the acts of the unconscious person, 
who can nevertheless act and bring into existence 
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come into existence (/7 l-hudût). He gives two arguments; First, we 
know that it needs us because it happens according to our intention; 
at the same time we know that what happens according to our 
intention is its coming into existence (hudût).*1 Another argument 
is given as follows : we know—by necessary knowledge—that every 
act needs an acting subject; that must be because of something all 
acts have in common and that can only be their coming into existence 
(hudût)*8 
Thus we know that everything that comes into existence from our 
side needs us in order to come into existence, needs us as "muhdit", 
the subject who brings it into existence. By way of analogy (qiyâs), 
we can deduce that everything that comes into existence needs a 
muhdit. In this analogy the 'ilia (the intrinsic cause of the judgement 
or quality) is the hudût, the judgement or quality caused by it is that 
it needs a muhdit. Everything that has the same 'ilia must have the 
same hukm, what has the same intrinsic cause is entitled to the same 
judgement. Consequently, everything that has the 'dia "hudût" and 
comes into existence must necessarily need a muhdit, a subject who 
brings it into existence and produces it. 
Mafûl : done, made.49 'Abd al-Jabbâr does not make a distinction 
between the act (al-ß'f) and what is done (al-mafûl); what the subject 
really "does" is not more than to bring into existence a substance or 
accident that was non-existent. This substance or accident is now called 
an act or made (Ji'l or mafûl). Thus 'Abd al-Jabbâr calls the bodies 
(ajsâm) God's acts (a/al Allah). Mostly he uses the term fì'l, in some 
cases also the term mafûl (done, made). Thus he calls the Qur'ân both 
"God's act" and "done by Him".50 
4 7
 "The indication that it needs us in the coming into existence (β l-hudût) is that 
by the (same) thing by which we know the need (for us), it is certain that the aspect of 
the need is the coming into existence Don't you see that what originates (yatajaddad 
instead of yatahaddad) at our intention and motives is the "coming into existence" 
(hudût)·*" Muhit I, 73 Cf Sarh 118-119 
*• Cf. Muhit I, 73 and Sarh 119 What all things can have in common and is 
consequently not attributable to the genera or the qualities of the genera, is "existence", 
"non-existence", and "coming into existence" For the first two the things do not need 
us, therefore, it must be the third 
4 9
 'Abd al-Jabbâr discusses the essence of "acts" at the beginning of Mugni VI/1, 
further especially in Muhit I, 229-230 and Sarh 324-325 
50
 For an enumeration of all kinds of acts which do fall under our ability (qudra) or 
do not and therefore must be God's acts, see e g the discussions on page 90 of the 
Sarh The Qur'ân is called mafûl, in Mugni П, 3, and it is called one of God's acts 
(afâl) in Mugni VII, 208. 
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An act is "a temporal thing originating from an able subject",51 
but to include also acts which come into being or remain after 
the death of the doer (fail) or after he became no longer able to do 
it by some other reason, a better way to put it, is "what comes into 
existence, and something else was able to (do) it",52 or what "exists 
from the side of one who was able to (do) it".53 So there cannot be any 
doubt : every act is temporal hâdit. 'Abd al-Jabbâr not only defines 
"acts" by way of "temporal things", but in his discussions of the 
subject he expressly excludes what is "non-existent" (ma'duni) and 
"eternal" (qadlm), so that only the temporal (hâdit) remains.54 
But the question remains, whether there is a difference between the 
two qualifications muhdat and mafûl, and if so, what difference.55 
Is there a difference in the meaning of both terms, or is there a 
difference in their extension? 
In his Sarh 'Abd al-Jabbâr mentions a difference qua meaning : 
"There is a difference between muhdat (produced) and ji'l (act) : one 
may know that something produced is produced without knowing that 
it has a producer (muhdit). This is not the case with the act; if one 
knows it to be an act, one knows that it has a doer (fa il), although one 
51
 " V/á rahstil min qádir mm al-hmiadit", Sarh 324 
52
 "Ma hadai i\a-kân al-ga\r qâdiran 'alaih", Muhit I, 229 There are three ways 
in which an act can be done by direct immediate production (iklirâ', possible only for 
God), directly (mubdsaralan), or by way of generating (tanlid), m this last case the 
result may appear after a lapse of time See, for instance, the example of the shooting 
of an arrow which after some moments hits the target Cf Sarh 223 To iqclude the case 
that the shooting subject becomes unable or dies between his shooting and the arrow 
hitting the target, the addition in the definition is made But more than here, it is the 
case in acts which remain, e g , the writing of someone, which remains after the death 
of the person who wrote 
51
 "ни/id min ¡ihat man kân qâdiran 'ala\li", Mugni VI 1, 5 The use of the verb 
им/к/ (lo exist) emphasizes that acts can remain and that the act is for 'Abd al-Jabbâr 
that which is done In the other definitions the verbs hadat and hasal are used, 
which indicate the moment of coming into existence rather than its consequence, the 
temporal existence 
^ Cf »ugni VI 1. 5 
55
 Hourani, biluci, 37 thinks that there is a difference between muhdat and /Г/, 
also qua extension '"It is not enough to define it (an act) as something generated 
(muhdat), an event coming into existence after non-existence This is a necessary 
condition of its being an act, but to differentiate an act from other generated things, 
we must mention its specific relation to another being that it arises from a purposive 
being with ability to do or not to do it. in modern terminology a free agent" This 
is not 'Abd al-Jabbàr's point of view Cf e g , Muhit I, 76, where 'Abd al-Jabbâr states 
that the intention (and purpose) is not necessary, but that our act is everything which 
occurs according to our stales (ahnâlmà), also without motives See also what we 
said on pp 88-89 about neutral acts 
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may not know him individually."56 So, qua meaning, the difTerence 
between the two terms is a difference between the knowledge expressed 
by them : if we know the temporal thing to have a relation with an 
able subject who "did" it, a "doer", we call it an act; so long as we 
do not know that, or deny that, we can call it muhdat (produced) 
but not //"/ (act) or mafûl (done). 
For some of 'Abd al-Jabbâr's opponents there is also a difference 
qua extension between the terms muhdat and fi'l; they are the people 
who state that a "nature" can produce something, or a "necessitating 
power";57 for them there are temporal things which do not come 
from an able subject. 'Abd al-Jabbâr denies this. Nothing can produce 
without having been able; an act may occur without a strict intention, 
without knowledge, but it has to correspond with the "state" {hai) 
of a producing subject. Therefore, "one must say that a produced 
thing (muhdat) indicates the producer, the doer",58 and "when we 
find a produced thing which (to make) is not possible for able subjects 
in this world, it must certainly have a connection with an able 
subject who is different from us (and 'Abd al-Jabbâr will prove that 
this subject must be God)."59 In consequence, we conclude that for 
'Abd al-Jabbâr the qualifications muhdat and mafûl are coextensive 
and, therefore, that the whole of our world, besides being existent 
{mawjud), temporal (hâdit), and produced {muhdat), is also made or 
done (mafûl). 
Maklûq : created.60 The entire discussion around the terms kalq and 
maklûq is for 'Abd al-Jabbâr a matter of the past. He remarks that it is 
a dispute about terminology, not about concepts and their contents.61 
Qua meaning, these words do not express anything new or anything 
special. The only reason why 'Abd al-Jabbâr gives it some (not very 
much) attention is because of the central place these terms were given 
in the fierce disputes about the nature of the Qur'ân, held in former 
,ft
 Sec Sarh .124-325 
57
 Cf Muhit 1. 229. these people <ire. respectively, the a\häh at-tuba ΐ or n.ituralists 
and the Mujbira or Jabriya 
5 8
 "fa-ia/ib an \iiqal inn al-muhdal \αώιΙ1 'ala l-mahdtl αΙ-/αιΓ'. Muhit I, 229. 
^ Uuhit I. 230 
^
0
 See in particular the discussions of God"s speech and the Qur an. especially in 
Wugni VII. 208-223, Muhit I. 345-346. and Sarh 548-549. 
*' Muhit I. 345: "hâtjà l-fasl kalâm /ί l-'thâra на та vata'allaq bt-l-ma'nâ" 
(this chapter concerns terminology and has no connection with "meaning"). But 
"because people were so сгагу about discussions of creation and created, our teachers 
spoke about it too" (Sarh 548) 
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ages. It is significant that he deals with the terms kalq and maklûq 
in his chapter on God's speech and the Qur'ân, but only in the form 
of some casual remarks.62 It is mainly because of the historical im-
portance of these qualifications that he deals with them at all; the 
concept in itself does not have a place of its own in 'Abd al-Jabbâr's 
theological system. 
The definitions he gives seem to be, at first sight, rather obscure. 
Thus he states that creation (kalq) is determination (taqdir); and 
"created" (maklûq) is, according to the definition he gives, "the act 
which is determined (muqaddar) by the purpose and the motive which 
correspond with it, in a way that nothing is added to it and nothing is 
lacking from it."63 How does he arrive at these—to say the least—not 
very clear definitions? In accordance with his starting-point, every 
term which is metaphorically used must in some case be used literally, 
in its real meaning (bi-l-haqiqa); moreover, if it is a term which is 
used both for the other world and for our world, the real meaning, 
the original meaning, has to be looked for in our world.64 The original 
meaning of the term kalq is found by 'Abd al-Jabbâr in the technical 
vocabulary of the manufacture of leather • the word is used there for 
the measuring of leather before it is cut; instead of the term kalq also 
the verb qaddar and the verbal noun taqdìr are used. In this way 
'Abd al-Jabbâr comes to his definition which makes kalq an equivalent 
of taqdir.65 
61
 The object of the chapters in question is to show that God's speech is His act 
and that it is not eternal The casuality of the remarks about its being created appears 
most manifestly in the text of the Sarh pp 548-549 
63
 This definition is given in Sarh 548 The Mugni (VII, 208) says that maklûq is 
"what happens in the way of determination" (kawmihâ (sc , al-a/'ál) »âqùitan 'alâ sabil 
at-taqdir"). and the Muhit describes it as "the act which occurs in a kind of determination, 
corresponding to the need" The central term in all 'Abd al-Jabbâr's definitions evidently 
іь the taqdir determination or measuring 
'"
,
 This question is elaborated in Mugni VII. 209-210 "When it is certain that it 
(this term) is communicative, it must without any doubt in some case be real because 
a term cannot be (always) metaphonc without reality, the fact that it is permitted to use 
a term metaphorically supposes that it has a reality and is used outside its own context 
to communicate something else than for what it was made" (Mugni VII, 208) "A name 
exists first on the basis of (mm) this world, either in what we know or in what we are 
convinced about, afterwards it is applied to the other world" (Mugni VII, 210) 
6 5
 Cf Л/исш' VII, 208-223 passim In this chapter 'Abd al-Jabbâr discusses the 
different explanations which had been given to this term kalq These are to produce 
immediately (iktira . the meaning given by the Mujbira), to produce immediately with 
a certain quality (iktira 'ala s//a, the doctrine ol Abu 'All, the w/i/ concerned being 
its being muqaddar. determined) an act from God (some Mu'ta/ila from the school of 
Bagdad), untruth and lie, manufactured (ma'muf), or the measuring of leather alone 
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Hence we can call every act which is done "muqaddar" ("determined" 
or "measured") maklûq, and every subject who does such an act can 
be called kâliq. This implies that we call all God's acts created ; He does 
all his acts "measured" and "determined". As for human beings, they 
too can do "determined" acts and create (just as they can "create" 
leather), but according to religious usage based on revelation we do 
not use the word kâliq without any addition for a human being, nor the 
word maklûq without any addition for human acts. That does not 
mean, however, that human beings do not create things.66 
By way of conclusion : all temporal things which are made by 
God—and according to 'Abd al-Jabbàr these are all bodies and many 
of the accidents—are mawjûd, hâdit, muhdat, mafûl, and maklûq 
(existent, temporal, produced, made, created), whereas the qualification 
"created" is normally not given to our human acts. 
2. SUBSTANCES 
Jawhar: substance.67 Our world, which is a composite aggregate of 
individual material things, in which change is possible while the things 
in question keep their own individuality, shows an element of perma-
nence as well as an element of change. This view of the world is 
expressed metaphysically in the thesis that the world is composed of 
a material substrate, which is so undetermined that it can be trans-
formed even in a so radical way as happens in the burning of wood 
where the wood changes into fire, and second, of accidents, which form 
the changing element, and which give the things their outer, changing, 
appearance.68 But because 'Abd al-Jabbâr's philosophy is never purely 
metaphysical, but tends always to be the expression of a physical 
reality, this division coincides in his doctrine with a physical world 
All these alternative solutions are successively discussed and rejected The enumeration 
is given in Mugni VII, 209 The alternatives are discussed in Mugni VII, 210-215 
66
 Cf Mugni Vìi. 212 
*
7
 The part of the Mugni where one could expect more ample discussion about 
this object (most probably part III) is missing Discussions are found in the chapters 
where 'Abd al-Jabbâr refutes the thesis that God is a body Sarh 217-230 and Muhll I, 
197-201. Sec also 'Abd al-Karim 'Ulmân, Nazamat al-iakli/, 117-128 
For further literature, see especially A Hiram. Die atomiîlisihe Subitanzenlehre aus 
dem Buch der Slreil/ragen zwischen Basrensern und Bagdaden\ern. Berlin 1902, Pincs, 
Beitrage zur islamischen Atomenlelire, Berlin 1936, О Pret/I. Die fruluslamiuhe Atomen­
lehre, Der Islam 19 (1931), 117-130, Frank, Metaphysics, 13-16 
6 8
 See, e g . Sarh 230-231 
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view which sees the world as composed of separate atoms which are 
brought together in composites to constitute material bodies 
A substance, by its being pure materiality, from itself has only 
a small number of qualities,69 all related to the concept of "mate-
riality" Besides its being a substance, it can be existent (man/ûd). 
When it exists, it is spatial (mutahayyiz) This is the most characteristic 
quality of a substance because this is the meaning of materiality being 
in space When a substance is spatial, it is "being" (kam)—a word 
'Abd al-Jabbâr uses, as we have seen, for the being in space alone— 
and it can only be "being" (kam) by a "mode of being" (kawn) 
Therefore, the essential quality of a substance, its being in space 
(tahayyuz), necessitates that it always is either moving or immobile, 
either combined or separated, and consequently has the corresponding 
akwân 70 
Substances, constituting the element of permanence in our world, 
remain Once they are brought into existence, they are permanent 
and remain themselves 7 ' 
Our experience shows that human beings, and other material beings, 
are not able to produce substances We can only change them—and 
that is a question of accidents, which constitute the element of change -
but we cannot bring them into existence Because they are produced 
and brought into existence, together with our inability to do that, it 
must be done by someone else, who can only be God.72 
All substances are similar (mutamâtila) because they have the same 
essential quality, their being spatial (tahayyuz) This has as a con-
sequence that what is necessary for a given substance in every situation 
must be necessary for every substance in every situation; what is 
6 9
 'Abd al-Karîm 'Ulmân (Nazarhal at-lakli/, 119) mentions four qualities (îifât) 
'aì-janliari\a ua-t-lahawuz на-1-Mujûd на-l-kaynûna fi jihat ma' its "being a sub-
stance", its 'being spatial", its ' existence", and its "being in a direction" Evidently, 
it has these qualities only when it exists because, according to Sarh 219, a substance can 
also be non-existent, and in that case it is not spatial (Read on page 219 of the 
Sarh, line 16 mutahawiz instead of mutamayyiz) When a substance is non-existent, it 




 Sarh 210-231, where substances are called bâqiya tâbita, "remaining and standing 
firm" See also Mugni VII, 24 
72
 Substances cannot produce themselves, for in that case they would be able when 
they are still non-existent, and that is not possible Consequently, they are produced by 
someone else This cannot be a human being, someone who is "able by an ability" 
(qâdir bi-qudra), for that would imply "that one of us could create the possessions 
and sons he wants, and we know that that is not the case" Therefore, God produced 
them See Sarh 119 
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песеььагу for a given substance under certain conditions, what is 
possible or impossible for it, must be necessary under those conditions, 
be possible or impossible for all other substances too 7 3 
Substances are "bearers" or "'substrates" of accidents, some accidents 
can exist in every substance, others need a certain composite whole 
of substances, a body, to exist in it, so, for instance, the accident 
"life" not every substance on its own can bear the accident "life", 
but only a certain compositum 7 4 
The term "substance" being a metaphysical terminus technicus, indi­
cating the element of permanence and the element that can bear acci­
dents, its relation to the physical term juz' (atom) is not explicitly 
defined. Hence, a substance may be one or more atoms Although 
the term ¡aw har occurs in Islamic and Mu'tazilî theology to indicate 
the jaw har fard or atom, I myself did not find instances in the works 
of 'Abd al-Jabbâr where he uses the wordyau/mr in this way 
Juz' (plural a/:â'). atom 7 5 We have spoken until this moment on 
a metaphysical level, we now come to the physical level, the structure 
of the concrete material world Here 'Abd al-Jabbâr agrees with most 
Mu'tazilî thinkers that the world is ultimately built from "atoms" 
(ajza), the smallest possible parts which cannot be divided again 
73
 Cf Sarh 219 when a substance is a substance in c\ery state (hai) all substances 
must be thus when it is "spatial" (cf note 69) on the condition of its existence, all 
substances must be thus, when it is possible that it is (kam) in another condition than 
it is now it is possible for all substances, and when it is not possible for a substance to 
be at the same time in the direction in which it is and in another direction, this must be 
impossible for all other substances too 
'* About the substance as a bearer of accidents, see, e g , Mugnî VII, 25 About the 
actual possibility to bear certain accidents as, e g , life or knowledge, see Sarh 220, 
where 'Abd al-Jabbar speaks about "bodies' (a/iam), but the same holds true of 
substances "A body bears what it bears because of its being spatial, and "being 
spatial (tahtiwu:) is surely present (jáhil) in all bodies Consequently, every body can 
surely bear something similar to what another bears, it can even (bear) the same 
individual (accident) as the other as we shall say about "composition" (la'Hf) As lor 
what you (the opponent) mentioned about inorganic bodies and living beings (al-/amâd 
ua-l-ha)\) (viz that inorganic bodies cannot bear the accident ' life"), that is because 
life needs a special structure to exist, built from flesh and blood, and inorganic bodies 
are not thus, it is not because the substrate could not bear it (life)" The last word (yahla-
miluhumä) is better read as y ahlamiluhâ 
Ίί
 Among Muslim thinkers fierce discussions have taken place around the various 
forms of "atomism" and their implications I leave these discussions outside my 
present study because the entire question of the existence and essence of atoms does not 
seem to be of great importance to the forming of 'Abd al-Jabbâr's theological world-
view Suffice for the moment to refer to the lines 'Abd al-Karîm 'Utmân has given 
to the subject Nazarlvat at-takHf, 120-122 
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Human beings are not able to divide a material being into its atoms, 
but God can do so b> taking away all combinations between the 
atoms and so separating them But He too cannot divide them again, 
therefore they are called "«/-/wr' alladì là yataiazza", the indivisible 
component But it remains a substance (jawliar), which is spatial (muta-
hayyiz), is characterized by the "modes of being" (aknân), and can 
bear some accidents So the atom is for 'Abd al-Jabbâr not a logical 
necessity, but an actual possibility 
Jism : body The word "body" (jism) is, like the word "atom" (/г/г'), 
originally a term which indicates a physical reality It indicates the 
concrete material beings we meet in this world, the beings which are 
ultimately divisible into their atoms Therefore, because it indicates 
a physical reality, 'Abd al-Jabbâr defines it by a definition, not derived 
from a philosophical vocabulary, but from the vocabulary of general 
everyday speech (/? l-luga) a body is "what is characterized by length, 
breadth, and depth"76 or "what is long, broad, and deep" 77 
A body (jism), to be long, broad, and deep, must be composed of 
at least eight atoms, two constituting its length, two more to constitute 
its breadth, and again four more to constitute its depth, thus they 
form what we would call a cube 78 
The, originally physical, concept of "body" melts, however, with 
the metaphysical concept of "substance" (jaw har). And so 'Abd 
al-Jabbâr says about bodies the same things he says about substances 
He mentions both these concepts together and even moves in the 
course of his argumentation from the one word to the other 79 And, 
consequently, he concludes that bodies are bearers of accidents and 
constitute substrates in which accidents can exist,80 bodies are spatial 
(mutahayyiz) and must have "modes of being" (akwân)*1 bodies are 
all similar to each other;82 bodies are created by God and are 
76
 Mugni VII, 6 
77
 Sarh 217 "ma yakûn tanîlan 'aridan 'amiqan' 
~
a
 See Sarh 217 " two points originate opposite the looking subject and this 
is called length or a line— and two other points originate on the right and the left on the 
side of the first two—so breadth results and it is called a surface or a plane , then above 
them four atoms, similar to them, originate—and depth results and the eight atoms 
thus arranged are called a body 
79
 Sarh 217-220 
8 0
 Mugni И, 25 
8 1
 Muhit I, 197 and Sarh 220 
8 2
 In Muhit I, 198 two arguments for their being similar (tamätul) are given, first, 
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permanent (bâqf),63 for 'Abd al-Jabbâr they constitute the principal 
indication of the existence of God, their producer, maker, and creator 
Mahall : substrate Mahall is another name for a substance or a body 
This term indicates the substance or body in as far as it is the place 
m which a certain accident inheres The substance is called in that 
case "the substrate of this concrete accident" {mahall al-'arad) Con-
sequently, the term substrate always indicates a relationship 
This substrate can be a single atom (we have seen that some acci-
dents can exist in a single atom), a composite of some atoms, or even 
an organic body, in that case it is called a "jumla", an aggregate of 
various substances All depends on what the accident concerned needs 
in its substrate to exist and to inhere {hall) in it Movement, for 
instance, only needs a single atom as a substrate, composition needs 
more atoms, one may discuss what sound and speech need in their 
substrate 8 4 Finally, it is evident that the accidents of a living being 
require an accurately composed body, although one may ask in certain 
cases what especially is their substrate, so, e g , knowledge does not 
inhere in the hand, its substrate is only the human heart8 5 
3 ACCIDENTS 
'Arad : accident After mentioning the physical analysis of the world 
and its division into bodies which are composed of and divisible into 
their smallest elements, the atoms {ajza), we now return to the meta-
physical level 
Everything that comes into being in our world—and that, conse-
quently, is produced and made, and in this way called by 'Abd al-Jabbâr 
"acts" or afâl—shows an element of permanence and an element of 
change The first we called "substance" {jauhar), the second we call 
"accident" {'arad), or, because even this element of change needs a 
plurality, "the accidents" {al-a'râd) 8 6 
they are all spatial (mutahayyiz) and this belongs to their most specific qualities, when 
two things have a so characteristic quality in common they are similar 
Second two difTerent substances may be mixed up when one perceives them (note 
read iltibâs instead of al-qiyâs in line 10), this can only be caused by their similarity 
8 3
 See e g , MuRnì VII, 24 
·* See Mugm VII 31-42 
8 5
 See, e g , Sarti 220 
8 6
 See, e g , MuhU I, 28 "wa kuil al-haHâdit là takruj an an takûn janâhir аи 
a'radon" 
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Because they are the element of change in a world which funda-
mentally remains the same, they must always be connected with a sub-
stance which constitutes the element of permanence This is expressed 
by the thesis that an accident normally inheres in (hall) a substance and 
does not exist without a substance 87 Consequently, an accident cannot 
inhere in another accident because every change in our world happens 
on the basis of a permanent substrate The accident, being the element 
of change in the world, is defined by 'Abd al-Jabbâr accordingly as 
"what happens (ya'nd) in the existence and does not have to remain 
in the manner substances and bodies remain";88 this means that it 
only lasts for some time and can fall back or be brought back into 
non-existence, in the case of substances, however, this is not possible 
'Abd al-Jabbâr distinguishes between several genera (ajnâs) of acci-
dents, which he brings together in some broader categories. I mention 
here some of these divisions into categories of genera, since I hope 
that these divisions may elucidate 'Abd al-Jabbâr's metaphysical inten-
tions whenever he uses the word "accidents" 
The first distinction 'Abd al-Jabbâr makes is between accidents 
which are perceptible, and consequently known by necessary knowl-
edge,89 and accidents which are imperceptible and can only be known 
by way of reflection and inference 90 According to the text of the 
Saih, in which 'Abd al-Jabbâr is far more concrete m his description 
B7
 For the distubiions, —centred especially upon the essence of the divine will— 
whether an accident can exist without a substrate on the condition that it necessitates 
a "state" (han for a living being sec for instance, M ugni VII, 26-40 
8a
 Cf Sarh 240 This definition (ma ui'nd fi l-uu/úii na-lá \ajib lahltih ka-labl al-
lawâliir iia-l-ajuim) is based upon the meaning of the verb 'arm/ and ils dematives in the 
socabulary of non-tcthnical Arabic ' Know that accident ('arad) originally means in 
the (common) language what happens (\a'niD in the existence and does not remain 
for a long time independently of its being a body or an accident Therefore one 
sa\s about a cloud that it is 'ami (according to Lane, 2011 various descriptions of this 
term are given all lending in the same direction, for instance a collection of clouds 
appearing or presenting itsell, or extending sideways in the hori/on) and also is said 
the world is a present and frail good ('artul htuhr), the righteous and the unrighteous cat 
thereof (cf also Lane 2008 who gi\es the translation quoted above and observes 
that it is a tradition indicating that the goods of this world have no permanence)" 
To the text of the definition is added in (he manner substances and bodies remain" 
because accidents may remain for some time, but never in the same manner as 
substances do When a substance is brought into existence, U remains and stays firm 
(¡ahn) whereas accidents which remain can nevertheless be annihilated and fall back 
into non-exislence by the production of their opposiles 
"'' For the relation between perception and the necessary knowledge, created in 
that case by God, sec pp 9.1-95 
•^ See Sarh 92-91 
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and enumeration of the accidents than in the text of the Muhit, one 
can distinguish seven genera or seven kinds of perceptible accidents; 
these are : colours, tastes, odours, warmth, coldness, pains, and 
sounds.91 These are genera (ajnâs) of accidents, which implies that they 
can be subdivided. Thus under the heading of "colours" the various 
varieties of colours are mentioned, and—according to 'Abd al-Jabbâr— 
under the heading of "sounds" also the category of speech. 
Other accidents are imperceptible, but their presence can be deduced 
from the possibility of change in our world; we know that a given 
substance or body is in a certain "state" (hâi) at this moment, while we 
know that this state is related to the changing element in the world and 
not to the element of permanence, because of our knowledge that the 
substance or body concerned could also be not in that state. Because 
this is related to the element of change, which 'Abd al-Jabbâr called 
"a'râd" (accidents), he deduces the presence of an accident in the sub-
stance concerned which is the cause of the possibility of change. Con-
sequently, this accident must not be seen as a physical but as a meta-
physical entity.92 Some of these imperceptible accidents can inhere in 
any substance and give it a certain state, as for instance the accident 
"movement", which causes the substance to be "moving",93 others 
can only inhere in a composite substance which has a special structure, 
as for instance the accident "life", which causes the composite substance 
to be "living". 
A second distinction is made between accidents which are remaining 
(bâqiya) and accidents which are not remaining.94 None of the acci-
dents, however, is "permanent" in the strict sense of the word; none 
necessarily remains in existence once it has been brought into existence, 
such as the substances in this world. But some of these accidents, 
nevertheless, remain until they are annihilated, and this happens by 
the production of its opposite. This is the case, for instance, when 
a substance cannot exist without either a given accident or its opposite, as 
we have seen when discussing the "modes of being" (akwân).9* A sub-
91
 These accidents are called in Arabic alnán, tu'ûm, rawaih, harâra, hurùda. 
âlam, awäl (Sorh 92) 
^ СГ Sarh 93. Some authors who discuss this theory tend to see it loo physically 
Hourani, ¡slamu Raliomihsm, passim, appears to do so, but also 'Abd al-Karim 
'Utmân, Nazariyai al-taklif. 128-129, does not realize the (ull metaphysical implications 
4i
 In this case the metaphysical character of this accident must be manifest Physically, 
the accident is not the cause of the substance's being moving, that cause is the "mover" 
' * See Sarh 231 
95
 Seepp 112-113 
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stance remains "immobile" by "immobility" until its opposite "move-
ment" is produced in it and makes it to be "moving"; but, because 
the substance must be either moving or immobile, the accident which 
is present must remain until its opposite is produced. Other accidents 
which do not have an opposite and without which a substance actually 
can exist do not remain at all, but disappear after some time without 
any intervention from outside. This we see, for instance, in the case 
of sounds and speech.96 
A third distinction : some accidents only need a substrate {mahall) 
to exist, as, for instance, colours, odours, or tastes. They do not need 
a special structure, but can exist "everywhere". Other accidents, how-
ever, need a specially structured and composed substance to exist. They 
need a living being. To this category belong, for instance, ability 
(qudra), life, and knowledge.97 The first category only needs a substrate, 
and, in consequence of that, characterizes that substrate only. When 
a colour inheres in our hand, our hand, and our hand alone, is charac-
terized by it : our hand is coloured, not the whole subject of which 
the hand forms an element. The second category, which needs a living 
being, also characterizes the whole living being; when there exists 
knowledge in our heart, we say that "we" are knowing, not the heart. 
Fourth : some accidents are a '"ilia", others are not. The accidents 
which are a ΊΙΙα characterize a thing and make it to have a quality, 
whereas the other accidents do not.91* We have, already seen that all 
imperceptible accidents we know necessarily must be 'Hal (plural of 'ilia), 
for only in this way we came to know their presence : we know them as 
the 'ilia of the state we know the substance to be in. 
The fifth and last distinction 'Abd al-Jabbâr makes among accidents 
is based on the distinction between the subjects who made them and 
have power over them. 
There are eleven kinds (genera : ajnâs) of accidents which do not 
come under our human ability, over which we have no power at all.99 
96
 Sec Mugni VII. 5 
9
" Muhir I, 28. 
9
» See Sarh 211 
99
 Scirh 90. The enumeration of the various accidents we give here in our text, 
is taken from a discussion of the a/'âl (acts) which fall or do not fall under the power 
of someone who is not essentially able (so is God alone) but able by an ability (qádir 
bi-qudra) But because everything that is temporal according to 'Abd al-Jabbâr is 
also made (mfl/'u/) and consequently an act (Ji'l), all accidents must be mentioned in 'Abd 
al-Jabbâr's list of the acts, there are no accidents which are not acts In consequence, 
when we omit from this list the substances (which evidently are not accidents) and the 
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These eleven genera are : colours, tastes, odours, warmth, coldness, 
wetness, dryness, life, ability, desire, aversion.100 Because these acci-
dents, which are, as all existent things, brought into existence and 
made, cannot be made by human beings, and cannot be our acts 
(afâf), they must be God's acts. 
To the second category belong ten genera of accidents; all these 
genera come under our ability. This category is subdivided by 'Abd 
al-Jabbâr into two sub-categories, which he calls "the acts of the 
limbs" (afâl al-jawârih) and "the acts of the hearts" (afâl al-qulûb). 
The five acts of the limbs are : modes of being {akwân), pressures 
(ïtimâdât), compositions (ta'lîfât), sounds, and pains. The five acts of 
the hearts are: conviction, will, non-will,101 assumption, and reflec-
tion.102 
This list, which 'Abd al-Jabbâr has given in his Sarh, pretends to 
be an exhaustive list of all genera of accidents. Consequently, in his 
opinion, there exist twenty-one genera of accidents, ten of which fall 
under our human power. 
Within the category of genera that fall under our power, one does 
find some instances which, however, do not fall under it, and which, 
consequently, are created by God. We have seen that we are able to 
produce (acquired) knowledge by means of reflection; we also saw 
that knowledge belongs to the genus conviction, which comes under 
our ability. But besides the acquired knowledge there is necessary 
knowledge, there is intuition ('aqi), over which we have no power at 
all, but which is given to us by God, who creates it.103 
'Abd al-Jabbâr gives some other instances too : we have no power 
annihilation (Jana, which is not really something, and which can only be known by 
revelation), we keep the accidents —The formulation of 'Abd al-Jabbâr runs "ma la 
yadkul /insuh taht mac/dûrmâ" 
'
ü 0
 The Arabic terms used are аЫап, m'ûm, rana ih, harâra, buiûcla. rutûba, wibûsa, 
ha\át, qudra, salma, nafra It is noteworthy that in this scries the four "elements" of the 
old Greek philosophy are mentioned warmth, coldness, wetness, dryness 
10
 ' Since desire («/Λιι«) and its opposite (nafra) belong to the category of accidents 
which are created by God. we cannot translate the term karáha by "aversion", "distaste". 
or something similar It must be the opposite of /rdA/just as nafra is the opposite of ialina 
To make the distinction between the two pairs of accidents as clear as possible, I render 
karáha as "non-will" The implications of this distinction between desire and will, 
a distinction in which the desire is created by God and the will an act of man, is dealt 
with in our discussion of the place of the will in 'Abd al-Jabbâr's anthropology 
102
 See Sarh 90, the Arabic terms are ¡'liqâilât, irâilât. karàhàt, zunûn, and anzâr 
In this list the assumption (zann) is not reckoned to fall under the genus "conviction" 
(l'tKjâtf) See our discussion of this subject on page 46 
, 0 3
 See pp 92-93, 'Abd al-Jabbâr mentions Ihis example in Sarh 90-91 
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over a tremor and the movement of the arteries; they must be created 
by God. The pain caused by the sting of a hornet or a scorpion stands 
in no relation to its cause and therefore must be caused by God,104 
although the genus "pain" comes under the ability of able subjects 
(animals too) in this world. 
Of the twenty-one genera of accidents mentioned by 'Abd al-Jabbâr 
in the text of the Sarh, nine need a living being in order to exist, twelve 
need only a substrate. Of the nine genera which need and characterize 
a living being, three have already been discussed ; these are conviction 
(i'tiqâd in its various forms : knowledge, positive ignorance, tradition-
alism, uncritical belief), assumption (zann), and reflection (nazar); the 
other six (life, ability, desire, aversion, will, non-will) are dealt with in 
the paragraph about 'Abd al-Jabbâr's anthropology. Of the twelve 
genera which only need and characterize a substrate (mahalf), we leave 
aside the seven genera which are created by God and belong to the 
given situation of this world (colour, taste, odour, warmth, coldness, 
dryness, and wetness), and restrict ourselves to some remarks about 
the five remaining genera : the accidents which only need a substrate, 
and can be produced and made by man. These five genera are : being 
in space (kawn), pressure (i'timâcf), composition (talif), pain (alam), 
and sound (sawt). 
Kawn: being.105 This genus of accidents, which in any form must 
104
 These instances are given in Sarh 91 
105
 See in the works of 'Abd al-Jabbâr especially Énrh 96-104 and Muhtt I. 32-46. 
Max Horten wrote an article devoted to this concept : Was bedeutet al-kaun ah 
philosophisLher Terminus?, ZDVG 65 (1911), 539-549 As for the translation of this 
term kawn by "being" or. for the sake of clarity, by "being (in space)", this translation 
corresponds with the term used m Arabic, kawn being the verbal noun of the verb 
kán, "to be" 
Similar translations are given also by Horten, Was bedeutet al-kaun '. 539 : Scins-
formen oder Seinsweisen, РгеігІ, Attributenlehre, 47 Scinsweisen des Dinges im Raum; 
Horovitz, Über den Einfluss der griechischen Philosophie, 72. Seinsformen; Frank, 
Ma'nâ, 249 : modes of being in space. 
That among Mu'tazila it originally had the sense of becoming, is argued by Frank 
in his Metaphysics; so, e.g , ρ 17. "Abu 1-Hudhayl does speek of an 'accident' of 
'becoming' (kaun, pi., akwân), where he does recognise a kind of continuous process, 
viz., a defined process of becoming in time and place from 'this' to 'that'." When 
we know, as we will prove in our text, that the meaning of "becoming" is still 
emphasized by 'Abd al-Jabbâr, the translation Nader gives in his Système philosophique, 
170-171, "génération", is not far from the truth, although he could not know all 
implications of this concept. In as far as it concerns 'Abd al-Jabbâr's vocabulary, 
the reproach made by M. Bernand (La notion de 'dm, 39) that this translation is "un 
regrettable contresens", does not seem justified She herself translates akwàn as 
"accidents propres", which is a rather formal way of translating 
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always inhere in the substances which exist in our world, and which 
is deduced from the fact that these substances exist in space, occupy 
a certain amount of space, and have a "volume", gives the substance 
in which it inheres two characteristics first, its concrete structure in 
space, and second, its becoming and changing in space This accident 
expresses a being in space and time and a certain dynamism in them 
Both these aspects are expressed in the definition of the "being" we 
find in the Muhîl "ma bih yasîi αΙ-μιηΙιαι fi /ilici dim /ilia", "by what 
a substance becomes in a concrete individual place" 1 U 6 Here the 
accident "being" explicitly is defined by means of the verb "to become" 
(sâr); this makes clear that this element is for 'Abd al-Jabbâr still of 
importance 10Ί 
When the term "being" (kawn) is used absolutely, without any 
addition, it indicates an accident which only inheres in a substance 
at the moment of its coming into existence It is the absolute 
"becoming" When the substance remains after its coming into exis­
tence, it bears the accident "immobility" (sukûn) 10H Apart from this 
"being" in its absolute sense, 'Abd al-Jabbâr distinguishes among four 
other kinds of "being", the four "modes of being" (akwân) 
From the text of the Muhlt it becomes apparent that in 'Abd al-
Jabbâr's discussions of the akwân two different views are discernible, 
the first view is rather physical, whereas the second is surely meta-
physical and corresponds to 'Abd al-Jabbâr's normal way of dealing 
with accidents. 
The first view implies that the kann of a substance is its relation 
to the concrete place it occupies at a certain moment of time, it is its 
being in that concrete place at that concrete moment This has as 
a consequence that there is no real difference between this kawn no 
matter whether the substance is moving or immobile, combined or 
separated. It is only "called"109 thus (immobility, movement, combi-
""^ The definilion given m the text is found in Muhil I, 33 The word ¡iha used in the 
derimlion indicates the direction into which the substance extends itself, and con-
sequently also the concrete place it occupies See for the meaning of this word, e g , 
Goichon, Le\iqui> de la langue philosophique d Ihn Sinâ, 423-425 
101
 It is especially in the Muhii that this meaning of the term is emphasized The 
text of the Sarh is less explicit 
10H
 Muhii I, 33 "Sometimes we call it being {kawn) without any addition when 
it exists as beginning, not after something else (alter some other accident on the same 
substance), this is only in the existent thing in the state of the coming into existence of 
the substance (it only inheres in a substance at the moment of the substance's coming 
into existence) Thereafter, we may call it "immobility" when it remains" 
[ 0 g
 See Muhii I, 33, 'Abd al-Jabbâr repeats several times that we "call" (пичатт!) 
the Ааии immobility or movement and so on 
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nation, separation); these are "names" which give information about 
the relation of the substance concerned to other akwân, be it of the 
substance concerned itself or of other substances. But, though the 
names may differ, the reality remains the same : the being at a concrete 
place. This view supposes a certain atomism in time : time is divided 
into "moments" (waqt; plural: ciwqát), "time-atoms", and every 
moment the accidents are created again.110 
The second view is the metaphysical one. It holds : being moving is 
something else than being immobile; this difference in the states in 
which the substance is needs a manâ, an accident which is the cause 
of the state concerned. This is the way in which 'Abd al-Jabbâr showed 
the existence of knowledge, reflection, and other accidents. ' ' ' 
We elaborate both these views below. 
Sukûn : immobility. In the first view mentioned above, the physical 
view, we call a kawn "immobility" when it comes into existence on 
a substance immediately after another kawn which was similar to it. 
When in the second "moment" the substance occupies the same place 
as in the first "moment", we call its kawn in the second moment 
"immobility". Consequently, the kawn receives its name from its 
relation to the immediately preceding kawn. ' ' 2 
In the second and metaphysical view, "immobility" is said to be the 
ma'nâ which necessitates the substance to be in one and the same 
place for two or more moments.1 ' 3 
Haraka : movement. This accident is described by 'Abd al-Jabbâr in 
a way which is strictly analogous to the way in which he described 
immobility. Thus, movement is defined as the "being" (kawn) which 
comes into existence immediately after its opposite; this means that 
the substance's being in a certain place follows its being in another 
place in the immediately preceding moment. The two "beings" are 
different; in that case the second one in time is called "movement". 
110
 See especially Muhit I, 33 This view is mentioned in the Muhii more explicitly 
than in 'Abd al-Jabbâr's other works 
111
 About the ma'nâ we speak when we deal with the relationship between sub-
stance and accidents and the different names derived from this relationship 
112
 See Muhit I, 33 "Sometimes we call the being (канп) immobility (sukm, not as 
the Egyptian edition ρ 41 reads takemnun), this means that it (this kann) comes 
into existence immediately after (another kann) similar to it" 
1 1 3
 Muhit I, 33 immobility is "by what the substance remains in one and the 
same place for two moments or more" 
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Consequently, the name we give to a "being" (kawn) expresses its 
relationship with the immediately preceding "being" : when they are 
similar, it is called immobility; when they are different, it is called 
movement. 
Movement is also defined in the way the ma'ânî generally are defined ; 
it is what necessitates its substance to be moving, to be in a place 
after it was in another place, without interruption.114 
Ijtimâ' : combination. The word "ijtima" is the normal terminus 
technicus for this "being". That 'Abd al-Jabbâr uses three other words 
in its place, when he describes the various "modes of being" in his 
Muhît, must therefore have a reason.115 He mentions in that context : 
mujâwara (vicinity), muqâraba (proximity),116 and qurb (nearness). 
Whereas ijtimâ' could imply a certain composition, an influence of 
one substance on another, this is explicitly excluded by the terms here 
mentioned on the authority of 'Abd al-Jabbâr. That he uses twice 
a third form of the verb (Jâ'al, with the verbal noun : mufá'ala), indi-
cates that there is a relation to something else; it is not a combination 
inside the substance concerned, but a touching of another substance. 
This accident indicates that the substance concerned is so near to 
another substance that there remains no distance between the two 
of them.117 
One may justly ask why this rather external relationship supposes 
an accident in the substances concerned. The reason is probably that 
'Abd al-Jabbâr took these four "modes of being" from the tradition 
of his school, in which they certainly had functioned in some way or 
other.118 But the last two (combination and separation) could scarcely 
find an appropriate place in his system. 
114
 See Muhil I, 33 : "Sometimes we call it (the being or kawn) movement when it 
comes into existence immediately after its opposite, or necessitates that the body is 
in a place after it was in another one without interruption (bt-lâ fast)" 
115
 See Muhit I, 33 In the Sarh the whole argumentation to prove the existence 
of the modes of being and their being produced is centred upon the term ijtimâ'. 
116
 Read here muqâraba (with the Egyptian edition, ρ 41) and not muqârana In 
the same line the Lebanese edition has another error, where it reads тиНанага instead 
of mujâwara 
117
 Muhît I, 33 : "Sometimes we call an occurrence of it (ba'dah; sc. of the being) 
vicinity, proximity, and nearness when this substance is near another substance 
in a way there is no distance between the two of them" An alternative reading, mentioned 
by Houben in the Lebanese edition, runs "in a way they touch each other" (a/-
mumâssa instead of là masâf a). 
1 1 8
 It seems to have had its function in the system of absolute atomism In 
that system it might indicate the way the atoms were related to each other, both in time 
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Iftirâq : separation. This word is the contrary of the preceding one. 
The alternative names which 'Abd al-Jabbâr mentions in the Muhit 
are "wH/a'a/a-forms" of the verb, just as was the case in the preceding 
paragraph; he mentions mufâraqa (separation from) and mubaada 
(being distant from). The meaning of this term is said to be that there 
is a distance between the substance concerned and another sub-
stance.119 
Ta'lîf : composition.120 Composition belongs, as the "modes of being", 
to the acts of the limbs, and just as was the case in the preceding 
paragraph, we have to deal here with a view on the structures of 
the world which has both physical and metaphysical elements. We 
always have to be aware of the influence the physical views have on 
the metaphysical doctrine. 
Composition is, in fact, the touching of two substances, a "mumássa' 
as 'Abd al-Jabbâr calls it.121 This description already implies that to 
constitute a composition at least two substances are needed. Never-
theless, 'Abd al-Jabbâr states that composition only needs a substrate 
in which it can inhere. This substrate is, however, in origin two sub-
strates, two substances which together form something like one sub-
strate 122 Hence he can make the remark that accidents which do not 
need a living being to exist only need a substance, except the compo-
sition, which needs two substances which are going to form together 
and in space, and in which ihcy buill together the bodies and made them change 
See, e g , Pines, Atomenlehre. 6 
Horovitz, bmlhiss, 74, discovered a relation between these modes of being and the 
five categories of Plato "Die fünf Acciden/en sind nichts anderes, als die von uns 
bereits mehrfach erwähnten fünf Kategoneen Piatos, nur dass am Stelle von Identität 
und Verschiedenheit durch ein sprachliches Missverständnis Verbindung und Trennung 
getreten sind Uebercinslimmung und Verschiedenheit wurden missverständlich fur 
räumliche Verbindung und Trennung genommen" 
114
 Л/А;/ I, 3.1 "Sometimes'we call an occurrence of it (hâ'dah. sc of the being) 
separation from, being distant from, and separation when there exists on a distance 
from it another substance" 
'
2
" Composition is just as the other "acts of the limbs" (afäl al-ianânh) discussed 
by 'Abd al-Jabbâr in his chapter about human acts and the way in which man can do 
these acts Miigni IX. passim 
'
2 1
 See Μιώίι I. 366 Among the five acts of the limbs (a/'âl al-jcmanh) is mentioned 
"al-mumassa aliali uir/a' hihâ ilâ t-ta'Hf', the touching which is based upon the 
composition In other enumerations composition itself is mentioned among the five 
acts of the limbs 
122
 Sec, e g , Mugni VII, 36 ' In our opinion it (composition) only needs a substrate, 
but the two substrates form for other things -as it were one substrate because it 
(composition) only inheres in them both" 
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something that behaves as one substrate. In another place he even 
says that this accident can exist "between" the two substances.123 
Because the composition is for 'Abd al-Jabbâr the pure touching of 
the two substances, there is only one kind of composition; no sub-
division is possible.124 
The question now poses itself what the difference may be between 
this composition {talîj) and the combination (ijtima) we discussed 
before. Both are characterized by the fact that two substances touch 
each other. Is it the only difference that the talif inheres in both 
substances together, and the ijtima in both substances separately? 
When we make a composition, we must do this by means of a cause 
(sabab), by means of generation {taw lid), because we cannot make it 
directly {mubâsaratan).125 The cause we use is called by 'Abd al-Jabbâr 
mujâwara, which word is employed by him, as we have seen 126 and 
as becomes manifest in the texts concerned, to indicate the "mode of 
being" {kawri) which is also called i/tima. When we make a "vicinity" 
or "combination", the result constitutes immediately a cause, "sabab" 
which necessitates a composition ( /Û7/ / ) ; 1 2 7 it even causes this compo-
sition without any delay.128 Vicinity causes or generates (u aliad) this 
composition only at the moment it itself comes into existence,129 and 
when the vicinity disappears, the composition may remain.130 
The solution of this rather enigmatic relationship between vicinity 
and composition is found in the vicinity being one of the "modes of 
being", one of the akwán. It is exactly because it is a mode of being 
that it expresses the presence of the substance in a concrete, individual 
'
Д 1
 Wuhit I, 367 "The composition which can exist between two substrates'" (ha\n 
inahalhiMi) This does not mean that the accident composition exists without a sub­
stance, but. because the two substrates touch each other, the accident can be said to be 
exactK on that point of touching This evidently is a very physical view 
'
2 i
 Xluhil I, 166. explicitly is mentioned in the list of acts which occur in various 
forms that composition is mm' »¿¡hid, one kind only 
'
2
^ About the various manners in which we act, directly or by using a "cause" (suhuh) 
which generates the effect, we give some more details in our paragraph on 'Abd 
al-Jabbâr's anthropology 
See also \tugm IX, 124-132 
126
 See page 131 
'-" See Muhil I, 411 and M ugni IX. 44 
, 2 8
 See M ugni IX 155 
124
 See M ugni IX, 160. Muhit I, 414 
130
 CT \tiigm IX. 44 'Abd al-Jabbâr can therefore say in \liigni VII. 36 "Com-
position in reality docs not need the vicinity, it only cannot exist when the two sub-
strates are at a distance from each other (шя' taba nil) because the two of them 
behave by the vicinity as one substrate" 
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place in space. This being determined by a concrete place is not one 
of the characteristics of the accident "composition". It is pure touching. 
So, when both substances move together to another place, the "compo-
sition" remains, but the "vicinities" of both substances disappear and 
are replaced by other "vicinities".131 In consequence, we say that 
composition does not need in its substrate a "vicinity" (because it 
may be replaced by its opposite, another vicinity) but that compo-
sition is impossible when there is a distance between the two sub-
stances.132 
We conclude that composition (talif) is an accident, inhering in 
two touching substrates together; unlike the "combination" (ijtima), 
it does not restrict the substrates to a certain place. 
Alam : pain.133 For 'Abd al-Jabbâr the accident "pain" is comparable 
to the accident "composition" (talif), and both are dealt with in his 
works in an analogous way. 
Pain is a form of separation which occurs in a composite sub-
stance.134 Just as composition, it only needs a substrate in which it 
inheres to exist.135 Consequently, it can exist also in substances which 
are not living, although—says 'Abd al-Jabbâr -in that case it is not 
called "pain". There is only one kind of pain because it is pure 
separation, as composition is pure touching.136 
We cannot make "pain" directly; we must do it by means of a 
"cause" (sabab) which generates (wallad) the pain. This cause we have 
to use is called by 'Abd al-Jabbâr "иа/ш", cleavage.137 The difference 
between this cleavage, which is a kind of separation (i/tirâq), and the 
pain is that by pain the substrate is not restricted to a concrete indi-
vidual place; the separation or cleavage, which is a mode of being, 
determines the place the substance occupies in space. The cleavage 
1 J
' See Mugn! IX, 44, where it is iUted thai the various "vicinities" are each 
other's "opposite" (ílid(í) because they exclude each other in the same substrate 
1 , 2
 So, e g . in Mugn! VII, 36 and Wuhit I, 414 
, 3 ,
 For a discussion of the essence of pain, see especially the chapters 'Abd al-Jabbâr 
devotes to human acts in part IX of the Mugn! 
M 4
 See MugnHX, 52 (T 
135
 See MugmVll 36, Miihil I, 414 
,3<
' See Muhil I, 366, here 'Abd al-Jabbâr mentions, apart from pain, also delight 
(ladda), which comes under the same genus, is the same genus, and only differs from 
pain by the name which is given to it, a name based upon things which are connected 
with it "Pains and delights, Ihey constitute one genus, the name given to them 
differs by the connection of special ma'äni to it" In fact, these arc the aversion or the 
desire of the subject concerned 
1 3
' See UugmM, 52 
COSMOLOGY 135 
(wahâ) causes or generates the pain without any delay.138 When the 
cleavage disappears, the pain can remain because the cleavage is re-
placed by another cleavage. 
Pain is, however, not always called pain. To be called thus it must 
be perceived by a perceiving subject who, moreover, has a sensation 
of aversion. A subject is said to have pain when he perceives the 
pain "with an aversion of his nature".139 Hence, in fact it is used for 
the body of a living being. Against this background 'Abd al-Jabbâr 
defines the cleavage (wahâ) which generates pain as : the separation 
(iftirâq) at which the soundness which is needed by life disappears. 
Other forms of separation are not called by this name.140 Hence, it 
is understandable that Abu 'AH holds the view that pain needs a living 
being to exist; in fact, it does not need a living being to exist, but only 
to be called pain.141 
I'timad : pressure.142 From 'Abd al-Jabbâr's discussions of this term 
and its functioning in the description of human acts, it becomes clear 
that the accident "pressure" is the translation into metaphysical lan-
guage of what we know in this world as the normal physical pressure 
or pushing. The example which is given to elucidate the meaning of this 
pressure—the pushing of the human hand against an object, which 
pushing generates the movement of that object143—clearly points to 
the physical background of the concept. 
, 3 8




'' See. e g , Mugni IV, 15 "One only becomes 'having pain' (read âlim instead 
of alam) when one perceives somelhing from which one's nature has an aversion. 
then one is qualified as having pain" Mugni VII, 37 it must be "perceived with an 
aversion of the nature", "mudrak ma' nufùr at-iab'" 
140
 "i/tirâq (iliadi lanlaß 'indah as-sihha aliali lahlâj ila\hâ l-ha\ât. dûn al-iftirâq 
alladi là \u'attir hâdâ t-ta'tir" Mugni IX. 52 
141
 The opinion of Abu 'Ali is mentioned by 'Abd al-Jabbâr in Mugni VII, 36-37 
and Muhii I, 414 
142
 The discussions about the pressure (¡'timad) have found their place, as have the 
discussions about the other acts of the limbs, in the chapters 'Abd al-Jabbâr devoted to 
human acts Mugni IX, passim, Muhit I, 356-421 and passim Sec also Bernand, 
La notion de 'dm. especially pp 39-40 
143
 See, e g , Mugni IX, 60 "When one of us touches something with his hand 
or touches what touches it (viz, the "something" mentioned, read here má mássah 
instead οι ma má massah, what is meant is the direct or the indirect touching) and 
presses (t'tamad) upon it, movement must be generated in it" 
What Horovit?, Der Einfluss, 18, says about the meaning of the word t'limad in 
the theology of an-Nazzâm is. in any case, not applicable to its function in the works of 
'Abd al-Jabbâr "Ttimâd ist nichts anderes als das stoische tonos, die Spannung des 
Korpers, die Strömung des Pneumas, welche vom Zentrum des Korpers nach der 
Peripherie hin sich erstreckend und von dort wieder zurückkehrend die Teile einerseits 
zusammen und anderseits in gewissen Abstanden auseinanderhält" 
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Consequently, i'timâd is not pure "strength" or power, but it is 
actualized and directed strength inhering in a substance. It is the 
actual pushing in a given direction; it is the "strength" in the hand 
which actually pushes something forward; it is the "strength" of a 
slope which makes things on it go downhill; it is the "strength" in 
an arrow flying through the air, which makes it to be in the next 
place in the given direction the next moment. To emphasize that this 
strength is an actualized and directed strength, we call it pressure. 
From the examples given it will be clear that by this i'timád the 
substance has a "direction", is tending towards a given direction; hence 
it is this /''timad4hat can cause changement of place. For 'Abd al-Jabbâr 
pressure is "what is characterized by direction".144 At first sight one 
may get the impression that pressure by this definition is said to be 
similar to movement. This, however, is not the case, for in the opinion 
of 'Abd al-Jabbâr movement is not characterized by "direction" (jiha). 
To explain this he states that by direction is meant "that by which the 
pushing (al-mudâfaa) distinguishes itself'. Direction is the quality by 
which pushing (and pressure) is distinguished from everything else.145 
Movement, which is one of the modes of being, is only the presence 
of a substance in a given place after it was in another place; 
fundamentally, it is а "Агяи-л", the being of a substance at a given 
moment of time at a given place of space. Hence, it does not have the 
characteristic "direction". 1 4 6 
To exist, pressure only needs a substrate; it can exist in every sub­
strate. But to remain in a substrate and to be a "necessary pressure", 
a pressure which is inherent and proper to a given substrate—as, for 
instance, the pressure of a slope, which is proper to that slope; a slope 
always "pushes" downhill what is found on it, whereas the human 
hand, for instance, does not always and necessarily push things for­
ward; therefore, the pressure of a slope is necessary and remaining, 
whereas the pressure of the hand is not—it needs something in its 
1 4 1
 "Al-muklaw Ιιι-μΙια", this is taken from the works of Abu Hâsim, but 'Abd 
al-Jabbâr apparenti)· agrees with it Miigni IX. 140 
'*'' "Mû \ahm (or, as vocalized in the text as edited, "inihin" · we distinguish) hihá 
al-imiilâ/a'u" See Miigni IX. 141 As an example is given "the pressure of something heavy 
on the hack of one of us" 
146
 See diligili IX. 141 " movement belongs to the same genus as becoming (the 
Ar/M« in its absolute sense, see ρ 99. in the printed text one must delete the words 
'nun ¡ms m-sukiin (illaiji \tihiia' ì/ài/uh fi І-пиіНаІГ), the bringing into existence of which 
is beginning (the existence), and to the same genus as the immobility, when it is not 
possible that these two (becoming and immobility) have a direction, the same has 
to be said about movement" 
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bubstrate, as, for instance, a special structure. When pressure is used 
to produce an effect in something else, it needs a form of touching. 
When we, human beings, want to produce something in another sub-
strate—not the substrate in which the ability to produce that act 
inheres we must use a "cause" (sabab). This cause is pressure, since 
only pressure can cause changement of place.147 When pressure thus 
is used to generate an effect in something else (another pressure, a 
mode of being, or a sound), it needs a form of "touching" (mumâssd) 
or "contact" (ittisâi).1** The effect concerned does not need this 
touching in order to come into existence; the effect can occur after 
some delay so that in the meantime there comes an end to the touching 
or even to the existence of the cause.149 
When pressure generates movement in something else, it does not 
do so in the point where it touches only, but in all atoms of that 
substance : when we throw a stone, all atoms of that stone are 
moving.150 Pressure can move the object concerned in one moment 
only one place further : it moves the object to the nearest place in front 
of itself.151 
Apart from the examples of the human hand, the slope of a hill, 
the burden on one's shoulders, 'Abd al-Jabbâr also mentions the 
shooting of an arrow. This example clarifies what we already said 
about pressure. "... the pressure of the arrow in its penetrating: the 
shooting subject makes pressure in it at the moment it is fired from 
the string of the bow; afterwards it penetrates (something) without 
the pressure being renewed from him (the shooting person)." In this 
case, we conclude that one pressure generates another, and this one 
another, until the target is reached, and the last pressure generates 
a mode of being : separation.152 
14
'' See Sarh 453 "tadhat al-fi'l 'an mahall al-qudra la \umkm ilia Ηι-Ι-ιΊιιηάιΓ' 
1 4 8
 See Muhii I, 81 " it belongs to the conditions of a pressure in its generating 
what it generates in another substrate than its own, that there is a touching (титама) and 
contact (itnsâf)" Also MuMl I, 408 
149
 See Mugni VII. 36 " we only say that it needs a maná other than itself in its 
necessity and its remaining (// luzûmih na-baqâ'ih). in its existence (/f nujûdih) it does not 
need that" 
150
 See Muhli I, 85-86 
151
 See Шugni IX, 27 " . although the pressure can necessitate the movement of 
the substrate in (all) the directions, it only necessitates (in fact) in one moment its 
movement to the nearest place in front of it because it is characterized by the fact 
that it generates in its direction" 
1 5 2
 This text is taken from Muhii I, 367, both this edition and the Egyptian edition 
(page 351) here use the root hdd, to define I suggest that we read the root jdd, 
to renew An entire passage in that text is dedicated to the difference between generated 
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Sawt : sound 153 Sound is the last of the five "acts of the limbs", and 
contrary to the colours, odours, tastes, it can be produced by man 
Sounds are not direct (mubâsir) acts, but they are produced by means 
of a cause which generates (nallad) the sound This cause must always 
be a pressure (ΐtimad) 
Sound is an accident that does not remain 1 S 4 If it could remain, it 
would cause great difficulties for the hearing subject Perceptible things 
remain perceptible as long as they exist If sound were to remain, it 
would remain perceptible, and that implies that speech would no 
longer be understandable, because the sequence of the letters, which 
is their appearing and disappearing, would be disturbed, one would 
hear all letters of a word at the same time ' 5 5 
Sound is a perceptible accident, it is mudrak Human beings and 
other living beings need the instrument of the ear to perceive it The 
way it is perceived is not as the way warmth and coldness, tastes and 
odours are perceived These accidents are with their substrates brought 
to the perceiving subject and perceived by this "transportation" (bi-I-
mtiqâl), sound, however, is perceived in the way colours are they 
are perceived at the place they are ' 5 6 If we would hear the sound only 
"by way of transportation", we would not be able to discern from 
which side it comes But, when we are in the vicinity of audible 
things,157 we know that they are on the right or on the left side, 
consequently, we must hear them at the place they are 15B 
things which have to be caused again by the subject at every moment, as, e g , speech, 
and generated things in which that is not necessary 
153
 Speech (kalâm) belongs to the genus sound (гаи/), Mugni VII, passim and MuMt 
I, 320-326 
1
' * See Muhit I, 323 and Mugni VII, 5, 24 Accidents do not remain as substances do 
When accidents are said to remain (baqâ ), this means that they do not disappear without 
any influence from outside, they fall back into non-existence when their opposite comes 
into existence (mostly on the same substrate) Other accidents remain only for some 
moments and then disappear, these are called "non-remaming ' To this latter category 
belongs sound 
155
 This argumentation is given in Muhit I, 323 and Mugni VII, 24 The same 
argumentation is given, to prove that sound and speech cannot be substances (for 
substances, by their very essence, are remaining) nor remaining accidents The example 
given by 'Abd al-Jabbâr both in the text of the Mugni and that of the Muhit is the 
impossibility to discern whether the name zayd when it is pronounced really is ra></, 
or dzay, or y:ad, or still something else 
156
 In Arabic bt-hayt hun, Muhit I, 324 
157
 Read in Muhit I, 324, line 11 jawarnâ "to be in the direct vicinity, to be 
neighbours" instead of jânaznâ It is remarkable that here the Egyptian edition makes 
the same mistake (p 313) 
158
 This argument is given in Muhit I, 324 and Mugni VII, 24-25 
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The genus "sound" occurs in various ways;159 it may be a fluent160 
sound, it may be a regularly articulated sound, it may be an irregularly 
articulated sound ' 6 1 which shows sometimes connection and some-
times separations, it may also constitute letters and in that way lay 
the foundation for what we call speech. 
Like the other "acts of the limbs", sound in order to exist only 
needs a substrate, a substance to inhere in; it does not need a living 
being.162 But the question arises whether sound can exist in any 
substrate; or can it inhere only in substrates which have a certain 
structure (binya) or at least a certain solidity (salaba)! And does it 
need movement to exist?163 Abù 'Ali held that sound can exist in 
every substrate 164 but always needs movement. To explain the latter 
half of this statement, he appeals to human experience : if we knock 
on a brass basin, it gives a sound; if we stop its movement, sound 
ceases also.165 Moreover: we know that we cannot produce sound 
without movement. This movement is, however, not the cause we use 
and which generates the sound ; therefore, it must be a necessary condi-
tion : sound must need (ihtâj) it.166 Although sound in general does 
not need a special structure and solidity in its substrate, some forms 
of it do need a special structure (so, for instance, the various letters of 
speech) or a certain solidity (the sound of a brass basin, for instance, 
needs this solidity).167 
Abu Hâsim does not agree with Abu 'All's statements; in his 
opinion, sound does not need movement. Three different arguments 
' " This distinction is given by 'Abd al-Jabbâr in Mitgni VII, 6 
160
 Read here (Mugni VII, 6) muqawad (fluent) instead of mufid (communicative), 
which can by no means be the opposite of "articulated" Here is meant a sound that is not 
"cut" (muqana), the word we render by "articulated" 
161
 In Mugni VII, 6, line 18, delete the words "fi/im" I think that (hese two words 
are derived from the text of line 17. where they follow the word muqaiia' In line 18 
they do not make any sense, and their presence there can be explained as an error of 
a copyist 
' " Sec MugniVW, 26-30 
163
 These questions are discussed by 'Abd al-Jabbâr in Mugni VII, 31-42 
'^
4
 His words seem to indicate this See Mugni VII, 31 This is deduced by 'Abd 
al-Jabbâr from "zähir kalâmih", the external meaning of Abu 'All's words 
'^
5
 Mugni VII, 31 
'** "Because one of us (a human being) can only bring it into existence together with 
movement, although this is not a cause {sabab) of it. that supposes its (sound's) need for 
it (movement)" Mugni VII. 31 
"^ Here Abu 'Ali again appeals to experience, we know that letters cannot exist in 
every place, but only in places which are built m a special way, as the human mouth, 
tongue, etc We also know that the sound of a brass basin cannot exist in water, this 
sound needs the solidity of brass Mugni VII, 32 
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are given for this thesis. First : if sound would need movement, it 
could not exist together with its opposite; the various movements are 
each other's opposite ; so, in that case, sound could not exist together 
with another movement. That contradicts our experience, because we 
know that a substrate in which sound exists can move in space at the 
same time.168 
Second : movement is a kawn, a mode of being. If sound would need 
movement, it would need its genus (kawn), not the occurrence of that 
genus in a certain way (viz., as movement); consequently, it could occur 
with immobility (sukûn) instead of movement.169 It will be apparent 
that these two arguments depend on the manner movement is con-
ceived : as a "mode of being", as the substrate's being hie et nunc, its 
being now in this concrete place. The whole argument is based on this 
conception of movement. 
The third argument is different. Movement is related, in its connec-
tion with sound, to the cause we use and to the instrument we need. 
God does not need an instrument nor a cause, and consequently. He 
can produce sound without movement. When God can do so, sound 
in its essence does not need movement.170 
Sound does not need a special structure nor a certain solidity of its 
substrate, for "everything that characterizes a substrate and does not 
necessitate a state for the living being, to exist only needs its sub-
strate."171 
'Abd al-Jabbâr agrees with Abu Hâsim that sound only needs a 
'
6 B
 All depends in Ihis argumentation upon Abu Hâsim's (and 'Abd al-Jabbâr's) 
ideas about the essence of movement. For him two movements exclude each other 
in the same substrate because movement is a kawn, the substance's being in a concrete 
place. It cannot be in two places at the same lime. When the substance in which the sound 
inheres moves in space, it gets another, "opposite" movement. See Mugnt VII, 33. 
" * This argument is based on a generally applicable thesis: "every maná which 
needs something else in its existence needs the genus of that something else, not its 
occurring in a certain way" (kutl maná yahláj β wujûdih ila garriti, yahtâj ilá jins 
dálik al-gayr, dun uuquih 'ala »а/Л maksûs): see MugniVll, 34. 
For Abu Hâsim (and 'Abd al-Jabbâr), movement is not г genus of its own but 
only a way in which the genus kawn (being in space) occurs; the conclusion would be 
that sound only needs kawn (being in space), and in that case sound could exist together 
with immobilily (also a mode of being) instead of movement. 
1 7 0
 MugmVll. 34. 
1 , 1
 This general thesis is given by 'Abd al-Jabbâr on page 36 of M ugni VII. 
He proves this thesis by pointing to the colours, modes of being, tastes, and odours and by 
showing that arguments against this thesis are not tenable. Another argument is given 
in M ugni VII, 38 ff. : in Abu Hâsim's opinion sounds are each other's opposite; 
when something needs something else in its substrate to exist, its opposite needs the 
same thing; this would imply that all sounds need the same structure in their substrate. 
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substrate, no movement, no structure, no solidity.172 This statement 
of 'Abd al-Jabbâr influences greatly his conception of what speech is, 
and consequently his conception of God's speech. 
Human beings, and other living beings, which are able (qâdir) by 
an ability and not per se cannot produce sound directly; they need 
the use of a cause which generates sound. This cause, in fact, is the 
pressure (i'timad).11 ъ Not every pressure, however, can generate sound; 
to generate sound, it must occur in a certain way, it must constitute 
"knocking" (musâkka). When pressure occurs in the way of knocking, 
movement is connected with it.174 Therefore, although movement is 
not the cause which generates the sound, it is a condition for the 
possibility of generating it. So we can say that it is as necessary as the 
cause itself; movement is as necessary as pressure.175 This implies, 
that God, who does not need the use of instruments and causes, does 
not need movement to produce sound.176 
The fact that we can only produce sound by means of pressure, and 
the fact that pressure can only generate by way of a certain form of 
touching of two substrates, whereby the effect is originated in the 
second substrate (not the substrate of the ability), prove that sound 
exists in a substrate.177 
Summarizing : sound is a perceptible accident that does not remain. 
Human beings arc able to produce it by means of knocking (tnusâkka), 
which is a form of pressure (Гtimad) connected with movement (haraka). 
' " MugnlVU. 42 
1 7 1
 Sound is an act produced not "in the place of the ability", the substrate in 
which the ability inheres Therefore a "pressure" {t'timäil) is needed lo cause the transition 
from the one substrate to the other See also Ungili VII. 26-30 
'^
4
 Read in the text of Mugn! VII. 34. line 10 mtu/äiana instead of mufâraqa, 
"connection" instead of "separation" This emendation of the text is an evident 
necessity in the whole context 
' ^ See M ugni VII, 34 
'^
6
 Mugni VII. 34 "It is certain that God does not need a cause to bring 
speech (and consequently also sound) into existence, consequently, the existence of 
speech (and sound) from His side must be possible together with the non-existence of 
movement just as it is possible together with the non-existence of pressure, and just 
as it can exist from His side without an instrument (ahi), although we (human beings) 
need an instrument to bring it into existence" 
'
7 7
 See Ungili VII. 26 The argumentation given in the text docs not prove that 
sound cannot exist without a substrate because God can produce sound without using 
pressure That sound cannot exist without a substrate is proved by 'Abd al-Jabbâr 
in the rest of that chapter ρ 27-30 The general thesis is that everything that 
characterizes a substrate, notwithstanding the differences, has in common that it cannot 
exist outside a substrate (là fi inahall) 
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The genus sound, however, does not absolutely need movement, nor 
a special structure, nor solidity; it can exist in every substrate. 
After this discussion of the five acts of the limbs, I finish this section 
with two qualifications given to accidents which frequently occur in 
'Abd al-Jabbâr's argumentations. These two are the concepts of "being 
opposite" and "being other, being something else". 
Didd : opposite. The concept of "being opposite" is expressed and 
elaborated by 'Abd al-Jabbâr by means of the term "tanaJF', mutual 
exclusion.178 Two things are "opposite" when they cannot exist to-
gether. This mutual exclusion can be restricted to a concrete substrate 
(mahalf) :179 two opposite accidents cannot inhere in one and the same 
substrate at the same time. When the second one comes into existence 
in that substrate, the first must fall back into non-existence. This is 
the case, for instance, with the modes of being.180 
Two things can also be opposite "without a substrate" :181 two 
things can exclude each other without existing in the same substrate. 
This is the case when two different accidents inhere in two different 
substrates, but both characterize the same living being; they may 
inhere in two substrates of that living being, but also in a substrate 
outside it; thus speech characterizes a speaking subject, even when it 
exists outside him. Consequently, speech may be said to be the opposite 
of silence which characterizes the same person. These two—with slight 
restrictions—cannot exist together.182 
From 'Abd al-Jabbâr's use of the term, it becomes apparent that 
"opposite" does not indicate a pure denial, nor the absolute contrary 
of the thing concerned.183 This is confirmed by the thesis that, when 
' ^ See, e g . Мири VII. 27 
'""' The substrate is said to be the "condition" (sart) of the mutual exclusion, 
Mugni VII. 27 
1 8 0
 This relation between two opposite accidents becomes most clear in the matter 
of remaining accidents (see ρ 125). it is evident that such accidents can or cannot exist 
together because we know that, when a new accident comes into existence, the former 
either remains or disappears In the case of non-remaining accidents, the relation 
between different accidents is not as manifest as in the other case This explains the 
hesitation of 'Abd al-Jabbâr when the sounds (which are non-remaining accidents) 
are concerned It is not self-evident that they exclude each other Cf Mugnl VII, 28 
181
 The substrate is said not to be the condition (san) of their mutual exclusion, 
MugniVU. 27 
' ^ About kalâm and sukút (speech and silence) I speak in my next chapter. 
1 в з
 The text of Sarh 109, where 'Abd al-Jabbâr discusses the possibility of an 
opposite of "eternal" (qac/im), points m the direction of this meaning of "opposite" 
as "absolute contrary" Here the words bi-l-'aks arc used 
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something needs something else on its substrate to exist, its opposite 
needs the same.184 Two things which are opposite are two things 
which are related to each other and as such exclude each other. 
From all this it is clear that "opposition" is not an accident inhering 
in a substrate; it does not characterize a substance. The term only 
indicates a relationship between two things, be it substances or acci-
dents. 
Gayr: else, other.185 First of all, when we consider the vocabulary of 
everyday language—'Abd al-Jabbâr's usual starting-point—to be "some-
thing else" or to be "other" is a purely terminological matter, based on a 
conclusion of the subject who gives these names. We call two things 
"other" when they are not one and the same thing and one is not 
a part {bad) of the other. The difference between a description as 
"part" or as "other" depends entirely upon the name—'Abd al-Jabbâr 
says : the mention {dikr)—we choose to compare both things and to 
describe their relationship; it depends on the angle from which we view 
the two things concerned. So we sometimes call the human hand a part 
(bad) of the human body, but we also call the hand "other" (gayr) 
than the remaining limbs of the body. For the actual relationship 
between, for instance, hand and feet, this does not make any 
difference.186 
Therefore, 'Abd al-Jabbâr gives for "gayr" (other or else) the 
following definition : "when in any pair of mentioned things one of 
them distinguishes itself from its companion by a 'mention' which 
184
 MugnîVW, 38 
1 β 5
 This term is frequently used in the discussions about the essence of God's qualities 
and the essence of the Qur'ân All parlies involved in these theological discussions had 
to describe the relationship between God and His qualities without touching God's unity 
and uniqueness The denial that His qualities and the Qur'ân are something else than 
God played in these discussions a fundamental part 'Abd al-Jabbâr gives ten pages 
to the description of the meaning of this concept m Mugni VII, 119-129, in discussing 
the relationship between God and His speech 
186
 This example is mentioned by 'Abd al-Jabbâr in Mugni VII, 120. in the course 
of his argumentation he again returns to this example The second example he gives 
is less concrete "One says about one of the ten that it (the one) is a part of it (the ten) 
and not other than it And if one gives it a mention of its own, one says that it is other 
than the (remaining) nine But its relationship to (hâluh ma') the nine (in the 
manuscript can be read also al-lis'a instead of the as-шЬ'а, which is printed in the edition, 
the mention of seven does not make any sense, the reading nine seems evident) does 
not differ in the two cases Therefore, one says about the eleventh that it is other 
than the ten, and one does not say this about the tenth because one of them falls under 
the ten and the other docs not fall under it" See Mugni VII, 120 
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characterizes it, each of them must be other than its companion."187 
For : "what does not fall under the thing mentioned, is other (some-
thing else); what falls under it, is a part of it."188 
So much for the meaning of this word as used in everyday language. 
When we leave the terminology and concentrate on the reality behind 
the words, we discover that there are not three, but only two possi-
bilities; two things are either one and the same or something else (or 
other). When we know that a certain thing is characterized, or can 
be characterized, by qualities by which the second thing is not charac-
terized, each must be something else, other than its companion.189 
While names can be chosen at will, qualities cannot. Therefore, what 
is called a "part" because of the name chosen, is in fact "other" 
because both the "part" and the "whole" can have qualities its 
companion has not. 
The being "other" of two things is not based upon an accident 
"gayriya" ("otherness") that would inhere in the substance,190 for 
they cannot be "non-other"; they cannot stop being other and become 
one and the same.191 
4. QUALITIES 
This section not only deals with the relation between accidents and 
substances and the way in which the inhering of accidents in a substance 
determines the qualities of that substance, but also with any other way 
in which a "thing" (including also God Himself) can be qualified and 
be characterized by a certain description. 
When we try to follow the footsteps of 'Abd al-Jabbâr in his elab-
oration of the concept of "quality"—a concept which has constituted 
197
 Mugni VII, 119' "kuil maJkûravn yumayya: ahaduhumâ bi-mâ yakussuh mm 
ad-dikr 'an sähibih, fa-yajib kann kuil »âhid mmhumâ gayran Ιι-1-âkar" 
1B8
 Mugni VII, 120. "ma la yadkul Iaht al-madkur kàn gayrah, wa-mâ dakal tahtah 
kân badali" 
189
 Mugni VII, 123: "Every qualified thing (mawsúf) which is known to be 
characterized by judgements (ahkâm) and qualities (sifâl) by which the other is not 
characterized— or when this is possible for them- -each of them is other than its 
companion in reality (/? l-ma'nâ)". 
190
 The thesis that something is gayr because of an accident gayriya inhering in it, 
is refuted by 'Abd al-Jabbâr in Mugni VII, 127-129. Before (Mugni VII, 123-127), he 
already refuted the definition of two other things running "the existence of one of 
which is possible together with the non-existence of the other". 
191
 Consequently, this qualification is said to be "because of its essence" and nol 
"because of a cause". 
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one of the major points of dispute between Mu'tazila and their 
opponents and among Mu'tazila too because of the implications it 
has for the discussions about God's qualities— we have to start from 
direct human experience, which forms the foundation of 'Abd al-
Jabbâr's system. 
There are two different starting-points in this matter, each of which 
has its own function and its own implications; together they form 
the basis of all further elaboration. These two starting-points arc : the 
known state (Ml) and the perceived accident {'arad mudrak). 
Hai : state.192 It is not a pure coincidence that this term is at the same 
192
 'Abd al-Jabbâr's "tejcher" Abu Hâsim is the one who became famous on account 
of his theor> of "slates" (ahnáf), he used this concept especially to explain the essence of 
God's qualities I or Abu Hàsim's doctrine, which is not entirely followed by 'Abd 
al-Jabbâr see, apart from the passages concerned in the handbooks M Horten, Die 
Modus-lheone des Abu Hâuhim, ZDMG 63 (1909), 303-324, M Horten, Neues zur 
Modus-theorie des Abu Häschim, Beitrage Gesih Philos Mittelalt Supplement 1913, 
45-53, D Gimarct, La théorie des ahwäl d'Abú Hâsim al-Guhbâ"i d'après des sources 
as'antes, JA 258 (1970), 47-86 
It was only after I had finished my manuscript that the acts of the Fourth Congress of 
Arabic and Islamic Studies were published, Richard Frank's contribution deals with the 
theory of the "ahnaF' and gives an excellent survey of the contents and the function of 
this theory It is because of my great appreciation for this article, which, moreover, 
has been written nearly ten years ago -that I make here a few short annotations 
bor the background of these observations it may suffice to refer to the relevant passages 
in our own study 
Ρ 88 According to 'Abd al-Jabbâr an existent (manjûd) being is not existent because 
of the inhering of an accident "existence" (UM/ÚÍ/), but "by an acting subject" (bi-fâ'il), 
because some able subject brought it into existence Consequently, it is preferable not to 
say that something "has" existence (nu/ûd) Ρ 90 The term "stfa", which indicates 
a description, cannot be compared with either the "state" or the "accident" See also 
ρ 92 Ρ 90-91 Frank's interpretation of 'Abd al-Jabbâr's text is not entirely accurate 
The passage about the "ta'tir" which the accident necessitating the composite totality 
to be in a state has on its substrate, must be interpreted in the sense that this accident 
also has an influence upon its own individual substrate The difference discussed 
here is that the accident "life", besides necessitating the composite whole to be living, 
also causes its individual substrate to be living, whereas the accident knowledge 
necessitates the composite whole to be knowing without causing its substrate (the 
heart) to be knowing too Ρ 97 I think that also the state mutahayyi: supposes that the 
substance concerned is existent 
As a translation I use the term "stale", which is generally accepted in some form 
or other Although the word possibly is not used in exactly the way in which Abu 
Hâsim used it, it is also for 'Abd al-Jabbâr a technical term so that the remark of 
Hourani (who renders the term hai by "condition", "state", and "status"; see Ethics, 
62 and 67) is not correct "There is no need to look here for a technical meaning of 
hai (pi ahnâl) The meaning can be induced from the examples, in all of which it 
refers to a permanent state of the agent in relation to another being Perhaps it can 
best be translated as 'status' " (Hourani, Ethics, 67) The hai mostly does not indicate 
a relation to another being, and it is not always permanent 
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time used in the Arabic grammar too. Many Mu'tazila were very well 
versed in the science of the Arabic grammar, and the philosophy and 
theology of 'Abd al-Jabbâr—like those of most of the Mu'tazila -
are greatly influenced by the views of the grammarians. 
When we, therefore, look into the way grammarians use the word 
hai in their explanations of the structures of the Arabic language, 
we see that it usually indicates an active participle or another adjective 
expressing a transitory slate (Hal muntaqila)— although it may indicate 
also a permanent state {hal gayr muntaqila)— of the subject (or object) 
of the sentence.193 
This meaning is implied in the philosophical concept of hâl as 'Abd 
al-Jabbâr uses it. We, human beings, know that we are at a certain 
moment in a "state"; this can be expressed by the use of an active 
participle or another adjective.194 That we are in such a state and 
can be called with such an adjective, is known by direct necessary 
knowledge, a certain knowledge we cannot banish from our soul. So we 
perhaps can even say that what we really know is that a certain adjective, 
used in the language as а Ля/, is at this moment applicable to us. At 
this moment the active participle "knowing", "being convinced", 
or "reflecting" is applicable, to mention some examples we already 
discussed before. And in the same way we know the difference between 
the various states; we know, for instance, that our being knowing is 
different from our being reflecting. So both the fact that we are in a 
certain state and the difference between the states is based upon our 
direct experience and therefore known by necessary knowledge, guar­
anteed by God. 
Our first knowledge of the existence of such "states" being based 
upon our self-experience—an experience expressed by 'Abd al-Jabbâr 
by the verb wajad nafsah : to find oneself (to be in a certain state)195 -
we can acquire further knowledge of states we or other human beings 
1 , 3
 See, e g , Wright, A Grammar oj the Arabic Language. II, 114 
1 9 4
 Mostly participles arc used; see the instances we have discussed already. 
'âhm (knowing), mutaqid (being convinced), zânn (assuming), sâkm (immobile), 
mutaharnk (moving), etc In some cases adjectives arc used (this depends upon the 
common usage and has no philosophical implications), for instance, hayy (living), or 
passive participles as mawjûd (existing) 
1 . 5
 For the use of the expression и ajad nafsah, "to find oneself", sec pp 41 and 54 
1 . 6
 Every composite body {jumla) is living. Cf p. 174 and also Frank, Kalám, 307 
When a composite body is in a state, it is not necessary that the cause of that state 
inheres in every part of it In some cases it does so (the accident "life"), but in other 
cases the accident inheres in a part of it but, nevertheless, causes the composite body to 
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or other living beings are in by way of reflection and argumentation. 
And in that way, we discover that not only living beings, composite 
bodies (jumla, plural : jumaf),l9b but also simple atoms are in certain 
states.197 
But all these states, be it the state of a simple substance or of a 
living being, have in common that what is primarily known is the 
state itself and not something that causes this state; the causes, if any, 
can only be deduced by way of reflection and argumentation.198 
What exactly are these states? A state is not something outside the 
substrate, not something added to it, but only a state it is in. A state 
is not "something" besides the substances and accidents, for all "things" 
in this world are either substance or accident. Hence we cannot say that 
these states are existent (mawjûdy -nor that they are non-existent 
(ma dûm)—or come into being (hâdit). For their "beginning" other 
terms have to be used, "tajaddad" (to be new) or "hasar (to result). 
But, notwithstanding all this, such a state is not a pure abstraction; 
for 'Abd al-Jabbâr it is the name for and an expression of a necessary 
self-experience. Therefore, it is not necessary to describe or define 
what is a state; everybody, every human being who is compos mentis, 
must know what it is. 
By the same self-experience which taught us the states we are in, 
we know that some of these states are permanent and others are not. 
Most states are transitory : at some time we are in that state, at other 
times we are not. We know that, though we are now in that state, it is 
possible that at some time we are not. Our being "knowing", "reflec-
ting", "moving" are examples of such transitory states.199 But, on 
the contrary, our being "what we are" and our being "human" is not 
transitory but permanent : we cannot not-be in that state. 
When a state is permanent, it is entirely connected with our being 
"ourselves", or, generally spoken, with the thing's being what it is, 
with its "essence" : the thing cannot cease to be in that state without 
at the same time ceasing to be what it is. Therefore, it is said to be in 
such a state "because of its essence" or "per se" (li-dâtih or li-nafsih). 
When a state, however, is not permanent but transitory, and the thing's 
be in that state (the accident "knowledge", inhering in the human heart). See Mugni 
VII, 43-47. 
197
 A simple atom can be, for instance, "moving", or "being in space" as we have 
seen in our discussion of the "modes of being". 
1 , 8
 See, e.g., Mugni VII, 44 and XII, 5. 
199
 See Mugni XII, 5. 
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being in that state is not connected with its essence, there must be a 
reason why it sometimes is in that state and sometimes not : some-
thing must be the cause of it. This can be an acting subject who, by-his 
very act, causes the thing to be in a certain state without producing an 
accident related to that state. This especially is the case in causing 
something to be existent (jnawjûd) or coming into existence (hádit). 
When, however, a transitory state is not caused by an acting subject, 
but by the inhering of an accident in the substance concerned, this 
cause is called a '"ilia" and the thing is said to be in that state 
"U-'illa", "because of a cause" or "per accidens", the cause always 
being an accident.200 This "cause" is often expressed by the verbal 
noun (masdar) corresponding to the participle used to indicate the 
state. 
Li-dâtih or li-nafsih :2 0 1 by its essence or per se. Both of these terms 
seem to be used by 'Abd al-Jabbâr indifferently, without any difference 
in the meaning.202 When the expression li-nafsih is used, however, 
in its strictest sense and does indicate "because of its soul", it can be 
used for a living being only because the word nafs or "soul" indicates 
the totality of the living being.203 But, just as the word nafs is used in 
a more general way to indicate "itself, so this expression can be used 
in the meaning of "per se". The other term, li-dâtih, points to the 
"essence" {dát) of the thing concerned; this word is used to indicate 
"what the thing is", not in concreto, but fundamentally; it indicates 
that which makes the thing what it is, independently of all changing 
elements. But in fact both of these expressions are used as synonyms. 
That something is in a state, not because of a cause, but per se, 
because of its essence has as a consequence that that state is not 
restricted. According to 'Abd al-Jabbâr a state is restricted by the 
cause of that state, the 'ilia : our being knowing is restricted by the 
knowledge which is the cause of our being knowing. The causes ('dal) 
constitute at the same time the causing and the restricting element 
2 0 0
 This is the way in which the existence of imperceptible accidents is deduced; 
so, e g., the "modes of being" (aknân) • pp 98-101. 
201
 This term seems to have a Greek background just as many of the terms used 
in Mu'tazili theology, although the meaning of these terms has frequently changed. 
Sec for this expression · H. Wolfson, Philosophical Implications of the Problem of Divine 
Attributes m the Kalám, JAOS 79 (1959), 73-80 
202
 See, eg., Mugnì VII, 82-83. In the first line of page 83 one must probably 
read clauih instead of adattili although the first alifis found in the manuscript. 
2 0 3
 See MugnlXU, 22 
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in our states. When a thing is, however, per se in a state, it lacks the 
restricting element and is in that state without any restrictions.204 
Consequently, being in a state per se or because of its essence 
implies two things : the thing concerned is always in that state and 
cannot not-be in that state and, second, it is not restricted in being 
in that state. 
'Ilia: cause.205 In the case of a transitory state, the term 'ilia indicates 
the accident which causes the thing concerned to be in a certain state. 
The 'ilia does so by inhering in a substrate, which is not necessarily 
the thing which is in that state.206 But when this cause exists, the 
thing is in the state related to that cause; when it ceases to exist, the 
thing ceases to be in that state. For it belongs to the essence of a cause 
Cilia) that it necessarily, and immediately, is followed by its effect, and 
that its ceasing involves the ceasing of the effect. It indicates a direct 
and necessary relationship.207 When discussing in this way the essence 
of the cause, we must not forget that what is known first is the state, 
the cause being deduced as the metaphysically necessary condition.208 
Hence, we can say that in this part of 'Abd al-Jabbâr's theology 
the word 'ilia (cause) is used for an accident which is not perceptible, 
but the existence of which is postulated to explain the thing's being 
in a certain transitory state. But if we formulate it in this way, our 
20i
 This is the reason why God knows everything and we do not, and why God is 
able to every kind of act and we are not In the same way our being what we are 
is not restricted, nor our being "human", "blackness" is not restricted m its "blackness" 
because it is so because of its essence (Mugni VII, 127) 
205
 Some very fundamental remarks about the meaning of the term 'ilia are found 
in Frank, Maná. JAOS 87 (1967), 248-259 and especially on pp 250-251 "Most 
importantly, the 'ilia is most often (almost by definition) an intrinsic cause, it is 
interior to the thing and automatically produces its effect", and "'Ilia, on the other 
hand, is used, when used in a strict sense, most commonly as the direct or primary 
determinant cause that produces its effect (ma'lúf) immediately and necessarily, 
without the intervention of any other causal factor, the existence of the 'ilia 
necessitates that of the ma'lûl and a single 'ilia, in contrast to sabab, can produce but 
a single effect" See also, in a broader context, van Ess, Logical Slruaure, 37 Cf 
also Gimarel, La théorie ties ahnâl. especially pp 52-51 
20b
 A composite body can be in a certain state because of an accident which 
inheres in a part of it There was a dispute about the question whether God can be 
in a certain state by an accident which docs not inhere at all. Cf pp 273-276 
20
~ See Mugni XU, 5 
^
0
'' See, e g , Gimarct, La théorie des ahwâl, 52-53 In the case of a transitory state 
'Abd al-Jabbâr's position corresponds with the views accepted by most Muslim 
theologians, but a distinction is made between a permanent and a transitory state, 
and it is in the case of the permanent state that the Mu'ta/ila, and among them 
'Abd al-Jabbâr, do not agree with many other theologicans 
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description is too narrow; it has a much broader use than this; it can 
be said to be any accident which causes a thing to be characterized 
(iktass) by this accident and to get a name derived from this accident.209 
In this context the word 'ilia (cause) is used to indicate the accident in 
its relation to the "thing" it characterizes, whatever this might be. 
In 'Abd al-Jabbâr's opinion there are four possible kinds of relation-
ship between an accident and the thing characterized by it.210 One 
of these four has been discussed above : an accident characterizes 
something because it causes it to be in a certain state. 
Three other possibilities remain ; what they have in common is that 
first the accident is known (by knowledge based on perception), and 
that afterwards one comes to the conclusion that something is charac-
terized by it. Whereas in the case of the transitory state 'Abd al-Jabbâr 
followed the way from the characterized thing to the characterizing 
thing, here he has to go the other way round : from the characterizing 
to the characterized thing. 
Once we know the accident, we can come to the conclusion that 
what is characterized by it is either the substrate in which it inheres, 
or a composite body (a living being) in a part of which it exists, or 
the subject who made it.21 ' 
In this case the accidents are known and one asks the question 
which thing is characterized and described (mawsûf) by it; and here the 
common language is of great importance for 'Abd al-Jabbâr; his 
confidence in the language corresponding with reality becomes mani-
fest : that thing is said to be "qualified" by the presence of an accident 
which in common language is "described" by it. And by using these 
terms, corresponding with the Arabic root "ил/", we come to the 
word "si/a" (quality, description) upon which many fierce disputes 
in matters of theology had been centred. 
2 0
' ' Sec Mugm VII, 50 The names meant here arc frequently participles related to 
the names of the accidents. Names which are used in the common language play 
a very important pari 
2 , 0
 These four are mentioned in M ugni VII, 50 and elaborated on this and the 
following page "Moreover, we know that speech has a connection with the speaking 
(subject) which supposes that he (this subject) is more likely to be speaking by it than 
something else. This connection must be knowable (ma qui. knowable by a knowledge 
based ultimately on human intuition), therefore, it can only be qualified by it either 
because it (speech) inheres in him. or because it inheres in a part (bad) of him, or 
because it necessitates for him a state, or because he made it. other aspects of connection 
can have no place in this mailer" 
-' ' The question can be formulated also once we know the accident and know which 
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Sifa: quality212 'Abd al-Jabbâr's most fundamental statement about 
the essence of the qualities is. "the quality is the word (qawl), like it 
(the word) is the qualification (was/) " 2 1 3 Since the root to which the 
words sifa and »lai/'belong (the root nsf) literally means "to describe", 
a quality is nothing else but a qualification and a qualification nothing 
else but a description Consequently, a quality is not something in the 
thing described, but only a word which describes a thing as it is 
adjective or participle is related to it, to which thing must this adjective or participle 
be applied'' 
2 1 2
 The qualities (si/ál) belong without any doubt to the most discussed subjects in 
Islamic theology The discussions amply elaborated in the handbooks are always centred 
upon God's qualities But also about the concept of "quality" in general and as 
applicable to things in this world much can be said, 'Abd al-Jabbâr even observes that 
it is not possible to deal with God's qualities before having studied the essence of 
qualities in this world (See Mugnl VII, 51 "We already explained in the chapter 
about the qualities that the reality (haqiqa) of the quality cannot be different in the 
present (world) and the absent (world) ) 
A very thorough and detailed study of the discussions about the essence of God's 
qualities—not involving however, 'Abd al-Jabbâr s position in this matter -was written 
by Michel Allard, his book is called Le problème des attributs di\ms dans la doctrine 
d Al As'ari et de ses premiers grands disciples (Bcvrouth 1965) The title of this book 
already betrays what will be its mconvemence for our present study Allard wrote 
his book from the standpoint of the As'ari school and this involves that the impression 
one gets of the Mu'lazili position will be rather negative and somewhat coloured 
But that does not alter the fact that, especially for the understanding of the As'ari 
theology, the work of Allard is of great importance 'Abd al-Jabbar's views on the 
qualities, especially on God s qualities, are treated by 'Abd al-Karim 'Utmän i\a:ari\at 
at-tak lil 169-104 
For the translation of the word sifa I had the choice out of some alternatives 
"description'. attribute", and 'quality" have been used by modern authors The word 
"description corresponds with the meaning of the root ' ч ?/" in its non-technical use 
and remains very close to the meaning the technical term has in 'Abd al-Jabbâr's 
works but this translation mav cause—exactly because of its being so clearly defined 
some ambiguity when used in discussions between 'Abd al-Jabbâr and his opponents 
The terms "attribute ' and ' quality are both somewhat vaguer and capable of various 
interpretations My choice of "quality" is influenced by the easy way its derivatives 
can be used in English and made to correspond with the Arabic words sifa (qualit>) 
nasf (qualification) and nasaj (to qualify) 
2 1 3
 /V/utfm'VII 117 li-ann as-sifa lin аі-дані, Kama annali al-nasf' The argument 
'Abd al-Jabbâr gives to prove the identification of the two terms »as) and sifa is 
based on the use of these words by linguists (ahi al-luga) 'We gave as an indication 
to this (the identification of the two terms) the word of the linguists somebody 
describes somebody else with a good quality or with a good qualification (both 
terms are used in the Arabic grammar to indicate the adjective, see next note and 
Wright, Grammar, I, 105)" A second argument 'Abd al-Jabbâr gives is based on the 
fact that someone who is dumb cannot describe, he concludes that dumbness prevents 
the "quality" {sifa) Consequently, "quality" must be a "word" (qiml) See for both these 
arguments Wugnì VII. 117 Cf also al-A5'ar¡ Maqâlât 172 "The Mu'lazila and the 
Kawânj said names and qualities are words ' 
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The terms wasf and si/a are also used by Arab grammarians, and in 
the grammar too they can be used as synonyms.214 When we look for 
the meaning of the word sifa as used in the technical vocabulary of the 
old Arab grammarians, we discover that it indicated the active parti-
ciple; but it was generalized so that the word became applicable to all 
participles and adjectives.215 This corresponds with what we said 
above about the relation between an accident and the thing which 
is characterized by it.216 
But should we conclude from all this that the qualities are the 
result of a purely intellectual activity which gives names to things, or 
even worse : should we conclude that the qualities are only names and 
words arbitrarily given? Not at all. A quality is the expression of 
a reality which is known, ma'qui, known by knowledge based on 
human intuition. And we have to remember that for 'Abd al-Jabbâr 
knowledge implies certainty and correspondence with reality. The 
reality which is expressed in the quality can be a state or a relation of 
the thing concerned to a given accident.217 
This really known reality behind the qualities, which constitutes the 
basis of our actual description, is expressed by 'Abd al-Jabbâr by means 
of the verb "istahaqq", "to be entitled to". The quality, conceived as 
a description, is not an arbitrary act of a subject who decides or does 
not decide to describe or qualify the thing concerned. That thing is 
entitled to this quality, entirely independently of the actual description 
or qualification by a describing subject.218 Because we know that 
a thing is entitled to a quality, we can qualify it in that way. 
2 1 4
 See Wright, Grammar, I, 105, where both terms are used to indicate the 
adjectives. But see also, especially for the history of the word sifa and its use in the 
works of the old Arab grammarians, Fleisch, Traité de Philologie Arabe, 265-266 
2 1 5
 Cf Allard, Problème, ρ 3 and Heisch, Traité, p. 265-266 Allard makes the 
following remark : " . . . le terme sifa, pour les grammairiens arabes, désigne par priorité 
des participes actifs ou passifs, et secondairement de véritables adjectifs qui, gramma-
ticalement, sont traités comme des mots ressemblant aux participes (al-muiabbaha 
bi'ism al-fâ'if)" (p 3; his argumentation is based upon the work of Fleisch) See, 
however, also W. Diem, Nomen, Substantiv und Adjektiv bei den arabischen Grammatikern, 
Oriens 23-24 (1974) 312-332, esp 313-316. 
2 1 6
 See our discussions of the hai (state) and the 'ilia (cause) We already pointed 
to the fact that in most cases active participles are used to indicate the characterized 
thing, and verbal nouns to indicate the characterizing thing. 
2 1 7
 See Mugni VII, 50. Sec also Frank's reaction to the view expressed in the 
book of Allard that this sifa is "une opération de l'esprit": "When al-Gubbâ'i insists 
that the attribute (sifa) is really our act of attribution (wasf), he does not mean at all 
that it is nothing but 'une opération de l'esprit'" Frank, Kalâm, 299. 
2 1 8
 Al-Bâqillânî seems to deny this reality behind the actual descriptions in Mu'tazilî 
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In this istihqâq (being entitled) two aspects are to be distinguished : 
the thing which is entitled to the quality and the reason why it is entitled 
to it.219 This concept of istihqâq is also used to distinguish between 
the different qualities; if a thing can in any case be entitled to a quality 
without at the same time being entitled to the other one, the two qualities 
are different ; if this is not possible and a thing, whenever it is entitled 
to the first, is also entitled to the second, the two qualities must be 
identical, as we have seen in the case of the two qualities ''reflecting" 
(nâzir) and "thinking" (mufakkir).220 
In depending upon the reason why a thing is entitled to a certain 
quality, we divide the qualities of that thing into three categories, 
corresponding to three different reasons : 
first, the qualities to which it is entitled because of its essence 
(li-dâtih), as its being what it is; 
second, the qualities to which it is entitled because of an accident 
which characterizes it,221 as its being moving; 
third, the qualities to which it is entitled "by the doer" (bi-l-faif), 
because someone else made it to be so, this is the case with the quality 
"existing" to which does not correspond an accident "existence". 
Here we have to notice that from another point of view also the 
qualities of the second category may be said to be "by the doer" 
because the presence of the accidents is also caused by an acting subject; 
the distinction here is made to point to the fact that some qualities result 
without the producing of an accident.222 
theology See, e g , the appendix to the article of Tntton, The Speech of God, in SÎ 36 
(1972), 21-22 • "According to al-Bàqillânî the Mu'tazila affirmed that God had no names 
or qualities till He created speech with which other parts of His creation could talk 
about Him It seems that al-Bâqillânî felt that a quality was somehow mixed up with 
speech, with the ability to talk about it" 
2 1 9
 See Muhit I, 100, MugniVU, 53 
2 2 0
 For the identification between the two qualities "reflecting" and "thinking", 
see Mugni XII, 4 "li-annah là nâ:ir ht-qalbih ilia mufakktran wa-lâ mujakkir ilia 
nâziran bi-qalhih" The general statement on which this actual identification is based, 
is found in Mugni IV, 33 "Know that, when a qualified (object) can in any way be 
entitled to a quality, whatever it is, although it does not receive another quality, one 
has to decide that the contents of the one of them are not the contents of the other; 
in this way one comes to know the difference between the contents of the qualities. " 
The distinction between two qualities can also be made when the qualified thing is 
not entitled to both qualities in the same way See Muhit I, 100 So "blackness" is 
entitled to the quality "being blackness" because of its essence, and to the quality 
"existing" (mawjûd) because of the doer (al-fatl). See also note 222 
221
 The word used here in the Arabic text of the Muhit is maná, I explain this word 
at the end of this paragraph 
222
 The distinction made here is found in Muhit I, 100 Another distinction 
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When we take into account both the reason why a thing is entitled 
to a quality and the thing which is entitled to it, we come to the 
following division :2 2 3 
First, there are the qualities to which a substrate (mahall) is entitled ; 
these can be subdivided into qualities to which it is entitled because 
of its essence and qualities to which it is entitled because of an accident 
which inheres in it. This latter case can be subdivided again, according 
to whether this accident causes it to be in a state or not.22* 
Second, there are the qualities to which a living being is entitled; 
some of them indicate something that has an influence upon the 
instruments {al-âlât) a living being needs to act, especially a defect of 
such an instrument; all others indicate that the living being is in a 
certain state {hai).225 
In the third and last place, there are the qualities to which the doer, 
the acting subject (al-jail), is entitled; they are all of the same kind : 
they all indicate the occurring of the act from him without causing 
him to be in a certain state.226 
The objection made by Hisâm bn al-Hakam that nothing can be 
said about a quality, because that would mean a description (wasf) 
or quality {sija) of that quality {sifa) and consequently an inhering of 
mentioned there is qualities to which it is entitled because of its essence, qualities 
to which it is entitled because of a ma'ná, and qualities to which it is entitled neither 
by its essence nor by a maná The last category can be subdivided, first, the 
quality of the coming into existence by a doer (та Лии bi-l-jâ'il mm al-hiulût) and 
second, what is influenced by another quality All this too can be condensed into two 
categories · what is connected to the essence and what is connected to the acts. 
Consequently, 'Abd al-Jabbâr speaks in three different ways about acts when discussing 
the qualities . he may mean qualities caused by the act of someone which does not result 
in κη accident, he may mean besides what is mentioned above, also all accidents which 
maice the thing be entitled to a quality, every quality except the essential qualities; 
or he may mean the accidents by which the doer is qualified and not the substrate 
in which it inheres (as, for instance, speech) 
2 2 3
 This division can be found in Mugni VII, 53 The category "Ьі-І-{аіГ is missing 
here. 
2 2 4
 'Abd al-Jabbâr gives one single example here, and this is meant for the accident 
which causes a state He mentions the quality "being (in space)" (kam). The printed 
text adds "fi ba'd al-muhâdatât", this expression can have no function in the context. 
The normally used specification of kâ'm runs /Г ba'd al-jihat (in some direction). See 
therefore also pp 128-129. Possibly we have to read in our present text// ba'dal-muhâduât. 
2 2 5
 As instance of the first kind 'Abd al-Jabbâr mentions the living being's being 
dumb or being blind. Instances of the second kind which we met already are · knowing, 
being convinced, reflecting, assuming, etc 
2 2 6
 So, e.g , "beating" (dânb) and "speaking" (mutakallim) 
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an accident (sifa) in another accident (sifa),221 cannot be levelled 
against the descriptions of the qualities given by 'Abd al-Jabbâr since 
in his view a quality is not an accident but a description to which 
a certain thing is entitled. Therefore a description of a quality must 
be compared with an information about an information.228 
Hukm : judgement.229 While the term sija (quality) appeared to have 
a strong connection with the science of Arabic grammar, the word 
hukm seems to be derived from the vocabulary of Islamic legislation 
(sar'îyât).230 For, besides its use in the matter of the "names and judge-
ments" (ql-asma wa-1-ahkâm), which constitutes the foundation of the 
intermediate position (al-manzila bayn al-manziiatayn), which again 
is said to be on the basis of the origins of the Mu'tazila,231 the word 
hukm plays an important rôle in the analogical reasoning used in the 
science of Islamic legislation.232 In the description of this analogical 
reasoning or qiyâs we find besides the term hukm also the term 'ilia 
(cause) : the judgement about the legal and moral value of an act 
(hukm) is said to be dependent on the presence of a certain cause 
('ilia) in that act. For example, the drinking of wine can be said to be 
forbidden (the hukm) because of its being intoxicating (the 'ilia) ; con-
sequently, whenever this 'ilia is present, the act is entitled to this hukm. 
22п
 See, e g , Mugni VII, 3 Cf also Pretzl, Attributenlehre. 17 For HiSâm bn 
al-Hakam as for many other Muslim theologians the w/á/ are the accidents 
2 2 8
 Hisâm's arguments and those of his followers are refuted by 'Abd al-Jabbar 
in Mugni VII, 117-119 The description of a quality, or the qualification of a quality also 
does not necessitate an endless chain of descriptions or qualifications "That matter 
would only be necessary if we had said that a quality must be qualified because it is 
a quality, as we said about the necessity of a connection between the produced things 
and the producer (ta'alluq al-muhdatât bi-l-muhdit) We explained that, when that 
(connection) is not necessary, it is analogous to the admitting of an information 
(kabar) about an information, and that (read an instead of in) this does not lead to an 
endless chain" Mugni VII, 117 
2 2 9
 For the meaning of the word hukm in this context, see for instance van Ess, 
Logical Structure. 48 Hourani, Ethics, 39, renders the plural ahkâm as "the broadest 
categories" This is not correct See also his ρ 62 Von Grunebaum, Observations on 
the Muslim Concept of Evil, SI 31 (1970), 117-134, translates the word as "status" 
and places much emphasis on its relationship to legislation I chose myself the term 
"judgement" since this translation indicates its original meaning which is still supposed 
in 'Abd al-Jabbâr's use of this term, it corresponds to its use both in matters of legislation 
and in philosophical texts, both in sar'îyât and in 'aqliyât 
2 3 0
 It can be used as a grammatical term and in that case be translated as 
"predicament" See Lane, 617 and Cachia, The Monitor, 33 of the Arabic part But it 
did not belong to the commonly used vocabulary of the grammarians 
231
 See, e g , Massignon, La Passion d'AI-Hallâj, 706-710 
2 3 2
 Cf Mugni Х ІІ See also pp 71-72 
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The presence of the 'ilia (cause) immediately and necessarily causes 
the being entitled to the judgement, for, as was the case with the quality 
or sifa, the actual pronouncement of a judgement is not necessary, 
it is the being entitled to it (istihqâq) which matters. 
When the term hukm is used outside the realm of legislation, it is 
used in an analogical way it indicates a judgement to which a thing 
is entitled because of the presence of a 'ilia (cause).233 Hence, in fact, 
it is nearly a synonym of "quality" : every quality a thing is entitled 
to because of a 'ilia (cause) can be called a hukm. The difference may 
be found in the fact that the use of the term hukm places special 
emphasis on the fact that it is caused by a 'ilia : it is the consequence 
of the 'ilia. 
Ma'nâ : qualifier,234 accident which causes something to be entitled 
2 3 3
 Sec Mugni IV, 8 " the need of a Ihing, in the originating of a judgement for 
it, for a cause " (Ammä hâjat as-ïay' fi husúl al-hukm Iah dà 'illa ) and Mugni IV, 
59 " the originating of the judgements at the coming into existence of the 
ma'âni (here used as a synonym for 'ilia, plural 'liai wa-husûl al-ahkâm 'ind hudût 
al-ma'áni) Together these two short quotations describe the relationship between 'ilia 
and hukm 
2 3 4
 In the course of this century some authors have been intrigued by this obscure 
concept, which could point in the direction of Greek philosophy (with the Platonic 
concept of the "ideas"), but which at the same time appears to be far removed from 
a possibly Greek origin Especially its use in the theology of the Mu'tazili Mu'ammar 
received some attention In 1909 Horovitz wrote in his book Über den Einfluss der 
griechischen Philosophie auf die Entwicklung des Kalâm some ten pages (44-54) about 
the Greek background of the ma'nâ In Ihc same year Horten wrote Die sogenannte 
Ideenlehre des Muammar (Archi\ fur svstematnthe Philosophie XV, 469-484), the next 
year followed by H-Os bedeutet ma'nâ als philosophischer Terminus? (ZDMG 64 (1910), 
ЪУХЛЧЬ) While Horovit? places much emphasis upon a possibly Greek origin of the 
concept. Horten looks for that origin in the Indian philosophy, as he often does 
In 1940 appeared Pretzl's Die fruhislamische Attnbulenlehre, ihre Weltanschaulichen 
Grundlagen und Wirkungen, in which he discussed the use of ma'nâ, basing himself on 
the text ol al-As'arî's Maqâlât In 1965 Wolfson published his article Muammar s Theory 
of Ma'nâ in the Studies in Honor of Hamilton A R Gibb, as a reaction Frank wrote his 
thorough and elaborate article, which summarized the former discussion and gave it 
a conclusion This article appeared in JAOS 87 (1967), 248-259 under the tille Al-Ma'nâ, 
some reflections on the technual meanings of the term in the Kalâm and its use in the 
Pin su s of Muammar 
To give a correct and clear translation of the word ma'nâ is very difficult Trans-
lation by ' idea" is confusing since that might point to the meaning this word has 
in Greek philosophy The terms "form" (Watt, tormative Period, 245), "Moment" 
(van bss. Ihn Kullâb, 111), and "ground" (Hourani, Islamic Rationalism, 63, wrongly 
he compares in that text и ajh with 'ilia and ma'nâ) are more vague and therefore 
usable, if well defined Frank describes rather than translates this word by calling it 
"an intrinsic determinant cause of some real aspect of the being of the subject" (Ma'nâ, 
252) or 'the intrinsic causal determinants of the thing's bemg-so" (Ma'nâ 250) I chose 
the word "qualifier" in an attempt to make clear the function of the mana in the chosen 
translation itself 
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to a quality. When I use the word "qualifier", I do not use it in its 
grammatical sense, but, literally, as that which makes something to be 
qualified, to be entitled to a qualification. 
In a non-technical vocabulary, the word maná is used as the contrary 
of ism (name) or lafz (words) to indicate the reality which is to be 
found behind these words, the "meaning", be it a reality in the mind 
or a reality outside it, which for 'Abd al-Jabbâr does not make a big 
difference.235 
As a terminus technicus in 'Abd al-Jabbâr's philosophical vocab-
ulary, it stands for an accident considered from a certain point of view. 
A maná must be, without any doubt, an accident;236 the point of view 
from which it is considered is its relation to a quality or judgement : 
it is the accident in as far a quality comes forth (sâdira) from it or a 
judgement (hukm) is necessitated (awjab) by it.237 When we know 
something to be in a given transitory state, we postulate this thing 
to be in that state because of a qualifier (ma'nâ). 
From what is said above and what we remarked before about the 
essence of the 'ilia and its use as a philosophical terminus technicus, 
it becomes apparent that both these terms are used in the same cases. 
Ma'nâ, in fact, is frequently used as an equivalent of 'ilia (cause); 
both words are used even in one and the same sentence, evidently as 
synonyms.238 A thing is entitled to a quality, either by its essence, or 
by a qualifier (ma'nâ) or by a doer (fa'il); thus 'Abd al-Jabbâr points to 
the equivalence of 'ilia and ma'nâ and to the fact that any accident, 
in its relation to the thing which is characterized by it and is entitled 
by it to a quality, is called a qualifier and ma'nâ.239 It may be an 
accident which inheres in the substrate that is qualified, but it may 
also inhere in another substrate, the connection with the qualified thing 
235
 For the non-technical use of this word, see, e g . Mugm VII, 3 : the "meaning" 
of God's speech must be understood Cf van Ess, Logical Structure, 33; van Ess clearly 
speaks about the non-technical use of ma'nâ when he compares it with the Greek lekton 
2ib
 See, с g , Miignì VII. 8 : "With 'special arrangement' we do not mean a qualifier 
(ma'nâ) other than the letters, . for the letters are an accident and an accident cannot 
inhere in it" So, evidently, a ma'nâ must be an accident See also Prctzl, Atinbutenlehre, 
39 
2 3 7
 See Sarh 533 "For. if the qualifier (ma'nâ) is not necessarily known, the way to 
(know) it must be either a quality coming forth from it, or a judgement it (the qualifier) 
has necessitated". Sec also Mugni IV, 22. 
13
* See Mugni XII, 5 "just as he must be willing by a ma'nâ and being convinced 
by a ma'nâ, so he must be reflecting by a 'tila" See also Frank, Ma'nâ, 250. "In this 
sense, the term is an equivalent to the term "cause" ('ilia)" 
2 3 9
 See Muhit I, 100 and our discussion of that text on p. 153 
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being the connection between an act and its doer. A living being is 
qualified as "speaking" (mutakallim) because of a qualifier {maná; 
here : kalâm) which inheres in another substrate.240 
By way of conclusion we hold that a qualifier (mana) is that kind of 
cause ('///a) that makes a thing entitled to a quality. And just as the 
ma'ná is related to the 'ilia, so the sifa is related to the hukm. 
2 4 0
 See Mugni VII, 82, where speech is said to be the ma'ná by which the speaking 
subject (al-mutakalhm) becomes entitled to this quality because he made it In that 
context also the relation between the two terms maná and 'ilia becomes apparent; 
see Mugni VII, 62-83. 
See Mugni VII, 82 : "That God cannot be speaking 'neither per se nor by a cause 
{'ilia)'. What we already indicated- that the establishing that He is speaking is the 
establishing of His speech, and that He has no state by which He would be characterized 
and which could be the meaning οΓ our word speaking—refutes this statement. 
It (also) explains that He must be speaking by a ma'ná, when it exists. He must be 
qualified by that, and when it is non-existent. He must not be (qualified) thus" 
С. ANTHROPOLOGY 
It is characteristic of 'Abd al-Jabbâr's fundamentally theological 
way of thinking and of his orientation towards an ultimately theo-
centric world view, that the context in which he expressly discusses the 
essence and qualities of man is his treatise on the taklif, God's charging 
mankind with duties. It is in this context that man is described as 
the one who is charged (al-mukallaf). ' 'Abd al-Jabbâr even goes so far 
that he deduces the qualities of man from his being charged by God. 
But besides this theological starting-point,2 there is also a second 
one which like the first is characteristic of 'Abd al-Jabbâr's theology : 
his phenomenal starting-point; the evidences of our direct experience 
and the knowledge based on perception constitute also a foundation 
of his discussions about the essence of man. 
From his theological principle that man is charged by God with 
duties, that man—in consequence—is responsible (mukallaf), and that 
in this respect he is comparable with the angels,3 'Abd al-Jabbâr deduces 
that man {just as the angels) must be able, knowing, perceiving, living, 
and 'willing. A responsible subject must be able to perform the act 
he is charged with, he must know how it is (its kayfiya), and he must 
be willing to produce that act in a certain way. The other two qualities 
mentioned are deduced from the responsible subject's being able : in 
order to be able he has to be living (this is a necessary condition), 
and a living being can only be distinguished from other beings by its 
being perceiving.4 
1
 The general principles of the taklij are discussed by 'Abd al-Jabbâr in the elevenlh 
part of the Mugni In that context he discusses besides the taklif also the mukallij (God, 
who charges) and the mukallaf (the living beings which are charged by God with duties). 
About the mukallaf— and in fact the human being is discussed there—is spoken in 
MugniXl, 309-406. In the Sarh and in the now published part of the Muhit there are no 
elaborate treatises on the human being comparable to the one we find in the Mugni. 
See also 'Abd al-Karîm 'Utmân. Nazarhal at-laklif, 305-408, where he deals with the 
human being under the general heading of the mukallaf 
2
 In the elevenlh part of the Mugni 'Abd al-Jabbâr discusses the so-called taklif 
'aqli, the taklif in as far as it is independent of revelation and knowablc on the basis 
of human intuition. Although 'Abd al-Jabbâr's anthropology can be called in its quasi-
totality a "theological" anthropology, it cannot be called a "revealed" anthropology 
3
 "In this chapter it is not allowed to qualify him (the responsible subject, al-mukallaf) 
as 'man' (¡nsân) because angels are also responsible subjects, and they are not qualified 
as such (se as 'man')" Mugni XI, 309 
4
 "For He (God) only charged with an act the (subject who is) able (qädir) lo bring it 
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As for 'Abd al-Jabbâr's second starting-point, which we call with 
a modern term "phenomenal" because of his appeal to the "pheno-
mena" of the world, our perception tells us that man resembles the 
animals, which are living beings like him, but that he is distinguished 
from them by the way he is built. Besides the question of what is 
a human being, one may also ask which things belong to the human 
being, which things are a necessary condition, and which things are 
neither part of the human being nor a condition.5 
This latter question as to what in fact a human being is, constitutes 
together with the five qualities deduced from man's being responsible, 
the contents of this paragraph, which will be divided accordingly into 
six sections. 
1. THE ESSI-NCE OF MAN 
Insân : man, human being.6 'Abd al-Jabbâr admits not to be interested 
in the use and the meaning of the word insân. What he is interested in, 
is the responsible person (al-mukallaf) and his qualities. Insân is only 
a name which, like other names, is given to a certain number of things. 
Here we must not take into consideration the names, but the maná, 
the reality behind the names, and that reality is for 'Abd al-Jabbâr the 
able living being (al-hayy al-qâdif) who is responsible. What urges 
'Abd al-Jabbâr nevertheless to discuss the meaning of that "name", 
is that other theologians apply this name to the able living being.7 
(the act) into existence, knowing ('âlim) how it is (kayßya), willing (murid) to produce 
it in this and not in another way, an able subject (qâdir) is only able when he is (also) 
living And the state of the 'living' (hay\) can only be distinguished from others by his 
being perceiving (mudnk) the perceptible things when the hindermgs are taken away, 
and by the possibility of his being knowing and able" Mugni XI, 309 
5
 "Man is the living being, he is this person (saks) structured by this special structure" 
(Mugni XI, 321) See also Mugni XI, 311, where 'Abd al-Jabbâr gives the opinion of 
"our teachers" and where is added to the definition given above "through which he 
is different from the other animals" The characteristic element in this definition is the 
repetition of the demonstrative pronoun "this" person with "this" structure, which 
points to the phenomenal character of this description 
6
 See also "Abd al-Karîm 'Utman, Nazariyat at-laklif, 309-316, the author does not 
make a distinction between the name insân and the description of the responsible person 
as "the able living being", a distinction 'Abd al-Jabbâr explicitly makes in the text 
of the Mugni 
1
 See Mugni XI, 309 "We only mention the disagreement about what man is 
because they disagree about what the able living being (al-hayy al-qâdir, the description 
of the responsible person) is, and everybody who says what he has to say about him 
(sc the able living being) qualifies him as 'man' (msân)" 
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So it is because of his opponents, especially that he might be able to 
refute them, that 'Abd al-Jabbâr is going to use and explain the word 
msän, man 8 But this description of the meaning and use of the name 
msûn will not teach us what exactly is the responsible person; 'Abd 
al-Jabbâr discovers that both terms are not coextensive. In order to 
know what "we" really are, we have to start from the concept of 
taklif, and deduce in that way our qualities. 
Whenever we want to know the meaning of a name, we have to 
appeal to the philologists (ahi al-luga)д for an answer. We necessarily 
know that they, in qualifying a human being as human being, mean 
"this" 1 0 shape, which is structured with "this" structure by which it 
is distinguished from other animals.11 The difference between this 
definition and the definition of the responsible person we gave above,1 2 
is that this definition has as its basic term not "person" (saks) but 
"shape" (sura) so that this definition points yet more clearly to the 
outward appearance (which is not only the outward surface) as the 
element which constitutes the basis of the distinction made between 
different living beings. ' 3 
The word insân indicates the whole living being, not a part of him, 
8
 "We explained before what in this chapter is connected with the reality behind the 
names (al-manâ), and we indicated that the able living being is this person, and we 
refuted the statement of him who says that it is a qualifier (mana) in him (the person). 
or a qualifier which directs him without being in him, or the person and a qualifier in 
him This is sufficient for the aspect we meant bor we wanted in this way to explain the 
essence (ba\ân mana) ofthe responsible person in order that it will be possible afterwards 
to mention his qualifications and conditions {amâ/ah иa-surûiah) Names have no 
place in this chapter, although we mentioned a number of them because they arc so 
much discussed by some people" See also M ugni XI, 310 
9
 Literally the people of the language The translation "philologists" is proposed 
by Frank (Fundamental Assumptions, 11) But possibly what is meant is the people 
who speak this language as their own, who really know this language without it being 
stipulated that they have made a scientific study of that language See Lane, 121, where 
this example, however, is not mentioned 
10
 The use of the demonstrative pronoun is an indication that this definition does 
not more than point to the perceived reality and the use of the word in the vocabulary 
of every day 
1
 ' See MugniW, 359 See also 'Abd al-Karim 'Utman, Nazarhat al-taklif, 311, where 
he mentions a description found in the not yet published part of the Muhit · "Man 
(al-msân) is the composite body (al-jumla) we see, not something outside it or something 
inside it, the most lucid indication to him is the pointing (¡Kara) to this special structure" 
12
 See note 5 In Mugni XI, 311 this is said to be the able living being, in Mugnl 
XI, 321 it is said to be man, but also in this latter instance the discussion is not about the 
meaning of the word, but about the ma'ná behind the names 
13
 СГ Mugni XI. 359 the distinction between the living beings is made "bi-s-sura 
az-záhira", the outward appearing shape 
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and certainly nol something hidden in him.14 There was some dif-
ference of opinion among Mu'tazila concerning some "parts" belonging 
to the insân, or constituting a condition for him, or having no essential 
connection with him at all. Abu 'Ali, for instance, stated that all that 
grows with the growing of the totality belongs to it. Abu Hâsim, on 
the contrary, restricts it to the atoms which are living and by which 
the subject is, consequently, perceiving.15 But one can say that a man 
is still called man when he is dead, so long as the shape is remaining; 
he is then called a "dead man"; and now one can discuss again what 
exactly belongs to that "shape". But, although there is some disagree-
ment, which is always possible when we are concerned with names, 
everybody knows in general what is indicated by the word insân. It 
suffices to point to that necessary knowledge everybody has. 
When we leave the question of names for what it is, and direct our 
attention to the reality, the theological and metaphysical reality, we 
see that 'Abd al-Jabbâr has chosen as his starting-point the taklif and 
the person who is charged by this taklif, the mukallaf or responsible 
person. In order that this taklif, this charging of persons with duties, 
can be good (hasan), the responsible person must be able, knowing, 
willing, living, and perceiving.16 For his description of the responsible 
person 'Abd al-Jabbâr uses two of these qualities : this person is 
al-hayy al-qádir : the able living being.17 On this concept in fact 'Abd 
al-Jabbâr's anthropology is built. 
The able living being is "this" person, structured by "this" special 
structure through which he is distinguished from other animals; to 
him are directed command and prohibition, blame and praise; and 
though he is only living and able by qualifiers in him, this does not fall 
under the definition;18 to the composite whole of the living being 
only belongs that in which life inheres, nothing else. This description 
of the able living being, attributed to "our teachers", is most probably 
accepted by 'Abd al-Jabbâr.19 
It will be manifest that a similar description can lead to endless 
14
 See Mugni XI, 358 and 363-364. 
15
 See Mugni XI, 364 About the essence of "being living" and its connection with 
"being perceiving" - cf. the following sections of this paragraph. 
16
 See Mugni XI, 309, translated in note 4. 
17
 See Mugni XI, 309 and the discussion which follows there 
18
 The Arabic text (Mugni XI, 311) gives : "vea-m kân ¡â yakûn hayyan qâdiran illa 
li-ma'âni ßh, lâkmn dâlik là yadkul Iaht al-hadd": seen from the purely theoretical 
conditions deduced from the taklif, this is not necessary. 
19
 Mugni XI, 311. 
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discussions about some concrete atoms being a substrate in which 
life inheres or not The hairs (sa'ar), bones, and blood of the human 
body have constituted in this way the object of disputes about their 
belonging to the person on the basis of their being living or not 
The way in which one can make a distinction between what is living 
and what is not, is by establishing whether it is perceiving or not 
Some forms of perception—seeing, hearing, tasting, and smelling— 
need a special organism, a special instrument, built in a special manner, 
but other forms of perception do not These are used as the distinctive 
mark between what is living and what is not, they are the perception 
of warmth, coldness, and pam In this way the level on which the 
discussion is held changes, not the discussion itself, for the question 
to be answered now runs, for instance do we feel pain in our bones 
and in our blood920 'Abd al-Jabbâr's teachers Abu 'Alî and Abu 
Hâsim agree that we do not perceive with our blood, but that, never-
theless, blood is a necessary condition for the living being to be 
living 2 I 
For 'Abd al-Jabbâr, the able living being is, consequently, the person 
we see and know It is the body, in the general sense of that word 
and not as opposed to spirit, a composite whole (jumla) of substances 
and their inhering accidents For 'Abd al-Jabbâr man is a material 
unity Man is not a combination of a material and a spiritual element, 
nor does there exist something inside or outside the body which really 
would be the able living being No, the body as we know it, that is the 
able living being That should be called "man" 2 2 
In the Mugni we find two basic arguments to prove this view first, 
the knowledge of a quality is said to be based upon the knowledge of the 
thing which has this quality;23 the relationship between the two sorts 
of knowledge is that between asl and far', root and branch, basic 
knowledge and derived knowledge When we know the able living 
being to be living (and to be able), we must know that being before, 
20
 For the opinions of Abu 'All and Abu Hâsim Mugni XI, 311-312, in the case of 
the bones e g the tooth-ache is discussed 
21
 One might say that the "structure" mentioned in the definition of the human 
being implies that he is built from flesh and blood See Mugni XI, 312 
22
 See Mugni XI, 358 
23
 See Mugni XI, 312 This is based on the general principle that "the establishing 
of what cannot be known, neither by necessary knowledge nor by indication, is not 
possible" A quality supposes a qualified thing, to establish the existence of that 
qualified thing, we have to know it 
164 SOME REMARKS ON 'ABD AL-JABBÂR'S "PHILOSOPHY" 
and the only thing we do know is the person (saks), the composite 
body.24 
The second argument maintains that the fact that we know some-
thing to be perceiving, just as the fact that activity is possible for it,2S 
indicates that it is living. 'Abd al-Jabbâr takes being perceiving as the 
characteristic feature by which the living being is distinguished from 
other things. As for the possibility of activity, this indicates its being 
able, and something cannot be able without being living. When, conse-
quently, both perception and possibility of acts are the indications of 
the living being, and both perception and possibility of acts charac-
terize the composite body of the living being, this composite body must 
be the living being.26 
Afterwards, 'Abd al-Jabbâr refutes the theses of his opponents who 
deny that the able living being, or the human being, is the composite 
body, nothing else and nothing more. 
In these refutations, he starts from the fact that the life of a living 
being in this world is not unrestricted and not necessary; therefore, 
this living being must be living by a "life", a qualifier which causes 
the being to be living. Therefore, living in this world is that thing in 
which life inheres. Together with the principle that the qualified thing, 
the living being, must be something known, and the thesis that the 
distinctive feature of the living being is its being perceiving, this 
starting-point constitutes the basis of these refutations.27 
Ruh : spirit. The word ruh, which for other Mu'tazili and non-Mu'tazili 
theologians—especially the older Mu'tazila— indicated something dif-
ferent from the body, sometimes even of an entirely different kind, 
something constituting the principle of life,28 is used by 'Abd al-Jabbâr 
" MugniXl, 312-313 
25
 Perception is not an act Γη this way one can make a distinction between something 
being perceiving and being able, the latter term meaning being thus that acts are 
possible for it So, it is theoretically possible that something is perceiving without being 
able 
2 , ,
 Sec M ugni XI, 313, this argument is elaborated and objections against it are 
refuted m Mugni XI. 313-320 
2
' The theses of the opponents who state that the living being or the human being 
is an element that directs the body, an atom of the heart, a spirit (rûh) in the heart, the 
spirit, the spirit and the body, or the spirit which interpenetrates the body, are mentioned 
and discussed in M ugni XI, 321-344 
28
 Some of these opinions are recorded by 'Abd al-Jabbâr in M ugni XI, 310-311 
According to an-Na77âm the spirit would be "life, interwoven (muiahika) with this 
body (jasad), it is in the body by way of penetration (mudâkala). it is one substance 
without different or opposite (parts), it is strong (qtmi, comparable to the term qâdir), 
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for something material, based as his philosophy is on the thesis that 
the entire world is built from substances and their inhering accidents.29 
Therefore, spirit, whatever it be, must be substance and accidents or 
one of the two. 
In fact, 'Abd al-Jabbâr concludes that spirit is a substance charac-
terized by the quality "subtlety" (nqqa).30 It is nothing else but breath 
which goes in and out the body (an-nafas al-mutaraddid). It belongs 
to the genus "wind" (п7г), and it is only called "spirit" {rûh) when 
it exists in the body of a living being.31 
Spirit itself is not living and consequently not a part of the 
composite body of the living being. The arguments leading to this 
conclusion are that we cannot perceive with this spirit,32 it misses the 
structure and also the "wetness" (rutûba) necessary for a living being.33 
But, 'Abd al-Jabbâr says, just as blood, which also is not living and 
not a part of the living being, spirit is needed for life; life can only 
exist in a composite body when there is spirit in the orifices (makâriq : 
especially the mouth and the nose are meant) of the body.34 In this 
way the concept of "spirit" existing in the able living being does not 
contradict 'Abd al-Jabbâr's thesis that that being is a material unity. 
Nafs: soul. Just as the term "spirit" (rûh), the term "soul" (nafs) is 
used by others to indicate an immaterial element in the human being 
and in other living beings.35 It frequently occurs in that way in the 
living, and knowing by Us essence" Bisr bn al-Mu'tamir held the view—and some 
other authors held similar views- that the spirit is the element by which the body 
is living 
24
 Cf Muhlt I, 28 
30
 See MugmW. 331 
3
' The identification between the spirit and the breath is explicitly made in Mugni 
XI, 336 "ма-alunna ann ar-iûh Лии an-nafas al-mulmaddid " This identification is 
less clear in M ugni XI. 331 where one could translate "U is only qualified by lhat 
(sc being spirit) when it originates in the living being, otherwise (wa-illû) it belongs 
to the genus of the wind and the breath which goes in and out" But against the 
background of the entire chapter of the Vtugni, we must conclude that surely the breath 
is meant by 'Abd al-Jabbâr, and that we have to translate "»a-illâ /a-hun" as "and 
unless 
12
 See Mugni XI, 336 "When we know that one does not perceive by it (the 
spirit) as one does not perceive by the hair, one must judge that there in no way 
is life in it, and when there is no life in it, it cannot be counted to (belong to) the 
composite body of the living being" 
11
 Uugni XI. 331 " life needs wetness and structure, and that docs not exist 
in the spirit" 
3 4
 Cf UugniXL 331 and 335 
^ Sec Calverley, art Ли/ç, in £ / ' , III, 827-830 
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books of philosophers of the Aristotelian tradition, who even called 
their books on anthropology, in imitation of Aristoteles, "kitáb an-
nafs", "book on the soul".36 For these thinkers the word nafs is the 
translation of the greek "psyche". 
To protect his own concept of the unity of the human person, 'Abd 
al-Jabbâr has to reject this meaning of the term nafs. Sometimes he 
uses the word nafs as an equivalent to the word qalb (heart);37 in other 
places, however, he explicitly denies this identification and states that 
the word nafs indicates the totality of the living being.38 This latter 
meaning of the word is confirmed by its use as the reflexive pronoun 
indicating the "self, and in the expression li-na/sih, which can be 
translated as "per se".39 In other contexts it is not clear what exactly 
he means when using the word nafs,A0 but it will never be an immaterial 
element in the human being. 
Qalb : heart. The word qalb seems, notwithstanding all that has been 
said above, to indicate a dichotomy in the human being; 'Abd al-Jabbâr 
makes a distinction between the acts of the heart (afâl al-qalb) and the 
acts of the limbs (afâl al-jawârih).*1 The acts of the heart being, for 
instance, knowledge and will, 'Abd al-Jabbâr seems to introduce here 
an element that is characterized by immateriality 
This, however, is not the case; 'Abd al-Jabbâr sticks to his principle. 
It is not the heart that is knowing or willing, but the entire person, 
the composite whole. Nor is the heart an instrument by which man 
36
 'Abd al-Jabbâr mentions this in Mugni XI, 312 See the references in GAL 
S III, 1013 See also Afnan, Phihsophttal Lexicon. 294-295 
37
 So, for instance, in Mugni VII, 14-20, a chapter entitled "Refutation of the state-
ment that speech is a qualifier existing in the soul (лаЛ)", in this chapter the words nafs 
and qalb are used alternately and obviously as equivalents, where the statement of the 
title of the chapter is repeated on page 15, the word qalb is used instead of nafs 
3 8
 So in Mugni XII, 22 "Us meaning is the composite whole (al-jumla) because that 
is expressed by means of 'soul' " 'Abd al-Jabbâr discusses there the meaning of the 
expression sukûn an-nafs and explains why he uses "tranquillity of the soul" and not 
"tranquillity of the heart" The principal reason why he does not use there the word 
qalb probably is that "tranquillity of the heart" would be conceived too physically as the 
slopping of its beating "The tranquillity, when connected with the heart (to constitute 
together an expression tranquillity of the heart), is understood in another way than 
the tranquillity of the soul" In this context he slates lhal the word nafs indicates the 
totality, which the word heart certain!) does not 
3
' ' Sec Mugni XII, 22 and our page 148 
4 0
 In the expression hadil an-nafs (talk of the soul) the exact meaning of this "soul" 
is not clear See pp 62-63 
41
 Sec for instance Muhil I, 366-367 
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can produce these acts;42 the heart is a substrate like any other sub-
strate; it is only built in such a way that accidents as knowledge and 
will can inhere in it. The only reason why knowledge and will inhere 
in the heart and not in other parts of the body or in lifeless things, 
is that the heart alone has the required structure (binya).*3 
When we read the word qalb in the works of 'Abd al-Jabbâr, we 
have to realize that what is meant is the physical heart of the human 
body, which is structured in such a way that the accidents which are 
called "the acts of the heart" can inhere in it. The heart has its function 
just as other parts of the human body and is not essentially different 
from the other parts.44 
Binya : structure.45 The word binya or structure 'Abd al-Jabbâr uses 
in his description of the able living being, and by which he distinguishes 
between the heart and the other parts of the human person, belongs 
to the category of concepts which can be called physical. We have 
already seen that he uses in his philosophy, besides the metaphysical 
concepts, words like "body" (jism) and atom (juz'), which seem to be 
derived from a physical world-view. These are names given to the 
directly perceived reality, as becomes manifest from 'Abd al-Jabbâr's 
appealing to that reality by speaking about "this structure", "hâdih 
al-bmya\ and pointing in this way to the perceived reality. Our 
perception tells us that the world is built from composite bodies which 
42
 Muhit I, 366 if it were an instrument, God, who acts without instruments, would 
be able to produce these acts of the heart also in other substrates This is impossible. 
therefore, the reason must be that they can only inhere in something that has this 
special structure which we meet in the human heart 
43
 See, e g , Sarh 220 "The same can be said about knowledge, for the only 
reason why it cannot exist in the hand is that it needs to exist a structure as the 
structure of the heart This may be explained by the fact that if we could structure 
(nabni) the hand in the same way the heart is structured these qualifiers could 
exist in it" See also Mugni IV, 33 
44
 See AfugmXl 329 
45
 Frank (Maná, 249) translates the word bmva as "organism" This translation 
can be correct when we discuss the bmya of the human body which is needed for the 
inhering of "life" in it The word bmya is also used for the structure of very small 
parts in the body, so, e g , when 'Abd al-Jabbâr observes that the production of any 
letter by a human being needs its own bmya (Mugni VII, 38) Even lifeless bodies can 
be said to have a special bmya as, for instance, the place where an echo can exist 
Therefore, it is better to translate the word as "structure". For Frank's opinion on 
the composite body of the living being as having a structure, see Kalâm, 307 • "The 
body as an organic unit, capable of life and of being the subject of those other accidents 
that qualify the whole in the unity of its being, is generally referred to as bmva" 
It is preferable to say that the body is referred to as mabni (structured) or having 
a certain structure because the body is not the structure 
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have a special structure by which we distinguish among the different 
kinds of bodies We also sec that living beings have a special structure, 
and that parts of the living being have each their own structure necessary 
to fulfil their task, the structure of the eye is other than the structure 
of the hand The reason therefore can be that something or some 
part of the body has to be used as an instrument and therefore needs a 
special structure, as for instance the tongue, the mouth, and the teeth, 
which are used as an instrument (ala) for the production of speech. 
Our various functions require various instruments, each with its own 
structure 46 Other structured parts are not used as instrument, but 
require neverheless their special structure to be the substrate in which 
certain accidents can inhere This, for instance, is the case with the 
human heart, in which the acts of the heart inhere, and with the totality 
of the living being, in which the accident "life" inheres 47 With these 
last examples we leave the physical level and come to the metaphysical, 
where we discuss the inhering of accidents in substances Our conclu-
sion is that this concept of "structure", derived from the physical reality 
and based upon the data of the perception, loses its clearness by its use 
in metaphysical contexts 48 
2 MAN IS LIVING 
Hayy : living49 Whenever 'Abd al-Jabbâr uses the terms "living" 
(hayy) and "life" (hayât), he seems to have in mind almost exclusively 
God and man, in the case of "life" only man Sometimes we find 
mention made of the animals, which are also reckoned among the 
46
 About the special structure which speech needs when it is produced by human 
beings, the reason of this need being that we have to use instruments to produce 
speech, instruments which must be "structured", 'Abd al-Jabbâr speaks in Mugni VII, 
31-42 Therefore, God, who does nol need instruments, can produce speech on every 
substrate 
47
 See Mugni VII, 40 and Muhit I, 366, where 'Abd al-Jabbâr argues that the heart 
cannot be an instrument For a discussion of the substrates of life and knowledge 
(resp the living being and the heart), see also Sarh 220 
4 8
 The metaphysical character of this argument (the substrate which needs a special 
structure) is confirmed by 'Abd al-Jabbâr's argumentations to prove that this substrate 
does need this special structure The reason therefore is that this accident must cause 
a "state" (háf) for the living being, and to be able to cause that state it must exist on 
a substrate which has a special structure See Mugni VII, 34, Muhit I, 366 
49
 About "living" and "life" 'Abd al-Jabbâr speaks mainly in discussing God's 
being living (especially in Muhit I, 121-128 and Sarh 160-167, see also 'Abd al-Karim 
'Utmân, Mazariyat at-taklif, 209-211) and in discussing the responsible person (Mugni XI, 
309-367) 
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living beings;''0 plants are not discussed at all as far as I have been able 
to verify. The reason of this "negligence" on 'Abd al-Jabbâr's part has 
to be looked for in his basicly theological orientation; his main interest 
is the relationship between God and mankind and furthermore the 
essence of man as the living being who is responsible towards God. 
The meaning of the word "living" and the difference between what 
is living and what is lifeless matter is "necessarily" known. When the 
general knowledge of what is "living" is concerned, no dispute is 
possible.51 Everybody must agree. 
But, though the general knowledge is necessary, the detailed is not. 
To acquire a detailed knowledge of "living", we need reflection and 
argumentation. For what does the statement that something is living, 
exactly mean? And how can we know what exactly has this quality? 
According to 'Abd al-Jabbâr, "living" is not an equivalent to 
"able", although every able thing is also necessarily living;52 but living 
is another quality, added to the quality of being able. As a definition 
of "living" he gives : "(the quality) with which (the subject), when he 
is characterized by it, can be knowing and able."53 This definition 
implies that whatever is knowing or able, is also living. But, since the 
definition mentions also the word "can", we cannot conclude that 
what is not knowing or able is not living. The quality of being living 
constitutes a fundamental condition for the possibility of the other 
two qualities, not more. 
50
 Sec Mugni XI, 312, where 'Abd al-Jabbar quotes Abu HâSim in a text of his 
BagiláíUyát, and seems to agree with him about that statement "The theologians call 
the able living being man, and they give the treatise about it the name 'treatise on man' 
(al-kalâm /Γ l-msän), although the animals which are living are not a man, but they mean 
(murâduhum) the living being, be it man or animal" 
" "Know that this quality is known in general ('ala tariq al-jumla) necessarily in 
this world" Muhit I, 121 The detailed knowledge (uifsil) is only known by acquired 
knowledge, we need a datala 
52
 There are three ways to make a distinction between two different qualities; 
if in none of these three ways a distinction can be made, they must be synonyms The 
first is the perception, perception tells us that black and white are two different 
qualities The second is the self-experience (»ajad naßah, see ρ 54), by this self-
experience (the verbal noun used here is al-m/dân mm an-naß), one knows that being 
willing is different from being non-willing. The third is that both qualities have another 
consequence or judgement (hukm), the quality "able" is entitled to the judgement that 
acts are possible, the quality "knowing" that acts are possible in a precise manner 
The difTcrence between the qualities "able" (qâdir) and "living" (hayy) can only 
be made in the third way the judgement on "able" is that acts are possible, the judgement 
on "living" that perception is possible For 'Abd al-Jabbâr perception is not an act. 
See Sarh 165 
53
 Muhit I, 312· "ma ma'ah yasihh 'md al-iktisâs bih kannuh 'altman wa-qâdiran". 
This definition is applicable both to living beings in this world and to God 
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In fact we can say 54 that by the presence of a quality which requires 
a living being we know that the qualified thing is living In such an 
argumentation we cannot use any quality which requires a living being, 
because there are qualities of God which we cannot know before we 
know that He is living, such as, for instance. His being perceiving 55 
When 'Abd al-Jabbâr looks for a distinctive feature which makes 
it possible to distinguish between the living and the non-living, he 
discovers the "possibility of being knowing and able" because that is 
the only characteristic feature which the temporal and the eternal living 
beings have in common, and which in both cases can be known 
before one knows that the being concerned is living 56 
But the pure metaphysical possibility (uhha) of a quality (in case 
the qualities of being knowing and being able) is not easily discernible, 
therefore 'Abd al-Jabbâr mentions a second distinctive feature "being 
perceiving" This characteristic is derived, not from metaphysical argu-
mentations, but from the physical reality and the perception of that 
reality It is 'Abd al-Jabbâr's phenomenal conclusion that what is 
living in this world distinguishes itself from the non-living by its being 
perceiving 57 Its non-metaphysical character is confirmed by the fact 
that we cannot know that God is perceiving but by way of a conclusion 
from the fact that He is living 5e Consequently, to distinguish living 
beings in this world, we can appeal to their being perceiving, to prove 
that God is living, we must argue from His being knowing and able 59 
54
 The opinion recorded here is the opinion of Abu Abdallah al-Basrî, Abd 
al-Jabbâr's direct teacher Abd al Jabbâr seems to agree with his teacher See Muhii 
I, 121 
55
 Muhill 121 122 ' One can infer that one of us is living by his being able, knowing 
willing, non willing, perceiving reflecting, desiring feeling aversion because the 
knowledge of all that mav originate though one does not know in detail that he is 
living As for the Eternal some ot these qualities are not applicable to Him and what is 
applicable to Him can be divided into two parts one of these two can be known 
before one knows that He is living consequently it is possible to infer from it that 
He is living so, for instance His being able and knowing The second cannot be 
known before one knows that He is living, so, for instance his being perceiving for 
we only know that He is perceiving when we know that He is living, and we only 
know that He is willing after we know that He is living 
56
 See the text of Muhit I, 121-122 which we translated in the previous note See 
also Mugni XI 309 
57
 See Mugni XI, 335, where 'Abd al Jabbâr discusses what is living in this world 
In this case perception is limited by the instruments we need for our perception The 
discussion on pp 335 and 336 is built on physical arguments 
58
 See Muhit I 122, the essence of perception and the way m which we know that 
God is perceiving will be discussed later 
" Therefore 'Abd al Jabbâr states ' The state of living can only be distinguished 
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Our being living is a state; we know that we are living before we 
know "life". God must be in that state because of His essence or per se : 
He cannot be non-knowing nor non-able . therefore His being living, 
too, must be a permanent state. 
For us, human beings and other living beings in this world, the 
state of "living" is a transitory state; we know that we are not neces-
sarily living and that we can stop being living, while the possibility 
to be living remains.60 This is the way in which 'Abd al-Jabbâr argues 
that we are in a certain state "li-'illa" (because of a cause) or "li-mana"' 
(because of a qualifier). The cause or qualifier the presence of which 
in the composite body makes it to be living, while its disappearance 
makes it to stop living, is called "hayât" or "life", in accordance with 
'Abd al-Jabbâr's usual way of treating the states. 
That a living being in this world cannot be living "per se" (li-nafsih), 
is proved by 'Abd al-Jabbâr in two groups of arguments—both 
dependent on the same general principle running : "it is not permitted 
(possible) that two things have in common one of the essential 
qualities (a quality both have per se) without (having in common) the 
other essential qualities."61 When two things have one essential quality 
in common, they must be similar and have all essential qualities in 
common. When both God and man would be essentially or per se 
living, one could draw two conclusions : God would have human 
qualities and man would have divine qualities. God would be temporal 
and at the same time eternal; He would have needs; He would be a 
body; He could do what is bad. Man, on the other hand, would be 
essentially able and therefore almighty; he would know everything; 
he would be eternal and live for ever. Because we know that all these 
conclusions are false, we know that the premise must be false.62 
from others by his being perceiving the perceptible things when the hindrances are 
taken away, and by the possibility that he is knowing (and) able" Mugni XI, 309 
Here the two distinctive features are taken together and combined 
Frank (Fundamental Assumptions, 6) places most emphasis on perception as the 
distinctive feature and comes to the conclusion that "this implies a fundamental outward 
orientation of the living being, an orientation towards the world and some form of 
action" We must observe that living for 'Abd al-Jabbâr is not identical with perceiving 
nor with knowing and able, it is the quality which makes the other qualities possible, 
and which also makes an orientation towards the world possible, as it makes, e g , the 
self-experience and self-determination possible 
6 0
 Mugni XI, 324 we know that man can leave (karaj) his state of being living 
61
 See Mugni XI, 323 "là yajûzfî s-say'ayn an yastankâ fl stfa mm stfât an-nafs dim 
sâ'ir ftfât an-nafs" In other places (also on the same page) this general principle is 
formulated in different ways, the tendency always being the same 
6 2
 All these arguments are found in Mugni XI, 322-325 
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When 'Abd al-Jabbâr has proved in this way that a worldly living 
being is only living because of a qualifier which exists in him, and 
that this qualifier must be an accident which inheres in a (material) 
substrate, it follows that this qualifier is not only the cause of the 
being's being living, but also the reason of its limitedness : by its being 
bound to materiality and its being limited to a concrete substrate, in 
which inhere other accidents too, the qualifier can only partially realize 
the possibilities of the quality. The qualifier is called the "determinant", 
but at the same time it is the principle of fragmentation in time and 
space.63 
The qualifier "life" (hayât), which inheres in a being, causes it to 
be living, makes it possible that it is knowing and able, ties it to 
materiality, and submits it to the rules of materiality—but at the same 
time this being is nothing more and nothing else than materiality.64 
To the rules of materiality belongs that the accident "life" can only 
inhere in a substrate that is a "composite body" (jumla), built from 
several atoms and having a certain structure (binya). Therefore, some-
thing that is "living by life", a worldly living being, needs a strictly 
definable structure;65 it must be composed of flesh, have a certain 
wetness, need blood—though the blood does not belong to the com-
posite body of the living being—and have a heart.66 A living being 
in this world is not the separate atoms, it is not some part of the 
body, nor is it something inside or outside the body that directs the 
body. The living being is the totality, the composite body.67 
Finally, two conclusions can be drawn, one on the rçietaphysical 
level, the other on the physical.68 
On the metaphysical level : as the substance's being spatial (its 
tahayyuz) is the firm and stable basis which makes the various modes 
of being {akwâri) and their alternation and succession possible, without 
6 3
 See Frank's article Maná and-our pp 156-158 
6 4
 See Wuhit I, 121 and 126 About its being pure materiality, sec our discussion of 
the essence of man, especially ρ 163 
^ Sec Muhit I, 125 and Sarh 220 
6 6
 See for some details Muhit 1, 128 
* ' See, с g , Muhit I. 313 and Èarh 161 Frank (Fundamental Assumptions, 6) states : 
"The living being (he means the living being in this world) is strictly conceived as a 
structural unity of material parts ( ), it is not identified with any simple component, 
whether a material organ, 'spirit', or whatever else" 
6 8
 The text of the Muhit is interested mainly in the metaphysical point of view, 
while the eleventh part of the Mugni gives much of its attention to the physical 
problems connected with the way in which 'Abd al-Jabbâr sees the essence of man and 
of living bemgs in general 
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having itself an opposite (didd) which could make it disappear from 
the substrate and cause it to be itself also a stage in a succession,69 
so the composite body's being living and the inherence of the qualifier 
"life" constitute the firm and stable basis which makes the succession 
of the various "knowledges" and "abilities" in this body possible. Being 
living, as being in space, has no opposite, is not a stage in a succes-
sion,70 and in this way can form the "remaining" basis71 about which 
'Abd al-Jabbâr can say, speaking on a metaphysical level, that it makes 
knowledge and ability (if only living beings in this world are concerned) 
or being knowing and able (to make it applicable to God too), 
possible.72 
On the physical level : just as the composition (ta'lif) of single atoms 
can constitute a body (jism) which may receive qualities a single atom 
cannot have, so the combination of several bodies can constitute 
•djumla or composite body,73 which can have qualities, as for instance 
the basic quality of being living, the separate parts of this composite 
body cannot have. The reason is that some qualities need a structure; 
only when this structure is realized by the combination of several 
bodies into a whole which has the required structure, the qualifier 
"life" can inhere in it and make this combination of lifeless bodies 
into a living being. Therefore, the atoms or parts of the living being 
cannot remain living when separated from the composite body.74 
Mayyit : dead. When we use the term "death" (mawt) in everyday 
language, we mean something that makes a living being cease being 
living without the disappearance of the structure (binya) which is 
ь* A substance— even the single atom—is always spatial This does not change nor 
disappear What disappears and changes is the exact place where the substances are m 
space, but this is expressed by the modes of being or aknân, which succeed one 
another on the substrate But a substance or atom, whenever it exists, is necessarily 
mutahen i/r. spatial 
70
 Death is not the opposite of life, nor being dead the opposite of being living, sec 
below where we make some remarks about 'Abd al-Jabbâr"s description of death 
71
 It is an accident, which consequently cannot remain as the substances remain, 
but we can say that this accident remains as long as the living being remains a living being 
72
 See Muhit I, 121 "This quality (sc being living) became the principle of the 
possibility of these qualities (sc being knowing and being able) which succeed each other 
and arc each other's opposite in the composite body (al-iumla) just as its being 
immobile and moving, combined and separated is possible because of the being 
spatial (/я/шимг)" See also \ίιιΜι I, 126 
7 3
 According to 'Abd al-Jabbâr a composite body (jumla) becomes only a composite 
body by the existence of the qualifier life in it Muhit I, 126 "malum annulla mnamâ 
law /umlaian ha'<l НІІ/ШІ ul-ha\âl l'ili" (or. maybe better lìllà) See also \iugni I, 127 
^ Sec M ugni XI. 356 and 327-329 
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needed for life.75 So we use it for something momentary, and in fact 
we do not know what it exactly is. 
Philosophically, it is clear that being dead (mayyit) is not a state 
the composite body (al-jumld) is in ; the composite body only becomes 
a composite body by the inhering of the quality "life".76 So one can 
say with Abu Hâsim that by death the substrate ceases to be the 
composite body of a living being.77 Life needs and characterizes a 
composite body which has a certain structure, death does not. There-
fore, one cannot say that a composite body is dead, but only that the 
atoms which once constituted the composite body are dead, meaning 
that they once formed part of the composite body of a living being.78 
'Abd al-Jabbâr therefore remarks that death has the same influence 
as has the separation of a part of the living being from the living being; 
through this separation it ceases to be living as it ceases to be a part 
of the living being.79 
Because we cannot establish a state of being dead, we cannot estab-
lish a qualifier "death". The only thing we can say is that life can 
disappear from a substrate without the loss of something it needs— 
a loss that could explain its disappearance. Because there is no clearly 
discernible reason for that disappearance, we say it is caused by 
"death".80 Because of all that is said above, it will be apparent that 
death can by no means be the opposite of life.81 
75
 Mugni VII, 37. 
76
 See Mugni VII, 37 · "For it (sc death) is not a state in which life disappears from 
the composite body of the living being or from a part of it which is cut οΓΓ' I read 
h-annah là bi-hâl instead of li-annah là hai, in the manuscript there is a small stroke 
before the letter hâ' which can be a M'. The intcrpunction in this paragraph of the 
printed text is confusing and not correct 
77
 Cf Mugni XI, 355 "tnruih vukri; al-mahall mm an yakt'm ¡umlal al-ha\v fa-
yasir β hukm at-tabâyun" 
78
 Cf MugniXI, 355 . life characterizes a perceiving composite body, death evidently 
does not "When they qualify the composite body as dead, the meaning of it is that 
every atom of it is dead" The qualifying of a composite body as living is not a qualifying 
of every single atom but of the composite body See also Muhil I, 127 
~
9
 Mugni VII, 39 · "It (death) only influences the substrate just as the separation 
(al-mfiwi) from the living being, it makes it cease to be a part (read ba'd instead of 
naqid, this appears in the manuscript and from the sense of the context) of it". 
80
 Mugni VII, 37 "Moreover, it (sc life) disappears while everything it needs is 
as it was before, therefore, one can conclude that it notwithstanding the fact that it is 
(a) remaining (accident)- only disappeared by death There is no other possibility to 
establish it (sc death)" 
'" Muhil I, 126-127. Sec also Mugni VII, 37 and 39 
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3. MAN IS PERCEIVING 
Mudrik : perceiving.82 Although 'Abd al-Jabbâr defines, and confines, 
the living being by means of being perceiving—and in this manner he 
even excludes from the composite body of the living being those parts 
by which the living being is not perceiving83—and although he thus 
makes perception the distinctive feature of what is living, perceiving 
is another quality than living, however strong the relationship between 
both may be. 
We know by inner experience (wijdân an-nafs) that we are sometimes 
in the state (hai) of being perceiving, and that at other moments we 
are not in this state. Consequently, we know that this is a transitory 
state. We also know that our state of being living has a more permanent 
character, and can only come to an end by what we call "death". This 
implies, as we also know by inner experience, that we can be living 
without perceiving. The conclusion can be drawn that "perceiving" 
(mudrik) and "living" (hayy) are two different qualities.84 
In the normal course of his argumentation, 'Abd al-Jabbâr would 
now deduce from the fact that perceiving is a transitory state that we 
are perceiving because of a qualifier (li-ma'nû) the presence of which 
makes us to be perceiving, while its disappearance makes us cease to 
be thus. But in this case the conclusion cannot be drawn. Perception 
(idrâk) is not a qualifier.85 For, if perception would be a qualifier, it 
would be possible that we had the qualifier "life" (hayât) and 
consequently were living, but that we had not the qualifier "perception" 
(idrâk). That implies that it would be possible that we are living, that 
perceptible things are present, our senses are in perfect condition, and 
'
2
 Aboul perceiving (mudrik) and perception (idrâk) 'Abd al-Jabbâr speaks in some 
detail when discussing two important themes of his theodicy The first theme is the 
discussion about God's qualities and the question whether He can be called "perceiving" 
and whether that is something other than to call Him "knowing" This question, which 
is answered by 'Abd al-Jabbâr in the affirmative but by Mu'tazila from the Bagdâdî 
branch in the negative, is discussed in Sarh 167-175 and Muhit I, 129-132 while the 
corresponding p.irt of the Magni is missing The second theme is the question whether 
God can be seen in paradise; this was a matter of dispute between traditionalists and the 
Aä'ariya on the one side and the Mu'tazili theologians on the other See for this 
subject Scirh 232-277, Muhil 206-211, and M ugni IV, 33-240 
Sec also some remarks on this matter in 'Abd al-Karîm 'Utmân. Nazarival at-taklif, 
65-74 and M Bernand, Le savoir entre la volonté et la spontanéité selon an-,\'az:âm 
et al-Gàhiz, SI 39 (1974), 25-57. 
83
 Cf MugnîW, 311-312. 
84
 See, e g , Sarh 168. "wa-ann kawnah mudnkan sija zâ'ida 'ala kanmh hayyan". 
85
 See Muhil I. 129 
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no outward hindrances occur, and that we, nevertheless, would not 
perceive those perceptible things because we miss the qualifier "percep-
tion". This is not possible; we necessarily perceive the perceptible 
things which are present when our senses are in good condition and 
there are no hindrances. Hence is 'Abd al-Jabbâr's conclusion that 
we are perceiving by our being living under certain conditions.86 
Therefore, being living not only makes possible that one is perceiving, 
but even makes this necessary if the conditions are fulfilled. Perceiving 
is not an act, nor the result of a free choice, but the consequence of 
the being living under certain conditions.87 
There are three categories of these conditions; the first concerns the 
perceiving subject; this subject cannot have a defect (âfa) that has an 
influence upon the possibility to perceive, as in living beings in this 
world, for instance, blindness. The second category concerns the per-
ceptible object; the only condition to be fulfilled here is that it is 
existent. The third category concerns conditions which are related to 
the instruments living beings in this world have to use in perceiving : 
the exclusion of "hindrances" (mawânï) which we will discuss later 
on.88 But we can already conclude that God, who cannot have a defect 
and does not need instruments in perceiving,89 necessarily perceives 
all existent perceptible things.90 
But what exactly does 'Abd al-Jabbâr mean when he uses the term 
perception (idrâk) or the term perceiving (mudrik)l As he does in 
similar cases, he remarks that he cannot give a definition, because 
every definition one could give of perception would be more com-
plicated and more obscure than the term "perception" itself. And it 
belongs to the essence of a definition that it is clearer and more 
revealing than the term to be defined;91 nothing, however, can be 
clearer than the term "perception" because every human being who 
is compos mentis knows by self-experience that he sometimes is 
perceiving, and that it is not the same as being knowing, just as he 
"
6
 This is argued, e.g., in Mugni IV, 50-58. 
^ Cf. Muhit I, 130. 
Be
 These conditions are mentioned in various places in 'Abd al-Jabbâr's works in 
various forms. See, e.g., Muhii I, 130-131. 
Β 9
 God is per se or essentially living, but cannot be said to be per se or essentially 
perceiving because He only is perceiving when perceptible things do exist. See also what 
we observe under the headings "basir" and "samt". Therefore, God is called perceiving 
on the condition that perceptible things exist; thus He is called "perceiving" now. 
9 0
 See Muhit I, 129-132 and Sarh 167-175. 
^
1
 See pp. 76-78. 
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knows the difference between being seeing and being hearing or other 
forms of perception.92 
Perception is not knowledge, nor an act.93 We can try to describe 
'Abd al-Jabbâr's opinion by saying that it is the fundamental openness 
of the living being towards the outer world.94 It is the fundamental 
openness of the living being, and just as the composite body of the 
living being in this world is the living subject, it is the totality of the 
living being—or in this world the composite body that is perceiving. 
What is perceiving is not the heart, nor the spirit, nor the senses, but 
the totality : I see, I hear, I perceive, indeed by means of my senses, 
but the perceiving subject is me, in my totality as a material unity.95 
When we know by self-experience that we are perceiving, we also 
know that we need instruments, senses, for this perception. The reason 
for this need of instruments is to be found in our being living through 
a life that as an accident inheres in us. When we are perceiving, we 
arc thus through this life, which is bound to a material substrate. 
Therefore, we have to use the substrate of this qualifier "life" as an 
instrument for our perception. Consequently, the presence of the 
qualifier "life" makes it possible that the living being is perceiving, 
but at the same time it limits its possibilities by connecting it with 
materiality. Therefore, we have to use the substrate of the accident life, 
and that means the composite body of the living being, as an instrument 
for our perception.96 
92
 "As for the seeing (subject), he is only qualified (in this way) because of the 
originating of the special state (read al-hál instead of al-ká!) which his being living 
supposes The difference between his being perceiving the other perceptible things 
(and his being seeing) every person who is compos mentis knows Irom himself, as he 
knows the difference between his being perceiving and his being knowing and what 
is analogous to this The pointing to this makes it superfluous to define it in expressions, 
for in this occurs more disclosure and revealing than occurs in expressions" Mugni IV, 81 
93
 Cf, for instance, Sarh 165-166 
94
 While the living being as living is not essentially connected with ('Abd al-Jabbâr 
uses the word ta'allaq) something else outside the living being (see Muhit I. 129), as 
perceiving it has this connection and is connected with a thing (see Mugni VII, 24) 
This connection is even a fundamental openness since it is not based upon a free 
choice, the possibility at the same time is necessity (See Mugni IV, 39) 
95
 See Mugni \\, 313 
96
 See Mugni IV, 36-38 "The Eternal can only see the things notwithstanding His 
being elevated above the possibility of senses, because He is essentially living, as He 
does not need life and its substrate in His being living, so He does not need to use the 
substrate of life as a means (read at-tanassul instead of at-tanassul) to perceive the 
visible things The state of one of us is not thus, for he is living by a life that inheres 
in a part of him (Ji badili), therefore he needs in the perception of the perceptible things 
the use of the substrate of life in the perception of them so that it becomes an instrument 
for him" {Mugni IV, 36) 
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So far we discussed the perceiving subject, which, according to 'Abd 
al-Jabbâr, is the living being that under certain conditions perceives 
all existent perceptible things (nnulrakât). 
The next question that arises is which things are perceptible and, 
therefore, must be perceived if the conditions are fulfilled. We know 
from experience that not every existent thing is perceptible.97 We know 
that there are accidents, as for instance the acts of the heart (knowledge, 
will, etc.), which are imperceptible. The perceptible things are : sub-
stances and the seven genera of accidents which 'Abd al-Jabbâr called 
the perceptible accidents.98 These are : colour {lawn), sound (sawt\ 
odour (râ'iha), taste (tarn), warmth (harâra), coldness (burûda), and 
pain (alam). Everything that is perceptible is perceived according to its 
most characteristic quality,99 the characteristic of its genus.100 This 
implies, for instance, that a substance is perceived because of its being 
spatial, and that what is perceived of the substance is exactly its being 
spatial.101 What is perceived of speech is its being sounds, speech 
belonging to the genus sound.102 
So there are various kinds of perceptible things the difference among 
which lies in the perceived things themselves, not in the perceiving 
subject, nor is it caused by the perception or by the senses used. The 
perception, which fundamentally is one and the same, is called by 
various names according to the object of the perception. When we 
perceive a colour, we are seeing, and when we perceive a sound, we 
are hearing. Basically, this is independent of the use of the corre-
sponding sense; therefore, God can be called "'seeing" and "hearing" 
although He perceives without using senses.103 
We, living beings in this world, have to use—as we already said -
the substrate of our qualifier "life" as an instrument in perceiving. 
'^ See Mugni IV, 83-88, a chapter where 'Abd al-Jabbâr discusses the question of 
the quality which something must have to be visible (and perceptible) In the title of this 
chapter read (as also in the indices on pp. 4 and 350) "fi hayan as-sifa aliati li-kann al-mar'i 
'alavhâ iura" instead of " aliali yakûn " 
9 Я
 See pp 124-125 See also Sarh 92. 
" Cf Mugni VII, 24 . "Al-idrâk yata'allaq bi-ï-sav' 'ala akass ansâfth", "perception 
is connected with the thing (perceived) according to its (sc the thing's) most characteristic 
qualification". 
100
 Cf M ugni IV, 83 we perceive things "li-mâ híy 'alayh β najiihâ". See the 
following argumentation on pp. 83-84 
101
 It is the most characteristic quality of the substance, more characteristic than 
being existent ; Mugni IV, 84 
102
 See Mugnì VII, 21-23. 
103
 See Sarh 167-168 and 174. 
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Four kinds of perceptible things do not need a special structure to be 
perceived and can be perceived by means of every part of the com-
posite living body; these are substances, warmth, coldness, and 
pain I 0 4 The other accidents, however, need a special structure and 
cannot be perceived by means of every living substrate, perception 
of colours needs the structure of the eye, perception of sounds the 
structure of the ear, of odours the nose, and of tastes the mouth 105 
Moreover, the eye is also used as a means in perceiving the substances, 
so that substances are perceived by means of both the eye and the 
other parts of the body 106 
The fact that we have to use the composite body or even some 
special parts which are structured in a complicated way, forms the 
basis for the defects and hindrances which can prevent the percep-
tion 107 
By way of conclusion we hold that the perceiving subject is a unity, 
and that fundamentally there is only one kind of perception, consisting 
in the openness of the living being towards the outer world The 
difference we experience comes from the difference of perceptible 
objects, which necessitates the difference of our senses 
The relationship between the two qualities "perceiving" (mudnk) 
and "knowing" ('ahm) has been discussed when we treated perception 
among the sources of human knowledge 108 
In short, being perceiving is not the same as being knowing "The 
perceiving (subject) has, by his being perceiving, a quality more than 
his being knowing the perceptible things"1 0 9 We know this from 
experience, for we can know something without perceiving it,110 and 
104
 See Mugni IV, 37 and XI, 311-312, Muhit I 131 
105
 See Muhit I, 131, Mugni IV, 38 In this context the term hâssa, plural ha\\âs\ is 
used It is the word we translate as "senses" The five senses are parts of the composite 
body which are structured in a special way to constitute eye, ear, nose, and mouth in as 
far as these are used as means for perception, the fifth sense (lams, touching) is present 
in every part of the living body and does not need a special structure, this last sense 
is used to perceive substances, warmth, coldness, and pain 
106
 See Muhit I, 131 and Mugni IV, 83-84 
107
 The most important defects and hindrances occur in seeing and hearing, the 
most complicated forms of perception in this world These two forms of perception will 
be treated separately 
108
 See pp 93-95 
109
 See Mugni IV, 33 "/i ann h-l-mudrik bt-kannih mudnkan ftfatan zaidatan 'ala 
kan nifi 'âliman bi-l-mudrakât" 
110
 Knowledge may remain after perception of the known object has come to an 
end and even after the loss of our sense, see Mugni IV, 34 We can also know God, the 
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we can perceive something without knowing it. ' ' ' In this way we know 
that perceiving and knowing do not indicate the same quality.112 
But perception is a way to knowledge (tarîq li-l-'ilm), and, when 
a living subject who is compos mentis clearly perceives something 
without there being any vagueness, God necessarily creates in him 
the knowledge of the perceived object. When in concreto God creates 
that knowledge and when He does not, is known by inner experience, 
for in the first case we discover in ourselves the tranquillity of the 
soul, which is connected with real knowledge, and in the second case 
we do not.113 
After this general discussion of the quality "perceiving" (mudrik) 
we now discuss in some more detail two forms of perceiving . perceiving 
colours and substances (seeing) and perceiving sounds (hearing). It 
will be clear that we have to say a few words on "hearing" because of 
the part it plays in 'Abd al-Jabbâr's treatise on speech and sound, while 
seeing is used in those discussions as a point of reference and is the 
form of perceiving 'Abd al-Jabbâr most explicitly discusses. To the 
other three forms of perceiving 'Abd al-Jabbâr does not pay much 
attention. 
Baçîr: having the metaphysical possibility to see 11* When a being 
is living and has no defects, it necessarily has the possibility to see the 
existent visible things. This quality, which indicates that the qualified 
single alom, many imperceptible accidents, and even the non-existent things without 
being able to perceive them See Sarh 169 
1
 ' ' The reason may be that the perceiving subject is not compos mentis Çâqif), 
or at a certain moment is not thus, thus a sleeping person can perceive the stinging 
of a flea without knowing it Or there may be a "vagueness" (iltibâi) in the perceived 
object related to the fact that we do have to use instruments in perceiving, thus 
the distance between the perceiving subject and the perceived object may be the cause 
of the perception's unclanty, and therefore not leading to knowledge See Sarh 169 
and also Mugn! IV, 70-79 
112
 This is based upon a general principle running "Know that every quality 
d qualified subject can be entitled to in some way without receiving another quality, 
must indicate something else than the other indicates, this is the conclusion" See Mugn! 
IV. 33 
113
 About perception as a way to knowledge, sec Vi ugni IV, 72 The tranquillity 
of the soul as the criterion to distinguish between perception which leads to knowledge 
and perception which does not, is mentioned in Mugni IV, 72 In Mugni IV, 70-79 
'Abd al-Jabbâr discusses the causes of the vagueness (illibâs) in the perception His 
conclusion on ρ 78 says that one cannot perceive something as other than it is, but 
that other things may influence the perception 
" * I did not find an appropriate English translation for this word, its definition 
can be found in Sarh 167 
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subject is in a certain state (hai) by which it is possible for him to see 
the existent visible things, ' ' 5 is used to show that God has the possibility 
to see, even when- -before the creation—there is nothing that can be 
seen, ft indicates a real possibility in God, which can only be realized 
after the creation of the world. This term is used to safeguard God's 
unity and His being Himself before and after the creation.116 
Just as God is essentially and per se living, so He is also essentially 
and per se basir ; living beings in this world, which are living through 
a life, are also basir through that life and therefore limitedly basir. 
Mubçir or Râ'î: seeing.117 On the metaphysical level not much is 
added here to what is said already in our discussion of the quality 
"perceiving" (mudrik). The subject who perceives colours and sub-
stances 118 is called "seeing". God, who is essentially living and there-
fore perceiving all perceptible things which are existent, necessarily 
perceives and sees all existent substances and colours. In His seeing, 
He does not need any instruments or "senses" because those form 
part of materiality and of material subjects.119 
Human beings and other living beings in this world are living through 
a life, and in their perceiving they need the use of the substrate in 
which that qualifier "life" inheres, as an instrument. To perceive visible 
things (colours and substances), that instrument must have a special 
structure as experience tells us; we can only see through that part of 
115
 See Sarh 167 "ammâ l-baur, fa-huu al-muktass Ы-hâl li-kanmh 'alayhá 
\asihh an . Mibsir аІ-тиЬчаг ¡dà »u/idâ (the verb is in the dual form, because of the 
connection made between the possibilities to be seeing and hearing)" Because the 
pure possibility is meant, Abu 'Ali said (and this statement is approved of by 'Abd 
al-Jabbâr) that this term is "intransitive" (gâ)r muta addi) while the term "seeing" 
(mubsn) is transitive See Sarh 168 
116
 See also Frank, Kalám, 299, where he states that this distinction between haiir 
and mubsir (having the possibility to see and actually seeing)—just as the similar 
distinction between sann and sámi' in the matter of hearing represents "an attempt to 
deal with the metaphysical problems involved in the relationship between God's being 
as essentially eternal and the temporal reality of creatures" 
'
1 7
 The choice between the two words mubsir and rai (from the verb ra'â), which are 
both used by 'Abd al-Jabbâr to indicate the actual seeing of visible things, seems to be 
dictated by the tradition which finds its basis in the way both words are used in the Qur'ân 
In fact, mubsir is used when 'Abd al-Jabbâr calls God "seeing", while he uses ra'â 
especially when he argues that God Himself cannot be seen I or references, see our 
section about mudrik (perceiving) 
118
 Substances arc perceived both by seeing and by touching See ρ 179 
1 1 9
 Cf, for instance, M ugni IV, 36 "As He in being living does not need life and its 
substrate, so He does not need the use of the substrate of life to perceive the visible 
things" 
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our body that has the structure of the eye. If the eye, which is our 
instrument, is healthy (sahlh) and there are no hindrances (mawâm'), 
we can see the visible objects; we even have to see them, because we 
are not seeing through a qualifier "sight" which might be present in 
us or not, but through our life, which necessarily is present as long as 
we live. Therefore, whenever we can perceive something, we must 
perceive it; whenever we can see something, we must see it.120 
So far for the metaphysical level. But the problems arise for 'Abd 
al-Jabbâr when he leaves the metaphysical level—where no real 
difference is found with perceiving in general and the other forms of 
perceiving—and comes to explain the way in which we actually and 
physically see some object. 
It is not necessary to give a definition of what exactly is meant when 
a subject is called "seeing"; this belongs to the data of the human 
intuition as one of the things everybody knows by self-experience. 
The same applies to the knowledge of the difference between seeing 
and perceiving the other kinds of perceptible things.121 What we see 
are substances and colours.122 But in which way do we, living beings 
in this world, actually see things by using our senses? 
'Abd al-Jabbâr does not seem to feel at home in this physical 
matter; the vocabulary he uses in his description is not his own. He 
seems to have adopted the entire argumentation without even trans-
lating its vocabulary into his own philosophical language.123 
120
 Sec Mugnî IV, 50 "Know thdt the seeing (subject) from among us only sees 
a thing if his sense is healthy and the hindrances are taken away, in his being seeing 
and perceiving he docs not need a cause ('ilia) by which he becomes thus, for then it would 
be possible that it (here must be meant the cause, 'ilia, so that we have to read lujad 
instead of yû/aJ) would not exist notwithstanding the healthiness of his sense, the 
presence of the visible thing before him. and the being removed of the hindrances, 
and he would not see in any way We already explained that that is impossible" 
121
 See Mugni IV, 81 
122
 See Mugni IW, 83 
123
 hor a description of the way in which living beings in this world see—we 
always have to bear in mind that God does not need an instrument to see, and that 
everything we arc going to say about the physical aspects of seeing is not applicable 
to God—sec also Vajda, Іл' problème de la \ision de Dieu d après Yûui/ al-Вачіг, in 
Islamu Philosophv and the Clasmal Tradition. 473-489. where he translates the 
corresponding passage of Yûsuf al-Basir (see our ρ 24) and compares it with the 
argumentation given by 'Abd al-Jabbâr Both theologians show a great similarity even 
in the wording of their arguments 
'Abd al-Jabbâr discusses this problem of the physical aspects of human seeing 
especially in part IV of the Uugni Some examples of the unusual vocabulary he uses in 
this context, a vocabulary which is nearly unchanged Ihroughoul the texts concerned 
the formula "lays baynah на-hawi al-mar'i sâtir na-lâ makàn xasluh an \akûn /ìli sâtir", 
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We know from experience that we cannot see by means of every 
part of our body, but only by our eyes. This implies that a certain 
structure (binya) is required to make it possible that the substrate is 
used as an instrument in seeing. 
Whereas we perceive odours, tastes, warmth, coldness, pain, and 
substances (when these substances are perceived by touching and not 
by seeing) by means of "transportation" (intiqâf)—the object which 
has to be perceived is brought to the substrate or sense and perceived 
in direct contact—seeing, just as hearing, does not happen by way of 
transportation and direct contact. The visible thing is perceived at the 
place where it is, at a distance from the instrument, the eye.124 
How is this done? It belongs to the completeness (tamâm) of the 
instrument of the seeing subject that rays separate themselves (injasaf) 
from it; these rays can reach (ittasai) a visible object.125 Because these 
rays belong to the completeness of the instrument, they must always 
separate themselves from it and reach something whenever the instru-
ment is sound and complete.126 This is the only way in which living 
beings in this world can see a visible object.127 Such rays are "a thin 
luminous body"128 consisting of several atoms, some of which can be 
separated from the body.129 It is conceived to be a moving body, 
departing from the eye, possibly reflected in a mirror or some other 
polished surface, and reaching the visible object. It is not a remaining 
"link" made by a ray or a beam of rays, but a body that departs from 
its starting-point and arrives at its target. 
'Abd al-Jabbâr summarizes his point of view as follows : "The rays 
which returns, unchanged, in the most varied parts of 'Abd al-Jabbâr's works. He 
possibly uses the word qaida to indicate a substrate, the same holds true of the noun 
makân, while the corresponding verb kán seems to be used instead of hall to indicate 
the inhering of an accident. 
124
 See Muhii I, 324 
125
 See M ugni IV. 69 · "It belongs to the reality {haqq) of the rays which belong 
to the completeness of the instrument of the seeing (subject) that they originate in as 
far as there is no concealing (substance) between them and the visible (object), and 
no substrate in which rightly a concealing (accident) inheres". See also Mugm IV, 
57-58. 
126
 See, eg., Mugni IV, 69. 
, 2
' See Mugm IV, 59, where the title of the chapter runs' "The mention of the 
indication that the seeing (subject) among us (sc in this world) only sees by rays which 
separate themselves from his eye m a special way, and related subjects" 
128
 '"alimná ann as-su'a ¡ism lati/ munir", Mugni IV, 58 
129
 See, for instance, Mugni IV, 66, where 'Abd al-Jabbâr mentions the possibility 
that some atoms of rays which are reflected in a mirror can stay behind in thai mirror 
so that the mirror itself is also seen. 
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which separate themselves from the pupil of the eye, which are called 
'the angle of the rays',130 separate themselves from it in a straight 
line, the rays reach a special quantity {qadr), and their substrate 
originates in a way that between them and the visible (object) there 
is no concealing (substance) and no substrate which is so prepared 
that a concealing (accident) inheres in it If the situation is as we 
mentioned, he (sc the perceiving subject) perceives the visible object 
with his sight, if there is a certain distance between it and the pupil 
of the eye, and he perceives by it (sc his sight) what is on its line and 
not what is outside it " 1 3 1 
We will now discuss the various elements of this description the 
rays "separating themselves" from the eye, the straight line in which 
they move, the quantity of rays required for the actual seeing, the 
possibility of concealing, the required distance, and the question 
whether the rays must actually reach the visible object or not 
First, the rays, which consist of atoms, come from the eye In the 
text the verb "infasal", to separate oneself from something else, is 
used This seems to imply that these rays formed before a part of 
the eye or were connected with it 'Abd al-Jabbâr proves that this 
is the way in which we see by pointing to what happens when we see 
something in a mirror If the mirror is well polished, we can see our 
face, if it is not, we cannot see it The reason is that in the second case 
no rays go out from the mirror In the first case, when we look into 
a well polished mirror, the mirror functions as if it were an eye; it 
does so by reflecting the rays which come from our eye 132 He also 
points to the example of deforming mirrors (as for instance the blade 
of a sword), where it becomes clear that we see according to the way 
m which the rays go out from that mirror 133 To see things as they 
really are- and not double—the two beams of rays which come from 
our two eyes must fall together This also proves that we see by rays 
130
 Grammatically the words "which is called the angle of the rays" indicate either 
the "rays" mentioned or the "eye ' This term is discussed by 'Abd al-Jabbâr in Wugni IV, 
76-77, where he deals with the reason why we see things smaller when they are at 
a distance His answer is that wc then exercise some pressure upon the "angle of the 
rays", by which this angle becomes thinner, and he compares it with the pressure 
someone exercises when he is going to jump I think that the most probable explanation 
is that 'Abd al-Jabbâr refers here to the possibility of the pupil of the eye to become 
wider or narrower The changing of the pupil would in that case cause the changing 
of the form of the rays 
131
 MugnilV, 64 
132
 Cf Mugni IV, 59 and Sarh 249 
133
 Cf Mugni IV, 60 
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which come from our eyes. When we find ourselves on a rolling ship, 
the rays move with the ship and we think that the sky and the sky-line 
move.134 And, finally, when we see in the dark the eyes of a cat or 
a lion, we see that they give light and that rays are coming from 
them.135 By all these data of our perception, it becomes clear that wc 
are seeing by means of rays which separate themselves from our 
eye. 
Second, the conclusion that the rays move in a straight line is also 
based on our experience (iktibâr). We see what is directly in front 
of the eye and we do not see what is outside that line. When we use a 
mirror, we use that as a means (wás i fa) which is going to function as the 
eye so that we see what is directly in front of that mirror. We know 
that, when the object we see moves, we have to move our eye too in 
order to move in that way the line of the rays.136 
Third, the rays which come from our eye are not strong enough to 
make something actually seen; therefore in darkness, when there are 
no other rays than those which come from our eye, we cannot see. 
A cat, because of the fact that the rays which come from its eyes are 
stronger and have a greater quantity, can see in the darkness.137 
Because the quantity of rays coming from our eyes is not sufficient, we 
need extra rays, which come from the sun or from lamps, to make 
it possible that we actually see. The quantity of light needed for seeing 
knows a minimum but also a maximum; when there are too many 
rays, as for instance when we look directly into the sun, the actual 
seeing is no longer possible.138 
134
 In the first case 'Abd al-Jabbâr says that the larf of one of the eyes is broken so 
that the rays from that eye are curved Probably with larf is meant the way of looking. 
See Mugni IV, 61. After the mentioning of the man on the rolling ship, who thinks that 
the sky moves, 'Abd al-Jabbâr mentions also the looking into the water, which gives 
the impression that things are broken. Mugni IV, 61 
'
J 5
 What we see arc the rays which separate themselves from the eyes of these animals; 
from the eyes of these animals alone come enough rays to make them visible 
In this way they can also see in darkness. Mugni IV, 61. 
136
 See Sarh 248-249 and Mugni IV, 65 One of the ways in which 'Abd al-Jabbâr 
proves with rational arguments that God cannot be seen is based on this condition. 
See also Muhit I, 208. 
137
 Mugni IV, 61. "What separates itself from our eyes in the night becomes 
dispersed because of its weakness, therefore we only see the visible (object) in 
darkness when the rays of our sight are made stronger by a strenght of rays (sc. : when 
the rays coming from our eyes are reinforced by the strong rays coming from the 
visible object) Therefore, we see the eye of a cat because the rays separating themselves 
from its eye are stronger and become a component of the rays of our sight" Mugni IV, 
61-62 
138
 See Mugni IV, 62-63. Darkness is not a "hindrance" for the rays (according to 
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Fourth, the expression used by 'Abd al-Jabbâr when he mentions 
the possibility that there may be between the eye and the visible object 
something that makes the actual seeing of that object impossible, is 
rather cryptic The reason therefore is possibly that he deviates here 
from his usual vocabulary and records only some standard formula 
The text runs in Arabic "wa-tahsul qaidatuh bi-hayt кпч baymih ия-
bayn al-marl sâtir wci-lá makân yslh an \akûn fili sâtir" 139 A literal 
translation of this formula runs "and their (sc the rays') basis results 
in so far there is between them (sc the rays) and the visible (object) 
no concealing (thing), nor a place in which it is good 140 that there is 
a concealing (thing)" 
The first difficulty is presented by the word qauia or "basis" in this 
text When 'Abd al-Jabbâr repeats this formula,141 the word qaida 
is omitted, consequently, it does not seem to form an integral part 
of the description, the expression "the basis of the rays" being replaced 
by "the rays" I suggest that we see it as an equivalent of the term 
mahall and render it by "substrate" 142 
The second difficulty is found at the end of the formula "a place 
in which it is good that there is a concealing (thing)" Once, when 
'Abd al-Jabbâr repeats the formula, he uses instead of this phrase 
"má yajri majrâ s-sâtir", "what is analogous to a concealing (thing)", 
what behaves in the same way 143 The word makân (place) seems to be 
in this formula a synonym for mahall, though the use of this word 
(makân) leaves the possibility of an accident existing not on a sub-
strate 144 It is probable that, whereas the first "concealing" (sâtir) is 
'Abd dl-Jabbâr darkness is a thin body,jiim latif, which forms no hindrance for the rays 
as the experience shows), therefore the reason must be that in darkness there is not 
a sufficient quantity of rays The quantity of rays separating themselves from our 
eye and the fact of their separating themselves from it is not our act and not dependent 
upon our free choice It is, consequentlv, God's act 
134
 Mugni IV, 64 I did not vocalize the word yslh because different meanings are 
possible according to the way it is vocalized 
iM
 To fill in in this translation the word yslh (see previous note), I translated it by 
the basic meaning it has in the first form of the verb to be good 
141
 He does so in Mugni IV, 66 where the formula is repeated without the term 
qaida Also in Mugni IV, 66, where an objection is formulated, saying that, when we see 
our face in a mirror, the "basis of the rays" comes into contact (múllanla) with the fase 
and not with the mirror 'Abd al Jabbàr's answer is that some atoms may remain in the 
mirror This use of the expression confirms its possible meaning of "substrate" 
142
 In Mugni IV, 66 also the expression "Irq as-su'a" occurs, the meaning of which 
is not clear either 
113
 Mugni IV, 67 
144
 See, e g , Mugni IV, 66 "without any doubt it must come into contact with 
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used to indicate a substance which can be somewhere without needing 
therefore something else, the second "concealing" is meant to be an 
accident which inheres in a substance.1 4 5 Remains the meaning of the 
verb 'У?//)"; no ethical meaning seems to be possible in this context, 
nor a judgement on the correctness of the inhering,1 4 6 only the 
actuality of the inhering appears to be important in this formula. 
I propose, therefore, to read here the passive of the fourth form of the 
verb : yuslah, which might be translated as : the place which is so 
prepared that in it a concealing (accident) inheres. 
Fifth, just as the quantity of the rays required for the actual seeing 
has a maximum and a minimum, so the distance at which something 
actually can be seen ranges between a certain minimum and a maxi­
mum. When the distance between the eye and the visible object is 
extremely small, we cannot see i t ; 1 4 7 nor can we see it when the 
distance is extremely large, though the seeing on earth is more limited 
by distance than the seeing into the sky—where we see sun, moon, and 
stars- - because of the haze and the dust which hinder the seeing 
on the surface of the earth. 1 4 8 
Sixth, a last question is whether it is a condition for the actual 
seeing of a visible object that the rays reach that object and come into 
contact with it (ittasaf). Here a philosophical problem arises ; a colour 
can be seen, but being an accident, it is not possible that something 
comes into contact with it; contact only is possible with substances. 
And if we say that the rays must come into contact with the substrate 
of the visible thing, it is not applicable to the substances which can 
also be seen. 1 4 9 Nor can we take both expressions together and 
conclude that it is a condition that the rays come into contact either 
it if it is a substance, or with its place (makâmh) if it is an accident" See also the next 
sentences on pp 66-67. 
145
 Then the verb kán and its local substantive makân are in fact used as synonyms 
for the verb hall and its local substantive mahalL 
146
 The usual meaning of this verb expresses ethical goodness, aptitude, or technical 
correctness See Lane, 1714 
147
 See Mugni IV, 66 "In this way we said that he only sees things between which 
and his two eyes a certain distance ifurja) exists, for we know from experience 
that he cannot see what is between his two eyes, and his eye itself he cannot see (I read 
yarâh instead of tarâh), he only sees by it something else if there is between them a kind 
of distance, though it is possible that he sees the eye itself in the mirror as we said 
before" In Mugni IV, 116 he calls this "al-qurb al-mufnt", the excessive nearness, which 
hinders the actual seeing 
148
 See Mugni IV, 119-121 about the way in which the "excessive distance" (al-bu'd 
al-mufnt) makes it impossible to see 
149
 See Mugni IV, 67; this argumentation was used by Abu 'Abdallah 
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with the visible object itself or with its substrate. One cannot say this 
because the condition under which something is perceived must be the 
same in all cases.150 Moreover, if a colour could exist without a sub-
strate, it nevertheless could be seen. And this possibility is not 
accounted for in any of the two expressions. ' 5 ' 
Therefore, in order to give a philosophically sure solution, 'Abd 
al-Jabbâr confines himself, in describing this condition of the actual 
seeing, to mentioning that there cannot be a concealing substance 
or accident between the eye and the visible object.152 
As we said before,153 if the eye, the instrument we use in seeing, 
is healthy (sahih) and there are no hindrances (mawâm'), we necessarily 
see the visible objects. Therefore, the final words in our discussion of 
seeing will be dedicated to these mawam" which can prevent the actual 
seeing. 'Abd al-Jabbâr knows six or seven of these hindrances, and 
the six of them are mentioned in the three theological works which are 
still at our disposal.154 
The first category of hindrances are things which make it impossible 
that the rays are resulting in the way that there is no concealing sub-
stance or accident between them and the visible object.155 To this 
150
 The general principle which is applied here runs "It belongs to the essence 
(haqq) of the sense when by it something is perceived, that the way in which is perceived 
whdt is perceived by it does not differ" (mm haqq al-hâssa idâ udnk bihâ an íakún 
kayih'at idrâk ma \udrak bilia là taklaltf) See Magni IV, 67 
151
 This is an observation made by Abu Hâsim, Magni IV, 68 
152
 It remains true that when the conditions are fulfilled and the visible object 
is a substance, the rays will come into contact wilh it (cf Mugni IV, 68), but this 
cannot be formulated as a condition as is expressed also in Magni IV, 144 
153
 See ρ 182 
15
'* Sec Sarh 257-261 On pp 257-258 six hindrances are discussed, and on ρ 257 
'Abd al-Jabbâr explicitly states thai there arc six hindrances 
In Mugni IV, 116-133 seven hindrances are mentioned (see ρ 116), the excessive 
nearness (al-qurb al-mufnt) is not mentioned in the two other works 
Muhii I, 208-209 The text of the Wuhit is discussed by Vajda m Le problème de la vision 
de Dieu, sec especially pp 479-480 and note 54 
155
 Sec Muhii I, 209 "Fither they (se the hindrances) are preventing the rays to 
result in relation to the visible (object) in the way we mentioned before" (fa-immâ an 
lakûn qâti'an Ιι-ί-iu'â' 'an humlih ma' al-mar'i 'alâ l-najh alludi dakarnâh) This "way" 
'Abd al-Jabbâr mentions here is explained on ρ 208 and corresponds with what we 
said above that there is no concealing substance or accident between the rays and the 
visible object In Muhii I, 208 he says "that way is that they result in relation to the 
visible (object) in as far as there is no concealing (thing) nor something in which that 
is supposed to be (na-lâ ma yuqaddar dâhk jih)" Of this last sentence Vajda did not 
grasp the philosophical implications (the distinclion between substances and accidents), 
where he renders "Nous entendons par là que ce rayon doit être realise de telle façon 
qu'il n'y ait la rien qui puisse cacher (l'objcct visible) ni rien dont on puisse supposer 
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category belong the excessive distance, the screen, and the excessive 
nearness (the last one is mentioned only in the text of the Mugni).156 
These hindrances are already discussed above. 
The second category is related to the fact that the rays move in a 
straight line, exactly in front of the seeing subject.157 Therefore, a 
thing cannot be seen when it is "in another direction than exactly 
opposite the seeing" subject.158 This condition too has been discussed 
above. 
The third category of hindrances is that which disperses the rays and 
makes them lose their arrangement.159 The reason is that the quantity 
of rays is too small ; if this quantity is increased and the rays become 
stronger, it is possible to see the things in question.160 'Abd al-Jabbâr 
calls this hindrance "subtlety" (riqqa); the examples he gives of such 
subtle bodies are angels and demons.161 We cannot see them because 
our rays are too weak; they are mixed with the subtle body, are 
dispersed, and lose thereby the quality which makes it possible that 
they function as an instrument in seeing.162 But if God makes the rays 
qu'il le fasse", (p. 479). Also his translation of the other sentence mentioned above is not 
entirely correct · "Ou bien c'est quelque chose qui interrompt le rayon, si bien que 
celui-ci ne peut rejoindre l'objet visible de la manière que nous avons dite" There is 
no question of cutting rays nor of their reaching the object. 
156
 See Muhil I, 209 Mugni IV, 116 mentions the three of them "al-qurb al-
mufrii на-1-bu'd al-mujnt ua-1-hijâb". Sarh 257 mentions besides the hijâb also al-basr 
al-mujnt, as becomes clear from the discussion of this hindrance on p. 259, we have 
to read here as in the other places al-bu'd al-mujnt See also Vajda, Le problème, 487, 
note 54. The division into various categories of hindrances is derived from the 
text of Muhit I, 209. 
157
 'Abd al-Jabbâr's wording is rather obscure "immâ an yakm mu'abbtran C) 
lah 'an samtih" (Muhit I. 209) On ρ 208 he says · "This will only happen when they 
(the rays) go their way (dähib jî samtih) and result in relation to it (sc the visible 
object) in a way m which there comes (jand instead of varudd) no gap (between the rays 
and the visible object)" Consequently, the samt is the straight line in which the rays 
move So, possibly the Arabic phrase mentioned above can be translated as "or it 
(sc the hindrance) is an expression for it about its way". 
158
 This is the wording of the Sarh (259) and the Mugni (IV, 116), for the term 
"opposite" the Arabic text has muhadát. The text of the Muhit (I. 209). which is less 
clear, uses the term muqâbala Against the background of the texts of the Sarh and 
the Mugni in particular. Vajda's translation of the text of the Muhit (see Le problème, 
480) docs not appear to be correct 
1
 ^  See Muhit I, 209: "на-immâ an \ufarriq ai-su'a (instead of al-ms'a) 'an 
mzämih" 
1 6 0
 See, e.g , Mugni IV, 122; also Sarh 259. This hindrance is not per se a hindrance 
but by something else (bi-gavnhá). the weakness of the rays and their small quantity. 
1<
" See Mugni IV, 117 and 121-122, Sarh 259. 
162
 In Mugni IV, 117-118 'Abd al-Jabbâr also speaks about the dispersion of the 
rays as the cause that something is not seen. In that paragraph he mentions and discusses 
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separating from the eye of the prophet stronger, he can see angels. 
In the same way demons can see each other because their rays are 
stronger than ours.163 
The fourth category preventing the visible object to be clearly seen is 
a confusion (iltibâs) between the object and the rays; consequently, 
one cannot distinguish between the object and the rays.164 These 
things 'Abd al-Jabbâr calls "thin" (latif); they are small or uncompact 
things, the opposite of this term being katif, thick or compact.165 So 
the single, separate atom is called "thin", and we already saw that 
all hindrances, subtlety alone is not dealt with The dispersion is given as the reason 
why distance is a hindering So one could assume that the text is distorted here, and 
that what is said about the dispersion of the rays has to be applied to the subtlety, 
while the distance must be brought together with the screen, just as 'Abd al-Jabbâr does 
in the text of the Muhit (see above). I think, however, that this is not the case 'Abd 
al-Jabbâr stales here that, if we want to see something al a great distance, we have to 
exercise some pressure (read in the text ya'tamtd . i'umâd instead of yä'tamil .. l'timâl, 
see also note 130), and this has as a consequence that the rays separating themselves from 
our eyes become subtler; and because of the small quantity (read li-qtlla instead of 
Ιι-ΊΙΙα) of the rays they become dispersed. Our conclusion is that the distance as 
a hindrance is discussed in two different ways in the WuAi/ and the Mugni, and that in 
this context in the Mugni the subtlety is not dealt with But, neverlhelcss, the dispersion 
of the rays in fact prevents the actual seeing 
The reason of this dispersion in the case of the subtlety appears to be that the 
rays are mixed (iktalal) with the subtle (read bi-r-raqiq instead of hi-d-daqìq) body; 
Muhit I, 209 
163
 See MugniW, 121-122. 
" ^ See Muhit I, 209 "or that it (the visible thing) is confused with the rays, as , 
the 'thin' (object), in which case what is seen docs not distinguish itself from that by 
which it is seen" Notwithstanding the obscurity of this expression, it is clear that 
a confusion is meant between the rays by which something is seen and the visible 
objects Vajda (Le problème, 480) is not exact enough when he translates "Enfin il 
arrive que le rayon ne procure qu'une vision confuse, notamment lorsque la ténuité de 
l'objet ne permet pas de distinguer ce qui s'y voit" 
See also Mugni IV, 118 "It belongs to the essence (haqq) of the rays that they only 
come in contact with the thin (thing) in a way that they remain distinct from it ('ala 
lui//) гап/ям/ miiih), as they remain distinct from the thick (thing) when the rays are 
strong. Consequently, when they are strong, he sees the thin (thing), and when they are 
weak, he does not see" The difficulty of this sentence is presented by the verb infa\al 
(to separate oneself) When we compare this text with the Muhit, I believe my translation 
to be right 
'^
5
 Sarh 257 mentions as one of the six hindrances the "katáfa" in the place where 
one supposes to find the "latâfa" That wc have to read here in fact latäfa becomes clear 
when we compare this text with what 'Abd al-Jabbâr says on ρ 259 Not only does he 
mention there the laiâfa as a hindrance, but in the same paragraph he states that the 
katâfa even makes the actual seeing possible Moreover, it is not understandable how 
the thickness could possibly prevent the actual seeing Vajda (Le problème, 487, note 
54) did not notice this error, and therefore he has great difficulty in finding the 
parallelism between the texts in the Sarh and the Muhit 
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also rays and darkness are called "thin" bodies.166 The reason that 
we cannot see these bodies, is that the rays separating from our eyes 
are not strong enough to make it possible for us to see the rays and 
the visible object separately.167 
All these kinds of hindrances we have mentioned, are restricted to 
substances; they are not applicable to visible accidents, the colours. 
Therefore, to complete this enumeration 'Abd al-Jabbâr adds a last 
kind of hindrance, applicable to accidents only : the substrate in which 
the visible accident inheres has one of the five above mentioned qualities 
which prevent the actual seeing.168 
So much for our discussion of the quality "seeing". We have given 
much attention to it in the hope that 'Abd al-Jabbâr's physical inter-
pretation of the distinction between seeing and hearing becomes clear. 
The insight into this distinction is of great importance for the under-
standing of 'Abd al-Jabbâr's argumentations on the essence of speech. 
Samî' : having the metaphysical possibility to hear.169 This quality 
indicates a state (hâf); when the subject is in this state, it is possible for 
him to hear the existent audible things It is the openness of the living 
subject towards audible things, sounds (aswât) A subject is in this 
state because of his being living. Just as the term basir, so this term 
is especially used to describe God before He created the world and 
the sounds. 
166
 The single atom is called lati/ in Sarh 259 For the rays, see ρ 183 and note 128 
of this section bor the darkness, see note 138 of this section 
1 6 7
 See Sarh 260 
1 6 8
 See Afugni IV. 116 "The judgement on the accident which inheres in a sub­
strate concerning the way in which it is seen, is the same judgement as the one on the 
substrate What hinders the seeing of the substrate and has an influence upon it, hinders 
the seeing of the inhering (accident) So it (the accident) follows it (the substrate) in the 
aspects in which the seeing of it is possible or hindered Therefore, we did not mention 
there something by which it (the accident) is characterized and not its substrate For 
it is certain that all hindrances we mentioned only hinder the seeing of the visible 
(object) because of the aspect we explained that the instrument receives a quality which 
makes it impossible that it is an instrument in its seeing when it is in this slate, when 
its state changes, it is no longer impossible that it is an instrument therein" I quoted 
this passage in full to show how m 'Abd al-Jabbâr's argumentation physical and 
metaphysical arguments go hand in hand 
See also Sarh 258, where as one of the hindrances is given "that its substrate has one 
of these qualifications (sc one of the other five hindrances mentioned)" The Arabic 
text runs "ua-kawn mahallih bi-ba'd hâdih al-ansâf', we have to read bi-ba'd and 
not yanqucl as in the printed text, see therefore also the rest of ρ 258 
1 6 9
 See Sarh 167 "ammá з-яатГ , fa-hun al-muktass bi-häl It-kanmh'alavhâ yawhh 
an yasma' al-masmû' . idâ uujidâ" Sec also note 115 of this section 
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Sâmi': hearing1 7 0 When we start again on the metaphysical level, 
we can say that "hearing" is a state one can be in, it is not possible 
to give a definition of "hearing" because the reference to the experience 
every human being has is more revealing than any expression 171 
So far as a living being actually perceives audible things—and that 
is to say sounds (awât)—he is called "hearing" Hearing in this way 
being a kind of perceiving, and the difference between the various 
kinds of perceiving essentially being determined by the perceived 
object, one must conclude that God necessarily is hearing, and that 
He is hearing all audible things because he does not need instruments 
in order to perceive But living beings in this world, which by their 
being living through a qualifier life inhering in a substance, are tied 
to materiality, have to use the (material) substrate in which their "life" 
inheres as an instrument in perceiving Our experience tells us that we 
cannot perceive audible things with every part of our body, but that 
we need an instrument, the ear, which is structured in such a way 
that it can be used as an instrument in hearing 
Therefore, 'Abd al-Jabbâr can draw the conclusion that, if our ear 
is healthy and there is no hindrance, we, living beings in this world, 
necessarily hear the audible things—the sounds 172 
When we come to the physical elaboration of this theory, 'Abd 
al-Jabbâr first states that hearing corresponds to seeing in as far as the 
perceived object is perceived in the place where it is (bi-hayt huw), a 
transportation towards the instrument of perception—necessary when 
one perceives the odours, tastes, warmth, coldness, and pain, which 
are perceived by direct contact—is possible but not necessary for the 
hearing 173 To make transportation towards the ear a condition for 
170
 For details about 'Abd al Jabbâr's opinions about hearing we have to look both 
into his treatises on the essence of speech (and the Qur'ân as God's speech) and into 
his treatises on perception and seeing, where hearing mainly is discussed to emphasize 
the difference between seeing and hearing See, e g , Mugnî IV, 67 68, 119-120, 134-138, 
and other passages, all in the context of a discussion of perception and seeing, so also 
Muhit I, 320-326, Mugni VII, 24-25, and passim in the context of discussions on speech 




 See Mugni IV, 81 
172
 See Mugni IV, 119-120 "For sound is perceived on its substrate, if the 
instrument is healthy, and there is no hindrance analogous to the closing of the 
ear-opening, it is heard" 
173
 See Muhit I, 324 "As for the way in which it is perceived, this is different from 
the perception of warmth, coldness, tastes, and odours and similar (read musabbaha) 
to the perception of colour in as far as sound is perceived where it is (bi-hayt huw) 
just as colour is perceived, we do not need in the (perception of) sound transportation 
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and the only possibility of perception of the audible things, leads to 
numerous absurdities as 'Abd at-Jabbâr shows.174 
But besides this similarity between seeing and hearing, 'Abd al-
Jabbâr also sees a great difference between the physical realization 
of these two forms of perception. While the actual seeing results by 
means of rays separating themselves from the eye, the instrument of 
seeing, and coming into contact with the visible object—and this implies 
that there is some form of contact between the seeing subject and the 
seen object, be it directly or indirectly, and that seeing corresponds 
in this way to the other forms of perception mentioned above in the 
actual need for contact —hearing does not need any form of contact 
(ittisâf) at all, neither directly nor by rays, air, or something else.175 
In our discussion of seeing we dealt with a number of hindrances 
{mawâni') which prevent the actual seeing; all these hindrances were 
related to the rays and expressed their weakness or the impossibility 
to reach the visible object in a way they could be used as an instrument 
in seeing. Since hearing does not need such an instrument that makes 
the contact between the perceiving subject and the perceived object, 
there will not be as many hindrances as in the case of seeing. We can 
hear sound coming from all directions, a screen does not hinder our 
hearing. 'Abd al-Jabbâr only mentions as a hindrance for hearing the 
closing of the ear-opening and what is analogous to this.176 Besides 
that, 'Abd al-Jabbâr also mentions the blowing of the wind in the 
direction of the audible thing; this resembles a screen and as such is 
a hindrance.177 In other places, he also discusses the "hidden speech" 
(kalâm kafi) we cannot hear, though for instance angels and demons 
may hear it.1"'8 But the way in which this "being hidden" prevents us 
to hear it is not explained further. 
of its substrate We do not deny the possibility of its perception when its substrate 
is transported towards the aperture of the eye, but we do not make that a condition so 
that it could only in this way be perceived". 
174
 See Muhit I. 324 and M ugni VII, 24-25. 
175
 Cf Mugni IV, 136 "It belongs to our essence (mm haqqmâ) that we hear the 
audible (thing) without needing in our hearing the coming into contact (ittisâf) of rays 
or air (Ляпа'), therefore, one of us perceives the sound in its substrate and distinguishes 
by the perception between it and the direction in which the sound did not originate, 
notwithstanding the possibility" See also Mugni IV, 67-68 
1 7 6
 Mugni IV, 119 . "-na-lays hunâk mani' yajri majrâ sadd karq al-udn". 
177
 Muhit I, 324 "When our perception of sound is not possible at the blowing 
of the wind (hubitb ar-rih) in another direction than that of the speech, the reason is 
that this air becomes like a screen (ka-1-hijâb)". 
' ^ ' See, e.g., Mugni VU, 16 There are mentioned as examples of this hidden speech : 
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Finally the distance; is not the excessive distance (al-bu'd al-mufrit) 
a hindrance for hearing just as it is a hindrance for seeing? No, for here 
is no difference in the aspects because of which something is heard be 
it near or at a distance; because there is no condition for hearing, as 
was the case with seeing, there cannot be an essential difference which 
really makes hearing impossible.179 But we have to admit also that, 
whenever a sound comes nearer to our ear, it comes also nearer to 
perception, because it is perceived on the place where it is; therefore, 
there will be a difference in the way something is heard, according to 
the distance of the place where it is. But, essentially, distance cannot 
be said to be a hindrance.180 
By way of conclusion : the only audible object is the accident 
sound. Sound being a non-remaining accident, it is heard when it 
comes into existence and in the place where it exists. 
4. MAN IS ABLE 
In our discussion of "man", we followed 'Abd al-Jabbâr, dealing 
with man in his treatise on the person on which God has imposed 
His duties and who in this way becomes responsible. This ntukallaf— 
and not only human beings are responsible persons but angels and 
demons too—is described by him as "the able living being" (al-hayy 
al-qâdir).18i Therefore, we first discussed the living being, and because 
the distinctive feature of a living being is his being perceiving, we 
added a section on perceiving. We now come to the second quality 
'Abd al-Jabbâr mentions • his being able (qâdir). This quality is not 
identical nor coextensive with the quality "living" : it is possible that 
a living being is not able.182 
warning (kanr; see our pp. 63-65), talk of the soul (hadit an-nafs; see our pp. 62-63), 
and the speech of angels and demons 
' ^ Mugnl IV, 119-120: "If the instrument is healthy and there is no hindrance 
analogous to the closing of the ear-opening, it (sound) must be heard even when it is at 
an excessive distance. This is because of the occurring (husûl) of the aspect because of 
which (also) the sound that is near is heard, for the near (sound) is only heard for 
this cause. When the distant (sound) corresponds with the near (sound), it must be 
heard". The aspect because of which it is heard is that the instrument is healthy 
and there is no hindrance. This aspect remains the same in both cases 
180
 See Mugni IV, 68. 
181
 See ρ 162. Cf. Mugnî XI, 309 
192
 Something that is able is also living. "The able (person) can only be able if he is 
living" (wa-lâ yakùn al-qâdir qádiran ¡Ila wa-huw hayy)\ Mugni XI, 309 But what is living 
is not necessarily able, see, e g , Muhìt I, 103 
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The responsible person, upon whom God has imposed His duties, 
must be able.183 For, if God imposes His duties and man is not able 
to perform the required acts, God's taklîf. His imposing, would be 
evil (qabih), but we know that God performs no evil acts. Therefore, 
the responsible subject must be able. 
In this section we discuss the quality "able" and the realization of 
the possibility which is expressed by the quality able : the acts and 
the way in which we, able living beings in this world, produce them. 
Qâdir: able.184 We know that there are living beings in this world 
for which acting is possible, and that there are others for which it is 
not possible. The reason must be that some living beings are in a state 
(hâf) in which others are not, and that they by being in that state 
have a quality which others do not have. This quality is called "able" 
(qâdir).18 5 
How can we know that this quality is distinguished from other 
qualities? Not by inner experience, the way in which we know the 
difference between knowing and reflecting, seeing and hearing; it is 
not in this way that we know that we are able. We only know it by 
deduction : we only know that acting is possible by the actual hap-
pening of acts. Nevertheless, this actual happening of acts is not 
the distinctive feature of someone's being able.186 It can only be an 
indication that the acting subject was able just the moment before 
he acted. Hence, we cannot make this distinction by inner experience 
because we can only know afterwards that we were able before. 
It is impossible to define the quality "able" because there is no 
183
 Cf MugntXl, 367-370 
184
 The quality "able" is discussed by 'Abd al-Jabbâr in his discussion of God's 
qualities, see Muh'u I, 103-112 and Sarh 151-156, see also 'Abd al-Karîm 'Utmân, 
Nazarìyal at-taklif, 199-202 The quality is also discussed when 'Abd al-Jabbâr treats 
the human acts and man's ability to act See Sarh 323-417 Human acts arc discussed 
in Mugn! VIII and IX and in Muhil I, 356-444 (the end of the first part) In Mugni 
VIII, 59 'Abd al-Jabbâr announces a chapter on the ability (bäh al-fHiiaa), we assume 
that this chapter is in fact the tenth, still missing part of the Mugni. Also the second part 
of the Muhtt begins with a chapter on the ability, see Muhit I, 444 in the notes For the 
discussion of man's ability, see also 'Abd al-Karîm 'Utmân, Nazarìyal at-taklif, 317-332 
195
 Muhit I, 103 
186
 Cf Muhit I, 103-104 "As for the indication that the able (subject) is able, this 
is the possibility of acting (sihhat al-β'Γ) for him, this possibility, though it can only be 
known after the occurring is known, is the (indicating) aspect in the indication and 
not the occurring, thus, if it would be possible to know it without knowing (the 
occurring), it would be an indication" See also Sarh 151 if the act happens from 
someone in a way that it is necessitated ('α/á tariq al-wujûb), it does not indicate that the 
subject was able 
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expression which is more revealing than the term "able". The only 
way to distinguish the quality "able", is to describe it by pointing to 
its implications, the result it has for the qualified object; and, though 
this is not a real definition, one can describe the able subject as "who 
is characterized by a state; because of his being in it acting is possible 
for him if it is not hindered."187 
From what is said above it is clear that the thing qualified is the 
entire person of the living being. Just as it is the composite body, 
the whole person, which is living and perceiving, so it is the composite 
body which is able, not a part of it, nor something inside or outside it; 
it is a quality that characterizes and requires the composite body of 
a living being.188 
To continue the explanation of 'Abd al-Jabbâr's description of the 
quality "able" : this quality, which requires and characterizes an entire 
person,—the description begins with "man", "who"—is attributed to 
a state (hâf) the living being is in.189 By attributing it to a state, 'Abd 
al-Jabbâr points to the fact that a subject is not called "able" because 
there would exist somewhere a qualifier (mana) "ability", through its 
connection with which a subject would be called "able",190 but because 
we know by argumentation that the subject must be called by this 
active participle (qâdir), and therefore must be qualified and distin-
guished from other subjects by a state.191 The argumentation through 
which we know that a subject is in a state by its being in which 
he is called able, can be summarized as follows : we know that a given 
187
 See Muhit I, 103 This manner of describing somclhing is called a definition if 
it is more revealing than the original term, although it describes something by way of 
a hukm, a judgement, caused by the quality See also M ugni Vili, 59 
"* 'Abd al-Jabbâr discusses this together with his discussion about the living 
being, he shows that the able living being must be the jitmla, the composite body 
Sec pp 163-164 and the references given there 
' ^ For a discussion of the ""stale" (hâf), see pp 145-148 The stale of being able 
differs from other states a living being can be in by the fact that most of those states 
are known by inner experience, whereas this state is only known by way of argumentation 
and deduction 
1 , 0
 'Abd al-Jabbâr will prove that living beings in this world are able by a qualifier 
"ability", however, not our being able leads to the conclusion that there must be 
such a qualifier, but the fact that it is possible that we are not able Therefore God, 
who is always able, docs not ha\c such a qualifier See pp 148-150 
191
 By mentioning as the cause of the subject's being qualified as able the state he 
is in, 'Abd al-Jabbâr rejects the opinions of some other Mu'tazila, as for instance 
that of Bisr bn al-Mu'tamir, who held that it expresses the health of the limbs and the 
freedom from defects (Sec, e g . f-rank, Remarks, 320-321 and Watt, Free Will, 75) 'Abd 
al-Jabbâr rejects this restriction of the quality able to the purely physical level 
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human being is acting,192 whereas this is impossible for another human 
being. This implies that it was possible for the first person and im-
possible for the second.193 This difference between the two cannot 
be essential because both, being human beings, have the same essence; 
nor can this difference be attributed to a qualifier which exists some-
where because the subject's being able to act requires and characterizes 
a whole living being. Therefore, the difference must be found in the 
one person being in a certain state, whereas the second is not.194 
By being in this state, the subject has a relationship with acting, 
a relationship which does not concern its actuality but its possibility. 
Therefore, the conclusion we draw, when we know that someone 
has done an act, is that he was able the one moment just before the 
act if the act concerned is a direct act, or the one moment just before 
the producing of the cause if the act concerned is an indirect one.195 
Therefore, it is possible that at the moment of the act the subject is no 
longer able;196 and though it is possible that the subject was able 
during more moments, during a longer time before the actual acting,197 
the only conclusion we can draw is that the acting subject was able 
the one moment just before the moment of the act.198 
A third element, mentioned in 'Abd al-Jabbâr's description of the 
quality "able", is the act (//"/). Being able indicates a certain relation-
ship with acts. But what are these acts? An act is a substance or 
accident; and by calling it an act, it is emphasized that it is not only 
temporal and brought into existence, but that we know also that in its 
1 . 2
 In this context 'Abd al-Jabbâr uses the term /Í7. For him the act is the thing done. 
See pp. 115-116 
1 . 3
 The perceived and known fad on which this discussion is based, is nol the 
diflerence between the occurring and the non-occurring of an act (for non-occurring 
does not say impossibility), nor the difference between possibility and impossibility of 
the act (for the possibility cannot be perceived), but the difference between the occurring 
and the impossibility. See Muhit I, 104 
144
 Muhit I, 104-105 
195
 About these two kinds of acts we speak later on in this section An example 
of the second kind when we shoot an arrow which hits the target, the hitting is our 
act, nevertheless, we were only able the moment before we shot, we cannot conclude 
that we were able the moment before the arrow hit 
" * This implies, for instance, that there can exist speech coming from a person 
who at the same moment becomes dumb or dies but the moment before was still able. 
See, e.g , Mugni VII, 47. Cf. also what Watt (Free Will, 71) says about the opinion of 
Abu l-Hudayl. 
" ' ' This is based on the fact that the subject's being able gives information about 
the possibility (sihha) of the act, not about its necessity (wuiûh). The possibility implies 
that something else is required before the act actually occurs. See also Muhit I. 106 
" " See Muhit I, 105-106, also Sarh 324 and 412 
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being brought into existence it has a relationship with a subject who 
did this.199 The acting or doing subject (fail) makes something (a sub-
stance or an accident) that was non-existent (ma dum) existent (mawjùd). 
So, in fact, the able subject is able to bring into existence (ihdât) and 
to make existent (îjâd).200 This is the only thing an acting subject 
does: bring something non-existent into existence.201 Hence, we can 
say that the able subject has a relation only with non-existent things. 
For, when the things come into existence or exist, the relation will be 
that between the acting subject and the act. Non-existent things need 
an able subject to be brought into existence; when they are coming 
into existence or are existent, they no longer need such a subject.202 
Since 'Abd al-Jabbâr sees every act as something brought into 
existence, he makes no difference between God's acts and the acts of 
man. Both God and man bring into existence; the difference cannot 
be found in what they do, but only in the genera and the number of 
things they can do.2 0 3 Because man, just as God, brings into existence, 
one can even say that he "creates" (kalaq) his acts although the term is 
in fact not used.204 
Acts, being either substances or accidents, are bound to materiality 
which forms the principle of concretization and fragmentation. There-
fore, one can say both with reference to God and man that they are able 
in general, but also that they are able to concrete acts; one can discuss 
the relationship between God or man and concrete non-existent things. 
A very important part of the discussions 'Abd al-Jabbâr writes down in 
199
 See Muhit I, 229 and Sarh 324 An act is something that comes into existence 
and, therefore, a substance or an accident The fact that in the definition of act the 
term "able" is used, and in the definition of the quality able the term "act", might 
lead to a definition of the thing by itself, had not 'Abd al-Jabbâr observed that the 
meaning of "able" is evident and cannot be defined by an expression more revealing 
than the term "able" itself 
2 0 0
 See also what Frank says about the position of Abu 'Ali "What he says -and 
he was the first, I think, to put the matter in these blunt terms—is that qudra, in the 
human agent, is the power to realise the existence of the act it is qudra 'ala ¡jáüih 
'ala ¡hdálih" (Frank, Remarks, 321, I adapted the transliteration of the Arabic 
words) 
2 0 1
 Such a statement supposes a doctrine of the reality of the non-existent things, 
see pp 107-109 
202
 See Éarh 412 "The act only needs the ability to go out from non-existence 
into existence" This statement is proved on the page mentioned and the pages following 
it 
2 0 3
 A subject who is essentially able knows no restrictions in genera or number; 
a subject, however, who is able by a cause—called ability— is restricted in his being 
able and so are all able living beings in this world See, e g , Sarh 156 
2 0 4
 Μιιχηι VII, 208-223 
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his chapters on being able and on human acts, is given to problems 
related to this concretization of being able into being able to concrete 
acts.205 
The relationship between the able subject and the act is, as we already 
saw, not a relationship of actuality—and therefore it is not correct to 
translate al-qâdir as the able agent206— but one of possibility (sihha). 
'Abd al-Jabbâr himself states that the meaning of the word "possible" 
in this context has to be understood as "not impossible".207 Con-
sequently, when he states that able is "who is characterized by a state; 
because of his being in it acting is possible", he points to the ontological 
possibility of acting;208 when he says that a concrete act is possible 
for an able person who is able to that concrete act, he means that this 
person has the ontological possibility to do this act, while its realization 
is dependent upon the motive that invites him to act. Therefore, when 
an act comes from us, but not by way of possibility, but because it is 
necessitated in us, we cannot say that we were able (qâdir) to do 
that act.209 That not the purely physical possibility of the act is meant 
becomes clear when we take into consideration that a subject is still 
called able when the actual act is hindered by hindrances outside the 
subject. 
These hindrances are the last element mentioned by 'Abd al-Jabbâr. 
"Man"' or "hinder" is an accident because of the substrate of which 
the act is impossible for the able subject.210 Because of this accident 
2 0 5
 So, e g , the discussion about the thesis that it is not possible that two able 
persons are able to (produce) the same thing The main goal of all these discussions is to 
safeguard man's own responsibility for his acts, for he, and nobody else, is the one 
who does and can do these acts Therefore, these discussions form in 'Abd al-Jabbâr's 
theological works part of the treatise on God's justice, which supposes man to be 
responsible for his own acts 
2 0 6
 So, e g . Hourani in his Islamic Rationalism, 102 
2 0 7
 Sarh 395 "One may mention the possibility (sihha) and mean by it the denial 
of impossibility, as one can say · the act is possible for the able (subject), namely, it 
is not impossible {la yaslahll). one may (also) mention it and mean by it that its occurring 
is expected, as one can say that the creation of the world was possible for God in 
eternity, namely, its occurring was expected from Him" The remark in Mugni V I I , 
33-34 is not very enlightening in this context "When one says about the act that it is 
possible (mhih) for its doer, this means that he is able to (do) it" 
20B
 See, e g , Frank, Fundamental Assumptions, 10, where he translates "the original 
ontologica! possibility of action" Vajda seems to point more to the possibility of 
concrete acts when he says that it is "concevabilite logique et aussi possibilité de réalisation 
concrète" (Vajda, Parole de Dieu, 64) 
2 0 9
 See Muhît I, 104, also Sarh 151 
2 1 0
 Sarh 393 "al-man huw ma yala'addar 'alâ I-qâdir h-makâmh al-ß'l 'alâ wajh 
Іан-lâh la-mâ ta'addar na-hâlatuh ulk" 'Abd al-Jabbâr clearly takes the man' to be 
an accident which causes the substances in which it inheres to hinder the act 
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the substance can be called "тапГ\ hindrance. There are two kinds; 
the first kind is a hindrance by way of binding or holding back; one 
can bind someone and prevent him to walk. The second kind is called 
"by the opposite or what is analogous to it"; if it is by the opposite,2 1 1 
it is like the trying to move something when someone else who is 
stronger tries to keep it immobile; what is analogous to the opposite is, 
for instance, the missing of an instrument one requires for the act, 
for example, a pen for writing.2 1 2 
But notwithstanding these hindrances which prevent the actual 
occurring of the act the subject remains able. 
So far we have spoken about the state and quality "able" (qâdir) and 
not about the accident and qualifier "ability" (qudra), for one has 
to discuss first the general principles before paying attention to the 
difference between the way God is able and other living beings are. 
The more so, because one of the main objectives of 'Abd al-Jabbâr 
is here to show that both God and man are able, that both can act, 
and both are able to bring into existence; for only on the basis of this 
principle his discussion of the reality of human acting and man's real 
responsibility for his acts is possible. 
Qudra : ability. We, human beings, know by deduction that we are 
able, but we also know that we are not necessarily able; it would be 
possible that we were not, without this making any difference for the 
other states we are in, and independently of the being fulfilled or not 
of some condition or other. Therefore, we cannot be essentially able; 
consequently, we must be able through a cause Cilla), a qualifier 
(maná). If this qualifier inheres in us, we are able; if it disappears, we 
are no longer able.213 In the same way in which 'Abd al-Jabbâr 
showed in general that we can only be in a transitory state because 
of a cause, a qualifier, an accident inhering in us, he shows that we 
must be able by a qualifier "ability". 
Just as the other qualifiers, this qualifier too, by needing a substrate 
to inhere in, links the quality to materiality, the principle of different-
iation and limitation. By being tied to the material substrate, the 
realization of our being able in concrete acts has to make use of that 
substrate, which limits its possibilities. 
211
 The printed text gives twice the word qayd where we have to read didd: in 
Jines 14 and 17. Our reading is necessitated by the sense of the context (SorA 393). 
212
 For this argument see Sarh 393. One expects "what is analogous to binding 
(qayd)" instead of "opposite" (didd). 
213
 See Sarh 391, where this argument is summarized by 'Abd al-Jabbâr. 
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Also by pointing to the fact that our being able is limited by and 
related to the substrate which is the composite body, 'Abd al-Jabbâr 
shows that human beings must be able by a qualifier. In his Sarh he 
mentions two such arguments. First, we can perform certain acts by 
one of our limbs, but not by other ones; this difference cannot be 
caused by our being able, but only by the fact that our being able is 
tied to materiality and therefore limited.214 The second argument draws 
our attention to the fact that some able persons are stronger, "have 
more ability", than others, while all of them are able. The difference 
cannot be found in their being able, for they are all able, but must be 
found in the limitedness of their being able, which is caused by its 
being tied to materiality.215 
Consequently, the fact that we are able is both determined and limited 
by the qualifier "ability", which inheres in us. Fundamentally, this 
ability is not a power in us and not an imperfection or pure possibility; 
it is an accident which is said to inhere in us in order to explain that our 
being able, which is a perfection because it is an expression of our 
possibility to bring things into existence, is not a permanent and 
necessary state, and is limited qua genera and qua number of things 
we can bring into existence.216 
This qualifier, the inhering of which in us causes us to be able, 
has been given several names; besides qudra (ability) it is also called 
qûwa (might), istitaa (faculty), and tâqa (capability).217 




 'Abd al-Jabbâr says that the stronger person has "more ability" {:iyâdat 
al-qudra). Here, as in other contexts too, he is inclined to "fill up" the rather empty 
concept of "qualifier". Sarh 391 
2 1 6
 See also Frank, Causality, 19, where he says: "Most importantly, this active 
quality oí qudra ... is not strictly taken in the kaiâm as a power or potentiality to become 
other but as an "accident" ('arad) or attribute, and so designates the actuality of a state 
of being in the subject, viz , the actuality of being able to effect the realisation of some 
act". In some other texts Frank, just as 'Abd al-Jabbâr himself, tends to fill up this 
concept and to consider it as the power in the subject (See Kalâm, 300 and Fundamental 
Assumptions, 10). This ability is more than the soundness of the structure and the 
healthiness of the limbs, though this structure is a condition for the qualifiers which 
require a living being; otherwise they cannot inhere in it. See, e g . as-Sahrastâni, 
al-Milal, I, 100, where he discusses the opinion of Abu 'Ali and Abu Hâsim. Nader 
(Système philosophique, 261) did not understand this correctly. 
21
 " ¿arh 393. The English terms are chosen somewhat at random in trying to find 
some English equivalents for the term "ability". The verb corresponding to tâqa (atâq 
with the active participle mutig) is not used for God because this verb is only used 
concerning acts for which one has to make some effort. 
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being makes acts possible. This implies that "ability precedes the act 
and does not necessitate i t " 2 1 8 The quality "able" implies, in the 
eyes of 'Abd al-Jabbâr, that for the subject that is qualified as able 
an act is possible; that means that the act can occur or not. Therefore, 
the ability cannot necessitate the act; in that case the act would not be 
possible but necessary.219 
Ability must precede the act. For, if it were simultaneous with the 
act, no real possibility would be left.220 One may argue, too, the other 
way round, starting from the act : the act needs an ability to come 
into existence, but it does not need it when it is already existent nor at 
the moment it comes into existence; therefore, it must need it when 
it is still non-existent. Consequently, ability must precede the act.221 
Another consequence is that ability is not restricted to one concrete 
determined act : an ability222 has the possibility to two opposite acts; 
the ability to be unbelieving is the ability to be believing, the ability 
to move something is also the ability to make it immobile.223 Or, as 
'Abd al-Jabbâr says in a more general statement, a concrete ability 
is connected with similar, different, and opposite things.224 
By describing human ability in this way, 'Abd al-Jabbâr lays the 
2 1 8
 "Al-qudra sàbiqa It-l-fi'l на-laysat mau/ibatan lah", Wuhit I, 364 Instead of the 
term sâbiqa 'Abd al-Jabbâr also uses the term mutaqaddima, which has the same 
meaning, Sarh 390 
2 1 9
 See Sarh 151 
2 2 0
 "If the ability were simultaneous with its object (maqdûr), the obligation God 
imposes upon an unbeliever to believe would be an imposing of something to which 
he has no capability For if he (the unbeliever) were capable, it would occur from 
him, and because it did not occur from him, this indicates that he is not able to (do) 
it" Sarh 396 
2 2 1
 See Sarh 412. 'Abd al-Jabbâr compares in this context the different qualifiers 
required for the occurring of the act (ability, knowledge, will) with the instruments 
aldi) needed some of them are needed before the act, some only during the act, and 
some both before and during the act The ability only is needed before the act Some 
examples to confirm this are given by 'Abd al-Jabbâr on pp 414-415 
2 2 2
 When 'Abd al-Jabbâr speaks about various "abilities" (in the plural), it is 
because the "being able", by its connection with the material substrate, is divided into 
separate abilities to concrete acts 
2 2 3
 See Sarh 396 ff See also note 220 The argument 'Abd al-Jabbâr gives here states 
that God could not oblige the unbeliever to believe, for this would be an obligation 
to something he is not able to For, if he would be able to believe, he would actually 
believe God imposes upon the unbelievers the obligation to believe and His imposing 
cannot be bad, therefore, they must be able to believe Who is able to be unbelieving is 
also able to believe 'Abd al-Jabbâr calls this "qudra sâhha li-d-diddayn" 
2 2 4
 See Sarh 415-416 "al-qudra 'mdanâ muta'alhqa hi-1-mutamâtil на-1-muktalif 
wa-1-mutadâdd" In his elaboration of this statement he is mixing up the ability to do 
something and the actual doing, and that makes his argumentation rather confusing 
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basis for his doctrine that man really has a free choice in his acting, 
and that he is really responsible for his acts 
The other aspect of the qualifier ability is that it, besides causing the 
subject in which it inheres to be able, also limits that subject in its being 
able The reason is that, as an accident, it needs a substrate and that 
this substrate can itself hinder the act or being hindered from outside 
Just as, for instance, the qualifier "life" (hayât), the ability needs 
a substrate, structured in a special way, to inhere in it can inhere 
only in the composite body (jumla) of a living being, our experience 
tells us that only living beings can be able 225 This implies that in 
acting we have to make use of this substrate, and that we cannot act 
without that substrate 226 In this way our acts, and therefore also the 
possibility of acts, our ability, are restricted and limited This restriction 
is made concrete by 'Abd al-Jabbâr as follows "Without any doubt, 
that to which he (the subject who is able by an ability, qâdir bi-l-qudra) 
is able, is restricted in genus and in number, the direct producing 
outside the acting subject (al-iktira)221 is impracticable and impossible 
for him, hindering him is possible, without any doubt, he must make 
use of the substrate of his ability in the act or the cause " 2 2 8 
The genera of acts which are really possible to us, are restricted 
We cannot produce substances, nor can we produce all genera of 
accidents We already saw that 'Abd al-Jabbâr mentions eleven genera 
of accidents we are not able to produce, and ten genera we are able 
to produce These ten genera are subdivided into five acts of the limbs 
(modes of being, pressure, composition, sound, and pain) and five 
acts of the hearts (will, non-will, conviction, opinion, reflection) 2 2 9 
That these acts are also "restricted in number {'adad)" means that 
the volume, content, or in general the number of "atoms"230 of which 
the acts we are able to produce consist, are limited Our acts can never 
be infinite; they even cannot exceed given measures 2 3 1 
225
 Cf Sarh 392-393 
226
 Cf Muhit I, 107 
2 2 7
 See, e g , Sarh 323, 'Abd al-Jabbâr knows three ways of acting producing 
something in the substrate of the ability, producing something outside that substrate 
by using means, and producing something outside it without using means This last 
form of direct acting outside the substrate is called "iktirâ"', and is impossible for 
living beings in this world We deal with these three ways of acting when treating the 
"maqdûrât", the acts we are able to do 
2 2 9
 Muhit I, 107 
229
 We have dealt with these genera on ρ 127 
2 3 0
 'Abd al-Jabbàr shows a tendency in his works to describe everything by way 
of quantities, see therefore, for instance, Sarh 416 and 393 
2 3 1
 See Sarh 415-416 
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We cannot produce something outside the substrate of our ability 
without using a means, without there being any form of direct or 
indirect contact. Directly we can produce something in ourselves, in 
the substrate of the ability; outside that substrate we have to use 
a means or cause (sabab).232 
The substrate we have to use in acting being material, can be 
hindered from outside: it can be bound or held back; in the acts 
in which we have to use a cause, this cause can be missing or be taken 
away. So, because of the use of the substrate, hindering is possible. 
Finally, because we have to make use of that substrate, every imper-
fection and every illness of that substrate will influence our being 
able. In this way the qualifier "ability" (qudra) is at the same time the 
cause of the human being's being able and the reason why he in his 
being able is restricted and limited. 
Maqdûr : possible. The maqdûr is something which to produce someone 
is able Consequently, it must be non-existent, for we cannot be able 
to produce something that exists already. It is something non-existent 
that can come into existence because there is some able subject who 
is able to produce it, to bring it into existence 2 3 3 Every individual 
possible thing234 has a relationship to an individual able being, and 
it is called "maqdûr" because of that relationship; it can only have 
such a relationship with one single able being, because it is not possible 
that two living beings are able to produce the same possible thing, be 
it in the same or in another way.235 
What is caused in an act, when an able person produces it, is only 
2 3 2
 See note 227 СГ Muhit I, 367-368 
2 i i
 I rank. Fundamental A •¡•sumptions, 11. stales that the maqdûrât are "pure possibles, 
grounded in the power of efficient causality" See also his Remarks, 323-329 
2 3 4
 This theory is based on the assumption that there arc individual non-existent 
things and that those non-existent things already have a kind of essence and a kind 
of individuality Acting by God or man means the bringing from non-existence into 
existence of such a non-existent thing The inverse is not possible— as far as we know 
by our human reason -when the act really is remaining (substances), some accidents 
fall back into non-existence without influence from outside, others only when their 
opposite is produced But acting is always "bringing into existence". Mât 
2 1 5
 This general principle, which is often used in 'Abd al-Jabbâr's argumentations, 
is discussed in Wugn't IV, 254-266. in as far as the impossibility that two able beings are 
able to produce the same possible thing in the same way is concerned The addition 
"or in another way" is made lo exclude a kind of cooperation between God and man 
in producing (he acts of man This is dealt with in M ugni VIII, where 'Abd al-Jabbâr 
discusses among other subjects the doctrine of the ka\b. which knows some kind of such 
a cooperation (Mugni VIII, 162-168) 
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its coining into existence (hudût); it is possible that an act, when it 
comes into existence, is characterized in other ways too, as for instance 
as good or bad, but that is not dependent upon the subject's being able 
but upon other states the subject is in. For we know that the subject is 
able because he produced the act, and we know that it is he who 
produced it because its coming into existence corresponds with his 
intention and motives. Therefore, its coming into existence is the 
characteristic caused by the subject's being able.236 
The possible things {maqdûrât) can be divided into two categories 
according to the way they have to be done, the way they have to be 
brought into existence. 'Abd al-Jabbâr calls these categories "mubtada"'1 
and "mutawallicT.231 The term mubtada' can be rendered as "imme-
diate"; such a possible thing can be brought into existence without 
the use of a "medium", a "sabab" or secondary cause. The term mula-
wallid, on the contrary, should be translated as "mediate" though 
this translation does not correspond with the Arabic word used, 
meaning "generated"—because it indicates that such a thing can only 
be brought into existence by an acting subject who uses a "medium", 
a "sabab". 
The first category is called mubtada', literally "begun", because the 
acting subject begins with doing it without having to do something 
else before, which is going to function as a secondary cause.238 In this 
category two sub-categories are distinguished according to the place 
where the act is produced and its relationship with the substrate in 
which the ability inheres; the act is produced either in that substrate, 
and in that case it is said to be muhâsir (direct),239 or not in such a 
substrate, and in that case it is said to be muktara'. Because human 
beings and other living beings in this world, as we have seen, have to 
use always the substrate of their ability in acting, the last sub-category 
{muktara') is not possible for them.240 When they produce something 
2 , 6
 Cf especially M ugni Vili. 64 bul also the resi of thai chapter pp 64-73 
"That on which an act is originated by the acting (subject) can be divided into two, 
on one oflhcm it is originated only because he is able, on Ihe other it is originated because 
of other states by which he is characterized, as, eg , his being knowing and willing. 
about both of them is said that they are by the aclmg (subject)" ( Vinoni VIII. 63) 
2 , 1
 See Sarh 391 "al-maqdmät 'ala daihawi muhiada' ka-l-iräda »a-muumallid 
ka-s-mw l" 
23
'^ Cf Miihil I, 367, where it is said to be "mm dûn fil siwâh" the acting subject does 
it "without doing something else" 
2 3
' See Smh 223 "Mubâsara means that the act is done through the ability in its 
(the ability's) substrate" 
2 4 0
 СГ Muh'u I, 368 "It is that by which the able (subject) begins without it being in 
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outside the substrate of their ability, surely when they do so outside 
the composite body, they have to use that body as a secondary cause 
to produce it 
'Abd al-Jabbâr mentions four genera of acts we can only do directly 
('ató tarîq al-mubâsara), and in which the use of secondary causes 
is not possible. These are four genera from among the acts of the 
hearts : will {irâda), non-will (karâha), assumption {zann), and reflection 
(nazar). Three genera can only be done indirectly, by making use of 
secondary causes; these are sounds (aswât), pain (alam), and compo-
sition (ta'lîf). The other acts which are possible for human beings, 
and which belong to the genera conviction (i'tiqad), pressure (i'timad), 
and modes of being (akwân) can be produced either directly or by 
using secondary causes 241 
Mutawallid : generated.242 Generated acts are accidents243 which are 
not directly brought into existence by the able subject, but by means 
of another act, another accident, which functions as a secondary cause, 
a sabab The able subject produces an accident, which again generates 
(wallad2**) another accident; this latter accident is called mutawallid. 
the substrate of the ability" And, 'Abd al-Jabbâr adds, it therefore is only possible 
for a subject who is essentially able and not by an ability Consequently, God alone can 
do things in this way See also Sarh 223 "For it is the 'doing exist' (íjád) of an act 
which goes out from him (muta addi 'anh) without a secondary cause" This is not possible 
for beings who are able by an ability, for in that case we would be able to prevent 
someone else to do something without touching him directly or indirectly 
241
 Cf Mugni IX, 124 Instead of the conviction 'Abd al-Jabbjr mentions the 
knowledge Çulûm) among the acts which can be done either directly or by using secondary 
causes But because knowledge belongs to the genus conviction, I mentioned the genus 
instead of the species In this category it is not so that every individual act can be 
done either directly or by using secondary causes, but in these three genera some acts 




 Both in his Mugni and in his Muhit 'Abd al-Jabbar devotes several chapters to 
the "generating" (ta» lid), mainly with the objective to show that also the generated 
acts can really be the acts of man "See Mugni IX and Muhit I, 399-444 
2 4 3
 Bodies cannot be produced by generating (tanlid) but only by iktirâ', direct 
production not in the substrate of the ability This is proved by 'Abd al-Jabbâr m 
Sarh 223 Therefore, generated acts must always be accidents, every act being either 
a substance or an accident In fact, only six genera of accidents can be generated 
sound, pain, composition, conviction, pressure, and mode of being See our discussion 
of maqdûr 
2 4 4
 If we take the words in their strict sense, we cannot s^y that the cause generates 
(»aliad) the generated act because this term can only be applied to acting subjects, and 
therefore it should be applied to the acting subject who produces the cause The use 
of "generated" (mutawallid) for the effect is, however, correct, independently of the 
calling of the acting subject or the cause by the name "generating" (muwalltd) See 
therefore Muhit I, 422, where 'Abd al-Jabbâr states that (his is a question of names, 
not of realities 
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So the secondary cause which is used here is not what we normally 
call an instrument (in Arabic called : ala); it is an accident by means 
of which we produce another accident in the same or in another 
substrate. In the example of the shooting of an arrow which hits the 
target, we can say that the shooting person produces directly pressure 
(i'timad) in his arm; by means of this pressure he produces pressure 
in the bow, which again causes pressure in the arrow when it is shot, 
and this pressure can cause a separation (iftirâq) in the target. Con-
sequently, the secondary causes we use to produce the separation in 
the target, are a series of pressures in various substrates.245 
The generated act has therefore two relations; a relation to the 
secondary cause, and a relation to the acting subject who really is the 
one that produces and generates it. 
The relation between the generated act and its cause can be proved 
by the fact that the generated act results at (simultaneous with) the 
cause ('ind as-sabab2*6), according to that cause, and always in the 
same way, if there are no hindrances which prevent it.247 If these three 
conditions are fulfilled, the relationship between the two accidents 
must be a relationship between cause and generated efTect.248 
We can know the relation between the generated act and an acting 
subject, and prove that the subject who makes the cause is also the 
producer of the effect, by pointing to the fact that the generated act 
occurs according to his states (ahwâl), motives (dawai), intention (qasd), 
and will {irada).2*9 This is the way in which 'Abd al-Jabbâr always 
shows that an act is the act of a certain acting subject. When either a 
direct (mubâsir) or a generated act occurs in this way, we can deduce 
that it is the act of the subject concerned.250 
2 4 5
 In this example, by a series of pressures (itimâdât) we produce a mode of being 
(канп, in fact here iflirâq) in another body, it is not done by direct contact, but by 
indirect contact we touch what at its turn touches something else See Muhit I, 367 
2
'"' The preposition is not easy to translate, one could describe it as "when the 
cause is present" 
24
'' See Muhit I, 400 
246
 In this way 'Abd al-Jabbâr proves in Mugni XII, 77, that reflection generates 
knowledge at the same reflections the same knowledge results, it results when the 
reflection exists, and its contents correspond with the contents of the reflection 
2 4 9
 The terms 'Abd al-Jabbâr uses in various contexts vary In Mugni XI, 37, for 
instance, he uses the terms "intention" (qasd) and "will" (irada) In the Muhit he prefers 
the term "slates" {ahwât) because it is broader and makes it possible to ascribe also the 
less intended and less conscious acts to the acting subject Sec Muhit I, 70-72 Therefore, 
he mentions in this context (Muhit I, 400) only the "states" (ahuâ!) and "motives" 
(danai) 
2 5 0
 In this respect there is no difference between the direct and the generated act 
This is discussed in Mugni IV, 37-63 
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As the immediate act (muhtada), so the generated act too can come 
into existence either in the substrate the ability inheres in or not in such 
a substrate ^ 1 When able subjects who are able by an ability that is 
to say every able subject besides God—produce generated acts, they 
first produce directly {bt-tanq al-mubâïarct) a cause, which is an 
accident, in the substrate of the ability When this cause is not 
characterized by "direction" (jtha), the generated accident results in 
the same place, in the same substrate Therefore, reflection (nazar) 
can only cause knowledge Çilm) in its own substrate, the heart of the 
living being When this cause, however, is characterized by direction 
(jiha)—and only pressure (itimâd) is characterized in this way 2 "— 
and there is a touching between the substrate of the ability (which also 
is the substrate in which the direct act inheres) and another body, 
a generated accident may come into existence in the other body 25;> 
As we already mentioned, sound, pain, and composition are always 
generated acts, while conviction, pressure, and mode of being may 
be either generated or direct acts 25'1 
Sabab: secondary cause2 5 5 The secondary cause being an accident 
that is used to generate another accident in the same or another sub-
strate, it will be evident that it must not be confounded with an 
instrument (ala) It is an accident the acting subject produces to 
produce by it another accident 
We have to be aware too of the difference between the sabab and 
the 'ilia—two totally different concepts though both can be rendered 
as "cause" Both are accidents, but whereas the secondary cause 
(sabab) generates another accident, the 'ilia only causes something to 
have a certain quality The 'illa as 'ilia does not generate, is not used 
to bring something into existence, but only is the reason why some-
thing is entitled to a certain qualification. Therefore, the "causing" 
251
 See Muhit I, 367 One cannot say "in the substrate the ability inheres in, or 
outside that substrate' because such a formula would be applicable to able beings in 
this world alone who are able by an ability, but not to God, who is essentially able 
Therefore, the formulation has to be vaguer 
252
 Cf ρ 136 The conclusion is that we can only produce something outside our 
own body by using pressure (ΐtimâd) as a secondary cause 
2 5 3
 Sec Muhil I, 367 
2 5 4
 See ρ 206 
2 5 5
 See also what Frank says in his article Ma'nâ, especially on ρ 251 "The 
relation of the sabab to its result (musabbab) need not to be necessary, ι e , the term, 
per se, does not imply that the result follows immediately and inevitably from the 
sabab or the sequence of asbâb, nor, again, is the sabab necessarily the cause of but 
a single effect" 
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of the 'ilia is necessary, cannot be hindered, and occurs at the moment 
the 'ilia itself comes into existence.256 The result of a secondary cause 
can be hindered, and it is possible that it results after the coming 
into existence of the cause itself.257 To give an example : reflection 
(nazar) can be called both sabab and 'ilia ; as a sabcib it generates 
knowledge in the heart of the human being in which it inheres, whereas 
as a 'ilia it only causes that human being to be "reflecting" {nâzir). 
Among the acts of the hearts one only can be a secondary cause : 
reflection; the one result possible is knowledge.258 Among the acts 
of the limbs only two can be used as a secondary cause : pressure and 
modes of being.259 The pressure, being the only accident that is charac-
terized by "direction" (jiha),260 is the one cause we can use to bring 
something into existence outside the substrate of our ability; all our 
acts outside our own body need such a pressure. By means of pressure 
we can produce another pressure, a mode of being, or sound. The way 
in which we know that they are generated by means of a pressure, is 
that wc know that they come into existence simultaneous with the 
pressure, always in the same way, and also according to the pressure, 
e.g., in direction and in strength.261 The modes of being, in fact the 
combination and the separation, can only generate something in the 
place they are; the combination generates composition (ta'lîf), the 
separation generates pain (alami). 
Fâ'il : doing. Whereas the quality "able" (qâdir) indicates the possi-
bility that acts come from the living being who is qualified in this way, 
and whereas it may also be used to indicate a connection of the living 
being with a certain individual non-existent thing he can bring into 
existence, the quality "doing" indicates a connection with a certain 
individual act the subject brings or has brought into existence.262 




 See also Frank, Μα'ηά, 250-251 
2 5 1
 Muhit I, 408 
2 5 9
 M ugni IX. 125-126, Muhit I, 408. See also M ugni XII, 104-118, where 'Abd 
al-Jabbâr shows that the refleclion can only generate knowledge and not something else 
2 5 9
 This is discussed in Mugni IX, 138-160 See also Muhit I, 408 
2 6 0
 See ρ 136. 
2 6 1
 See Mugni W, 140 
2 6 2
 This connection (ta'alluq) is discussed by 'Abd al-Jabbâr in Mugni VII, 50 
We know that there must be a connection between the acting subject and the act which 
makes that this subject and not someone else is said to be the acting subject of this act 
Since this connection cannot be that the act exists in him or in a part of him, nor 
that it causes him to be in a state, the connection must be that he made it There are no 
other possibilities 
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of a momentaneous fact, because at a certain moment of time he has 
brought into existence the substance263 or accident concerned. By 
being "doing" the subject is not in a state, for the fact that he has 
done something makes no real difference. When he would be in a 
state by being "doing", we would have to know that state either by 
necessary or by acquired knowledge. In fact we do not know such 
a state; therefore we must conclude that this connection with the act 
does not really change the subject.264 
The only way in which we can know that someone is "doing" is by 
knowing that an act has come from him, that he has made some-
thing; the way we can know that an act came from him, is by knowing 
that that act corresponds with his motives and his states.264 
This quality is called "a quality related to the act" (sifat al-fi'I), 
it is attributed to the subject "under the aspect of activity" Cala jihat 
al-/i'Hya).2b6 Such qualities do not characterize the substrate, nor the 
living being, but only the acting subject. They all indicate that an act 
comes from the subject, and they do not indicate that he is in a certain 
state.267 
According to the accidents we produce, the quality doing has various 
names : when someone is making speech (Jail al-kalâm), he is called 
"speaking" (mutakallim), and in a similar way he is called "beating" 
(dârib), "moving" (muharrik : moving something else), or "making 
immobile" (musakkin).268 When a subject is qualified by one of these 
qualities, the reason is that he made the corresponding accident, and 
not that he would be in a certain state. 
2 6 3
 See also note 243 We cannot produce substances, the only one who can do that 
being God 
2 6 4
 'Abd al-Jabbâr's main argument that such an accident cannot cause the subject 
to be in a state, is that one should be able to know that slate See Magni VII, 43-44 
2 6 5
 About the vocabulary 'Abd al-Jabbâr uses to describe this, see note 249 
In Mugni VII, 48 'Abd al-Jabbâr says "The way to know that something is attributed to 
the living being under the aspect of activity is when we know its occurring from him 
according to his intention, will, and motives, he is qualified by it" 
2 6 6
 See ρ 153, where we discussed the different kinds of qualities Cf also Mugni 
VII, 48. 
2 6 7
 Mugni VII, 53 "wa-ammâ sifât ai-fa ¡I fa-jamfuha tußd wuqü al-ß'l mmh wa-lä 
tufid Iah hälan" 
2 6 8
 These examples are mentioned by 'Abd al-Jabbâr in Mugni VII, 48; they are 
used throughout his discussions about the quality "speaking" to elucidate what he is 
going to say about this quality 
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5 MAN IS KNOWING 
The quality "knowing" and its qualifier "knowledge" (respectively 
'âlim and 'ilm) have been already discussed in detail in the first 
paragraph of this chapter, the paragraph about 'Abd al-Jabbâr's doc-
trine on logic 2 6 9 In that paragraph we also discussed the genus to 
which knowledge belongs, conviction (ftiqâd), as also two other genera 
from among the "acts of the hearts" (afâl al-qulûb), reflection (nazar) 
and assumption (zann) The two remaining acts of the hearts will be 
discussed in our next section 
One short remark should still be made about the responsible person 
{mukallaf) as knowing Besides the fact that we can know that human 
beings are knowing either by inner experience or by the fact that they 
do precise acts, we also know by deduction that the responsible person, 
upon whom God has imposed His duties, must be knowing 270 For the 
execution of these obligations it is necessary that the responsible person 
can know the obliged act, its qualities, and its difference from other 
things Only in this way can he make the intention to execute this 
duty and know that he has executed it This implies that God, in order 
that His imposing of duties be good, has to give man (and other beings 
upon whom He imposes His obligations) the knowledge necessary to 
execute these duties This knowledge is called, as we have seen, intuition 
( 'a?/)2 7 1 
6 MAN IS WILLING 
Murid: willing 2 7 2 Every person who is compos mentis ('âqil) knows 
by necessary knowledge, based on his inner self-experience (wydân 
2 6 9
 See especially pp 47-55, and also what we said about the intuition ('aq[) on 
pp 92-93 
2 7 0
 See Mugn! XI, 371-387 
271
 See WugniXl, 309 and 371-372 The definition of intuition ('aqf) can be found 
in Mugni XI, 375 
272
 'Abd al-Jabbâr deals especially with the quality "willing" when treating God's 
will So he does in Mugni VI'2 (the whole of the second volume of this part of the 
Mugnî is given to the will), in Muhit I, 267-288, and in Sarh 431-477 'Abd al-Karim 
'Utmân deals with this divine quality in Nazariyat al-taklif, 222-229 and with the 
will of responsible (human) beings on pp 353-367 
'Abd al-Jabbâr deals with this subject in his treatise on God's justice, which in the 
Mugni begins with part VI, and not in his treatise on God's unity For, according 
to him, being willing should not be reckoned among God's essential qualities, but among 
the qualities which are related to His acts God's will is His act as we shall see in our 
paragraph on the theodicy The importance of this subject for 'Abd al Jabbâr and other 
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an-nafs213), that he is willing. It is not necessary to look for some 
indication to prove that ; it is a necessary knowledge which everybody 
has and nobody can banish from his soul.274 Our being willing is 
known in the way we know all states we are in : before knowing the 
existence of "will", we know our own state as being willing. 
Because everybody knows this state clearly and distinctly when he 
is in this state, it is not possible to give a definition of what is this 
quality "willing", for it belongs to the essential conditions for a good 
definition that it is clearer and more revealing than the term to be 
defined; but no expression can be clearer and more revealing than 
our simple term "willing".275 Nevertheless, one can try to describe it, 
and this 'Abd al-Jabbâr does, saying that willing is "who is charac-
terized by a quality because of his having which it is possible for 
him to act in this way and not in another."276 This rather cryptic 
expression can be explained by saying that it is possible for the "willing" 
subject to give his act some extra qualifications above its being existent; 
by willing he can make his speech to be a command or an information 
about a given person or thing; by willing he can give his act a certain 
"intention". 
The meaning of the term "willing" is explained by 'Abd al-Jabbâr by 
mentioning two other terms which he considers to be synonyms of the 
term murid, namely "qâsid" or intending and "muktâr" от choosing 2 7 7 
thinkers is somewhat poetically expressed by 'Abd al-Karîm 'Utmân where he says 
"The divine will belongs to the most important topics about which the opinions of 
Muslim philosophers and thinkers differ, the reason is that it is the, quality by means 
of which the heavens meet the world and by which is realized the creation with man, 
animals, and lifeless matter on it ' (Nazarhal al-iaklif, 222) 
The opinion that willing is an essential quality could lead to the conclusion that 
the world, which is willed by God, must be willed from all eternity and therefore be 
itself eternal 
2 , 3
 Cf pp 54-55 
2 7 4
 See Wuhtt I, 267, Sarh 411-412. Miign! VI 2, 8 Against his opponent who says 
that this knowledge is not necessary and that not everybody admits it, 'Abd al-Jabbâr 
slates "Somebody who is compos mentis cannot deny that he is intending (qásid) 
an act, willing (murid) it, and choosing (muklâr), he makes a distinction between his 
being in this stale and his being non-willing (Kânh), and he makes a dislinclion between 
what he wills from himself and what he wills from someone else When his motives for 
a thing arc strong (enough), he surely wills it, just as he does not will it when his 




 СГ Sarh 432 Sec also what we said in our discussion about the conditions of 
á good definition on pp 76-78 
276
 Sarh 4.12 "al-muklass bt-sifti h-kannih 'ala\hâ \asihh mmh al-fi'l 'alâ najh dun 
ни/Л" 
2
"' 'Abd al-Jabbâr says so in \fugni VI 2, 8 in a passage we translated in note 274 of 
this section (sec above) 
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Though everybody necessarily knows this state of being willingT it is 
possible that one does not make _ clear distinction between this state 
and other states one is in, and that one needs some reflection to 
discover this distinction.278 
Thus we discover that being willing is not the same as being knowing 
Çâlim). One could think that willing is nothing else but knowing that 
an act has some benefit for the acting subject; this is not true, for it is 
possible that one knows a long time that something has some benefit 
without being willing it, while at a given moment one also becomes 
willing it.279 
Being willing also is not the same as being able (qâdir), for we can 
be able to do something without willing it, and we can be willing to 
do something without being able to do it. This is the way we know 
that two qualities are different.280 
Being willing must not be confounded with being desiring (mustaht). 
Desiring implies that one perceives something and that one's nature 
(tab') is attracted by it because it is of direct benefit for him.281 One 
can, however, will something that at this moment is rather harmful, 
but the result of which will be advantageous; one can also will without 
perceiving; one can will something that is of benefit for someone else; 
one can also will something that has no reality, but that one is convinced 
to be existent. In this way the difference between the qualities willing 
and desiring becomes crystal clear.282 
The quality we thus discovered must be caused by our being in 
a state (hai)-, for, we know that the totality of our person is charac-
terized by this quality : we are willing, not a part of us, nor something 
outside us. In that case there are three possibilities :2 8 3 it can be 
2 7 Я
 "One only needs meditation (la'ammul) about the distinction between it (vi/ 
being willing) and the states of the living being which can be confounded with it, 
meditation as we mentioned about the being perceiving of the perceiving (person)" 
Xfugm VI 2, 8 
^» Cf Siirh 434 and Uugni VI 2. 8-9 
2 1 , 0
 See Sarh 434 
^*
1
 A whole series of differences between will and desire (irada and iahna) is 
mentioned m M ugni VI 2. 35-36 One can base oneself on this list to make a similar list 
of differences between the two qualities "willing" and "desiring" 
2 В 2
 See M ugni VI 2, 9 Concrete examples from which appears the difference between 
being willing and being desiring arc given by 'Abd al-Jabbâr in Sarh 433 one can will 
what one does not desire, for instance, many of the repugnant medicines, one can also 
desire what one does not will, for instance, adultery, drinking wine, drinking cold water 




 Sec ρ 154 
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because of a state, because of a defect in the instruments we have to 
use, or because we made something. The second possibility can be 
excluded; we are also not qualified as willing "under the aspect of 
activity" : being willing does not mean that we made something; more-
over, in that case we should know the act (will) before knowing the 
quality (willing), just as we know speech before knowing that we are 
speaking. The only possibility that remains, therefore, is that we are 
willing because of a state we are in.284 
We know by necessary knowledge, by direct self-experience (wijdân 
an-nafs), that we ourselves are willing. But how do we know someone 
else to be willing? There are two possibilities : we know that either by 
necessary or by acquired knowledge. 
By necessary knowledge : we know whom and what someone else 
intends (his maqâsid) by his words and by his acts. Therefore we know 
he is intending (qâsid), and since intending is a form of willing,285 we 
also know he is willing. 'Abd al-Jabbâr gives some examples : when 
someone speaks to me, I know I am the person to whom he directs 
his words; I know that he "intends" me. When I enter a room, and 
someone who is there stands up to honour me, I know his intention by 
that act.286 Moreover, there are many acts which are only what they 
are by the intention of the acting subject; for example, a command 
or information only is a command or information because the speaking 
subject intends it to be so. Hence, when we know by necessary knowl-
edge that something is a command or information, we also know that 
the speaking subject is willing.287 
By acquired knowledge : the only indication (dalif) that points to 
the fact that someone is willing, is that he is just and wise ('adii and 
hakim). But this way to argue that someone else is willing is only 
usable in the case of God and His prophet Muhammad.288 
2 β 4
 Cf. Wugni VI 2, 22. 
2 8
 ' See M ugni VI 2, 58' "al-qan/ irâdal fì'l al-msân β hâlih an hai muiahbabili" 
the intention is the will of the act of man at the moment (it happens) or at the moment 
its effect (happens) 
2t
"' See M ugni VI 2, 10 and also Muhit I, 267, where this is very briefly summarized. 
We must know these intentions, for, if we could not know these intcnlions. we certainly 
could not know the motives, and we have to know the motives in order to know that 
that person is the acting subject of thai act. See also note 249 
2 8 1
 It is not the outward form of speech which determines it to be a command, 
information, or something else; it can have the same form and yet be in one case an 
information and in another case a command or an information about something else 
See MugniWl. 10 
2 β β
 Sec Sarh 433 and M uhi ι I. 267 and 268. 
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By way of conclusion : we can know three states the living being is 
in when we know his acts : 
because these acts were possible for the acting subject, this subject 
was able (qâdir); 
when this act occurs in a precise (muhkam) way, he is knowing 
Çâlim) ; 
when this act occurs in a special way Çalâ wajh maksûs), he is willing 
(murid).2*9 
Finally, if God's imposing duties on mankind is really good, it 
supposes that man can do his act in a special way by which it is good 
and according to those duties. This also requires that man is willing.290 
Irada : will. We know that we are willing, but at the same time we know 
that we are not necessarily willing, that it would be possible that we 
were not willing. Our being willing or not willing at this moment is not 
dependent on another state we are in, nor on some condition which 
has to be fulfilled. Therefore, the only reason why we are willing now 
is the presence of a cause ('ilia), a qualifier (ma'nâ) in us.291 Con-
sequently, while we know our being willing and also the being willing 
of other persons by necessary knowledge, the will can only be known 
by acquired knowledge, by argumentation.292 For the will is nothing 
else than the qualifier the inherence of which makes us to be willing, 
while its disappearance makes us cease to be willing.293 
Our will being a qualifier and, therefore, an accident, inheres in 
a substrate. Without the assistance of divine revelation we cannot know 
in which part of us it in fact does inhere. We might assume that it 
inheres somewhere in our breast,294 but only revelation tells us that 
the exact place in which will, knowledge, and other "acts of the hearts" 
(afâl al-qulûb) inhere is the human heart.295 
2 8 9
 Cf M ugni VI 2, 22 
2 9 0
 СГ MugniW, 309 
2 9 1
 Cf Mugni Ь2, 24, Muhit I, 268, Sarh 432-433 
2 9 2
 Therefore, 'Abd al-Karim 'Utmân's explanation is not correct (Nazarival ai-laklif, 
354) He states that every person who is compos mentis knows the will by inner experience 
What he knows is, in fact, his being willing The will can be known by acquired knowledge 
only. 
2 , 3
 Cf Sarh 431 · "Ja-1-irâda hun ma yû/ih kawn ad-dât murìdan" 
2 9 4
 Cf Muhit I, 268 In Mugní VI/2, 28 'Abd al-Jabbâr explains that we, when 
we are willing or thinking, may feel a kind of tiredness in our breast 
2 9 5
 In Mugni VI 2, 28 'Abd al-Jabbâr menlions the text from the Qur'ân "They 
have hearts, but do not understand with them" (Sural al-a'râf, verse 179), in Muhit I, 268 
we find "saying with their mouths that which never was in their hearts" (Sural 
Al 'Imrân, verse 167) 
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The will is one of the acts of the hearts, an accident we bring into 
existence, it belongs to our own acts and not to the acts of God 2 9 6 
Therefore, one can say that the will has a twofold connection · it has 
a connection with the motives why we produce this accident "will", 
and it has a connection with the thing willed (al-murâd) We discuss 
briefly this double connection. 
The motives {ad-dawai) are not really the cause of the will, they 
do not necessitate the will, nor do they necessitate us to be willing 
But these motives which, according to 'Abd al-Jabbâr, are either a 
conviction or a knowledge or an assumption that a certain act will 
be of some benefit for us, urge the subject to will the act concerned.297 
If the motives for a certain act are strong enough and there are no 
motives against that act, we surely produce the corresponding will 
and will that act But it is possible that the motives against that act or 
the motives for an opposite act are stronger, and in that case we 
produce the other will 
Consequently, our being willing is not a deliberation, and we could 
even say it is not free, determined as it is by the motives. Nevertheless, 
'Abd al-Jabbâr states that the will is not entirely determined because 
the motives may vary and change, and so also the will may change.298 
On the other hand, the will also has a connection with the willed 
object {al-murâd) But to understand what 'Abd al-Jabbâr says here, 
it is very important to bear in mmd that in his opinion it is possible 
to will an act of someone else Consequently, willing is not the decision 
to do something, nor the link between the motives and the act, for 
these things are not possible when we will an act of someone else 
-
9 6
 There are five acts of the hearts which to do we. able beings in this world, 
are able conviction, assumption, reflection, will, and non-will, see also ρ 127 Desire 
and aversion do not fall under our power and, therefore, are created in us by God 
2 9 1
 See Muhit I, 70 Motives are "má na'lamuh an na'taqitluh an nazunnuh mm naf 
lana an daf' darar", the benefit or repulsion of harm for us wc know, are convinced about, 
or assume The motives urge (jwifu, the verb corresponding with the noun used in 
Arabic for the motives) the subject to will, see Mugn! XI, 400 See also Muhit I, 268 
and M ugni VI 2, 24 
2 9 в
 СГ Muhit I, 268, 'Abd al-Jabbâr's opponent objects that 'Abd al-Jabbâr thus can 
no longer sa> that one is willing while it is possible that one is not (In his argumentation 
that we are willing because of a qualifier will he used this as an argument) 'Abd 
al-Jabbâr answers that the motives can change so that the subject is no longer willing 
Therefore, one can say that he is willing while it would be possible that he is not, when 
we take the motives into consideration ('alâ taqdir tag\ir ad-danai) Nevertheless, in 
this case loo the will remains determined by the motives For 'Abd al-Jabbâr, the will is 
not a link between the motives and the act and the act is directly urged by the motives 
without intervention of the will 
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Hence, the connection between the will and the thing willed is not 
a connection between cause and efTect; the will does not necessitate 
the act. One could easily think that the will does this when we look 
into our will and our acts; when we will an act of ourselves, an act 
we really can do, we necessarily do that act.299 Nevertheless, there 
is no causal relationship between the two, but both acts the will and 
the other act are urged by the same motives. The main argument 
to prove that the will does not cause the act, is that we ourselves 
cannot do everything we will and certainly not the acts of someone 
else.300 
When 'Abd al-Jabbâr in this way considers the will to be a second 
act, besides the act which is willed, and denies a causal connection 
between the two, it will be evident that it is not necessary that the will 
precedes the act; for the same motives which urge us to do something 
also urge us to will something. This has as consequence that both the 
will and the act can be produced at the same time.301 Nevertheless, it is 
also possible that the will precedes the act willed.302 
But notwithstanding all this, the will can in some cases have influence 
upon the act.303 If we will an act of someone else, such an influence 
is impossible. If the will precedes the act, the influence is impossible 
too; the will only has influence on an act which really comes into 
existence and is really produced by the willing subject at the same 
time as the will itself. In this way, for instance, speech can become 
a command or information, and our act of standing up can become 
an act of honouring somebody who enters.304 
In this way, by a contemporary will, an act can become good or 
bad, as we already saw. Therefore, 'Abd al-Jabbâr can say that, when 
we know that God cannot do evil acts and that all His acts are good, 
" ' Cf Mugni VI '2. 86. 
3 0 0
 Mugni VI 2, 84. if the will would necessitate the act, it would necessitate every 
act the subject wills, every act it has a relation with. 
301
 "Because of what the act is done, because ofthat the will is done", Mugni VI/2, 
89 In that case the will is contemporary and concomitant with the act 
302
 Cf Mugni VI/2, 90 we can will something for the future; we can will the 
effect at the moment we will the cause; we can will all the letters of a word at the moment 
we produce the first of them 
3 0 1
 Cf Mugni VI/2, 91-93. 
3 0 4
 This is the way we can know that someone is willing, when his willing is 
contemporary with his acting, his will can have an influence upon his act which changes 
that act. By perceiving such an influenced act, we know that the acting subject is willing. 
The will has no influence upon the occurring of an act, but only upon a certain intended 
way it occurs. Cf. also Mugni VI/2. 92-93. 
218 SOME REMARKS ON 'ABD AL-JABBÂRS "PHILOSOPHY" 
we deduce that He is willing because the qualification of an act as 
good or bad depends partially on the will or intention of the acting 
subject.305 
Dâ'î : motive. A motive is said to be "the benefit or repulsion of harm 
for us which we know, are convinced about, or assume (to be) in an 
act."306 The Arabic word literally means "what invites" or "what 
urges" to do something. As a technical term it is only used for some-
thing inside the subject, telling him that there is benefit in a certain 
act. These motives not only invite us to act but also, and even more 
often, to will something. Motives can tell us that an act which in fact 
is impossible for us—such as the acts of someone else— would have 
some benefit for us; though we are not able to do that act, we can 
always will it.307 Against this background, it is clear why 'Abd al-Jabbâr 
compares this motive with the objectives {agrâ(i).i0B 
Such motives, which exist in our heart, can be produced either by 
ourselves or by God. We know that the necessary knowledge (al-'ilm 
ad-darûrî) must be produced by God in our heart, whereas the other 
kinds of motives (acquired knowledge, conviction, opinion) can be 
produced by ourselves too.309 Besides this way in which God influences 
our will and our acts, He also does so in a direct way, by directly 
speaking to us, as we already saw. This inner speech is called "kâtir" 
or "warning".310 
A motive does not necessitate the subject to perform a certain act, 
and even not to will a certain act. When there is a motive inviting 
us to do an act, and there is no motive that holds us back from that 
3 0 5
 See pp 88-89 
3 0 6
 СГ Muhli I, 70 See note 297 In that context the motives are discussed in their 
relation to the act. We shall show that the motives lead more to willing than to acting, 
the reason is that many acts are murad for us (we can will them) without being maqilur 
(we can produce them) So we can will, but not produce, the maqdûràt of someone else, 
the things he can produce, the things which eventually will become his acts. 
3 0 7
 Cf, for instance, Mugni XI, 400 and Mugni VI/2, 88 See also Frank, Fundamental 
Assumptions, 13 • "The motive (ad-dâ'i) is the reason for which the act is performed 
(. ) and as such is a state of the agent rather than the object or act (. .), it is taken 
generally to be the knowledge, conviction, or opinion of the desired object as the agent 
is aware of his desire" As we shall see below, in this description the term "desire" 
cannot be a translation of "sahna" One must restrict oneself here to the mentioning 
of the benefit (or the repulsion of harm) because this can also be found in or behind 
a non-desirable thing See also Gimaret, ¡Iga, 36-37 
3 0 9
 Cf Mugni XI, 400. 
3 0 9
 Cf Mugni VI/2, 88 
3 1 0
 See pp 63-65 
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act or invites to its opposite, we certainly will that act. But, when there 
is a stronger motive against that act or for its opposite, we do not 
will it. So the combination of motives determines whether we will 
and what we will.31 ' 
The relation of the motives to the act is somewhat different. When 
the motives invite us to an act which to do is possible for us, we certainly 
do that act when there is no stronger motive against it or for its opposite. 
But when the act is not possible for us, for instance because it is the 
act of someone else, his actual maqdûr, the motives can urge us to will 
that act, but that act in fact will not occur.312 
Murâd : willed. From what we said above about the motives (ad-
dawâ'i), it is clear that the thing willed is the same as the motive.313 
So one can will something one knows, is convinced about, or assumes. 
When we discuss, however, the meaning of the term murâd, and 
maintain that it is something with which the will has a connection, 
the murâd must be a thing. That is to say that it is either existent, or 
non-existent, or coming into existence. Since the will is connected with 
the coming into existence of something,314 and we know that it can 
precede or be contemporary with the coming into existence of the thing 
willed,315 we conclude that the willed thing (al-murâd) must be either 
non-existent or coming into existence. If it is non-existent—and here 
we have to pay attention to the definition of the non-existent things—316 
it must be known, and it must be possible that it comes into existence. 
Against this background we have to understand 'Abd al-Jabbâr's 
statement : "Know that what can be willed is every thing the possibility 
of the coming into existence of which is known ; thereby we mean that 
coming into existence is not impossible for it."317 We can will some-
thing to come into existence, and we can will that it comes into existence 
in a special way so that by the intention speech becomes command 
or information, or an act becomes good or evil. 
From the condition we mentioned one can deduce that it is possible 
to will an act we cannot produce ourselves, if it can be produced by 
someone else ; on the contrary we cannot will an act that cannot occur 
3 , 1
 Cf Mugni VI/2, 24-25. 
312
 Cf Mugni ІЦ, 187; Mugm\l¡2, 88 
3 1 3
 Cf Mugni VI/2, 68 
3 1 4
 This is discussed in Mugni VI/2, 68-77 
3 1 5
 Cf Mugni VI/2, 89-90 
3 , 6
 Seepp 107-109 
3 1 7
 Cf Mugni VI/2, 78. 
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and come into existence because such an act is not possible, and even 
is not "some thing" at all. 
To clarify the meaning which the term irâda has for 'Abd al-Jabbâr, 
I mention briefly seven other terms, each of which is used as a name 
for the will although most of them are only used in a special context 
and indicate a special aspect of the will.318 
Mahabba : love. The term mahabba is an equivalent for irâda. This can 
easily be proved : everybody knows that one cannot will without at 
the same time being loving, and one cannot love without being 
willing.319 When 'Abd al-Jabbâr's opponent remarks that we say that 
we love somebody, while it is, nevertheless, impossible that we will 
him— because we cannot will what exists and is remaining—'Abd 
al-Jabbâr answers that this expression really means that we will the 
benefit for somebody and the repulsion of harm from him.320 
Rida : contentment. This term is only used to indicate the will when 
the thing willed (al-murâd) is existent. The fact that the term is only 
used in this case, does not mean that the two terms are not identical; 
for we know that we cannot be willing without being content or 
being content without being willing.321 
Iktiyâr: free choice. Though this term too is an equivalent of the 
term "will" (irâda), it is only used when one wants to emphasize that 
one prefers one act above another act.322 
Wîlâya : "pietas".323 This word is used when someone wills reward, 
glorification, and veneration for someone else. So we can say that God 
31
 " These terms are dcall with m Mugni VI 2, 51-59 
3 1 4
 Cf Uugm V] 2, 51 
3 2 0
 Cf Mugni VI 2, 53-54, the addition that it also means, besides the willing of 
someone's benefit, that one does not will his harm, is made by Abu Hâsim 
321
 When it is used with this meaning it is construed with the preposition bi followed 
by a name of an act The verb may, however, also be construed with the preposition 
'an followed by a name of a person, in that case it means to will the glorification and 
veneration of that person since that person merits a reward See Mugni VI 2, 54-56 
122
 The term is also used as the opposite of djä' (constraint) According to 'Abd 
al-Jabbâr, however, one can make a choice even when one is under constraint When 
someone is constraint by fear to flee, he nevertheless can choose the way to flee 
3 2 3
 It is very difficult to translate this word because it is used both for the relation 
God has with believers and for the relation man has with God and his fellow-believers 
Therefore, I chose the Latin term pietas, which has the double meaning 
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has "pietas" for believers (He wills reward for them), and they have 
"pietas" for Him (they will glorification and veneration for Him).324 
Qa$d : intention. It is the will of the act of a human being at the 
moment it comes into existence or at the moment its cause325 comes 
into existence. This is the way in which, as we already saw, the will 
can exert influence upon the act. By this intention, which is the con-
comitant will, acts become good or bad and speech becomes, for 
instance, a command or information about something.326 
'Azm : decision. It is used for the will of a human being when he wills 
an act of himself before he produces the act and before he produces 
the cause of this act.327 
îtâr : preference. This word is used when we will something we choose 
above something else.328 
After these seven words indicating a way in which the will may occur, 
I mention two other terms which might be confused with the will and 
with the words mentioned above, but which in fact are something 
else.329 
Sahwa: desire. The desire is one of the acts of the hearts (afâl 
al-qulûb), but, unlike the will, it does not fall under the power of 
a human being. Consequently, the desire is produced in our heart by 
God.330 It is the desire of our nature for the perceived object, because 
this is of immediate benefit for ourselves.331 
Tamannî : wish. This term is used for a wish that cannot be fulfilled 
because it is connected either with something that did not happen 
m the past or with something that cannot possibly exist.332 
3 2 4
 When it is said about a believer who has pietas for another believer, it indicates 
that he wills benefits for him in the field of religion, as, for instance, some support 
for and defence of it Sec Mugni VI 2, 58 
3 2 5
 Read sahabih instead of musabbabih in Mugni VI 2, 58, line 8 The sense of 
the statement given there necessitates this emendation 
^*· See Mugni V\ 2. 10-11 
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~ This is not possible for God Mugni Г2, 58 
3 2 8
 This term is, consequenll>, synonymous with the term ikliiár mentioned above 
3 2 9
 This is discussed in Mugni Г2, 35-39 
3 3 0
 Cf Mugni VI 2, 36 
3 3 1
 This and more features of the desire arc mentioned in Mugni VI'2. 35-37, where 
'Abd al-Jabbâr discusses the differences between desire and will 
3 3 2
 'Abd al-Jabbâr stales that it is, or is expressed by, a sentence beginning with 
Imt, the introduction of a wish that cannot possibly be fulfilled Mugni VI,2, 37 
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Some disagreement arose about the question whether such a wish 
is only a word or some words spoken, or a qualifier in the human 
heart.333 But also if it is more than words and in fact a qualifier in the 
heart, the difference between the will and the wish is evident because of 
the difference between their objects : the will has as object something 
that can exist, the wish something that cannot exist.334 
What remains now is to say some final words about the opposite of 
the terms discussed until now in this section—about non-willing and 
the concepts related to it. We can be very short here; the similarity 
between the two series of concepts is almost complete. Therefore, we 
summarize here only some basic facts without further argumentation 
since this argumentation already has been given above. 
Kârih : non-willing. We know by self-experience when we are non-
willing, that it is other than willing, and also that it is other than 
the denial of willing. It is a positive quality. 
Our being non-willing must be caused by a state we are in since we 
know our being non-willing before we know some non-will. 
Karâha : non-will. We know that we are non-willing, but we also 
know that we are not always and not necessarily so. Therefore we must 
be non-willing because of a qualifier which we call non-will (karâha). 
This qualifier is an accident existing in our heart, one of the acts of 
the hearts we are able to produce. Just as the will, so the non-will is 
based upon the motives which invite us to a non-will. The object of our 
non-will, the "makmh", non-willed object, can be described in the 
same way as the murâd was : it must be known and its occurring must 
be possible. 
Sakat : detestation. Just as love is the same as will, detestation is the 
same as non-will. It is not possible that we are non-willing without 
being detesting, nor is it possible that we are detesting without 
being non-willing.335 
1 3 3
 Abu 'Alî has held both positions as appears from his works; according to 
Abu Hâsim, the wish is a qualifier in the heart corresponding with a sentence beginning 
with lay/. Mugni VI;'2, 37 
3 3 4
 If the wish consists only in words, the difference with the will is evident; if it 
is a qualifier, the wish also can exert no influence upon the wished thing (the will can 
have such an influence as we already saw) and does not suppose that an act happens 
in a certain way (as the will does). 
·
, 3 ,
 Cf. Mugni VÌI2, 60. 
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Nafra: aversion. This accident corresponds with the desire (sahwa); 
it is an act of the heart which does not fall under our power, and 
therefore must be created by God. It is the aversion of our nature 
when we perceive an object because something harming is expected 
to come from it. 
D. THEODICY 
This paragraph deals with that part of 'Abd al-Jabbâr's system 
which one could call in a narrower sense of the word his rational 
theology—although this term can surely be used in a broader sense 
to indicate the whole of his thinking on God and His creation as 
found in his theological works, based as his doctrine is upon his con-
viction that God occupies the central place in this world which comes 
from Him and shows a fundamental relationship with Him, that He 
continuously takes care of this world, and that human life in this 
world is characterized by God's taklîf, the duties God imposed upon 
the able living beings He created. This paragraph will, however, be 
devoted to God Himself and try to answer the question how we can 
know Him and what we can say about Him; all this on the sole basis 
of human intuition ('aq[) and reflection («azar), to the exclusion of 
everything divine revelation could tell us about this matter. 
I see 'Abd al-Jabbâr's theodicy as based upon three general principles, 
which exert their influence throughout his theological thinking. The 
first principle is the principle of God's transcendence : God is infinitely 
far above this world, especially above all its imperfections; He is not 
worldly and His creating in this world comes from outside this world. 
The second principle is 'Abd al-Jabbâr's full confidence in human 
intuition and in the refiection on the data of this intuition, guaranteed 
as these ultimately are by God Himself. The third principle, related 
to the second one, is his relying on this perceptible worldly reality as 
a true and reliable source of real knowledge. Upon these three 
principles 'Abd al-Jabbâr's theodicy is built. 
These principles have as a first consequence that God, because of 
His transcendence, is not necessarily known and certainly not percep-
tible;1 but, nevertheless, God can be known by acquired knowledge 
when we follow in our refiection the perceptible indications God laid 
down in this world and which point towards Him. All our knowledge 
about God is ultimately based upon these indications we find and upon 
our reflection on these indications ; there is no direct knowledge of God. 
1
 What is perceptible is either substance or accident; God can be neither a substance 
nor an accident, both implying some form of imperfection That we have also no other 
kind of necessary knowledge of God is evident from our experience. 
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Our knowledge of God is, therefore, marked by our knowledge of this 
world It is man's first duty to reflect upon these indications and to 
come in this way to a real knowledge of God This duty is the basis of 
every taklîf, every duty God imposed upon responsible persons 2 
It is also this human intuition and human reflection which can show 
us—and which have to show us—that God's revelation, the message 
He entrusts to His prophets to transmit to their peoples, must be 
trustworthy But only after one has proved this revelation to the reliable 
and a real source of knowledge, can one use the data of this revelation 
as arguments. This implies that revelation only gives confirmation 
of what we already knew and some additions to that knowledge, the 
basic knowledge about God and His qualities has to be grounded, 
however, on acquired knowledge and reflection on the data of human 
intuition 3 
In our discussion of 'Abd al-Jabbâr's theodicy we follow in main 
outlines his discussions of the object. After having discussed the way 
we can know something about the other (God's) world and the way 
we can speak about it, we deal with the arguments that are used to 
prove that there is a god. Then we treat God's permanent and essential 
states; the question of His "qualities" is discussed in a separate section. 
Then we mention some qualifications which have to be denied about 
God, we deal with His acts, and, finally, we make some remarks on the 
use of arguments derived from divine revelation in the theodicy 4 
Thus, this paragraph is divided into seven sections according to the 
subjects mentioned above 
1. OUR KNOWLESOGE OF ТИС OTHFR WORLD 
Before dealing with the possibility of knowing something about 
other worlds than the world we live in, we have to say something about 
2
 See ρ 61 
3
 See pp 95-100 about the function of revelation in the whole of human knowledge 
and also about the contents of revelation 
4
 The three theological works of 'Abd al-Jabbâr which are still at our disposition are 
structured in the same way The chapters on God's qualities based on His permanent 
and essential states can be found in the $arh and m the first part of the Muhit, while their 
structure in the Xlugni can be deduced from 'Abd al-Jabbâr's discussion of the divine 
names in Mugn! V, 204-258, the corresponding chapters about the qualities being lost 
The chapters about God's acts and the qualities related to those acts are preserved 
in the Sarh and partially also in the Mugni and the first part of the Muhit The qualifi-
cations which have to be denied can be found discussed in all three works The 
discussion of the way we can prove there is a God is missing in the Mugni and must 
have been treated at the beginning of that work 
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the meaning of the term used to indicate the other world, "al-gaib", 
and about its opposite, "as-sâhicT. 
As-sâhid : the present world, this world. The word as-sâhid can be 
translated literally as "the present" or "what is present"; when 'Abd 
al-Jabbâr uses this term in his argumentations, he does not use it to 
indicate what is visible or perceptible. He admits that one can use it 
for what is known, al-ma'lûm;5 but in a theological context it is better 
to use it for "what is among us".6 From this description, which we meet 
several times in his works, and from his discussions of it, we can deduce 
that what he understands by it is the whole of this world with all its 
substances and accidents, perceptible or not, actually known or not.7 
Al-gâ'ib or al-gayb : the absent world, the other world. These terms are 
the contrary of the term as-sâhid, mentioned above, and literally mean 
"the absent" or "what is absent". Although al-gaib is imperceptible, 
we cannot say that both of these terms are equivalent because the 
imperceptible accidents (as knowledge, will, life) do belong to this 
world (as-sâhid). And though the term may be used to indicate the 
unknown,8 al-gâ'ib actually can be known9 without ceasing to be 
gá'ib. Therefore, we have to take it, as the term as-sâhid, in an almost 
spatial sense : it is "what is not among us", the world that is not 
5
 Cf Muhlt I, 165. 
6
 fï-mâ baynanâ as 'Umar 'Azmî reads in the Egyptian edition of the Muhii (I, 167). 
Houben (Lebanese edition, I, 165) did not understand this correctly, he also wrongly 
read на-l-ûlâ ("and the first'") instead of wa-1-анІа ("and the best"). As a consequence, 
he also wrongly begins a new paragraph here This paragraph actually should begin in 
the fourth line from the bottom with the words fa-l-awwal ("and the first"). The 
expression fl-mâ baynanâ is a usual equivalent for as-sâhut in 'Abd al-Jabbâr's works. 
7
 Cf Muhit I, 165-167. Frank (Kalâm, 297) renders the term as-sâhid by "the 
phenomenal"; if he means by this term "the perceptible", this translation does not 
correspond with the way in which 'Abd al-Jabbâr uses the term because the imperceptible 
accidents nevertheless belong to as-sâhid. Van Ess (Logical Structure, 34) renders the 
term by "the 'present' or apperceptible world" ; here the same remark has to be made · 
if the author means the perceptible things, his translation does not correspond with the 
way in which 'Abd al-Jabbâr uses the term 
8
 Cf. Muhit I, 165. 
* Consequently, Frank's description of this term in the doctrine of Abu 1-Hudayl 
(Abu l-Hudhayl, 7) does not correspond with 'Abd al-Jabbâr's use of this term. Frank 
notices. "Taking al-gayb as the non-present, the non-phenomenal : that aspect of the 
Creator which remains completely transcendent and which He does not make manifest 
to man". According to 'Abd al-Jabbâr God's acts (His creation. His speech) belong 
to as-sâhid, how God is in Himself we can come to know by reflecting on the 
indications God placed in this world and by divine revelation. 
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here.10 From 'Abd al-Jabbâr's discussions, it becomes clear that he 
uses this term actually when speaking about God.11 Al-gaib in fact 
is God as He is in Himself to the exclusion of His acts in this (present) 
world. 
Consequently, possibly the best translation we can give of the two 
terms as-sâhid and al-gâ'ib, besides the literal translation "the present" 
and "the absent", is : this world and the other world. In this translation 
we evidently do not use the term "world" for a totality of material 
bodies and accidents, but for a totality which is closed in itself though 
a relationship with the other world is not excluded.12 
'Ilm al-gayb : knowledge of the other world. It is not possible to know 
the other world, or God, by necessary knowledge.13 We already saw 
that necessary knowledge is a knowledge which occurs in us not 
from ourselves, and which we cannot in any way banish from our 
soul.14 To the necessary knowledge belongs the knowledge which 
constitutes the completeness of the intuition {kamâl al-'aql); this is 
the knowledge every person who is compos mentis necessarily has. 
It is evident that the knowledge of the other world does not belong to 
the completeness of the intuition, for not every person who is compos 
mentis has this knowledge.15 Nor can the other world be known by 
a knowledge which is based on perception, because, as we will show 
later, it cannot be perceived. Other forms of necessary knowledge 
remain; can the other world be known by one of these forms? It is 
very difficult to prove by positive arguments the impossibility of a 
necessary knowledge. Even the argument that it is evident that this 
10
 For the translation of al-gá'ib by "the non-phenomenal" (Frank, Kaiâm, 297) or 
by "the 'hidden', inapperceplible things" (Van Ess, Logical Structure, 34), see what 
we said in note 7 
11
 See, e g , Muhitl, 165-166 
12
 This term is not a translation of an Arabic equivalent, I added it myself for clarity's 
sake. 
13
 Sarh 48-55 
14
 Cf page 54 See also Sarh 48-49. 
15
 This is discussed in Sarh 55 One cannot use this argument to prove that the 
knowledge of the other world cannot be necessary, for not every necessary knowledge 
belongs to the completeness of the intuition, but only the bidâyat al-'uqùl as 'Abd 
al-Jabbâr calls it here On ρ 54 he gives a similar argument saying that this knowledge 
cannot be a necessary knowledge because there is some difference of opinion between 
persons who all are compos mentis Here it is not the difference between knowing and 
not-knowing but between having one opinion and having another opinion 'Abd 
al-Jabbâr seems to accept this argument though the same objection as given above 
is possible here 
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knowledge can be banished from the soul, as appears from the life 
of believers who became apostates and banished the knowledge of 
God from their souls, cannot safely be used as 'Abd al-Jabbâr shows.16 
Therefore, 'Abd al-Jabbâr takes his refuge to another argumentation; 
he tries to show that the knowledge of God is always acquired 
knowledge and, therefore, cannot be necessary. ' 7 
He mentions two arguments to prove this, both leading to the 
conclusion that our knowledge of the other world is our act and 
cannot possibly be necessary, since the definition of necessary knowl-
edge says that it is a knowledge which occurs in us not from ourselves 
so that it cannot be our act. 
His first argument is that this knowledge is generated (mutawallid) 
from a cause which is our act; consequently, the generated result also 
is our act. Our knowledge of the other world is generated from our 
reflection, because it occurs at (simultaneous with) that reflection, 
according to that reflection, and always in the same way; when these 
three conditions are fulfilled, the connection described is that between 
the secondary cause (sabab) and its effect.18 We know the reflection 
to be our act; therefore, the knowledge of the other world also is. 
The second argument directly shows that this knowledge is our act. 
We already saw that something is our act when it occurs according to 
our states, intentions, motives, or will.19 Since we know that this 
knowledge occurs according to our intentions and motives, and dis-
appears according to our non-will and the motives that hold us back 
from il, we deduce that this knowledge is our act.20 
'Abd al-Jabbâr mentions also one argumentum ad hominem : if 
this knowledge would be necessary and, consequently, given by God, 
16
 Cf Sarh 55. 'Abd al-Jabbâr"s opponent objec4s that some necessary knowledge 
cannot be banished because the knowledge which God creates in the human heart is 
greater than the opposite of it which man can produce himself If, however, man can 
produce more of its opposite than God actually creates of this necessary knowledge, 
man can banish it by producing its opposite Sec also what we said on ρ 125 about the 
manner in which accidents can be brought back into non-existence 
1 7
 Cf Sarh 52-53 
'" These three conditions are described on ρ 207 'Abd al-Jabbàr's present argument 
can be found in Sarh 52-53, he mentions here that the knowledge occurs according to our 
reflection, in one way, and in a continuous manner ('aid . »atira mustamirra) I think 
that this last condition corresponds to the condition that it must occur at ('ma) the 
secondary cause there cannot be a gap, a lapse of time between both 
19
 Cf what we said on pp 209-210 about the way in which we can know that something 
is the act of an acting subject Here, in Saih 53, we find the terms "intentions" (qusûd) 
and "motives" (da»d'i) 
2Ü
 Cf Sarh 53 
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any person who lacks this knowledge must be excused, because that 
must be in accordance with God's choice. It would not be possible 
that the unbelievers lack this knowledge by their own fault, because 
they renounce it, though it is given by God; renouncing is only possible 
for small amounts of given knowledge and not for a knowledge such 
as that of the other world and God.21 The opponent therefore has to 
admit that all unbelievers are excused; but nobody can admit that. 
He therefore is forced to admit, that his premise was wrong.22 
So, if knowledge of other worlds and of a god is possible, it surely 
is not necessary knowledge but acquired. This implies that we have 
to generate that knowledge by reflection (nazar) and inference (istidlâl) : 
we have to follow indications in this world, indications which point to 
that other world; we have to use inferences from this present world 
towards the other, absent, world : istidlâl bi-s-sâhid 'alâ l-gaib.23 How 
can this be done? How can we infer from indications in this world 
conclusions about the other world? First, this is only possible on the 
condition that these indications are present, for an indication is some-
thing that in itself already points to something else.24 
In his Muhit 'Abd al-Jabbâr distinguishes between four ways in 
which we can know something about the other world—four ways of 
inference.25 All of them can be described as a form of "analogy" (qiyâs) 
if we take this term in a broader sense; if we take it in the strict sense 
of the word, only the second one of these four forms of inference can 
be called analogy because only that form is based upon the having in 
common of a 'ilia (cause); and this is said to be the distinctive feature 
of the real analogy. But all four forms draw a conclusion about 
something in the other world, in a way similar to that in which the 
conclusion is drawn in this world, and, consequently, can be called 
a form of analogy. 
The first form is said to be founded on the having in common of 
21
 Literally 'Abd al-Jabbâr says "Renouncing (al-¡iihuil) only is permitled (possible) 
of a slight number ('α/α l-'atlail al-yastr), of a great number and a large quantity not" 
Sarh 54 
2 2
 Sarh 54 Admitting that all unbelievers are excused, in fact is itself unbelief (ku/r) 
Though this argument seems to be based on revealed premises, it certainly is not 
According to 'Abd al-Jabbâr, the reflection to generale a knowledge of God is a duty 
for every responsible person, a duty we can know on the basis of our intuition without 
the data of revelation 
21
 Cf Muhit I, 165 
2 4
 Cf pp 65-68 about the dcilil or indication 
2
' Cf Uuhii I, 165-166 
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an indication; we know that in this world a certain indication points 
to something indicated, indicates that something has a given judgement 
(hukm). If we know the same indication in the other world, we 
conclude to the same thing indicated, to the same judgement. Therefore, 
this form is also called : the having in common of the way in which 
the judgement is known.26 This is the way in which we can know 
God's essential qualities; we know, for instance, that someone in this 
world for whom acting is possible must be able. When we know that 
for God acting is possible, He must be able too.27 In both cases the 
indication (the possibility of the act) is known; in this world the 
indication points to a thing indicated (being able); consequently, it 
must do the same in the other world. 
The second form is the real analogy, and therefore it is said to 
be founded on a having in common of a cause ('ilia). When we know 
that something in this world has a certain judgement (hukm), we can 
deduce that this must be caused by a certain cause ('ilia). When we 
know the same cause to exist in the other world, we can conclude to 
the same judgement.28 This form 'Abd al-Jabbâr uses especially in 
discussing God's justice, His acts, and His qualities that are connected 
with His acts. A man does no evil act when he knows it to be evil and 
he does not need that act; when we know that this cause ('ilia) is present 
in God (He knows such an act to be evil and He does not need it), we 
conclude that God does no evil.29 
The third form is very much like the second, only there is no question 
of a cause. We know something in this world to have a certain quality, 
and we deduce that because of that quality it is entitled to a certain 
judgement. When we know the same judgement in the other world, 
we can conclude there to the same quality. For instance, we know 
that we are willing, and we conclude that we can consequently do acts 
which occur in a special way (as command, information, good, or 
26
 Cf Muhit I, 165 ' "al-ist¡rák ft lariq ma'nfal al-hukm". 
27
 Cf Muhit I. 165. this example is given there. 'Abd al-Jabbâr observes that this 
form is used in most questions concerning the principle of God's unity (al-lanhkl). 
28
 This form of argumentation can Ь^ called linear rather than parallel From 
a hukm in this world is concluded to a 'ilia, which is compared with a 'ilia in the other 
world, from which we conclude to a hukm in the other world Cf. Muhit I. 165-166 
2 9
 This example is mentioned in Muhit I, 166, where 'Abd al-Jabbâr mentions two 
other examples too He summarizes "We necessarily know the judgement in this world 
and we need an indication to the causes (maybe we have to read 'ilal instead of the 
'alii of the Lebanese and the ta'lil of the hgyplian edition, ρ 168). then we compare 
the other world with it because they have the cause in common" The interpunction 
and the dividing of the text into paragraphs in the Egyptian edition is misleading 
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bad 3 0 ) ; when we know that God does such acts, we deduce that He 
is willing. Because of the similarity between this form of inference and 
the second form, this one is said to be based on "what is analogous 
to the cause".31 
The fourth and last form is described by 'Abd al-Jabbâr as follows : 
"In this world the judgement is connected with something; then there 
exists32 in the other world something that is intenser (ablag) than this 
thing". The example 'Abd al-Jabbâr gives of this fourth form is that, 
when something is good when we assume something, it also will be 
good when we know that, because knowledge is stronger (aqwâ) than 
assumption.33 We can call this a conclusion from the weaker to the 
stronger. 
If these are the ways in which we draw conclusions about the other 
world, it is evident that everything we can say about it, will be based 
upon this world, our knowledge of this world, and the way things are 
in this world. We must know, for instance, what a word or a name 
means in this world before we can apply it in the other world; we 
have to know what a quality means in this world before discussing 
God's qualities. Hence, we can say that in 'Abd al-Jabbâr's theology 
this world has the logical priority, though God has the ontological 
priority. And therefore we discussed 'Abd al-Jabbâr's logic, cosmo-
logy, and anthropology before dealing with his theodicy. 
2. GOD 
Allah : God. The proofs 'Abd al-Jabbar gives for the existence of 
God are based on the fact that our world in its totality is temporal and 
brought into existence (muhdat). There are things in this world that 
can be brought into existence by acting subjects in this world; but there 
are others which do not fall under the ability of an able subject in this 
world. Therefore, when they are temporal and existent, they must 
have been brought into existence by someone else from outside this 
world. And this someone is God.34 
'
,0
 See ρ 214 В) a concomitant will speech becomes a command or an information 
about something, by will it is directed to someone, by will some acts become good 
or evil This іь meant when 'Abd al-Jabbâr says that an act occurs "in a special way" 
31
 Muhit I, 165 "na-immâ an yakün fi-má va/rí ma/rá Ι-ΊΙΙά" 
3 2
 Cf Muhil I, 165 Read vújad (there exists) instead of nû/td (wc make exist). 
33
 Cf Muhl· I, 166 
3 4
 The arguments used to prove the existence of God can be found in the beginning 
of the Muhil and the Sarh Muhil I, 28-93 and Sarh 87-120 Since the first parts of the 
Mugnidxe still missing, we have to be satisfied with the texts of the two other theological 
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'Abd al-Jabbâr's main argument,35 the argument he elaborates in 
detail, serves to prove that the bodies in our world are temporal 
and must have been brought into existence by God because able 
subjects in this world are not able to produce substances and bodies. 
This argument was first used by Abu 1-Hudayl, and he was followed 
herein by the great majority of Mu'tazilî scholars.36 
This argument starts by establishing the modes of being, the so-
called akwân, as accidents inhering in the body. We already discussed 
this and proved the existence of these four modes of being, movement 
and immobility, combination and separation.37 
We also saw that a body cannot exist without a mode of being 
because these modes of being are the realization of the body's being 
spatial. And since we know that a body by definition (it is "what is 
characterized by length, breadth, and depth") is spatial, it cannot 
be without a mode of being.38 
Since the modes of being cannot be eternal -it is possible that they 
are non-existent,39 whereas what is eternal is essentially eternal40 and 
works 'Abd al-Jabbâr's arguments are summan/ed by 'Abd al-Karîm 'Utmän in 
Nazarívui at-іакіЦ. 158-163 Bddawi, Hiuoire, 208-215 follows (he text of the Sarh 
1 4
 'Abd al-Jabbâr also mentions another argument, in which he argues that there 
are accidents that do not fall under the ability of an able subject in this world These 
accidents need someone from outside this world who actually brought them into 
existence, this person is God As we already noticed (cf ρ 112), 'Abd al-Jabbâr realized 
—as appears from the text of the Muhlt — that this argument seems to be very simple 
and convincing, but in fact was fiercely attacked by his opponents, and that, moreover, 
their arguments were not easy to refute, founded as they were on an entirely different 
point of view concerning the accidents 
" Sarh 95. See also our pp 112-113. 
37
 Seep 112, also pp. 128-130 
38
 See also the other arguments in Sarh 111-113, these arguments are translated in 
Badawi. Histoire. 210-211 
34
 When something that was moving becomes immobile, the "movement" cannot 
remain in that substrate, for in that case the substrate would be at the same time moving 
and immobile, which is not possible Therefore, the movement must disappear from the 
substrate This cannot happen by way of transportation (intiqäl) because an accident 
(as movement is) cannot be transported from one substrate to another Therefore, it 
can only disappear from that substrate by falling back into non-existence; there is no 
other possibility left 
In Wuhit I, 50 'Abd al-Jabbâr gives another argument for the being temporal of the 
modes of being, where he docs not need this detour via the possibility of non-existence, 
and the proof that what is eternal cannot be non-existent He states there that these 
accidents "become" on their substrates (read in Muhit I, 50, line 15 . bi-tariqal tajaddudihâ; 
every time the printed text reads in this context the verb tahaddad, one has to read 
ta/addad); this cannot happen by way of transportation from another substrate; there-
fore, it must happen by their coming into existence. Consequently, they are temporal. 
'Abd al-Jabbâr, nevertheless, prefers the other argumentation; Muhit I, 50-51. 
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cannot be non-existent—they must be temporal (nmhdai) because this 
is a yes-no-division where no third possibility can be found.41 
By way of conclusion : since bodies cannot be without a mode of 
being, and since the modes of being must be temporal, bodies also 
must be temporal.42 
A second step in this argumentation is to prove that what is temporal 
needs someone who brought it into existence, who produced it : that 
the muhdat needs a muhdil. 'Abd al-Jabbar proves this by means of 
a real analogical reasoning as wc already discussed.43 This argument 
is, in a simplified form, recorded in the Sarh :44 "... our free acts in 
this world need us and have a connection with us; they only need us 
because of their coming into existence (li-hudûtihâ); everything that 
shares with them (sc. our free acts) the coming into existence,45 must 
share with them the need for a producer and doer; the bodies share 
with them the coming into existence and therefore they must need 
a producer and doer."46 
The third step is constituted by the argument that able beings in this 
world are not able to produce bodies.47 We already discussed 'Abd 
i o
 CT. Muh'íl I, 54-55. 'Abd al-Jabbâr gives two arguments to show that what is 
eternal must be essentially eternal and not by a cause ('ilici); if it were eternal by a cause, 
cause and caused would both be eternal and one could not know which of them would 
be the cause and which the effect; if something were eternal because of an eternal 
cause, that cause would again be eternal by an eternal cause and that would lead 
to an endless series, which, according to 'Abd al-Jabbâr, is not possible. Cf. also 
Sarh 108. 
Something cannot be eternal because someone else made it such, for in that case 
the acting subject would precede the eternal thing and that is not possible. Therefore, 
what is eternal must be essentially and per se eternal. 
11
 About this kind of division, see p. 73. 
42
 Since the body does not precede the temporal modes of being, it must be similar 
to them in its kind of existence and also be temporal (Muhit I, 58; Sarh 113-114 adds: 
"like twins"). Another argument says : if the bodies were eternal, they would precede the 
modes of being, for what is eternal precedes what is temporal by. if there were moments 
of time, an endless amount of moments. Otherwise one could point to a moment that 
would be the first of its existence. Muhit 1. 57-58. 
4 3
 Sec page 114, where we showed that this world because of its being temporal 
must also have someone who produced it, brought it into existence. Our text was mainly 
based on the argumentation of the Muhit (see I, 68-79) as being the most elaborate. 
л л
 The text of the Sarti concerning this argumentation (pp. 118-119) is rather short 
and simple in comparison with the elaborate and complicated argumentation one finds 
in the Muhit. The Muhit gives more nuances in the argumentation and anticipates the 
attacks of 'Abd al-Jabbâr's opponents. 
4 5
 Probably, we have to read in Sarh 118, line 8_/î l-hudût instead of/; l-hadat. 
4 6
 Sarh 118. This argument is translated by Badawi (Histoire, 213); his translation 
(e.g., ". . . ils ont besoin de nous pour les engendrer ...") is nol exact. 
47
 The argumentation in the Sarh (p. 119) is again very brief and simple and 
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al-Jabbâr's argumentation that bodies cannot be essentially and per se 
able, but must be so because of a 'ilia which is called ability.48 We also 
saw that a subject who is able by an ability (qâclir bi-qudra) can only 
produce something either by bringing it directly into existence in the 
substrate in which the ability inheres (mubâsaratan), or by producing 
a cause in this substrate by which he generates another act in the 
substrate of the ability or outside that substrate in a substrate that 
touches the substrate of the ability.*9 In none of these three ways 
bodies can be produced, for that would imply that a body inheres in 
another body, and this is not possible.50 Bodies, consequently, can 
only be produced by iktira, direct production without the use of a 
substrate in which an ability inheres. But for able subjects in this 
world, who are able by an ability and who have to make use of the 
substrate ofthat ability in acting, producing by iktira is not possible.51 
Because bodies are not able to produce bodies, and because accidents 
too are not able to produce them—if accidents were able, they could 
not be essentially so, but should be so because of a qualifier inhering 
in them ; it is, however, excluded that accidents inhere in accidents—52 
and because all temporal things are either substance or accident, we 
must draw the conclusion that bodies cannot be produced by temporal 
subjects. Since 'Abd al-Jabbâr, nevertheless, has shown that bodies 
appeals directly to our experience If able beings in this world were able to produce 
bodies, we would be able to produce them now And this implies that we could produce 
for ourselves any sons or possessions we like Here also the text of the Muhil (I, 79-88) 
is much more detailed and elaborated 
48
 Cf pp 200-201 We discussed there the able living being, but in order to be 
able by an ability, the subject must be a body Therefore, 'Abd al-Jabbâr here can speak 
about able "bodies" (ajsâm) Cf also Muhil I, 80, an able body must be able by an 
ability because it cannot be essentially able (in that case every atom of the body would 
be able), nor able by a doer who makes it able (then it would remain able, and 
also in this case every atom of the body would be able) There is no fourth alternative 
19
 Cf pp 204-206 
50
 That is contrary to the definitions of the substrate and the accident, cf, for 
instance, pp 119-120 
51
 Cf Muhit I, 81 We know also by our own experience that there must be some 
form of contact when we produce something outside ourselves We cannot produce 
immobility in a body that is at a distance from us without there being any form of 
contact between us and that body. 
52
 Cf Muhit I, 88-89 The argument 'Abd al-Jabbâr mentions here to show that 
an accident cannot be essentially able, is based upon something he is going to prove 
later, viz, that there cannot be two gods One can object here that he uses thai 
argument to prove that there is a god, while his second argument starts from there 
being a god 'Abd al-Jabbâr also shows (Muhil I, 89-90) that an accident cannot be 
able "by a doer" (bi-l-Jail) 
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need someone who produced them, a producer (muhdit) and doer 
{fail), the conclusion becomes inevitable, and he states that the bodies 
must be produced by someone who is eternal.53 
We also discussed the fact that bodies can only be produced by 
iktirâ', a form of production that is outside the possibilities of subjects 
who are able by an ability. Therefore, they must have been produced 
by someone who is not able by an ability but is essentially so 
'Abd al-Jabbâr's conclusion is that the bodies have a producer and 
doer who is eternal and essentially able. And because there only can be 
one person who is eternal and essentially able—as 'Abd al-Jabbâr 
will prove in the course of his discussions about God's qualities—54 
all bodies are produced by one producer and doer, whom we call God, 
and who is eternal and essentially able. 
3. GOD'S PERMANENT STATES 
Starting from the way in which we discovered God as Him who 
produced the bodies in this world, 'Abd al-Jabbâr comes to the 
discussion of the qualities of this God. I follow here in his footsteps 
and begin with the qualities God is entitled to because of a permanent 
state He is in. 'Abd al-Jabbâr deals with these qualities in the order 
in which they can be deduced from the starting-point that He has 
brought the bodies into existence. 
Qâdir: able.55 What in this world indicates (is an indication, dalil) 
that someone is able, is the fact that acts are possible for him.56 
53
 Cf Muhii I, 88 
94
 СГ Muhii I, 90, he announces that he will discuss this question in his bob nafy 
al-itnayn We deal with that subject in the course of this paragraph 
5 5
 The question of God's being able is treated by 'Abd al-Jabbâr in Sarh 151-156, 
this passage is summarized and partially translated by Badawi, Histoire, 215-216 The 
Muhit deals with this subject in I, 103-112 'Abd al-Karîm 'Utmân (Nazariyat al-laklif, 
199-202) takes this text as his starting-point, as I shall do myself, 'Abd al-Jabbâr's way of 
thinking apparently having matured between his writing of the Sarh and that of the 
Muhii Cf Mugni V, 204-218, where 'Abd al-Jabbâr deals with the "name" qädir and 
with related names which can justly be applied to God Cf also our discussions of the 
quality "able", the first part of which concerns this quality in general, the able subject 
being either God or a being in this world 
56
 Cf pp 196-198, where we explained the various aspects of this description 
One of these aspects was the "possibility" (sihha) We stated there that this possibility 
is an ontologica! possibility and excludes besides the impossibility also the necessity 
Therefore, being able does not necessitate the act, it even ceases when the act is 
produced the subject is able before the act Badawi did not understand this when he 
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From the fact that acts are possible, we conclude to the subject's being 
in a state; and so 'Abd al-Jabbâr can say that the meaning of the 
quality "able" is that the subject is characterized by a state because 
of his being in which the producing of acts is possible for him.57 
We already observed that one of the ways in which we draw con-
clusions about the other world, is founded on the fact that an indication 
always indicates the same thing, be it in this world or in the other 
one.58 When in this world the possibility of acts indicates that the 
subject concerned is able, the same must hold true of the other world : 
when we know that acts were possible for God, because He produced 
them. He must have been able.59 
Because God produced the bodies. He was able before the creation 
of this world. If one assumes that He were so by a temporal qualifier, 
He must have produced this qualifier Himself; but He could not do so 
before being able. So the assumption leads to an impossibility. It is 
also not possible that He is able by an eternal qualifier, someone who 
is able by an ability must, as we already discussed before,60 use the 
substrate of his ability in acting; this would imply that God is a sub-
strate and a substance; and this is impossible. Moreover, we came to 
know God because the bodies cannot be produced by a subject who 
is able by an ability, and therefore must have been produced by a subject 
who is able, but not by an ability.61 When, consequently, God is not 
made the following remark (Histoire. 215-216) "Dieu est puissant de toute éternité, 
tar II mente cet attribut pour Lui-même, et 'ce qui fait partie de l'essence ne peut 
jamais s'en séparer' Mais il faut noter que cette affirmation est étrange 'de celui qui nie 
I éternité du monde sur la base de l'eternite du Créateur puissant' En effet, si cette 
puissance est un attribut éternel de Dieu, il doit exercer sa puissance de toute éternité, 
sinon ce serait une puissance sans objet1" 
'" Cf M ugni V, 204 
,B
 Cf pp 229-230 
, ч
 Cf Miiliii I. 103-104 The real indication is the possibility of acting, it is, however, 
not possible for us to know that arts are possible for God before we know that He did 
them The onl> thing we can correctly deduce from the fact that God, or someone 
else, did some act is that he was able the one moment before the production of the 
act or the production of the cause (uibab) if the act concerned is a generated act 
(muia\uillul) We discussed this on ρ 197 To pro\e that God now is able and always 
will remain able, the argument given above does not suffice, we must demonstrate that 
God is per se able Only m that case can we conclude that He cannot cease being 
able 
b0
 Cf ρ 203 
^ God cannot be able by a temporal qualifier, this is argued in Muhit I, 106 
The proofs that God cannot be able by an eternal qualifier, an eternal ability, are given 
in Xluhii I. 170-184 The two arguments I mentioned in the text can be found on 
pp 180-181 See also the \ery short argument in Sarh 201 Cf also what we already 
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able by a temporal, nor by an eternal qualifier, He must be able per se. 
And when He is per se able, he cannot cease to be so and, consequently, 
must also be able now and remain able in all eternity.62 
Earlier we discussed the consequences which the being able has for 
the subject that is able.63 But above the judgements (ahkâm) every 
able subject is entitled to, 'Abd al-Jabbâr mentions some judgements 
which are restricted to the subject who is per se able and which are not 
applicable to subjects which are able by an ability 6 4 The ability (qudra) 
as a qualifier being the principle of determination and limitation, one 
might suppose that someone who is able per se, without such a qualifier, 
is not limited in his being able and therefore can be called "almighty".65 
One must make here, however, one restriction : because of his being 
able per se, there are no limitations in him; but this does not alter the 
fact that the possible things, the maqdûrât,66 are limited. For only 
that thing is possible which can really exist. Hence, everything that 
seems to constitute a limitation of his being able, in fact is not; it is 
related to the impossibility of the existence of the things concerned. 
Being able per se, without an ability, has some consequences we 
briefly mention here.67 
First, who is able per se is able to produce acts by way of iklira, 
direct production without using the substrate of an ability either as 
the substrate in which one produces or as a secondary cause to produce 
staled in Ihc preceding section, viz , (hat bodies can be produced only by a subject 
who is essentially able 
" Cf M uhi ι I. 106 
^ See pp 195-200 Cf also Muhil I. Ю7 
'"
,
 CI \fiihii I, 107 "To the judgements of His being able per se (belongs) the 
possibility of the ikliiù'. that what is possible for Him is infinite in genus and number, 
the impossibility of hinder, and similar things" In the same context 'Abd al-Jabbâr also 
discusses the judgements peculiar to the subject who is able by an ability, and he 
states there that these have to be denied when we deal with God as being able There he 
mentions the being able by an ability, the limitation of what is possible for the subject 
in genus and in number, the impossibility ol iklnà'. the possibility of hinder against it, 
and the necessity to use the substrate of (he ability in acting CT also pp 201-204 
^ In his discussions 'Abd al-Jabbar uses no term that is comparable lo the English 
word "almighty" he only repeals every time that the things which are possible for Him 
are infinite and not restricted in genus and number When discussing the names we can 
give God he mentions among other names i/ailir. a lorm ol the same root as qailir. 
and he stales that this word is used only for God because it indicates an intensity 
outside the reach ol able beings in this world This word, consequently, comes close to 
the meaning of the I nglish word "almighty' See Wugiii V, 206 
'"'' Cf pp 204-206 Possible things are non-existent things which can come into 
existence because someone is able to produce them 
^ Cf UMl I. 107-112 
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an act in another substrate. This has as a consequence that this person 
can produce bodies. 
Second, he must be able to an endless amount of things, the limitation 
being given by the possibility of existing alone. He is able to acts 
similar to those falling under the ability of any person who is able by an 
ability, and even to more than that, because any person able by an 
ability is in himself limited in his being able. Who is able per se is able 
to everything falling under the ability, and to more than that. When 
we have to admit that he cannot produce in fact everything he is able 
to, nor even two opposite things he is, nevertheless, able to, this does 
not indicate that his being able is limited, but that these things cannot 
exist together.68 He is able to produce any genus of acts. That is 
evident for the acts a subject who is able by an ability is not able to; 
but also the acts we are also able to are possible for him; he even is 
more able than we to produce them.69 The acts to which he is able are 
not restricted in number because this restriction is also dependent upon 
the ability.70 This term "number" ('adad) must be seen against the 
background of 'Abd al-Jabbâr's form of atomism, in which these 
"numbers" can also indicate the strength of something or the number 
of moments it remains. 
Third, he cannot be hindered; he does not need a substrate that 
could be bound, and he is always able to more and stronger acts 
than a subject trying to hinder can produce. 
A person who is per se able is, however, not able to a possible thing 
(maqdûr) someone else is able to; he is able to similar things, but 
not to that thing itself. The reason is that this is impossible in the 
thing itself; it is something that cannot exist. A possible thing cannot 
be possible for two able subjects; for this would lead to impossible 
conclusions, supposing that both subjects are really going to produce 
68
 MuMt I, 108. 
69
 Acts that do not fall under the ability must be possible for someone who is able 
per se, without such an ability. In this way 'Abd al-Jdbbâr proved that there is a god 
God also produced modes of being (e.g., movement) and p<iin, he also produced pressure 
(as the weight and the pressure of the fire), composition (the composition of the 
animals, surely that of the first living being), sounds, and speech He also produced 
his own will and non-will (as we shall sec) and convictions in us. He is able to 
assumption (if it is a genus of Us own. it is the opposite of knowledge; who is able to 
something, is also able to Us opposite) and reflection (who is able to produce the 
effect, is able to produce the cause, when God is able to produce knowledge. He is able 
to produce reflection) Cf Muhit 1. 108-109 
^
0
 MuhU 1. 109 
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the possible thing concerned.71 So God is able to every genus of 
acts, He is able to everything able beings in this world are able to, 
not to these things themselves, however, but to similar things and 
to more than that. He cannot produce what cannot exist at all, and 
He cannot produce together what cannot exist together. 
'Abd al-Jabbâr concludes his treatise on God's unity (at-tawhid) and 
His essential qualities in the Mugni with a discussion of a great number 
of names which we can give to God, and which are in some form 
or other related to God's qualities which he discussed in the first 
parts of the Mugni.12 He starts there with the names he considers to 
be synonyms of the name qâdir (able) or to indicate some aspect of this 
quality.73 
The names he mentions as equivalents of the name qâdir are : "qawf 
(strong), "malik" (king), "mâlik" (possessor), "rabb" (lord), "sayyid' 
(master), "samad' (Lord),74 and five names all meaning great, namely : 
"kabîr", "'azîm", "/яЛТ", "mutakabbir", and "mutajabbir". 
Besides these words, there is one word that because of its intensity 
is only used for God, who is per se able, and not for any able being in 
this world; this word is, as we already saw above, the name "qadir", 
which can be translated as "almighty" 7 S 
Another series of names is used to point to the fact that the named 
subject is stronger than others and that others cannot hinder him. 
First, there is a name derived from the same root as qâdir and qadir; 
this name "muqtadir" could be rendered by a neologism "over-mighty"; 
the same general meaning is given to "qâhir" (overpowering), "mustaw-
IV' (overwhelming), and three names all meaning "exalted" : "'α/Γ', 
" α / Γ , and "muta'áir from the root of "being high".76 
Other names indicate that the subject, besides being able, is also 
considered to be without any blame; these are '"arfz" (mighty), 
"' Cf Mugn! V, 254-266 and Muhil I, 372-381 
72
 Cf Mugni V, 204-258 
73
 Cf Mugni V, 204-218 
74
 When the word ramai/ is not taken in the sense of "Lord", but in the sense of 
al-masmüd ilayh. He to whom one applies in need, the word has to be discussed in the 
treatise on God's acts Cf Mugni V, 210 
75
 Cf Mugni V, 206, see also note 65 
76
 Cf Mugni V, 214-215. one cannot apply these words to God when they are 
conceived as indicating the place of the subject in space, "high" One can only say 
this about substances 
240 SOME REMARKS ON 'ABD AL-JABBÂRS 'PHILOSOPHY-' 
"karim" (noble).^" "majicT (glorious); the word "jabbâr" (omnipotent) 
points, moreover, to the fact that the subject cannot be hindered in 
his acting. 
Two names remain -two names which deserve some special atten-
tion because they are the names which are used explicitly to indicate 
God; these names arc "//aA" (god) and "Allah" (God). According to 
'Abd al-Jabbâr, these two names too are applied to God because He is 
able, and they do not tell us anything more than that. 
Ilâh : god. This name, which really is a qualification and not a proper 
name, is applied to someone who is entitled to and worthy of wor-
ship.78 When we take into consideration that the heathens call their 
idols "gods", and that they only call them by that name because they 
are convinced that those idols are entitled to worship, we must come 
to the conclusion that this is the real meaning of the name "Hâh". 
The formula 'Abd al-Jabbâr has chosen (to be entitled to; in Arabic: 
haqq lah) does not imply that there is something because of which He 
actually deserves it; this would be the case, always according to 'Abd 
al-Jabbâr, if he would have used the verb "deserve" (in Arabic : 
islahaqq), because the use of that verb implies that there is something 
for which one deserves something (al-mustahaqq 'alayh).19 Therefore, 
it is not a condition for His being entitled to worship and for His 
being god that He has done something before, something by which 
He deserves worship. The verb 'Abd al-Jabbâr chooses only points 
to the fact that God essentially can bestow favours by which He deserves 
worship when He actually bestows them. He is able to bestow such 
favours because He is able to produce bodies, to make living, and to 
give those great favours by which one deserves worship.80 Therefore, 
because God is per se and eternally able, He can be called "ilâh" 
in all eternity. 
Allah : God. Though this name is usually mentioned as a proper name 
for Him who has produced the world, the name also indicates a quality. 
77
 The word karim can also be used for someone who gives benefits, who is generous; 
in that case it has to be dealt with in the chapter on God's acts Cf. Mugni V, 213. 
78
 Mugni V, 210 "annali tnimman tahuqq Iah al-'ibäda wa-laliq bili" 
79
 Consequently, one cannot say that God eternally deserves worship (using the 
verb i.stahaqq), but one can say that He is eternally entitled to it (using the verb haqq)\ 
Mugni V, 210 
80
 About the special favours which God gives us and by giving which he deserves 
that we worship Him, see, for instance, Éarh 83. The first favour God gives us is that 
He creates us, living, for our benefit. 
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In fact, it indicates the same quality as the name Halt : viz., that He 
is entitled to worship because He is per se able.81 
'Âlim : knowing.82 There is one indication in this world we have to 
look for when we want to know whether someone else83 is knowing; 
that indication is a precise act (//7 muhkam) produced by him. A 
precise act is an act that shows such an arrangement and such a 
regularity as cannot have been produced by someone who is not 
knowing.84 Therefore, one can describe the knowing subject, by 
pointing to the consequence of his being knowing, as him who is in 
a state by his being in which precise acts are possible for him.85 
When the precise act is in this world the indication to someone's 
being knowing, it must be so in the other world too. We know that 
God performed precise acts, which show arrangement and regularity : 
His speech clearly is arranged : what happens in the nature, the ripening 
of the seeds, the production of fruits, the desires of animals, everything 
has its regularity and happens every time in the same way. All these 
precise acts, produced by God, indicate that He is knowing.86 
But, just as the occurrence of an act only indicates that the acting 
subject was able the moment before the occurrence of the act or the 
moment before the occurrence of the secondary cause, the occurrence 
of the precise act only indicates that the subject was knowing the one 
moment before the occurrence of the act or before the occurrence 
of the secondary cause.87 We can deduce, however, that God must be 
"' СГ Mugm\, 212 
8 2
 See as regards the arguments for God's being knowing per sc all knowable things 
Muhti 1, 113-120. Saih 156-160. and M ugni V. 219-228 See also 'Abd al-Karîm 'Utmân, 
Nazamai at-laklij, 202-209, Badawi, Histoire, 216-217, and our discussion of the 
knowledge on pp 47-53 
*
3
 This is the onl> way in which we can know that someone else is knowing, that we 
are knowing, we know by direct self-experience (wi/clân an-nci/s), finding that we arc 
convinced of something and that our soul is tranquil at that conviction Cf ρ 47 
The concept of the tranquillity of the soul is restricted to subjects who are able by an 
ability We cannot use this concept when dealing with God as knowing Cf M ugni 
V, 221 'Abd al-Jabbâr uses the concept of the tranquillity of the soul when describing 
the qualifier knowledge ('ihn), not when describing the quality knowing ('ahm) 
•^ The definition 'Abd al-Jabbâr gives of the precise act is "ma la vata'atiä mm kul! 
qâdir 'ala dàlik an-nizám" (Muhil I. 113) Besides the word mzâm 'Abd al-Jabbâr also 
uses the word lanih 
^ Cf, for instance, Muhil I, 113 and Mugni V, 219 Slight variations occur in the 
wording, those are always concerned with terminology, not with the meaning of the 
description 
'"' Cf Muhil I, 114 See also Sarh 158 for other examples derived from the course 
of events in nature 
87
 Cf Uuhit 1, 117 
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always knowing; for, if He would not be always so. His becoming so 
must be by a temporal qualifier, by a condition which has to be ful-
filled, or by an acting subject. None of these is possible; therefore 
God must be eternally knowing.88 
And because God cannot be knowing by an eternal qualifier, an 
eternal knowledge. He must be per se knowing.84 
Because everything, existent or non-existent, principally is knowable 
(malum), and because it can be known by every knowing subject 
without any restriction to a special subject—as is the case with the 
connection between the able subject and the possible things to which 
he is able—and since we know that the fact that our knowledge is 
limited is caused by the fact that we are knowing by a qualifier 
knowledge, which at the same time limits our being knowing, we 
conclude that God must know everything that is knowable because 
there are no restrictions, neither in the knowing subject, nor in the 
known object. God knows everything, be it existent or non-existent, 
be it occurring now, in the future, or in the past.90 
As God is called by a number of names because of His being able, 
we can also apply to Him some names because He is knowing. Not 
every name, however, which indicates that someone in this world is 
knowing, can be applied to God since many of these names can only 
be used for the imperfect way knowing beings in this world are 
knowing, knowing as they are by a knowledge ('ilm) which restricts 
their being knowing. 
Since '"or//" and "dán'' are synonyms of 'âlim,91 God, being 
eternally and per se 'álim, also eternally and per se is 'ari/ and dárí. 
8B
 If God were knowing by a temporal qualifier. He would have produced this 
qualifier Himself, for able beings who are able by an ability can only produce knowledge 
in the substrate of their ability and, moreover, they must have first been produced 
by God, who therefore has to be knowing. It cannot be because of the being fulfilled 
of a condition either, because everything, existing or non-existing, is knowable. An 
acting subject cannot produce such a knowledge for God as we saw above Cf Muhil I, 
118 'Abd al-Jabbâr does not explicitly explain here why God cannot produce such 
a qualifier for Himself In any case, there would be no reason why God would do 
such a thing. 
89
 This subject is amply discussed in Muhii I, 170-184; see also Sarh 201-203. So, 
for instance, God could only have one knowledge (as the opponents say), consequently, 
He only can know one thing; this would also imply that this knowledge can have 
an opposite, and this leads to evidently false conclusions Cf. Muhii I, 182. 
9 0
 Cf Muhii 1, 119-120 
" Cf ρ 56 Also MugniV, 221-222 and XII, 16 
9 2
 Cf. pp. 180-181 When related to the quality "perceiving" (mudnk). the word 
basir is used for "having the metaphysical possibility to see" 
THEODICY 243 
Besides these synonyms, 'Abd al-Jabbâr mentions three names which 
can be used as synonyms oï'âlim, but which can also be used in relation 
to being perceiving; they are "basir" (having insight92), ""wajicT 
(Finding), and " ra ï " (seeing).93 When they are used as synonyms of 
'âlim, one can say that God is eternally and per se qualified in these 
ways. 
Also the name "hakim" (wise) can be used as a synonym of '"â//m"; 
however, it can also be used in the meaning of "doing precise and wise 
acts", and in that case it has to be discussed among the names given 
to God because of His acts.94 
Finally, 'Abd al-Jabbâr mentions a great number of names which 
can only be applied to God metaphorically, or even cannot be applied 
to Him at all because they imply some imperfection in the being 
knowing, which has to be denied about Him who is per se and 
eternally knowing. 
Hayy : living.95 Being living is a quality which indicates that the 
qualified thing is in a certain state (hâf) because of its being in which 
it can be able and knowing.96 Since in this way the state of being 
living is a necessary condition for both the being knowing and the 
being able, and because God is able and knowing, He also must be 
living; for when a given indication in this world indicates something 
else, the same indication indicates the same thing in the other 
world 97 
Because God is eternally and per se able and knowing. He must, 
consequently, be eternally and per se living. 
There are no names that can be given to God because of His being 
living except the name hayy (living) itself.98 
Mudrik: perceiving.99 Being perceiving is the fundamental openness 
9 3
 Cf Mugni V, 222-223 
, 4
 Cf Mugni V, 222 
9 5
 God's being living is discussed by 'Abd al-Jabbär in Muhil I, 121-128 and Sarh 
160-167, this is briefly summarized in Mugni V, 229-231 Sec also 'Abd al-Karim 
'Utmân, Nazariyat at-lakli/, 209-212 and Badawi, Histoire, 217 See also our pp 168-173 
96
 Cf ρ 169 
9 7
 Cf ρ 230 Badawi's renderings (Histoire, 217) "ce qui tombe sous les sens" and 
"ce qui ne tombe pas sous les sens" are not correct and exact renderings of m-sâhid 
and al-gayb Cf pp 226-227 
9 8
 Cf Mugni V, 229-231 
9 9
 God's being perceiving in Us various forms, and with the possibility that He is not 
so, is—with the different names one can give Him because of it- discussed by 'Abd 
al-Jabbâr in Muhit I, 129-132 and Sarh 167-175, this is summarized in Mugni V, 241-243 
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of the living being to the outer world,100 to the existent perceptible 
things. Because all reasons why a living being in this world does not 
perceive all perceptible things that are existent are related to the fact 
that he must use the substrate of his qualifier "life" in perceiving, so 
that thereby his being perceiving is limited, God, who is eternally 
and per se living, is free from such limitations and must perceive all 
existent perceptible things. No limitation being possible in God, in 
His being perceiving, the only restrictions of His being perceiving are 
to be found in the objects. When something is non-existent, it cannot 
be perceived; and also among the existent things there are accidents 
that cannot be perceived.101 Because of these restrictions we cannot 
state that God is eternally and per se perceiving; no, He is said to be 
perceiving "'alâ suri' (on a condition), namely, on the condition that 
at least one perceptible thing is existent.102 Consequently, before the 
creation of the world God was not perceiving (He Himself is not 
perceptible, as we shall see), but now He necessarily is. 
Baçîr: having the fundamental possibility to see.103 Because God 
necessarily perceives all existent visible things, all substances and 
colours, He must have, eternally and per se, the possibility to perceive 
them, and therefore He is eternally and per se basir. 
Mubçir or Râ'î : seeing. Because God necessarily perceives all existent 
visible things and seeing means perceiving the visible things—104 
He is seeing ""ala surf", on the condition that at least one visible thing 
is existent. Therefore, at this moment, after the creation of the world, 
God is necessarily seeing.105 
Sami' : having the metaphysical possibility to hear. Just as God neces-
sarily perceives all existent visible things, He necessarily perceives all 
existent audible things, all sounds. He, therefore, must have eternally 
Though 'Abd al-Jabbâr explicitly discusses this subject in his three theological works, 
Badawi does not mention it while 'Abd al-Karîm 'Utmân only makes some slight remarks 
in his treatise on God as living; see Nazarhat al-laklif, 211-212 
100
 Cf ρ 177 
1 0 1
 CT ρ 178 
1 0 2
 CT Muhil I, 130-131, also Μιιςηΐ V, 243 
1 0 1
 The word Ланг can also be used as a synonym Гог 'âlim, in that case one can 
render it by "having insight" СГ. p. 243 СГ also M ugni V. 222 and compare M ugni V, 
242. 
1 0 4
 The distinction between seeing and hearing (and the other forms оГ perception) 
must not be looked for in the perceiving subject, but in the perceived object. СГ ρ 178. 
' ^ CT. for instance. Sar h 174 and Mugnì V, 241 
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and per se the possibility to perceive them and is called eternally and 
per se samî.10b 
Sâmi' : hearing. Since God necessarily perceives all existent audible 
things, He is called "hearing" on the condition that at least one 
audible thing is existent. Consequently, He was not hearing before 
the creation, but He is now since He created the world.107 
Though God also perceives all things that are perceived by touching, 
smelling, and tasting. He cannot be called '"touching", "smelling", or 
"tasting" because these terms indicate that the perceived object is 
brought into contact with the substrate of the perceiving subject. This 
is not possible in God. For the same reason we cannot call Him 
"sensorily perceiving" {hâss) because He does not use senses in 
perceiving. We have to deny every term that implies some form of 
corporality, and we can accept as names for God only those terms 
which do not necessarily imply corporality.108 
Mawjûd : existent.109 Things in this world which are existent are not 
essentially so since they all are muhdat, temporal, and, consequently, 
had a beginning. Nor are they existent by a qualifier "existence"; but 
they are so "bi-l-fäil", by a doer. They are existent because some 
acting agent brought them from non-existence into existence. 
The perceptible things we perceive, we know to be existent; but, 
since God cannot be perceived, we cannot know in that way that He 
is existent We must acquire that knowledge through argumentation. 
One can say that every thing that is able and knowing must be existent 
We know that God is able and knowing; ergo. He must be existent.110 
, 0 6
 СГ ρ 191 See also Swh 174 
1 0 7
 Cf ρ 192 See also Sarh 174. WugmV. 241 
'
0
" This is discussed by 'Abd al-Jabbâr in Uugni V, 242-243 Thus, wc have to deny 
also thai God is nâzir (looking), since this implies the directing of the eye towards 
something 
104
 When 'Abd al-Jabbâr discusses God's being existent in the Muhil (Ι. Π3-Ι43) and 
the Milani (V 232-240) he lakes God's being elernal together with His being existent, 
His being eternal being the way He is existent, vi/ , without a beginning Thus also 
'Abd al-Karîm 'Utmân (\azari\at at-uikll/. 212-214) Il is only in the Scnh that 'Abd 
al-Jabbâr denotes lo these two qualities two different chapters (Sarh 175-181 and 181-182) 
Badawi (tlnloiu: 217-218 and 218-219) follows the text of the Sarh See what we said 
about the quality "existent" on pp 106-107 
"
0
 This argument is called by 'Abd al-Jabbâr "general" ('//m al-jumla) Cf Muhii I, 
133, for the common believer this kind of argumentation suffices The theologian and 
scholar have lo go deeper and look for a delailed knowledge See also „WA 177 and 
Badawi, Histoire, 217 
246 SOMb REMARKS ON 'ABD AL-JABBÂRS "PHILOSOPHY" 
But what is the basic reason why we know that something is existent? 
According to 'Abd al-Jabbâr the distinctive feature is its having a 
connection with something else. Therefore, when we perceive some-
thing, there is a connection (ta'alluq), and both the perceiving subject 
and the perceived object are known to be existent. And when we know 
that God has connections by His being perceiving, willing, knowing, 
or able, we know that He is existent. ' ' ' 
When we know through this argumentation that God is existent, 
we ask the question whether His being existent has had a beginning or 
not. What has a beginning once came into existence and is temporal; 
according to 'Abd al-Jabbâr, everything that is temporal and came 
into existence needed someone else to bring it into existence.112 And 
since we know that God is not brought into existence, because that 
would lead to an endless series of producers, we know that His being 
existent did not have a beginning.113 Since we know that God's being 
existent had no beginning, we conclude that He cannot be existent by 
a doer (bi-l-faif) or by a temporal qualifier. And because He also 
cannot be existent by an eternal qualifier —if God would be existent 
by an eternal qualifier, this qualifier would also be eternally existent 
by a qualifier, and so on in an endless series—He must be existent 
per se.114 This implies that His existence neither had a beginning nor 
will have an end. 
Qadim : eternal. In everyday language the word qadim is used to 
indicate that something is old, that it came into existence "before".115 
1 , 1
 Cf Muhil I, 133 and Π5 Cf also MugniV, 232 
1 1 2
 Cf Muhit I, 138-139 See also our pp 113-115, where we demonstrated that what 
came into existence and is temporal is also produced 
"
,
 Cf Muhit 1, 138-139 If someone denies this, he has to deny one of three accepted 
principles cither he has to admit that there can be a temporal thing that does not need 
a producing subject (and in this way one makes it impossible to establish the existence 
of God), or one has to accept an endless series of producers of producers of producers 
(and this implies that there is an endless amount ol existent things, that is not true, 
for this amount can be augmented), or one has to accept that the world cannot exist 
because its existence would be connected with the existence of something endless, the 
endless series of producers 
1 1 4
 Cf Muhil I, 139-140 The same reason why existent beings in this world cannot 
be existent by a qualifier (vi7 , that this would lead to an endless scries because the 
existent qualifier would be existent by another qualifier, etc ) makes it impossible loo 
that God is existent by a qualifier, be it temporal or eternal Nor can He be existent by 
a doer, a subject who brings into existence, as is the case with existent things in 
this world because that subject would precede Him, which is not possible Therefore, 
He must be so per se (li-nafsili) 
1 1 5
 In Arabic ma taqâdam »ιι/ύώώ (Sarh 181) The sixth form of this root is used 
to indicate that something happened very long ago 
THEODICY 247 
Its use as a terminus technicus in theological thinking is related to the 
use in everyday language : it is used for what came into existence before 
any other thing; in fact, for what had no beginning at all.116 Since 
God's being existent had no beginning, we can call Him eternal, and 
state that He is per se eternal; it is the way He exists.1 ' 7 
Besides the names mawjûd and qadim, 'Abd al-Jabbâr mentions some 
other names we can give to God because of His being existent. 
When we use the terms "käin" (being) and "tâbit" (standing firm), 
not in the technical way in which they are used when applied to 
substances,"8 but with the simple meaning of "existent", they can be 
applied to God.119 
'Abd al-Jabbâr mentions also four names, all indicating that God 
preceded everything that came into existence; these names are "sâbiq", 
"mutaqaddim", "aqdam", and "mutaqâdim".120 
The name "bâqr (remaining) can be applied to God because it 
says that the existence of the subject concerned is not renewed every 
time,121 while the name "daim"1 (lasting) indicates that the such 
qualified subject does not fall back into non-existence or will have 
no end 122 This name too can be applied to God. 
Finally, the names "qaim"123 (standing) and "qayyûm" (everlasting) 
are said to mean "daini" (lasting) so that they can be applied to God 




 Sec, e g , Sarh 181 та Ш аннаі li-wujûdih Yfugni IV, 250 adds na-lâ iblidâ' 
111
 Cf also Mugni IV, 250-251 What is eternal, must be per se eternal, this is already 
implied by the concept itself One can apply here the same argument 'Abd al-Jabbâr 
used to show that God must be per se existent If something is eternal, it cannot be so 
by a doer (bi-1-fá'tf) or by a temporal qualifier (they would have to precede the eternal 
thing concerned), nor by an eternal qualifier (which would be eternal by another 
qualifier, etc ) 
118
 Cf pp 109-110 for the meaning of the term kam when applied to substances, 
it is used for their being in a certain place If one might assume that its application to 
God is meant in this way, one belter adds another term to make its meaning clear 
(Mugni V, 232) 
»ι« cf Mugni V, 232 The real meaning of tab it is said to be "existent" Other 
uses are called metaphorical 
1 2 0
 Cf Mugn! V, 238 If we describe by these names things whose existence had 
a beginning but which preceded other things, we certainly can call by these names God 
who had no beginning and preceded all other things 
1 2 1
 Cf MugniV, 236 
1 2 2
 Cf Mugni V, 239 The difference between the two explanations is discussed there 
121
 The printed text (Mugni V, 239, line 13) reads qadim, the discussions in this and 
the next paragraphs of the text suggest that originally the text had qâ'im 
12,1
 Cf Mugni V, 239 In the meaning of "standing right" one cannot apply the name 
qaim to God One says that God is qaim bi-nafsih to indicate that He does not need 
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When trying to summarize what we have come to know about God's 
permanent states— though the states indicated by the qualities per-
ceiving, seeing, and hearing, are not fully permanent but "on con-
dition"—we hold that God is existent, and that He had no beginning 
and will have no end; this is expressed by the word "eternal". He is 
living without any restriction and, consequently, perceiving all that 
can be perceived, all existent perceptible things. He is knowing all 
knowable things, and able to every genus of acts and to an infinite 
number of acts from each genus, but not to the individual things 
to which other subjects are able. 
What is missing here in this list of God's permanent states is the 
quality "willing" and also the quality "non-willing". The reason is 
that 'Abd al-Jabbâr considers the will to be an act of the subject, 
as we saw above. Consequently, the will and the non-will arc dealt with 
in the section on God's acts. 
But first, we now discuss the question what exactly are these per-
manent states and these qualities which God is said to have per se. 
Are they purely names or is there a reality behind these names? 
4 . G O D ' S Q U A L I T É S 
Sifât Allah: God's qualities.125 Among the various distinctions that 
can be made between several categories of divine qualities, the one 
upon which the arrangement of 'Abd al-Jabbâr's theological works has 
been built is the traditional distinction between God's essential qualities 
a place or substrate (the expression qâm hi is used for the inhering of accidents in 
substances), not in the meaning that He inheres 
125
 Most information about 'Abd al-Jabbâr's position in the dispute concerning 
God's qualities can be found in Muhli I. 97-102 and 157-190, see also Sarh 182-213. 
F-or a discussion of 'Abd al-Jabbâr's point of view against the background of the 
preceding Islamic tradition, see 'Abd al-Karîm 'L'Iman. Nazarivat ai-laklif, 169-196 
See also what we already observed about the qualities in general, pp 150-154 
I mention one book and three articles which are among the most important studies 
Western Islamologists have devoted to this subject 
First, an older article that remains important Otto Prctzl, Die /ruhislamische 
Ailnbulenlehre, München 1940, in modern times we have three works, each dealing 
with a special scholar or school, but dealing with this subject against a wider background 
of the totality of Islamic tradition in this field Michel Allard, Le problème des attributs 
diims dans la doctrine d'AI-As'ari et de ses premiers grands disciples, Beyrouth 1965, 
Josef van Ess, ¡bn Kullâb und die Mihna, Orient 18-19 (1967), 92-142, Richard M Frank, 
The Dmne Attributes according to the Teaching of Abu l-Hudhayl al-'Allâf, Le Muséon 
82(1969), 451-506 
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(sifât ucl-dât) and His factual qualities (sifât al-fi'l).126 This distinction 
is based on the fact that some qualities "follow the existence of an 
act from Him" whereas others do not.127 
Especially this latter category, the qualities that do not follow the 
existence of an act—the so-called essential qualities—has caused many 
a fierce dispute among Muslim theologians, and when we hear of 
disputes on God's qualities, these essential qualities are particularly 
in question. The problems to be solved in these disputes were : which 
are God's essential qualities? what are these qualities? what is their 
relation with God? and what is their relation to each other? I shall 
discuss in this order the answers 'Abd al-Jabbâr gives to these questions. 
The first question : which are God's essential qualities? 
The only way we can come to know something about God and His 
qualities is, according to 'Abd al-Jabbâr, by starting from His acts, 
and by following the indications we find in those acts. There is no 
other way to know something about Him.128 When we know His 
acts, we also know directly His factual qualities : when we know He 
brought the world into existence, we know He is "bringing into 
existence" (muluiit). But here we are interested, not in His factual, but 
in His essential qualities, and to discover those we have to follow 
indications. An act coming from God in itself indicates directly that 
God is able; its occurring in a special way indicates that He is knowing 
and willing or non-willing; by argumentation from these data we come 
to the knowledge that He is living and existent; and, in the third line, 
by argumentation from these last data, we come to know that He is 
126
 For the distinction:, made by 'Abd al-Jabbâr between several categories of 
qualities, see 'Abd al-Karim 'Utmân, Nazariyal at-takl!f, 194-196; sec also MMl I, 
97-102. We discussed this already on pp 150-154 
The distinction between the two categories (essential and Tactual qualities) is said to 
have been made by "the teachers". This distinction is complete if the factual qualities 
are defined as "what follows the existence of an act from Him" : it is not complete if we 
define them as what is caused by His doing an act; for God's being willing follows 
the existence of the will He made. but. according to 'Abd al-Jabbâr, God is not called 
willing because He made will, but because of a qualifier will Therefore, it is belter 
to say that He is entitled to qualities because of His essence, because of a qualifier, 
and neither because of His essence nor because of a qualifier. Cf Muhit I, 100. 
For the distinction between two categories, see, e.g., Bouman, Báqilláni, 14; also 
Pretzl, Allnbuienlehre, 9. The same distinction was also made by non-Mu'tazilî authors; 
see, e g , al-Bâqillânî. Kilâb at-lamhid, 262-263. 
' ^ Muhit I. 100 This expression is chosen to include the qualities "willing" and 
"non-willing" {muriti and kârih) in the factual qualities See also the preceding note 
128
 Cf. pp. 227-231 See also Muhit I, 155. 
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perceiving.129 In this way, we cannot come to know more qualities 
because in similar cases in this world, too, we cannot know more 
than these seven qualities.130 
So, by starting from God's acts, 'Abd al-Jabbâr establishes the 
existence of seven qualities behind those acts. Willing and non-willing, 
however, cannot be reckoned among the essential qualities because 
God is entitled to them, not per se, but because of a qualifier.131 
Consequently, there remain five essential qualities : able, knowing, 
living, existent, and perceiving. Because of some of these qualities God 
can be entitled to more names, as we already saw;132 but, funda-
mentally, the essential qualities are—contrary to the larger number 
mentioned by the As'ariya and theologians of a similar tendency—'" 
restricted to the five discussed in the preceding section. 
The second question : what are God's qualities? 
'Abd al-Jabbâr clearly states—and this and other similar expressions 
in his works do not leave the slightest doubt about his doctrinal 
position—that "the quality (si/a) is a word (qawf), just as the qualifi-
cation (was/)."134 A quality is a name—mostly an active participle 
or an adjective—something is entitled to because of some reason or 
129
 This argument can be found in Muhh I. 155 Cf also our discussions of these 
qualities in the preceding section, where we deduced them in the »ay mentioned here 
130
 All knowledge about the other world must be based upon a knowledge of this 
world; afterwards we can in four ways make the link towards the other world 
Cf pp 229-231 
131
 God is not per se willing or non-willing but because of a qualifier He makes 
Because this quality follows the existence of an act, this quality will be dealt with 
in the section on God's acts. Cf W«/i/f 1, 100 
13:2
 We treated those names in the preceding paragraph So, "eternal" is a name 
for His being existent, "god" for His being able, "seeing" for His being perceiving, and 
"wise" for His being knowing These names do not indicate separate qualities 
133
 So, for instance, al-Bâqillâni, Kiláb at-tamhiä, 262 He mentions life, knowledge, 
ability, hearing, seeing, speech, will, remaining, face, eyes, hands, anger, contentment, 
pity, wrath, pietas, hostility, love, preference, volition, perception Besides the difference 
qua contents between this list and that of 'Abd al-Jabbâr, it is significant that 
al-Bâqillânî mentions nouns, while 'Abd al-Jabbâr mentions adjectives (mainly active 
participles) This difference indicates the wholly different way in which both theologians 
see the essence of qualities 
Most qualities mentioned by the AS'arîya and scholars of similar inspiration, are 
derived from the text of the Qur'ân • "On trouve, en effet, à côté de ce que nous 
appellerions 'attributs', des actions divines présentées, dans le Coran, par des verbes 
actifs, et dont les théologiens tirent des participes présents ., des descriptions anthro-
pomorphiques de Dieu , enfin, des actions ou des états de Dieu qui sont difficile à ranger 
dans une catégorie . " (Allard, Le problème, 5-6) 
' " MugniWh 117 
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other; it is a name that can be applied because of some reason in the 
reality. 
By describing the quality as a qualification or a word, 'Abd al-Jabbâr 
clearly stands in the tradition of the Mu'tazila, and follows the 
opinions of his "two teachers" Abu 'Alî and Abu Hâsim.135 For, 
whereas many of the Mu'tazila's opponents advocated the real existence 
of God's knowledge, ability, and other qualities,136 the principal aim 
of the Mu'tazilî theologians was the defence of God's unity and unicity : 
the essential qualities cannot have such an independence or existence 
of their own that the acceptance of them constitutes a danger for the 
theory of God's absolute unity and unicity.137 Therefore, they either 
reduce the qualities to names,138 or they assert that God really is 
knowing by a knowledge, but that this knowledge, this "quality", is 
identical with God himself.139 Hence, there arose some confusion 
135
 Cf. al-Aä'ari, Maqâlât, 172· "Those who do not say that the names and 
qualities are the Creator disagree about what the names and qualities are, there are 
two opinions, the Mu'tazila and the Kawânj say that the names and the qualities are 
words (aqwâl) and that they are our word "God is knowing', 'God is able', etc.". 
Other Mu'tazila, however, say that the qualities are God Himself, as we shall show 
below Cf. also 'Abd al-Karim 'Utmân, Nazarîyal at-laklíf, 183-184, where he treats the 
positions of Abu 'Alî and Abu Hâsim, who both denied the existence of knowledge 
or similar qualities in God, but made the words the qualities; they only disagreed about 
the reason why God is entitled to those qualities Here Abu Hâsim proposed his well-
known theory of the "states" {ahwàl), in which he is followed by 'Abd al-Jabbâr and 
most of the later Mu'tazila. 
136
 One of the most famous among them was Ibn Kullâb, who said that "the names 
of God are His qualities and these arc knowledge, ability, life, hearing, seeing, and His 
other qualities" (al-As'arî, Maqâlât, 173). "Ibn Kullâb sagte, dass die Aussage 'Gott ist 
wissend' zugleich meine • 'Gott hat Wissen'—und so für all seine Attribute in konkret-
vereinzelnder Aufzählung (...), oder wenn er meinte, dass'Namen' auch (reale) 'Attribute' 
voraussetzten, wie überhaupt jegliches Ding, wenn es beeigenschaftet (mausûf) ... ist, 
dies nur wegen eines bestimmten 'Momentes' (ma'nâ) sein könne, eben wegen einer 
Eigenschaft (...), eines 'Dinges' (sai'), eines 'Akzidens' ... die in ihm subsistieren" 
(Van Ess, ¡bn Kullâb, 110-111) Ibn Kullâb is followed m this doctrine by al-A5'arî and 
his school 
137
 Cf., e.g., Bouman, Bâqillâni, 13. 
138
 So. for instance, 'Abbâd bn Sulaymân; cf. al-AS'arî, Maqâlât, 188. See also 
'Abd al-Karîm 'Utmân, Nazariyat at-taklif, 182. So also Abu 'AH and Abu HâSim; cf. 
note 135. Cf. also Nader, Le système, 57. 
139
 So says Abu 1-Hudayl. Cf. Frank, Divine Attributes, 472: "In his conception, 
the divine unity is more compact; God's self (nafs) is He as His eternity (qidam) is He, 
as He is one and identical with Himself, and so also His knowledge, power, grandeur, etc., 
are likewise God Himself". Cf. also al-As'arî, Maqâlât, 187-188. He mentions four 
solutions for the problem of the divine attributes as given by Mu'tazila Besides the two 
mentioned in our text, he also gives the identification between knowledge and known 
object, ability and object to which one is able, and the doctrine that the expression 
"God has a knowledge" etc. is only meant to say that God is knowing. This thesis 
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about the use of the term quality (sifa) : whereas for 'Abd al-Jabbâr 
the quality is, for instance, "knowing" or "living", his opponents use 
the term for "knowledge" and "life", and so they say that 'Abd "al-
Jabbâr, just as some other Mu'tazila, denies the qualities while in 
fact he dedicates many pages of his works to the "qualities". 
The third question : what is the relation of these qualities with 
God? 
Evidently, this question is an entirely different one, whether applied 
to the qualities as al-As'ari and Ibn Kullâb consider them to be—a 
knowledge by which God is knowing, an ability by which He is able—or 
to the qualities we came to know in the works of 'Abd al-Jabbâr. 
We do not discuss here the first conception of qualities, but we restrict 
ourselves to the treating of'Abd al-Jabbâr's position.140 The question 
then becomes : why is God entitled to these qualities?141 
Whereas Abu Hâsim holds the thesis that there is only one quality 
God is entitled to because of His essence (li-dâtih or li-nafsih)—and 
this quality, which is denied by 'Abd al-Jabbâr, is His being Himself, 
the essential quality (as-sifa ad-dâtîya) by which He is fundamentally 
different from other beings—142 and that God is existent, living, 
knowing, and able because of His states (ahwâl) or, in other words, 
"by that on which He is in His essence" {li-mâ huw 'alayhfì dâtih),1*3 
is advocated by an-Nazzâm and by, as al-As'arî states, most of the Mu'tazila from 
both the branch of al-Basra and that of Bagdad. 
'^
0
 This question of the relationship between God and His knowledge, ability, etc., 
is amply discussed by van Ess in his article about Ibn Kullâb. He· summarizes his 
conclusions on p. 118 in a very visual way. 
141
 This is discussed in Muhit I, 170-190 and Sarh 182-213. It is summarized in 
Muhil I, 170 as follows: "... His qualities either are because of the essence (li-d-dât) 
in the real sense of the word, as Abu Hâsim says about the quality he established (viz., 
the so-called "essential quality" by which He is different from others), or they are 
among those which are said to be 'per se', but by him (Abu Hâsim) 'because of that upon 
which He is in His self, as His being knowing, able, living, and existent; or they are 
neither per se nor by a qualifier, as His being perceiving— though there is some 
disagreement about this as was mentioned above ; or they are because of a qualifier, 
as His being willing and non-willing". Cf. Sarh 129, where this is mentioned as the 
opinion of Abu Hâsim; there His being perceiving is said to be "because of His being 
living on the condition that the perceptible thing exists". 
142
 This quality is discussed (and denied) in Muhil I, 152-154. It is the quality "by 
which He is different from what is different from Him (read mukâlifah instead of 
mukâlafa) and would correspond with what corresponds with Him (muwáfiqah instead 
of muwàfaqa) if there were something corresponding with Him; but He is too high for 
that". Sarh 129. 
143
 Cf. Muhit I, 170; Sarh 129 and 182. See also the literature mentioned in note 
192 on page 145, where some works are mentioned which pay attention to Abu HâSim's 
theory of states. 
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Abu 'Ali states that God is existent, living, knowing, and able because 
of His essence (li-dâtih).1** If we look into the position 'Abd al-
Jabbâr chooses in this discussion, we see that he follows Abu Hâsim's 
way of thinking : God is, just as human beings, qualified as existent, 
living, able, and knowing because of His being in a state. But when 
discussing the question whether there is a difference between God's 
being in that state and our being in the same state, he arrives at the 
conclusion that God is in that state because of His essence or per se, 
but that we are so because of a qualifier inhering in us. Consequently, 
he can say that, finally, God is qualified as existent etc. because of 
His essence, and that we are qualified in that way because of a 
qualifier; and so he uses in fact Abu 'All's terminology, though, most 
probably, the more complicated formula used by Abu Hâsim would 
be more accurate here.145 But what is really meant by the formula 
"per se" or "essentially", is that it is not necessary—and even not 
possible—to assume the presence of a qualifier in order to explain 
how the subject can be entitled to the quality concerned.146 
The fourth question : what is the relation among these four essential 
qualities'?147 
A first answer we give is that these four qualities are different from 
each other, for they indicate four different states God is in. But, 
nevertheless. He is in any of these four states per se and because of 
His essence; if that is true, how can we possibly know that these 
states and the qualities He is entitled to because of His being in these 
states are really different from each other? 'Abd al-Jabbâr's answer 
' " Cf Sarh 129 and 182 
ίΛ
^ One sometimes receives the impression thai 'Abd al-Jabbâr also accepts the 
formula Abu Hâsim used, and that he admits that he himself uses the terms "per se" 
and "esscnlially" in the broader sense of the word See therefore, e g , Sarh 129 and 
Muliil I, 170 1 think it is saving too much when Badawi remarks "Il nous sufTit de dire 
ici que 'Abd al-Jabbâr a adopté l'attitude d'Abù 'Ali al-Jubbâ'î. a savoir que Dieu mente 
les quatre attributs puissant, savant, vivant et existant, pour Lui-même, tandis que 
son fils Abu Hâshim disait que Dieu les mérite de par ce qu'il est en Lui-même 
Pour une fois, 'Abd al-Jabbâr se range du côte du pere et non du fils1" (Histoire, 220) 
'Abd al-Jabbâr follows Abu Hâsim, but not in the establishing of the "essential quality" 
Therefore, he does not have to accept the difference between the one quality that is 
because of the essence and the four others thai are because of "what He is upon in His 
essence" Consequently, 'Abd al-Jabbâr can say that they are because of His essence 
though he follows Abu Hâsim in stating that God can be qualified as knowing etc , and 
is entitled to these qualifications because of the stales He essentially and per se is in 
146
 Sec also Pretzl, Attributenlehre, 15 
147
 See especially Muhit I, 157-162 
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to this question runs : as we can distinguish148 between various 
essences (dawât)149 on the basis of their qualities, by knowing that 
one essence is characterized by a quality the other is not characterized 
by so that they must be distinguished from each other, so in a similar 
way we can make a distinction between different qualities by paying 
attention to the consequences they have for the subject which is qualified 
by them; 'Abd al-Jabbâr calls these consequences the "judgements" 
(ahkâm) the subjects concerned are entitled to. If the one quality has 
a consequence which the other has not—and here 'Abd al-Jabbâr 
means the fundamental consequence a quality has, a consequence so 
fundamental that it can be used as a kind of definition for the 
quality—150 the two qualities must be different and distinct from each 
other.151 What remains to do here is to show that God's four essential 
qualities have four different consequences. 
The consequence of God's being able is the possibility of acting; 
for a subject who is qualified as able acting is possible, and, on the 
other hand, a subject for whom acting is possible is called able. Con-
sequently, this really is the fundamental judgement (hukm). 
The consequence of God's being knowing is that He can make occur 
what he knows in a precise way, supposed that He is able to it.152 
The consequence of God's being existent is the appearing of the 
judgements of His essence.153 
The consequence of God's being living is the possibility of His being 
knowing and able, and His being perceiving when something perceptible 
exists.154 
148
 In this context (Muhit I, 157-162) 'Abd al-Jabbâr mostly uses the term tamyiz, 
"to make a distinction between several things" Nevertheless, he also mentions the 
more usable word mukâlafa, indicating that two things are difTerent, in such a way 
that we can assume that both terms are equivalents Cf Muhil I, 157 
'* ' 'Abd al-Jabbâr here (Muhit I. 157) uses the term "essence" for "what can be 
qualified, what can be entitled lo a quality" Possibly, he uses this word to encompass in 
this way both God and the substances 
150
 'Abd al-Jabbâr uses the word haqiqa We already discussed this on pp 78-79 and 
came to the conclusion that it indicates a kind of definition 
151
 Cf Muhit I, 157 
152
 What is meant here, is the "precise act" (al-fi'l al-muhkam) 'Abd al-Jabbâr 
says that one can take here some precautions by adding to the judgement mentioned 
"by realization or by some kind of implication" ('ala t-tahqiq aw 'ala darb mm at-taqdir) 
In this way one includes the atoms of an act, which in itself cannot be precise, but 
which can be so by the joining with something else (Muhit I, 158) 
153
 An essence is entitled in itself to a number of qualities and judgements, but these 
only "appear" when the essence is existent (Muhit I, 159-160) 
154
 God's being living necessitates (yüjib) His being perceiving on condition that 
THEODICY 255 
Because these four judgements or consequences are different, the 
four qualities must be different too. 
By way of conclusion, we maintain that God is entitled to four 
different essential qualities or qualifications because of four different 
permanent states He essentially and per se is in ; these four states and 
qualities must be distinct from each other because they have different 
consequences. Besides these four qualities (existent, living, able, 
knowing), God is also entitled to the quality "perceiving" ; this quality 
is based on a state He is in because of His being living on the condition 
that something perceptible does exist. 
All other qualities God is entitled to are either because of a qualifier, 
or because of an act He did, or they indicate that one must deny some-
thing about God. 
5. WHAT HAS TO BE DENIED ABOUT GOD 
'Abd al-Jabbâr pays relatively much attention and devotes many 
pages to the discussion of a number of statements about God that 
have to be denied.155 Most of these pages are filled with refutations 
something perceptible exists One cannot make the same statement concerning His 
being able and knowing, for these two qualities are necessitated by "what the Eternal 
is upon in His self' (h-mâ huw 'alayh al-qadim /i nafsih) Here 'Abd al-Jabbâr uses the 
expression Abu Hâsim forged in order to indicate the reason why God is entitled to 
His qualities (Muhit I, 160) 
155
 In Muhit I, 191-226 'Abd al-Jabbâr deals, subsequently, with the following 
statements that have to be denied about God · that He can be knowing etc. because of 
eternal qualifiers, that He can be a substance, body, accident, or substrate, that He can 
be seen, that He can need something, and that there can be a second one like Him, 
in the last part are included the refutations of the non-Islamic religions. 
In Sarh 213-298 he discusses the following theses God can need something, He 
is a body or an accident. He can be seen, there can be a second one like Him (here again 
the refutation of the non-Islamic religions is included). The fourth part of the Mugnl 
(the first one of what remains from this work) starts in the midst of these discussions, 
in it "Abd al-Jabbâr refutes the theses that God can need something {Mugnl IV, 7-32), 
that He can be seen (Mugni IV, 33-240), and that there can be a second one like 
Him (Mugni IV, 241-346), the first half of the fifth part of the Mugnî comprises the 
refutations of the non-Islamic religions. 
'Abd al-Karîm 'Utmân, Nazariyal al-laklif, 243-304, is very much interested in the 
passages from the text of the Qur'ân used in these discussions He also discusses a number 
of statements formulated on the basis of the Qur'ân and some statements concerning 
God's acts Badawi, Histoire, 220-224, follows, as he usually does, the text of the Sarh, 
he begins, however, after the discussion of the thesis that God can need something, 
and gives most of his attention to the proofs for God's unicity and the refutation 
of the non-Muslim opponents 
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of the theses of his opponents, just аь the choice of some of the state­
ments he discusses is inspired by the doctrine of these opponents 
They are both the adherents and scholars of other religions who in 
his opinion do not accept the unity and unicity of God, and those 
scholars inside the Islamic community who, according to 'Abd al-
Jabbâr, take the message of the Qur'ân too literally, and misinterpret 
it by deducing from its text a number of divine qualities 
We discuss briefly the most important among the statements treated 
by 'Abd al-Jabbâr, in so far as they may throw more light on his own 
position in these discussions and his own theodicy We deal sub-
sequently with the denial of the following theses God is a substance, 
He is a substrate. He is an accident, He can be seen. He can need 
something, and, finally, there can be a second god besides God 
Lays bi-jawhar wa-lays bi-jism : He is not a substance nor a body 
All arguments are based on the same principle, viz, that God should 
in that case have the essential qualities of a body and bodies should 
have the essential qualities of God, for, if two things have one essential 
quality in common, they must have all essential qualities in common 
Therefore, if God were a substance or a body, He ought to have the 
essential quality of bodies, their being spatial (mutahavyiz), and con-
sequently, as we already saw,156 he should be "being" (kam), and 
because something can only be being by a "mode of being" (kann) 
of which we proved that it must be temporal, God Himself would be 
temporal, this statement is a contradiction so that the premises must 
be false 
Or, from the other side, since God is essentially eternal, all bodies 
would be eternal, this again is a contradiction For the same reason 
all bodies would be essentially and per se able And, when we deny 
this, the conclusion again would be that God, too, is not essentially 
able, but because of an ability, that would imply that He cannot 
produce bodies. This again is a contradiction because we came to 
know Him as the producer of the bodies 157 In the same way, one 
should conclude that either all bodies are living, or that God is not 
essentially living but by a life 
These and other similar conclusions which have to be drawn from 
156
 Seepp 119-123andp 112 Cf 'Abd al- Jabbâr's discussion of this subject in Muhi/1, 
197-198 and Sarh 217-224 
157
 Cf Muhii I, 198, Sarh 221-224, see also pp 231-235 
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the statement that God is a body, are in contradiction with what 
we discovered above about God. 
That we have to deny that God is a body, implies that we also must 
deny everything that is characteristic of bodies and can only be applied 
to bodies. When the text of the Qur'ân seems to tell such a thing 
about God, we have to explain that passage and to examine the text 
for the real meaning of such an expression.158 
Laysbi-'arad : He is not an accident. We already saw that for an accident 
it is possible to be non-existent, the accident being the element of change 
in this world. If God were an accident, the conclusion should be either 
that God is not eternal or that the accidents are eternal. Both state-
ments are in contradiction with the descriptions we gave of them in 
the course of our present study.159 
Lays bi-mahall : He is not a substrate. Since "substrate" is a name 
for substances or bodies considered in their relation to accidents 
inhering in them, and since God cannot be a substance or a body, 
He cannot be a substrate for accidents either. 
The reason is that the possibility of the substance's being a substrate 
depends on its being spatial, its tahayyuz. What is spatial (mutahayyiz) 
can be a substrate for accidents, whereas what is not spatial cannot 
be a substrate. This becomes apparent in the fact that a body or 
substance cannot be a substrate when it is non-existent and, con-
sequently, is not spatial ; for the same reason an accident cannot inhere 
in another accident, so that the second one would be a substrate.160 
1 , s
 Cf. Muhit I, 199 "ΙΓ there occur in the Qur'ân verses thai suppose by their 
outward meaning a similarity (at-taibih : similarity between God and this world), 
they must be interpreted (wajab ta'wíluhá) because words can be interpreted in more 
ways and the indication of the intuition is far from being interpreted in more ways" 
This, evidently, is a very important principle in 'Abd al-Jabbâr's use of the Qur'ân 
in theological argumentations. 
1 , 9
 Cf. Muhit I, 201-202. See also Sarh 230-232, where the argument is given in 
a somewhat different way. 
160
 Cf Muhit I, 202 the acceptance of the possibility that an accident inheres in 
an accident is nol only in contradiction with the principles on which Ihe distinction of 
substances and accidents and the division of all things in this world into substances 
and accidents is founded, but il also leads to absurdities in as far as by this inhering 
oppositcs would no longer exclude each other. A substrate cannot be at the same 
time black and white because the two opposite accidents, blackness and whiteness, 
cannot inhere in one and the same substance at the same time If, however, blackness 
could inhere in whiteness, a substance could at the same time be white and black 
The principle at stake is called by 'Abd al-Jabbâr "at-tadàdd bayn al-mutadâddât" See 
also pp. 142-143. 
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Hence, since being spatial (tahavyu:) is a necessary condition to be 
a substrate, God evidently cannot be a substrate and cannot bear 
accidents.161 
Là yurâ: He cannot be seen.162 The question whether we, human 
beings, can see God in this world or after our death, was the subject 
of many disputes among Muslims and among Muslim theologians. 
These disputes were based in large part on texts from the Qur'ân or 
the Tradition which sometimes seem to contradict one another. 
There are texts that apparently affirm the possibility to see Him, 
while others apparently deny it. It is therefore not very surprising that 
a considerable part of the discussions 'Abd al-Jabbâr records in his 
works, is related to arguments that are called "sarnT' (based on 
revelation), more than is the case with the discussions on other 
subjects.163 But notwithstanding this, 'Abd al-Jabbâr mentions—both 
in his Muh'u and his Sarh—'64 two "rational" ('aqlï) arguments, based on 
161
 СГ Muhil I. 202 'Abd al-Jabbâr mentions still another argument if God were 
a substrate. He would have to be a substrate for an> accident, in that case He could be, 
for instance, desiring and having aversion by the inhering of the accidents concerned 
in Him It is, however, somewhat difficult to use this argument because it is possible 
and even an established fact, in the opinion of 'Abd al-Jabbâr, that not every accident 
can inhere in any substrate, but that accidents can require special substrates Cf ρ 123 
1 6 2
 For the argumentations that God cannot be seen, see M ugni IV, 33-240, Muhii I, 
206-211, and Sarh 232-277 Sec also 'Abd al-Karîm 'Utmân, Nazarhat al-takli/, 269-287, 
Badawi, Histoire, 223-224, Vajda, Le problème de la vision de Dieu d'aprei Yûsuf al-Basir, 
478-482, where he translates the arguments given by 'Abd al-Jabbâr, especially those 
of the Muhii See also what we already said about seeing on pp 181-191 
163
 So, for instance, in the Sarh pages 233-248 are given to a discussion of the 
revealed texts, for 'Abd al-Jabbâr a very large part of the 55 pages he devotes to the 
subject 
164
 In the Mugni all arguments and discussions and counter-arguments are discussed 
in much detail In Mugni IV, 98, 'Abd al-Jabbâr introduces his mam argument, which 
he will elaborate in the there following chapters This argument, which is somewhat 
different in its form and formulation from the arguments mentioned in the two other 
works, is in fact of the same kind as the one called the argument from the hindrances, 
it is only more generally and broadly elaborated here This argument is founded upon 
four theses which 'Abd al-Jabbàr successively proves we do not see God now, it is not 
because of something in us that we do see Him now (not because we miss, for instance, 
a special instrument, a sixth sense), it is not because of some hindrance (mam') that 
we do not see Him now, and, finally, it is not because of something in Him that we do 
not see Him now The conclusion of all this can only be that it is because it in itself 
is not possible to see Him, neither now nor later 
'Abd al-Karîm 'Utmân, Nazariyat at-laklif, 280-282, gives four arguments, the second 
and the third ones are those mentioned in our text, the first says that God would be 
necessarily known if He were seen, which is not possible What he calls the fourth 
argument, the refutation of the thesis that God can be seen by a sixth sense, is treated 
by 'Abd al-Jabbâr not as an argument, but among the refutations of his opponents' 
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human intuition; these two arguments are called the argument of 
"being in front of' (al-muqâbala) and the argument from "the hin-
drances" (al-ntawânf). 
The first argument can be summarized as follows:165 when we, 
living beings in this world, who have to make use of the substrate of 
our life in perceiving, see something, either the object seen must be 
directly in front of us, or it must inhere in a substrate that is directly 
in front of us, or it must be entitled to the judgement that it is in front 
of us, for instance, when it is in front of a mirror we look into.166 
This implies that the object seen must be a substance (only substances 
can be "in front of' because of their occupying a certain place) or an 
accident that inheres in such a substance. And since God can be 
neither a substance nor an accident, He cannot be seen. 
The second argument167 is based on the fact that a living subject 
that has no defects and the instrument (sense) of which is healthy 
necessarily sees all existent visible things if there are no hindrances. 
When we consider the hindrances we already discussed, we see that 
they are all related to the rays, which function for us as a kind of 
instrument in seeing, and we also see that all these hindrances can only 
be concerned with substances and their inhering accidents, for they 
all suppose that the visible object is in a certain place or has a certain 
material structure.168 
Therefore, because no hindrances are possible that can prevent the 
seeing of God, a living being that has no defects and the sense of 
which is healthy must see God if He is visible and existent. Because 
opinions The first argument 'Abd al-Karîm 'Utmân mentions does not more than 
show that we do not see God now Badawi, Histoire, 223-224, follows as usually the text 
of the Sarh, but he restricts himself to the first argument 'Abd al-Jabbâr gives there, 
the argument from the mugábala 
165
 In the formulation of the Muhît it is translated by Vajda, cf Le problème, 478-479 
166
 Cf about this mugábala and the fact that the rays separating themselves from 
our eye move in a straight line, but can be reflected by some objects, such as mirrors 
pp 185 and 189 This argument is given in Muhil I, 208 and Sarh 248 ff The formulation 
given in the Sarh is idâ kân mugâbilan aw hallan β l-mugâbil ан fi hukm al-mugâbd 
The meaning of the second part ("or inhering in what is in front") indicates the possibility 
that it is an accident, the third part is less clear, but it is explained in Sarh 249 by the 
example of the mirror, also a comparison with the text of the Muhit shows that this 
must be the meaning of these words Therefore, Badawi's rendering is less accurate 
"en vis-à-vis, ni dans une position de vis-à-vis" (Histoire, 223) 
167
 See Muhît I, 208-209 This text is translated by Vajda, Le problème, 479-480 
This translation is not always accurate, I have pointed out some misinterpretations in 
my section about "seeing" in 'Abd al-Jabbâr's anthropology 
1 6 9
 Cf pp. 188-191. 
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we know that we do not see Him—though He is existent—He must be 
invisible and it must be absolutely impossible to see Him. 
La yudrak : He cannot be perceived.169 Besides not being visible, God 
also is not perceptible to the other senses. He evidently cannot be 
perceived by touching, smelling, or tasting, because these forms of 
perception suppose a direct contact between the sensory instrument 
of the perceiving subject and the perceived substance or the substrate 
of the perceived accident.170 Consequently, God cannot possibly be 
perceived by these three forms of perception. 
But more generally, we can use for all forms of perception—con-
sequently also for hearing—an argument similar to the latter one we 
discussed in our demonstration that God cannot be seen.171 When 
there is nothing in God nor in us, the perceiving subjects, that makes 
the actual perceiving now impossible, and when there is no hindrance, 
God must be perceived now if He is perceptible at all. "What can be 
perceived, must be perceived if the perceiving subject172 has the 
quality because of which he can perceive, and the perceptible object 
has the quality because of which it can be perceived. About what is in 
this state and nevertheless is not perceived, we must conclude that 
it is in itself (per se) imperceptible. Concerning something that cannot 
be perceived because of a known obstacle without (the intervention of) 
which we surely would perceive it, we know that the reason why we 
do not perceive it is not because in its essence it is imperceptible, 
but because there is a hindering."173 
Là yajûz 'alayh al-hâja : He can have no need.174 The 'argument to 
prove that God has no need or that He is not needing (muhtâj) is one 
and the same in 'Abd al-Jabbâr's three theological works; it is best 
summarized in Muhit 1,212 : "It (viz. : need, al-hâja) follows 175 benefit 
" ^ This subject is explicitly discussed in Mugni IV, Π4-138 after 'Abd al-Jabbâr 
has discussed the thesis that God cdnnot be seen. He could have restricted himself to 
the general thesis that God cannot be perceived, because this implies that He cannot 
be seen The choice of his main subject here was evidently caused by the actual theological 
discussions. 
' ^ Cf Muhit I, 324 and also note 173 on ρ 192 
, 7 1
 Cf Muhil I, 207 and Mugm IV, 134. 
1 , 2
 The text reads "the seeing subject" (ar-rá'í). What is meant here, in this general 
discussion of perception, is evidently "the perceiving subject" (al-mudnk) 
п з
 Mugni ІУ. 134 
1 , 4
 Cf M ugni IV, 7-32, Muhil I, 211-214: Sarh 213-216 Sec also 'Abd al-Karim 
'Utmân. Nazarival al-lak/i/. 287-289. 
' ^ The Arabic text uses here several times the verb taba', meaning "to follow" For 
a good understanding of the text one can replace it by the verb "suppose" (Muhit I, 212). 
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and repulsion of harm, these two follow pleasure and pain, and these 
two follow desire and aversion. And since desire is impossible for Him, 
need is impossible for Him (too)."1"'6 From this summary it becomes 
clear that 'Abd al-Jabbâr uses here the term "need" (hája) in a special 
technical way. In other contexts he will use it to indicate that "some-
thing needs something else to exist, or its doer to come into existence, 
or a cause to receive a judgement, or a secondary cause to come into 
existence, or similar things".177 In the present context, however, it is 
used for the one who "needs to procure benefits and the happiness that 
follows, or the repulsion of harm and the sorrow that follows";178 
the term is also used for the need for acts or instruments used to procure 
those benefits and to repulse those harms.179 
By defining "need" in this manner, 'Abd al-Jabbâr connects it with 
benefit and harm We already saw that he defines benefit by "pleasure, 
happiness, or what leads to both or to one of them", and harm by 
"pain or sorrow, or what leads to both of them".180 We also saw 
that pain is based upon perception together with an aversion of nature, 
whereas pleasure is also based upon perception, but this time together 
with a desire of nature.181 This implies that, by the succession of 
definitions 'Abd al-Jabbâr gives, need (hâ/a) supposes desire and 
aversion. 
Desire is not possible for God; to prove this statement, 'Abd al-
Jabbâr uses an argumentation wrought by Abu Ishâq.182 God cannot 
be per se desiring; for, when a knowing subject knows something 
to be a benefit without there being any harm, he necessarily does it. 
So God would be compelled to that act, which would imply that He 
precedes His act by only one moment, and that implies that He 
cannot possibly be eternal, for that which is eternal must precede that 
which is temporal by an infinite number of moments if there were 
17<
' Muhit I, 212. see the rather similjr text in Mugni [V, 8 
' " VMÇW/IV. 8 
"
8
 Λίι/?ηί IV. Π 
'"" He mentions, for instance, knowledge, convictions, perception, senses It is not 
necessary that the subject himself docs the act by which he gets the benefits, so, for 
instance, he can be obedient in order to receive a reward which is a benefit for him 
Cf M ugni W. II 
'"" Cf ρ 91 and note 284 on ρ 91 Sec also Μιιχηΐ IV. 14 and Vtugnl XIV, 34 
' " ' Cf pp 114-1.15 
lH2
 Cf Suih 214, Mtihit I, 212 He also mentions an argument given by Abu Hâsim. 
saying that desire implies an addition, which would imply that God were a body 
'Abd al-Jabbâr. however, prefers the argument given by Abu Ishâq 
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moments.183 The same argument holds true for the assumption that 
He would be desiring by an eternal desire.184 Nor can He be desiring 
by a temporal desire, for then He would be compelled to produce that 
desire and the thing desired because He would know that to be a 
benefit.185 
The conclusion from all this is that God cannot be desiring and 
therefore can have no need. 
óani: self-sufficient.186 The word self-sufficient is for 'Abd al-Jabbâr 
the opposite and the negation of the word "needing" (muhtâj), and 
just as the quality needing supposes and characterizes a perceiving, 
and therefore living, being,187 its opposite "self-sufficient" also sup-
poses a living being. When a living being is not needing, it is called 
self-sufficient; this quality, this name, is not based upon the existence 
of something in the reality, but upon its non-existence.188 
Therefore, "self-sufficient" must be called a negative quality (sifat 
an-nafy); a subject cannot be said to be entitled to such a quality per 
se, or by a doer, or by a qualifier, but only because of the negation of 
something. Thus we cannot say that God is per se self-sufficient;189 
we can only say that He is self-sufficient because He is not needing, 
though He could be so because He is living. 
The name "self-sufficient" is the only name we can give to God 
in this context; but 'Abd al-Jabbâr does mention here a number of 
names which cannot be used for Him. Besides the names we discussed 
already, such as desiring and having aversion, having pain and having 
pleasure, 'Abd al-Jabbâr mentions some other names which are 
183
 СГ Muhit I, 57-58, also note 42 on ρ 233 
І і
 In the Sarh 'Abd al-Jabbâr mentions on ρ 215 a second argument if this 
qualifier were eternal, it would be similar to God because it would have an essential 
quality (being eternal which necessarily is an essential quality, cf note 117, ρ 247) 
in common Consequently, it would be a second god besides God. which is not possible 
as we shall show 
1 8 5
 Cf Sarh 215, Mugni IV, 20-21, Muhit 1, 213 
1 8 6
 Cf Mugni IV, 8-10, V. 247-248, Muhit I, 211-212, Sarh 213 
1 8 1
 Need supposes pain and pleasure, and these two suppose a form of perception 
as we saw above See also Mugni IV, 8 and Èarh 213 
188
 The term gani can also be used with the preposition 'an and a following noun or 
pronoun In that case it means that one is free from want of the thing mentioned, 
that one does not need it When it is used absolutely, it indicates that one does not need 
anything at all, and in this way it is only applicable to God Sec also Mugni V, 247 and 
Sarh 213 
189
 Cf Muhit I, 211-212 When we say that God is "per se" self-sufficient, we mean 
that He "per se" is so that He cannot be needing, neither now nor at any other moment 
But "self-sufficient" is not a really essential quality 
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connected with these concepts and consequently have to be denied : 
God cannot take pleasure (yusarr), be glad (yafrah), fear (yakâf), 
hope (yarju), worry (yagtamm), feel anxiety {yusfiq), be jealous {gayûr), 
or courageous (suja), because all these names indicate or imply some 
form of need, benefit and harm, or desire and aversion.190 
Là tânî Iah: He is second to none.191 The expression "He is second 
to none" is meant to indicate that there is no second one who shares 
with God His being eternal or His being god.192 The arguments 
'Abd al-Jabbâr gives to prove this statement are in fact based on the 
conclusion that the assumption of the existence of such a "second one" 
would imply that this second one must also be essentially and per se 
able, and the acceptance of two essentially able subjects leads to two 
different absurdities.193 
The basis of this argumentation, the part both arguments have in 
common, is most clearly summarized by 'Abd al-Jabbâr in his Sarh :194 
"If there were together with God a second eternal (being), it would 
be similar to Him because being eternal is one of the essential qualities, 
and the sharing of it necessitates the being similar and the sharing 
of the other essential qualities. When this is true and the Eternal is 
essentially able, the second one also must be essentially able."195 
Being able is an essential quality; we saw above that God is essen-
190
 Cf MugniV, 247-248 
1 , 1
 СГ Mugni IV. 241-346 and Mugni V, 244-246. In Mugni V, 9-159 'Abd al-Jabbâr 
refutes the theses of those who, according to him, believe in more than one God. See also 
Sarh 277-291 and Sarh 291-298 for the refutation of those who deny the unity and 
uniqueness of God: cf. Muhit I, 215-226 Cf 'Abd al-Karîm 'Utmân, Nazariyat at-taklif, 
244-252 and also 252-257 for the refutations. Badawi gives in his Histoire very much 
attention to the refutations, much more than 'Abd al-Jabbâr himself, so that his record 
of 'Abd al-Jabbâr's doctrine seems to make it an apology instead of a really theological 
form of thinking. Badawi discusses the argument for the thesis that there is no second 
one in Histoire, 224-226 and devotes pp. 226-240 to the refutations 
Vajda, loo, discusses in his La démonstration de l'unité divine d'après Yûsuf al-Baiîr 
'Abd al-Jabbâr's texts on this subject, comparing the structure of those three texts. 
192
 See, for instance, the title in Mugni IV, 241 : al-kalâm β annah ta'âlâ nâhid là 
tâni Iah fi l-qidam на-l-ilâhiya 
193
 These are the "two arguments" Vajda distinguishes in his article See, for instance, 
the text of the Mugni where the distinction between two arguments is most clearly 
made. On ρ 275 of Mugni IV the second argument begins; it is introduced and 
summarized on that page. The first argument is summarized by 'Abd al-Jabbàr in 
Mugni IV, 267-268. 
194
 This text is translated by Vajda, La démonstration, 309-310, but he omits the 
first more general sentences, and starts with the last sentence we translate in our text 
See also Badawi, Histoire, 224-225, who translates the entire text. 
195
 Sarh 278 
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tially able 196 What remains to be proved is the general statement 
that the sharing of one essential quality necessitates the sharing of all 
essential qualities 'Abd al-Jabbâr considers the essence (dal) to be 
something indivisible, the expression "per se" or "because of the 
essence" is here not considered to be purely the negation of d qualifier 
and the negation of the possibility to lose this quality,197 but the essence 
here has its own characteristic 198 And, 'Abd al-Jabbâr says, when 
two things are similar to each other because of their—indivisible— 
essences, for instance, being both by their essence eternal, these 
essences must be similar and cannot be at the same time the reason 
why the two things are different, one of them having an essential 
quality the other has not 199 Summarizing, the one and indivisible 
essence cannot be, at the same time, the reason why the thing is similar 
with and the reason why it is different from something else 
After this basic argumentation leading to the conclusion that the 
acceptance of a second eternal or divine 2 0 0 being implies the acceptance 
of two beings who are both essentially able, one may choose one of two 
ways to continue the argumentation 
The first argument says that God has a connection with the things 
He is able to produce. His "maqdûrât", which is because of His 
essence201 If the "second one" has the same essence as God, 
he must be able to produce the same possible things God is able to 
produce This implies the acceptance that one non-existent, possible 
thing is maqdûr of two different able subjects, and that two able 
subjects are able to produce the same thing And this is excluded 202 
The second argument, which is called the argument from the "mutual 
hindering" {at-tamânu)>20i is based on the fact that the subject who 
is able to produce something, is able to produce the genus of that 
something and its opposite—if there is an opposite. This implies that 
196
 Cf pp 236-237 
197
 Cf ρ 252 
1 9 β
 Sec Mugni IV, 252 The essence is, however, not something inside the being, 
a kind of kernel, but the being itself which can be qualified See ρ 148 
1 9 9
 Cf MugmW, 252-253 
2 0 0
 We already saw that for 'Abd al-Jabbâr the name "god" (¡Iah) directly implies 
that the subject is essentially and per se able, cf ρ 240 So, if one starts not from the 
second one's being eternal, but from his being god, the argumentation will be simpler 
yet 
2 0 1
 Cf pp 204-206 and 237-239 
2 0 2
 Cf Mugni IV, 254-275 See also pp 237-239 
2 0 3
 For this argument, see Vajda, La demonstration, 309-311 and Badawi, Histoire, 
224-226 
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it іь possible that God wants to move something while the "second 
one*" wants to keep it immobile This is called the "mutual hindering", 
for the object cannot be moving and immobile at the same lime. 
Consequently, what will happen is what one of them wants, while 
the other one is hindered And so it becomes apparent that the one 
whose will happens is essentially able and god, whereas the other 
one is not because he must be able by an ability and consequently be 
a body 2 0 4 This implies that the premise is false, and that there can 
be no second one besides God 
Wahid: one The original meaning 2 0 5 of the term uâhid is said to be 
that the thing thus called cannot be divided into atoms or parts,206 
or, eventually, that the thing thus called cannot be divided without 
ceasing to be what it is.207 It is evident that, just as the quality "self-
sufficient" (gant), so the quality "one" (wâhd) too is a negative 
quality, and that, consequently, God cannot be said to be nâhid 
per se or essentially, nor because of a qualifier 2 0 8 
If we use this name for a human being, we can do so to express that 
he cannot be divided, but also to indicate that he is unique, that 
he has qualities no one else has 2 0 9 When theologians say that God 
is wâhid, they mostly use it in this second way, and then it is preferable 
to translate this term as "unique" Consequently, since we know from 
the above mentioned argumentation that there is no "second one", 
we call God "unique" (wâhid). 
Besides this name, 'Abd al-Jabbâr mentions two others that can be 
applied to God because they are both synonyms of His name wâhid; 
these names are . "jariT (unique) and "nahid"1 (alone)2 1 0 
2 0 4
 СГ Sarh 278, Mitgni IV, 275-276 The argument is elaborated in Wugnl IV, 
277-146 See also Wuhit I, 216 
2 0 5
 In Arabic 'Abd al-Jabbâr calls this al-haqiqa Abu Hâsim held the opinion that 
the original meaning was the second one mentioned in our text Cf Mugni V, 245 
2 0 6
 Wahid is that which la ymajaiza' wa-lá yalaba'ad, the first verb using the root 
jz'. from which the noun /u:' (atom) is derived, the other one using the less specific 
root b'd CI Sarh 277 In this way the single atom can be called nâhid 
2 0 7
 When we call a human being wâhid—or, for instance, the ten wâhid—wc indicate 
—according to the thesis of Abu Hâsim that the parts into which it can be divided 
do not have the same name as the totality Cf Mugni V, 244-245 
2011
 Mugni V, 244 and Mugni IV, 247-249 
^
9
 Thus the word náhid is used when we say that someone is wâhid in his time 
or in his era Cf Sarh 277 and Mugni V, 245 
2 1 0
 Cf Mugni V, 245-246 
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6. GOD'S ACTS 
Very much can be said about God's acts,2 ' ' not because there are 
so many different acts—every act is either a substance or one of the 
known accidents, and the only thing the acting subject actually does 
is to bring them into existence—but because these acts can be charac-
terized in various ways by the function they have in the relationship 
between God and the world.212 And possibly even more can be said 
about the acts God actually does not produce, but which, nevertheless, 
fill many pages in 'Abd al-Jabbâr's theological works. 
And just as acting subjects in this world are qualified by certain 
qualities corresponding to the acts they do or did,213 God is also 
qualified by these qualities based upon the acts He did, His "factual 
qualities" (sifât al-fi'l). The reason that we qualify Him in this way, 
is that we know that acts came from Him, that at a given moment 
He brought into existence the substances or accidents concerned. As 
we qualify Him with one of the essential qualities because we came to 
know that He is in the corresponding state, we qualify Him with one 
of the factual qualities because we came to know that something is His 
act. Therefore, a factual quality does not mean more than that the 
act concerned came from Him.214 And as the acts can have different 
characteristics, so the qualities and names for God vary with them. 
We deal only with the general principles of God's acting and leave 
aside most of the secondary characteristics. We only discuss God's acts 
in general, and the thesis that all His acts are good and that He 
performs no evil acts. And although being willing and non-willing are 
not really factual qualities—we know that God is in a state before we 
know the act "will" or "non-will", just as we know first that a human 
being is willing and just as we only after knowing that state deduce 
2 1 1
 In the Mugn! the discussions about God's unity and His essential qualities occupy 
the first five parts of the work, while the remaining fifteen parts are filled with discussions 
that have one relation or other with God's acts, also by being, e g., the answer of a human 
being to God's acts. In the Sarh, the discussions about God's Justice arc found on 
pp 299-608, but also in the treatises on the three following Mu'tazilî principles much 
will be said about God's acts. 
2 1 2
 Thus the qualification of acts in categories of good and evil; also God's taklif, 
His imposing duties, and the characteristics which acts may get because of their being 
involved in the interrelationship of God and man which is expressed by the term 
taklif 
2 1 3
 Cf. ρ 210, where I mentioned as examples of such qualities: speaking 
(mutakallim), beating (dânb). moving (muharnk), and making immobile (musakkm) 
2 1 4
 Cf. the discussion on the quality fail. pp 209-210. 
THEODICY 267 
the existence of an act and qualifier "will" or "non-will"215—we here 
discuss God's will and non-will, just as 'Abd al-Jabbâr does The 
will and non-will also are God's own acts though it is better not to say 
that God's being willing is a factual quality, but to say that He is 
willing and non-willing "because of a qualifier" 2 1 6 
In the present context 'Abd al-Jabbâr also pays much attention to 
another one among God's acts, His speech, mainly with the intention 
to show that His speech really is His act, and that His being speaking 
really is a factual quality God's speech and His quality "speaking" 
will form the subject of our next chapter 
Fâ'il : doing Since we came to know God as the One who brought the 
bodies in this world into existence, and since we concluded with 'Abd 
al-Jabbâr that besides God there can be no second one who would 
be per se and essentially able, everything in our world living beings 
who are able by an ability are not able to—that is to say, all bodies 
and most of the accidents—217 must be brought into existence and 
"done" by God Consequently, we can call Him "doing" 218 
But, since one only can be qualified as "doing" (fail) when we 
know that he did some act, and since one only is entitled to this 
quality because of an act one brought into existence, God only is entitled 
to the quality "doing" from the first moment of His creation Before 
that moment God was not doing, He was only able 
Besides the fact that there is a difference between the acts God can 
do and the acts we can do—God is able to do everything we can 
do, but we cannot do everything He can do—there is also a difference 
between the way God acts and the way we act God being essentially 
and per se able, does not have to make use of the substrate of an ability 
to produce acts, He can act without such a substrate, a way of acting 
that is called iktira 2 1 9 God acts directly, by iktira, but not exclusively, 
He can also use secondary causes in His acting and produce things by 
"generation" (tawlîd) 2 2 0 
2 1 5
 As regards the way in which we can know that someone is willing, cf ρ 211 
about the way we know that we ourselves are willing (or non-willing) and ρ 214 
about the way we know someone еіье to be willing (or non-willing) 
2 1 6
 About the division of God's qualities into two (essential and factual qualities) 
or into three (essential, because of a qualifier, and none of these two) categories, 
see note 126 and Muhil I, 100 
2 1 7
 Cf pp 127-128 
2 1 8
 The quality fail is discussed by 'Abd al-Jabbâr in Mugnl XX/2, 187-189 
2 1 9
 Cf ρ 203 
2 2 0
 This is discussed in Mugnl IX, 94-101 
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We already saw that God, since He is essentially able, can produce 
every genus of acts and any number of it. By deduction we know which 
acts He in fact has done, but the question remains whether we can say, 
a priori, that God will do some acts and will not do some other 
concrete acts. This question is discussed below. 
Because "doing" implies that the act becomes existent (mawjûd), 
God is called "WM/ZÍ/"221 (making existent), and because His acts are 
coming into existence and brought into existence (hâdit wa-muhdat), 
He is called "muhdit" (bringing into existence) 2 2 2 
If we look into the way He acts, we call Him "тикШгГ1 (acting 
directly without the use of the substrate of an ability) and ^ímuwallιcΓ, 
(generating).2 2 3 
God can also be qualified as "mubdi'" (originating), meaning that 
He is the first who did a special аЛ 2 2 * We call Him "kâhq" (creating) 
because this quality indicates that He does an act in a "determined" 
(muqaddar) way; this name is more specially applied to God 2 2 5 
Finally, we conclude that words which indicate that the act exists 
or that it exists in a way which is found in all His acts or in some of 
them, can be applied to God. What indicates something more and 
in fact is related to an ability, the substrate of an act, hard labor {ta ab), 
and the use of instruments or limbs, all that has to be denied and cannot 
be applied to God 2 2 6 
221
 The printed text reads {Mugni XX 2, 187) maw/ûd (existent), when we try 
to find an interpretation of this word in the context, it becomes apparent that we have 
to read instead of it mû/td (making existent) Cf pp 106-107 
2 2 2
 CI pp 110-115, where we airead) argued that everything that is temporal and 
once came into existence needs someone who in fact brought it into existence, every 
muhdai needs a muhdit 
СГ Uugni XX 2. 187 
2 2 3
 СГ Mugn! XX 2, 190-191 One can use the name munalhd (generating) for God, 
for it is the subject that makes the secondary cause (\abab) which is said to generate 
the effect One has to be prudent in the use of this name because the word is also used 
for the begetting of a child The tford miihäUr cannot be used for God One has to 
correct the reading of Mugn! XX 2. 190, line 19 Most probably we have to read there 
wa-lä uu/âl f! fi'lili innah muhâsir, »a-la flit limali mubásir li-fi'lih one cannot say about 
His act that it is direct (viz on the substrate of the ability), nor about Him that He is 
directly producing His act 
224
 Cf UugmXX 2, 191 
224
 Cf our discussion of the meaning of the verb kalaq (to create) on pp 117-119 
Cf also Uugni XX 2, 192-193 
2 2 6
 Uugni XX 2, 194 194 In this context we mention some other names that can 
be applied to God, as synonyms lor fail are mentioned munii', sani', and 'ami/, though 
the use of these words is rectneted to some individual subjects, to indicate some 
special aspect we say that God is mudahbir (arranging His act), muqaddir (determining 
His act), inukawnm (bringing into being, cause to be kam), and mutbit (producing 
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Là уаГаІ al-qabîh: He does no evil.227 An act is, as we already 
saw, never evil in itself, essentially; it can only be evil because it occurs 
in a certain way, because it has a certain aspect (wajh). As the most 
important aspects that make an act evil, 'Abd al-Jabbâr mentions : 
wrongdoing (zulm), uselcssness Cabal), lying (kadib), ingratitude for 
a favour (kufr an-ni'ma), positive ignorance (jahf), willing evil (irâdat 
al-qabîh), commanding evil (amr bi-1-qabîh), and imposing unattainable 
duties (taklîf ma là yutâq).22B That these aspects, the occurring of an 
act in this way, make the act evil, is apparent from our experience in 
this world. An act by which the acting subject does not deserve any 
blame can become the cause of blame for the acting subject if it occurs 
in one of the above mentioned ways. Information becomes evil if it 
occurs in such a way that it does not correspond with reality; it is 
lying and in that case the informing subject deserves blame. If the 
information is given according to reality, but at a moment that no one 
hears it and also the informing subject has no use of it, it is useless and 
consequently also evil 2 2 9 
Because evil acts belong to the same genus as good acts, the quali-
fications good and evil being dependent upon the way in which they 
are done, and because it can be the same act that is good or evil 
according to the way in which it is done, it is clear that God is able to do 
acts that would be evil if He were to do them.230 
But in fact, and this is the general doctrine of the Mu'tazila,231 God 
performs no evil act. The argument 'Abd al-Jabbâr gives is the same 
in the Mitgni, the Muhit, and the Sarh : because God knows the being 
evil of the evil (thing), and because He does not need it and knows 
that He docs not need it, He surely will not choose it.232 
something so, that it is ¡clbil, firmly exisling) Cf, for all these qualities, M ugni XX 2, 
191-191 
2 2 1
 Cf Magnivi 1, 177-180 Cf also Muhit I, 257-261, in the context of pp 229-266, 
also Sarh 302-316 'Abd al-Jabbâr's position and argumentation are discussed by 'Abd 
al-Karîm 'Ulmân (Nazamal al-laklif, 294-296) and Hourani (Islamii Rationalism, 
97-102) 
2 2 Я
 Cf note 269 on ρ 88 Sec also M ugni VI 1, 61-69 and Hourani, hlamii 
Rationalem, 69-70 
2 2 4
 For the last example, see \1ugni VII, 182-184 
2 , 0
 This is mentioned in Sarh 313-316. Muhit I, 246-252. Magni VI I. 127-134 
The formulation is carefully chosen by 'Abd al-Jabbâr, he does not say that God is able 
to do c\il acts, the acts which He is able to do are non-existent and Iherelore cannot 
be e\il. for the) only become evil by the way in which they are done 
211
 This is implied in the second of their Гі\с principles, the principle of God's 
Justice See also, с g , Hourani, Islamic Rationalism. 100-101 
2 , 2
 CI Saih 302 The knowledge that He docs not need it has to be added, for. if one 
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God knows everything and, consequently, also the being evil of 
evil things; He does not need the evil thing : He is self-sufficient and 
does not need anything at all,233 and, since He is knowing everything, 
He must know also that He does not need it. The only element of the 
argumentation given above that remains to be proved, is the validity 
of the conclusion. To prove this 'Abd al-Jabbâr appeals to the evidences 
of this world, and by means of some examples he shows that, if the 
two conditions mentioned in the argumentation are fulfilled, man will 
necessarily not choose the evil thing because his motives, his dawaî 
—here : knowledge—234 do not urge him to that evil act, but hold him 
back from it. Then we can draw our conclusion that the same must be the 
case with God, because the same indications indicate the same thing 
both in this and in the other world. Moreover, the indications are 
even stronger in the other world because God knows everything and 
does not need anything at all. Therefore, the conclusion is surely 
correct.235 
We already saw that 'Abd al-Jabbâr leaves the possibility open 
that there are neutral acts, which are neither good nor evil. Some 
acts become good or evil, become value-acts, through the knowledge, 
conviction, or intention of the doing subject. If these acts lack knowl-
edge and conviction (because they are done by an unconscious person, 
a little child), they remain neutral. The acts concerned are mostly 
insignificant acts, most acts not receiving their value from the knowl-
edge, conviction, or intention of the acting subject, but from their 
aspect, the way they occur.236 
Because it is certain that God cannot do such a neutral act, and 
because we proved that He does no evil acts, all His acts must be 
necessarily good (hasan).231 
Because all God's acts are good, He is entitled to several names 
expressing this judgement on His acts : we call Him "muhsm" (doing 
good), "mun'im", "mufaddir, and "mutafaddir' (all meaning : giving 
does not need it but one is in positive ignorance and consequently one is convinced that 
one does need it, one can choose it Therefore this addition has to be made Cf Muhil I, 
257 
2 3 3
 Cf pp 260-263 
2 1 4
 About the motives cf pp 218-219 
2 3 5
 We can see this as an example of the fourth form of inference from this world 
towards the other one. see ρ 2.11 
2 3 6
 Cf pp 88-89 and notes 271 and 272 
2 3 7
 Cf Muhii 1, 262-264 
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favours), or "naß'" (giving benefits). We also call Him "musib" (acting 
rightly), "hakim" (acting wisely238), and "'άώΓ (acting justly).2 3 9 
Murid: willing.240 'Abd al-Jabbâr's most elaborate argumentation 
proving that God is really willing, is to be found in his Muhît.2*1 There 
he mentions two arguments; the first argument is entirely a posteriori, 
whereas the second has a moment of a priori-argumentation in it. 
The first way to prove that God is willing, corresponds with the 
way we can know that human beings are willing, viz., by the occurring 
of acts in such a special way in which they cannot occur when the 
acting subject is not willing. We mentioned, for instance, the occurring 
of speech as information about something individual or as a command 
to do something. Both among the data of divine revelation and among 
those of human intuition, we can find some that indicate in this way 
that God must be willing. 
We discover in the text of the Qur'ân that God is informing and 
commanding; this immediately leads to the conclusion that He must 
2 3 8
 The name hakim can also be used as an equivalent for 'aim, as we already saw 
on ρ 243. in that case it has to be translated as "wise" Cf also Mugni XX/2, 195 
2 3 9
 These names are discussed by 'Abd al-Jabbâr in Mugni XX'2, 194-196 
2 4 0
 bor a discussion of God's being willing and the qualifier by which He is willing, 
see Mugni VI 2 (the entire \olume is devoted to this subject), Muhit I, 267-288, Èarh 
431-455 See also 'Abd al-Karîm 'Utmân, Nazariyal at-taklij, 222-229 and frank, The 
Divine Attribute":, especially 496-506 
241
 In Mugni VI 2, 104-111 'Abd al-Jabbâr restricts himself to the first argument 
mentioned in the Muhit, and he does not make a clear distinction between the arguments 
based on the data of human intuition and those based on the data of divine revelation 
His argumentation is founded on the fact that God is informing (mukbir) so that his 
speech occurs as information (kabar). His acts also occur as address to someone (kttâb), 
command (amr), imposing of duties (taklif), reward (tawâb), punishment ('tqâb), praise 
(madh). and blame (damm) All these acts require a willing subject as the one who 
produced them 
The Muhit treats two arguments to prove that God is willing, accepting both of 
them They are found in Muhit I, 269-272 It is very regrettable that Houben, the editor 
of the Lebanese edition, did not entirely understand the very complicated argumentation 
'Abd al-Jabbâr wrought so that some faults crept into this edition, the bgyptan edition 
of the work (I, 265-268) shows that its editor, 'Limar 'Azmî, had less difficulties with 
this chapter 
'Abd al-Jabbâr uses two arguments, the first one is introduced ρ 269. lines 5-8, 
and is elaborated pp 269, line 23 - 272, line 5 This argument is subdivided into 
two parts, one concerned with the data of divine revelation (pp 270, line 1 -
271, line 20), the other with the data of human intuition (pp 271, line 21 272, line 5) 
The second argument can be found ρ 269, lines 9-23 The division of this chapter into 
paragraphs and the printing of some words in fat types should be corrected and 
adapted to the above mentioned interpretation of the text 
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be willing, for only in that way His speech can occur as information or 
command.242 
But also the data of human intuition and the argumentation based 
on those data, inevitably lead to the conclusion that God's acts occur 
in such a way that He must be willing. A first example consists in the 
evidence that He creates things that are of some benefit for a concrete 
person. This implies that He intends this, and we already saw 
that intention is a name for the will when it occurs in a special way, 
so that someone who is intending (qâsid) also must be willing (murici).2*3 
A second example is the creation by God of the desire for something 
bad in the heart of a human being. It is evident that He must have 
a goal (garaci) to do that. He 2 4 4 creates this desire either to tempt 
us, or to open the possibility245 of reward because we, notwithstanding 
that desire for something evil, abstain from that evil and do what is 
obligatory. And this also implies a kind of intention (qasd) in God. 
And, in general, since we know from His imposing duties that His 
acts can be reward or punishment, that they can be exaltation and 
praise, we know for certain that He is willing because acts can only 
be characterized in this special way because of His will.246 
The second argument 'Abd al-Jabbâr mentions is that "if one of 
us knows what he does, while it (the act) can be intended in itself 
and there is no hindrance247 between him and his will, that which248 
incites him to the act also incites him to the will of it." The same motives 
that incite to the act, must also incite to the will, if three conditions are 
fulfilled : one knows the act, it is possible to intend it, and the subject is 
not hindered in his willing.249 
2 4 2
 СГ Muhit I. 270-271. 
2 4 3
 We discussed the meaning of the qasd on p. 221. We described the qasd there as 
the concomitant will, viz., concomitant with the coming into existence of the act or of 
its secondary cause (sabab) 
2 4 4
 Read \af alali instead of nafalah ( "He" instead of "we"); Muhit I, 271, line 26. 
2 4 5
 Read at-ta'rid instead of at-tagrid ("exposing or making liable to something" 
instead of "making into a goal"), Muhit I, 272, line 1 
2 4 6
 Read bi-1-iráda instead of wa-1-irâda ("by the will" instead of "and the will"); 
Muhit I, 272, line 5. 
24
' ' The Arabic text runs here {Muhit I, 269). "wa-t-takhya baynah на-Ьауп irâdatih 
qâ'ima" (the Egyptian edition reads ta/liya instead of takliya, the latter is surely the 
correct reading). "the leaving to him of free access to his will is existent" That this 
expression is meant to exclude a hindrance becomes apparent from the further 
elaboration by 'Abd al-Jabbâr and the example he mentions. See also note 243. 
2 4 8
 Read here fa-má instead of /i-mâ. "that which" instead of "in what"; Muhit I, 
269. line 11 
2 4 9
 The text quoted, which can be found in Muhit I, 269, is explained and argued by 
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We know that it is not impossible that God is willing, for willing 
only supposes that the subject is living;250 we also know that God 
necessarily knows everything, and that He cannot be hindered. Con-
sequently, because He did acts that can have a goal and can be 
intended. He must be willing. For when an indication indicates some-
thing in this world, it must indicate the same thing in the other world 
too. 
Irada : will. To prove how God is willing, 'Abd al-Jabbâr makes use of 
the method of division (taqsim) of the question into its various possible 
solutions, and of exclusion of all possibilities except one, which, con-
sequently, must be the right solution.251 He argues as follows: God 
cannot be per se willing, nor can He be willing "neither252 per se nor 
by a cause", nor can He be willing by a non-existent cause, a non-
existent will, nor can He be willing by an eternal cause, an eternal 
will. When he has excluded all these possibilities, he comes to the 
conclusion that the only remaining solution must be the right one, 
'Abd al-Jabbâr in the following sentences . "Ifhe were unconscious of the act, he could 
not be willing let alone that he should be so , if he were knowing, and the thing 
not intended (rmicisûd ila\h) and the goal not connected with it —as the will itself and 
as what comes from the cleaving caused by a wound and from beating caused by 
the shaking off (read ««/</ instead of ba'cf) of dust, or pain it is not necessary that he 
wills (read \urulah instead \uzidah) because the goal is not connected with it, and if 
he were hindered from (mamnü mm) the will, he would not be willing, as we say about 
him who stands on the border of Paradise, while the will to enter it is made unattainable 
for him, without a will" (Muhît I, 269) 
The second condition may present a difficulty here and in the text of the 
argumentation itself it is mentioned as a condition that the act must be muqsûd. When 
we take this literally, in ils purely passive sense, it means that the act must be "intended"; 
but, because the intention is the will itself, it certainly is willed In that case, there is no 
need for the remainder of the argumentation and it is not easy to apply it to God 
Consequently, we most probably must translate it as indicating the possibility, it is 
possible that it is intended; this interpretation is confirmed by the examples given and 
by the addition in the text of the argument that the act must be maqsüd "fi nafsih" (in 
itself). 
2 5 0
 The argumentation is only valid when God actually can be willing. But in our 
discussion of the quality "willing" in 'Abd al-Jabbâr's anthropology, we already saw 
that this quality only supposes a living being Consequently, God can be willing 
2 5 1
 Cf. Muhll I, 274, where 'Abd al-Jabbâr also mentions, very briefly, a second 
argument God is willing, but He is not necessarily willing. The influence of the will on 
the acts that occur in a special way by the concomitant will, is a necessary influence 
('я/с tarit/ al-i/âb) If God would be necessarily willing, no possibility of choosing 
(read takayyur instead of lahayyu: in Muhlt I, 274, line 6) would remain so that His 
information could not be this lime about this Zayd and another time about another 
Zayd, while the form of the information remains the same (for instance, "Zayd is great"). 
252
 I added here la (Muhit I, 274, line 10) and I read : ". an yakún muridan li-nafsih, 
wa-lâ là li-na/sih ua-lâ li-'illa ..." 
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which is that God must be willing by a temporal will, a will that comes 
into existence (hádit). 
When we look into the various rejected possibilities, we first meet 
the statement that God cannot be per se willing. If He were so, He 
should be willing everything that can be willed, everything that some 
other willing subject wills, because a willed object is not restricted to 
one willing subject but can be willed by every willing subject. This 
conclusion, at its turn, leads to a great number of absurd conse-
quences, as, for instance, that God should will every act He is able to, 
and consequently also should produce every act He is able to.2 5 3 
Another argument is said to be that in the same way in which we came 
to the conclusion that God is willing, we also must come to the con-
clusion that He is non-willing (for instance, because He is known to 
be prohibiting). That implies that, even if God is not per sc non-willing, 
He certainly must will the acts He is non-willing. And that evidently 
is absurd.254 
Nor is it possible that God would be willing "neither per se nor by 
a cause"255—just as He is perceiving neither per se nor by a cause— 
for in that case, that which makes that He wills some things and does 
not will others, and that He wills something at a given moment after 
He did not will it—and this is a cause ('ilia) or qualifier (ma no)— 
would be absent, and God should will everything that can be willed 
at every moment. And that leads, as we already saw, to absurd con-
2 5 3
 СГ Muhii I, 275 and Mugni \\2, 111 As absurd conclusions from the thesis that 
God would be per se willing and consequently willing everything that can be willed, 'Abd 
al-Jabbâr mentions . 
When we will something for ourselves (possessions, children), God must will it too, 
and because He can produce it, He must produce it (Mugni VI 2, III and Muhit I, 
275) God should produce more than He actually did. He should have given us more 
life, knowledge, ability, etc (MugniVl'l. 111 and Muhit I, 275) He should have produced 
things before the time He actually produced them, even from all eternity (Mugni VI'2, 
111-112 and Muhit I, 276). Because one of us can will the opposite of what someone 
else wills. God would have to will opposite things at the same time, this argument is 
said to be used by the teachers (suyûk) (Mugni VI 2, 112 and Muhit I, 277) God would 
also have to will everything that actually comes into existence and thus, for instance, 
also the unbelief of the unbelievers and the evil acts of human beings This is not 
possible although some of 'Abd al-Jabbâr's opponents- the As'ariya maintain that 
God wills indeed every thing that comes into existence (Muhit I, 278) 
2 5 4
 Cf Mugni Г2, 130 and Muhit I, 276 
2 5 5
 The sequence of the chapters in the Muhit is not logical; in this work 'Abd 
al-Jabbâr first discusses the assumption that God would be willing by an eternal will 
(Muhit I, 279), and only afterwards he proves that He is not willing "neither per se 
nor by a cause" (Muhit I, 280-281). 
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elusions 25Ь God's being willing cannot be compared with His being 
perceiving, for in the case of perceiving we met a condition that had 
to be fulfilled to make the actual perception possible, viz , the existence 
of at least one perceptible thing Concerning His being willing, however, 
no such condition is possible since one can will what is non-existent 
as what is existent 2 5 7 
When God is known to be willing, and 'Abd al-Jabbâr proved 
that He cannot be per se willing, and that He cannot be willing "neither 
per se nor by a cause", we necessarily must draw the conclusion that 
He is willing by a cause or qualifier 
This cause cannot be non-existent, for in that case it lacks the 
influence needed to restrict the number and actuality of things willed, 
something non-existent being excluded from any real influence on 
existed things 2 5 8 Consequently, the cause must be existent, this implies 
that it is either eternal or temporal 
God cannot be willing by an eternal cause, that would lead to the 
same conclusions as the assumption that He knows by an eternal 
cause what is eternal must be similar to Him, and must be the 
"second one" the impossibility of whose existence we already demon-
strated 2 5 9 We would also have to accept that there was only one will 
and, consequently, only one thing willed Moreover, if God would 
be willing by an eternal cause, He must be willing in all eternity, and 
this leads to the same conclusions as the assumption that He were 
willing per se 2 6 0 
The conclusion must be drawn here that God is willing by a temporal 
(hâdit or muhdat261) will This will cannot inhere in God, for He 
cannot be a substrate for accidents. Nor can this will inhere in a sub-
strate that is lifeless (jamâd), because the will characterizes a living 
being and therefore cannot exist in a lifeless substrate 2 6 2 If this will 
2 5 6
 Cf Mugni VI 2, 134-135 and Muhil I, 281 See also note 253 
2 5 7
 Cf Mugni Vi'l, 135-136 and Muhil 280-281 
2 5 8
 This is discussed briefly in Muhit I, 282 and in ¿arh 448 
2 5 9
 Cf pp 263-265 The thesis (hat God is willing by an eternal will is said to be 
adhered to by the AS'ariya, $arh 447 
2 6 0
 \fugni VI 2, 137, Muhit I, 279, and Sarh 447-448 
2 6 1
 While the Mugni in this context consistently uses the word muhdat (the "normal" 
word in 'Abd al-Jabbâr's vocabulary), the Muhit here prefers the word hadit For 'Abd 
al-Jabbâr this difference in the vocabulary used does not imply a difference in the 
meaning, for in both works the will is said to be God's act and therefore not only 
"coming into existence" but also "brought into existence" The Sarh also uses the term 
"muhdat" 
2 6 2
 Cf Mugni Vl/2, 149-173 and Muhit I, 282-283 
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were to inhere in a living substrate, it would be that substrate which 
would be willing by it, and not God. Therefore, the only possibility 
that remains is that this will, this qualifier, this accident is existent 
without inhering in a substrate {mawjûd là β mahall). This conclusion 
may seem strange, but, 'Abd al-Jabbâr nearly apologizes, the con-
clusion is evident and inevitable.263 God is willing by a temporal will, 
which is existent without inhering in a substrate. 
7. THE USE OF "REVEALED" ARGUMENTS IN THEODICY 
Let us conclude this paragraph and this chapter with a short recapit-
ulation of what we said in the first paragraph of this chapter about 
the use of the data of divine revelation (as-sam') as indications in 'Abd 
al-Jabbâr's theological argumentation,264 by including in it the con-
clusions we reached in the course of this last paragraph. 
When the contemporaries of the prophet Muhammad witnessed 
some acts which a human being who is able by an ability is not able 
to produce, and when Muslims of all centuries witnessed to the Holy 
Qur'ân as a miracle that no human being or any other being that is 
able by an ability is able to produce, we must conclude that they are 
made by God, the only one who is essentially able. 
When these acts of God indicate that a given message is His message, 
and since we know that He is wise (hakim) and just ('adii), knows every-
thing and will not deceive, we must come to the conclusion that this 
message is His message and that its contents are the truth. This 
message is the Qur'ân. 
Not every verse in the Qur'ân forms in itself an indication and 
an argument; some verses are obscure and require a careful inter-
pretation. This is evidently the case when a given text in the Qur'ân 
seems to contradict a conclusion based on the data of human intuition. 
The verse in question has to be interpreted because both forms of 
knowledge, both intuitive ('aqli) and revealed (sam'i), are guaranteed 
- ' '
,
 Cf Мицпі VI 2. 162. where a number of difficulties is mentioned which seem 
to contradict the assumption of an accident and qualifier existing not in a substrate. 
He tries to refute these in the remainder of the chapter To the thesis that an accident 
cannot exist without a substrate he gives as his answer that the only thing accidents 
necessarily have in common is the fact that they are not remaining Therefore, it is 
not a priori excluded that some accidents could exist without a substrate Cf Mugni VI'2, 
166-167 See also Sarh 449-455 
" * CI pp 95-104 
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by God Himself and, therefore, cannot be contradictory. Since the 
conclusion drawn from a correct argumentation cannot be inter-
preted, whereas words can be interpreted because they can have 
various meanings, it is evident that it is the text in the Qur'ân that 
needs an interpretation.265 
When 'Abd al-Jabbâr has proved that the Qur'ân is a trustworthy 
source of knowledge, he can use it to confirm his theses, which he 
showed to be correct by a rational argumentation based on the data 
of human intuition, and he can discover the supplementory knowledge 
God gives us by His revelation, a knowledge that cannot be reached 
by reflection on human intuition alone. 
In the same way, 'Abd al-Jabbâr can also make use of the two other 
sources of revealed knowledge, the "Sunna" and the "Ijmâ"\ which 
both are guaranteed by the Qur'ân, and can be used in the argumen-
tations just as the Qur'ân itself can be used.266 
" ^ See Muhit I, 199 CI" also p. 102. 
" * Cf pp 102-104 
CHAPTER THREE 
THE QUR'ÂN AND GOD'S OTHER SPEECH 
The title of this chapter is derived from the texts of 'Abd al-Jabbâr's 
Mugnî and his Muhit, where the discussions on God being speaking 
and on His speech are introduced in this way.1 The fact that the 
sections concerned bear this title already indicates that for 'Abd al-
Jabbâr the Qur'ân really is God's speech and that, moreover, God has 
more speech than the Qur'ân alone. And though the discussions 
among Muslim theologians in this matter were centred upon the 
Qur'ân—probably the reason why it is mentioned here in the first 
place too—, 'Abd al-Jabbâr clearly puts this question about the 
essence of the Qur'ân in the broader context of a discussion of 
speech and the quality "speaking" in general, and God's speech and 
His quality "speaking" in particular. 
Against the background of the survey of 'Abd al-Jabbâr's "philos-
ophy" which we elaborated in the preceding chapter—in fact this is 
the background against which 'Abd al-Jabbâr places his treatise on 
God's speech and the Qur'ân—it must be possible to understand clearly 
and correctly the rather complex argumentations concerning speech 
and speaking, both in this and in the other world, as wc find them in 
'Abd al-Jabbâr's works. After our study of the terminology he uses 
and of his views upon the world, man, and God, we elaborate one 
concrete topic from the many dealt with in 'Abd al-Jabbâr's theo-
logical works in order to discover how he elaborates a concrete subject, 
how he sharpens his arguments, and attacks his opponents. The broader 
exposition of a single subject elucidates his methodical approach. 
The subject of this chapter, God's speech, has not been chosen 
entirely at random; in fact, it was a central topic in the early theo-
1
 Of Wugni VII, 3 and Muhit I, 316 There is not much literature available dealing 
expressly with this matter, besides the work of 'Abd al-Karîm 'Ltmân (Nuzurhut 
at-taklifi, two articles should be mentioned here J Bouman, The Doc trine of 'Abd 
al-D/abhâr on the Qur'ân m the Created Woid of Allah, an article which he wrote in 
Verbum. Utrecht 1964, 67-86 and which is concerned with the text of the Mugni, the 
second article is G Va|da, La parole tréee de Dieu daprès le théologien Kannte 
Yùsul al-Baûr. SI 19 (1974), 59-76, Vajda compares the text of Yûsuf al-Basîr with the 
three texts composed by 'Abd al-Jabbâr 
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logical discussions, and if has its links with nearly all aspects of 
'Abd al-Jabbâr's "philosophy".2 
The subject being dealt with in each of the three theological works 
of 'Abd al-Jabbâr that are at our disposal at the moment, the Sarh, 
the Mugni, and the Muhît, we discuss them all, though we base ourselves 
mainly upon the text of the Mugni, which is by far the most elaborate. 
It is hoped that in this way the characteristics of each of these three 
works become more manifest, and hopefully also the evolution in 'Abd 
al-Jabbâr's theological thinking will come to light. 
In this chapter, we first discuss the three texts concerned; after this 
introduction, we follow 'Abd al-Jabbâr's line of argumentation in the 
Mugni (and in the Muhit3) : we treat the accident speech as we know 
it in this world and the quality speaking also as we know it in this 
world; then we follow 'Abd al-Jabbâr in drawing his conclusions about 
the quality speaking in the other world, when applied to God, and 
about the essence of God's speech. We conclude this chapter with 
some final questions 'Abd al-Jabbâr adds to his discussions on this 
subject. 
A. THE TEXTS 
Sarh al-uçûl al-kamsa.4 'Abd al-Jabbâr's text on the Qur'ân and God's 
speech we find in Sarh al-usûl al-kamsa seems to be the oldest among 
the three texts that are still at our disposal. 'Abd al-Jabbâr himself, 
at the end of the dictation of his voluminous work, the Mugni, makes 
a remark implying that he dictated the text of the Sarh during the time 
he also dictated the Mugni, a dictation which took some twenty 
years.5 Unhappily, from the text of the Mugni it does not become clear 
whether the Sarh was composed before or after the dictation of 
the seventh part of the Mugni, dealing with the same subject. When 
2
 Speech being a perceptible accident and belonging to the genus sound, the 
discussions of it will be based on 'Abd al-Jabbâr's cosmology, while the discussion 
οΓ the quality speaking has its connections with his anthropology The whole discussion 
about God's speech and His being speaking is evidently based on his theodicy 
3
 The outlines of the sections concerned in both the Mugni and the Muhit correspond, 
while those of the Sarh are evidently different as we will show below 
4
 Badawi (Histoire, 253-255) deals with the chapter concerned of the Sarh, 
his discussion is, however, very short and does not deal with the general structure 
of the text concerned, nor with Us place in the whole of the Sarh 
5
 Cf Mugni XX 2, 258 Among the works mentioned there as written before or 
during the dictation of the Mugni, the Muhit is not mentioned The list, however, docs 
not pretend to be complete 
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we look, however, into the form and composition of both works, and 
when we study the argumentations given, it becomes obvious that the 
argumentation in the Sarh does not show the same rigid order and 
evidence we find in the Mugni and the Muhit The argumentations 
appear to be simpler and less elaborate. The reason for this relatively 
simple form of argumentation could be that this work is meant to be 
more "popular" and more "practical" than the two other works 
It mentions, for example, at the end of many chapters in a concise 
form what everybody has to know about the subject treated 6 There-
fore, we are permitted to state that the Sarh, be it written before or 
after the seventh part of the Mugni, represents a simpler form of 'Abd 
al-Jabbâr's theology, which will be elaborated in breadth and in depth 
in both the Mugni and the Muhit It is easy to see that the Mugni and the 
Muhit show much more correspondance than the Sarh and either the 
Mugni or the Muhit Therefore, I mention here the Sarh in the first 
place before the two other theological works 
The text on the Qur'ân which is found in Sarh 527-563 comprises 
only one single chapter і/ачі), this chapter bears the title "The Qur'ân 
and the mention of the disagreement about it" 7 Thus, in this title 
only the Qur'ân is mentioned as the subject of the chapter 
This chapter found its place in 'Abd al-Jabbâr's treatise on God's 
Justice (al-'adi), the second one of the five Mu'tazilî principles treated 
in this work 8 'Abd al-Jabbâr mentions two reasons why he gave it 
this place First, the Qur'ân is one of God's acts, as an act it could be 
good or evil according to the way it happens, because the discussion 
of God's Justice is concerned with His acts and the fact that they 
only occur in such a way that they are ^ood, the Qur'ân has to be dealt 
with in this context to show how it must occur to be really good 9 
6
 See, for instance Sarh 155, 160, 166, and many other instances See also Sarh 34, 
where 'Abd al-Jabbâr begins the text of the Sarh in such a way that it could confirm this 
aspect of the work 
Sarh 527 ' Fail fi 1-Qur'ân i\a-dikr al-kilâf ßh" Badawi (Histoire, 253) gives his 
paragraph the heading "La creation du Coran ' This not only does not correspond with 
the Arabic heading of the chapter, but also docs not cover its real contents as we shall 
see below 
8
 God's Justice, the second from the five Mu'ta7ili principles dealt with in the 
Sarh, is discussed on pp 299-608 
9
 Cf Sarh 527 " the Qur'ân is one of God's acts which can (yasihh, the 
metaphysical possibility) occur in a way it is good and in another way it is evil, 
the chapter about the Justice is about His acts and what He can (yajuz it is permitted, 
the factual possibility) do and what he cannot" Acts are not good or evil in themselves, 
but because they occur in a certain way 
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The second reason why 'Abd al-Jabbâr discusses the Qur'ân here, is 
said to be that it belongs to God's major favours and His favours 
are dealt with in the treatise on His Justice because we can know 
by it some moral rules and some moral judgements.10 By mentioning 
this second reason, 'Abd al-Jabbâr makes a connection between the 
Qur'ân as God's speech and the Qur'ân as a source of human 
knowledge. As a consequence, he treats both these aspects of the 
Qur'ân—which in the Mugni and the Muhii are treated separately—11 
together. Therefore, this chapter on the Qur'ân as God's speech is 
followed immediately by some chapters on the Quran as a source 
of knowledge : why God reveals, how we can know that something is 
His revelation, how we can know that the Qur'ân we know is really 
His speech, and how we must explain the text of the Qur'ân.12 All 
this together is dealt with at the end of the treatise on God's Justice; 
after the discussions of God's acts, what He does and what He does not 
do, these chapters on the Qur'ân conclude the treatise on God's Justice. 
The internal structure of the chapter about the essence of the Qur'ân 
as God's speech—the chapter that we are interested in in the context 
of this study—at first sight is not very clear.13 However, this chapter 
of the Sarh can be divided into three sections : first, a short intro-
duction containing also the opinions of the opponents and those of 
the Mu'tazila (pp. 527-528); second, follows his own argumentation 
(pp. 528-531); finally, the third and last section, and by far the longest 
one, is an elaborate refutation of the opinions of his opponents 
(pp. 531-563). 
'Abd al-Jabbâr's own argumentation is very short; it takes two pages 
and a half. In comparison with the texts of the Mugni and the Muhit 
it is also rather simple : after a discussion of speech in general- -what 
10
 See Sarh 527 So, besides dealing with the Qur'ân as God's speech (the first 
reason given), he also deals with the Qur'ân as a source of knowledge (the second 
reason) 
11
 In the Mugni these topics are treated, respectively, in Mugni VII and in Mugni 
(XV and) XVI 
12
 Sarh 563-608 
13
 In the printed text one finds written in the margin from time to time some 
important words taken from the text These words suggest a division of the text 
into separate sections. In fact, they are rather confusing and they do not mark the 
real division of the text, nor the really important topics. The same holds true of the 
table of contents; the indications given there seem to be chosen sometimes completely 
at random. See, for instance, six topics mentioned as sections of this chapter on ρ 826, 
which by no means indicate the real division Especially the mention of al-kaläm β 
l-kalq wa-ì-maklùq is out of place. 
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it is, how to formulate a definition—he comes to speak about God's 
speech which He revealed to His prophet, and from the fact that 
it—as all God's acts— must be good, he draws his conclusions as to 
how this divine speech actually must be : the same kind of speech as we 
find in this world.14 
As for his opponents, who receive most of 'Abd al-Jabbâr's attention 
in this chapter, he mentions in his introduction to this chapter two 
groups of them : first, the Haswîya or anthropomorphists,1^ who hold 
the opinion that the text of the Qur'ân, even the text that is recited and 
written down, is eternal and uncreated; second, the adherents of Ibn 
Kullâb and al-As'ari,16 who state that God is speaking by an eternal 
speech, an eternal qualifier inhering in His essence {manâ qadim qaim 
bi-dâtih),17 and that the recited and written texts of the Qur'ân are 
either a reproduction (hikâya; this is the opinion of the Kullâbîya) 
or an expression {'ibára; this is the opinion of the As'arîya, a correction 
upon the doctrine of the Kullâbîya) of God's eternal speech. Thus, 
whereas the Haswîya speak about an eternal Qur'ân, even in its material 
form, the Kullâbîya and As'arîya speak about an eternal Qur'ân 
inhering in God Himself, which is one and indivisible and of which 
the Qur'ân (and the Jewish and Christian scriptures) which God 
revealed and we hear and recite is a reproduction or an expression. 
In his refutations—the third section of this chapter—'Abd al-Jabbâr 
first deals with the thesis that the revealed Qur'ân is eternal;18 next 
14
 Cf Sarh 531 • "God's speech cannot be without a meaning (jaula). He also cannot 
address us by His message and then will nothing at all by it, or will something else than 
the outward meaning ol the text without explaining this" In that case, God's speech 
would be useless ('abat) and. consequently, evil (Cf ρ 90) 'Abd al-Jabbâr's conclusion is 
that God's speech therefore in order to be good must be "according to the definition 
we mentioned" of our human speech 
15
 Cf Sarh 527 'Abd al-Jabbâr calls these opponents "al-Haswîya ал-Nawâbit 
mm a/-Hanâbila". Cf pp 22-23 
16
 Al-As'arî is mentioned here to follow the same doctrine as Ibn Kullâb and his 
followers did, he only changed the expression "reproduction" to indicate the relation 
between God's eternal speech and the Qur'ân in "expression" because, according to 
him (and to 'Abd al-Jabbâr), the use of the term "reproduction" (htkâva) implies that 
both God's speech and the Qur'ân are either eternal or created, both being necessarily 
of the same genus. 'Abd al-Jabbâr states that the same holds true when one uses the term 
"expression" ('¡bara) instead of "reproduction" Ci Sarh 528. 
17
 Badawi, Histoire, 254, renders this expression by "une idée existante par soi". 
Evidently, the expression bi-dätih must indicate the essence of God, not that of speech 
In Histoire, 253, Badawi renders "une idée existante en Dieu", here only the translation 
of ma'nâ by "idée" can be questioned. 
18
 Cf Sarh 531-532 This is introduced by the words "Concerning the refutation of 
the first group, who say that the Qur'ân is eternal together with God . " (Sarh 531) 
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he deals with the thesis that God is speaking by an eternal qualifier 
inhering in His essence, in which context he also argues that the 
quality speaking only indicates that the qualified subject made speech 
(mutakaUim means fail kalâm).'9 Then he discusses the arguments 
brought into the field by the adherents of the thesis that the revealed 
Qur'ân is eternal,20 and in this context he also shows that the Qur'ân 
can be said to be created (maklûq). Then he turns again to the other 
group of opponents, to prove that God's speech (even when taken as 
an eternal qualifier) cannot really be eternal, and here he deals briefly 
with the concepts of reproduction and expression, used by respectively 
the Kullâbîya and the As'ariya in their description of the Qur'ân.21 
'Abd al-Jabbâr mentions next a thesis he did not mention before, 
implying that God is speaking "by His essence", per se and essentially; 
this doctrine is ascribed to Muhammad bn 'Isa al-Burgût.22 Finally 
'Abd al-Jabbâr deals with some arguments used by the As'ariya to 
prove their thesis that God's speech is an eternal qualifier inhering 
in His essence.23 
Thus we can render the structure of this chapter in the following 
shematic way (the numbers indicate the pages in the printed text) : 
I. INTRODUCTION 527-528 
opinion of the Haswîya (the revealed Qur'ân is 
eternal) 527 
opinion of the Kullâbîya and As'ariya (God's speech 
is eternal and inheres in His essence) 527-528 
opinion of the Mu'tazila 528 
19
 This texl is introduced by the statement "Concerning the refutation of him who 
says that God's speech is a qualifier inhering in His essence, " Here the eternity 
of this qualifier is not directly at stake, its eternity will be dealt with below, the 
argumentation is concerned with its inhering in God's essence and the reason why 
someone is qualified as speaking either by the inhering of a qualifier or because he 
made it (Cf Sarh 532-542) 
20
 Cf Sarh 542 "He who disagrees on the eternity of the Qur'ân has (advanced 
some) sophisms " The statement that the Qur'ân is said to be created—a general 
Mu'tazili doctrine—is discussed in Sarh 545-549 
21
 Cf Sarh 549 "And after all this we return to the indications which indicate 
that God's speech cannot (là yajûz a factual impossibility) be eternal" 
22
 According to Watt (Formative Period, 203), he was a pupil of an-Najjâr, an 
early theologian, who did not belong to the Mu'tazila; he died in 854 or 855 AD 
Cf also Sarh 551-552 
23
 These arguments are concerned with the whole theory of the As'ariya about 
God's speech, its eternity and its inhering in God's essence "Maybe these AS'arîya 
who established God's speech as an eternal qualifier inhering in His essence say " 
(Sarh 558) 
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II. ARGUMENTATION 528-531 
speech 528-530 
God's speech 530-531 
III. REFUTATIONS 531-563 
The revealed Qur'ân is not eternal (against the 
Haswîya) 531-532 
God's speech does not inhere in Him (against the 
Kullâbîya and As'ariya) but speaking means : 
making speech 532-542 
Arguments of the Haswîya refuted (Qur'ân is created) 542-549 
God's speech is not eternal (against Kullâbîya and 
As'ariya) 549-551 
God is not essentially speaking (against al-Burgût) 551-558 
Arguments of the As'ariya reflited 558-563 
Al-Mugni fi abwâb at-tawhid wa-l-'adl.24 We already saw that the text 
about the Qur an we find in 'Abd al-Jabbâr's Mugnî is not evidently 
of a later date than the text written down in his Sarh, this last work 
being dictated during the time the Mugnî was composed.25 But 
whereas the Sarh seems to be rather popular and shows the character 
of a handbook, the Mugnî is clearly intended to be a real "summa 
theologica", in which all problems are dealt with and the opinions of 
all possible opponents broadly discussed and refuted. The text, con-
sequently, is much more elaborate than the text of the Sarh. Most 
probably, however, the Muhît has been composed after the Mugnî; 
not only is the Muhît not mentioned when 'Abd al-Jabbâr at the end 
of his dictation of the Mugnî mentions the works he wrote during his 
dictation of this summa and some works he wrote before,26 but, 
notwithstanding the great resemblance between the Mugnî and the 
Muhît in their treatment of most questions, 'Abd al-Jabbâr's way of 
thinking appears to have ripened meanwhile, and have become more 
philosophical ; the author seems to rectify some statements and opinions 
2 4
 Bouman, The Doitrme of 'Abd al-D/abbár, deals with the part of the Mugni 
concerning God's speech and the Qur'ân (the seventh part) He is mainly inlercsled 
in the chapters where 'Abd al-Jabbär attacks the opponents, especially the As'ariya, 
and tries to refute their arguments 
25
 CT our ρ 279 and M ugni XX 2, 258. 
2 6
 Cf Mugnî XX 2, 258, 'Abd al-Jabbâr mentions the works he wrote during 
the time he dictated the Mugni as an excuse why this dictation lasted for some twenty 
years He would not have forgotten so voluminous a work as the Muhii actually is. 
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propagated in the Mugni, but without mentioning that book, as far as 
I have been able to verify.2'1 
The text is found in the seventh part of the Mugni, which it entirely 
fills. It covers 222 pages and is divided into 23 chapters. The manu-
script bears the title "About the Qur'ân and God's other speech" 
{Al-kalâm fi l-Qur'ân wa-sâ'ir kalâm Allah subhânah wa-taâlâ).2B 
Whereas the title of this text in the Sarh is restricted to the mention 
of the Qur'ân, here God's speech in general is explicitly mentioned too. 
As in the Sarh, here also God's speech and the Qur'ân are treated 
in the broader context of God's Justice. Having dealt with acts in 
general and with the judgements about their value, especially the judge-
ments good and evil, and having proved that God will do no evil 
acts and surely will do what is obligatory,29 'Abd al-Jabbâr discusses 
some acts to prove that they are either really God's acts or human 
acts, to treat afterwards the value of these acts and the characteristics 
related to these values. All this is announced by 'Abd al-Jabbâr in 
the beginning of his treatise on Gods Justice (His 'adi).30 The first 
act he deals with is God's will, which he proves to be God's good act, 
and the consequences of which being good he discusses. Next he turns 
to God's speech to prove that His speech too is His good act, and to 
discuss its consequences. Having discussed these two divine acts, he 
comes to speak about human acts, proving that they are really human 
and not in any way God's acts. In this context he does not discuss 
the Qur'ân as a source of knowledge : "we postpone the discussion of 
the inimitability (i'jâz) of the Qur'ân, the related question of the 
aspect (wajh) of its inimitability, the cessation of the attacks of those 
who attack it, and the mention of its judgements till the chapter on 
the prophecies, God willing."31 
The internal structure of this seventh part of the Mugni is not 
27
 Cf 'Abd al-Karim 'Utmân, Qâtli l-Qudâl, 69 See, for instance, the way 'Abd 
al-Jabbâr describes the relation between the acting subject and his act. and the way 
we can know that a given act is actually the act of a certain subject Cf. note 249 on 
ρ 207 
2
" For more details about the manuscript of this pan of the Mugni, about ils 
edition and the title given to the printed text of this part in comparison with the title 
mentioned in the manuscript pp 35-38 
2 4
 All this is treated in .Mugni VI I, in Mugni VI'2 the divine will is discussed and in 
.Mugni VII God's speech 
1 0
 Cf Mugni VI I. 3-4 "It is not possible to declare that He refrains from many 
acts, unless we explained before that they are acts This supposes that we explain that 
speech is His act and docs not belong to the qualities of His essence" (Mugni VI 1, 4) 
•" Cf Mugni VII, 5. read nu'akkir (we postpone") instead of ии/іг ("we summarize") 
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self-evident, although 'Abd al-Jabbâr divided it into chapters, bearing 
titles that indicate the subject dealt with in the chapter concerned, 
and, moreover, in his introductory chapter described the contents of 
this part of his Mugnî.32 Its structure is obscured by the many argumen-
tations directed against the opponents and the addition of entire 
chapters to refute their doctrine.33 In consequence, the opinions of the 
opponents to be refuted determine for a great deal the structure of 
'Abd al-Jabbâr's text. 
Nevertheless, it becomes clear that this seventh part of the Mugnî 
is divided into three major parts. After an introduction, it first deals 
with speech and the quality speaking as we know them in this world; the 
second part deals with God's speech and His quality speaking, and the 
last part draws the consequences from the general statement that His 
acts are necessarily good, and that, consequently, His speech, too, 
must be good.34 
In his section on speech and the quality speaking in this world, 
'Abd al-Jabbâr opens with a definition of speech. Then he refutes the 
32
 Cf M ugni VII, 5 . "There is no way by which we can say something about 
God's speeth and Us qualifications, unless we explained first the definition of speech 
in this world (chapter 2), that it belongs to the genus sound (chapter 4), that man is 
able to (do) it (chapter 5), that it is a perceptible accident that does not remain (chapters 3 
and 5), that it belongs to what characterizes a substrate (chapter 6) and does not 
entail a state for the composite whole (sc the living being, chapter 8), and that who is 
qualified by it is only qualified (such) because he made and produced it (chapter 9) 
Afterwards we explain that He is speaking (chapters 10 and 11): that He is not 
per se speaking (chapter 12), nor by eternal speech (chapter 15), that He is speaking 
by temporal speech, and that the way to establish that He is speaking is to establish 
His speech as coming into existence from His side 
We explain the way in which His speech can (yawhh, the metaphysical possibility) 
exist (one can translate also be found, this reading corresponds with the actual division 
of the book into chapters, but besides the fact that it would be a very unusual use 
of this term inside 'Abd al-Jabbâr's philosophical vocabulary, the use of the verb 
yasihh and the connection with the following sentence seem to indicate that we, 
nevertheless, have to understand this term as "exist"), and the way in which it is good 
and evil (chapter 19), and that (read ua-wnah instead of fa-mnah) He only can make us 
know what He wills by His speech (chapter 20), and we shall explain how we can know 
what He wills by His speech (chapter 20) Afterwards we give the treatise on the 
reproduction and the reproduced and some questions dependent upon this one 
(chapter 21) We explain the falseness of their mad assertion that God's speech is not 
God and not something other than He, and other opinions of our opponents (chapters 
16-17)" It is very remarkable that in this list even the mention of the creatcdness of the 
Qur'ân is missing 
33
 The following chapters seem to be added only for the sake of refuting the theses 
of'Abd al-Jabbâr's opponents, chapters 3. 5, 16, 17, 22 
3,1
 Cf. also Bouman, The doctrine of 'Abd al-Djahbâr, 72, who makes a similar 
division of the text 
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thesis that speech is a qualifier in the heart or in the soul.35 Speech 
belongs to the genus of the accident sound (sawt), and, consequently, 
cannot be a substance. Having thus defined and described speech as 
it occurs in this world, he comes to speak about the quality speaking. 
We already saw that some accidents need a substrate to inhere in, 
whereas others need a substrate that has a special structure or a living 
being; we also saw that some accidents give a qualification to the 
substrate in which they inhere, while others give it to the subject that 
is in a certain state because of this accident, and others yet give it to 
the subject who made it.36 Here 'Abd al-Jabbâr first proves that speech 
needs and characterizes a substrate, that it can exist in any substrate, 
and does not entail a state for a living being, but that the subject who 
is qualified by it as speaking actually is the subject who made it. 
Therefore speaking means : making speech. 
In his second section, 'Abd al-Jabbâr shows that God is able to 
make speech as we know it in this world, and that He actually made 
such speech, and therefore can be qualified as speaking. There follows 
a long and elaborate taqsim and the refutation of the various theses 
of his opponents. 
In the third section, 'Abd al-Jabbâr first discusses the way in which 
we can know God's speech; then he explains how God's speech can 
be good, namely, by communicating a certain meaning and by 
communicating what God wills; therefore, he adds a chapter to 
discuss the question of how we can know what God wills by His speech. 
The treatment of the subject is now complete, but 'Abd al-Jabbâr 
adds two long chapters, one about the relationship between repro-
duction and reproduced,37 and the other about the term "created" 
(maklúq).i& This part of the Mugni is actually concluded by a very 
short final chapter, functioning as a kind of general conclusion, adding 
only that God must create angels, human beings, or demons who can 
3 5
 Both terms occur in this chapter a qualifier in the soul (/f n-najs) and a qualifier 
in the heart (fi l-qalb), respectively in Mugnì VII, 14 and 15 Compare this with 
what 'Abd al-Jabbâr says about the so-called "acts of the heart" (af'ál al-qulûb) 
Cf pp 127 and 128 
36
 Cf ρ 154 
3 7
 According to the Kullâbîya, the Qur'ân is a reproduction of God's eternal 
speech To refute that thesis 'Abd al-Jabbâr discusses the relation between the 
reproduction and what is reproduced 
3 e
 For 'Abd al-Jabbâr this is not a new question in the course of his argumentations, 
it is not a matter of ma'nâ (the reality behind the words), but only a matter of giving 
names (/mi) Cf Mugni VII, 208 
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hear God's speech, before He speaks, for speaking before the creation 
of living beings that can hear His speech and for whom it can be 
useful, would be useless and, consequently, evil. 
Against this background the structure of this part of the Mugni can 
be schematically shown as follows : 
I. INTRODUCTION ch.l 
opinions of the opponents and the Mu'tazila ch. 1 
II. SPEECH AND THE Q I ALITY SPEAKING IN THIS WORLD ch. 2-9 
definition of speech ch. 2 
(refutation) it is not a qualifier in the soul ch. 3 
it is sound ch. 4 
(refutation) it is not a substance ch. 5 
it needs and characterizes a substrate ch. 6 
it can exist on any substrate ch. 7 
it does not entail a state for a living being ch. 8 
the qualification "speaking" is factual (making 
speech) ch. 9 
III. SPFFCH AND THE QUALITY SPFAKING IN THE OTHER 
WORLD ch.10-17 
God can produce this kind of speech ch. 10 
God made this kind of speech and, consequently, 
is speaking ch. 11 
God is not speaking per se ch. 12 
God is not speaking "neither per se nor by a cause" ch. 13 
God is not speaking by eternal speech ch. 14 
God is not eternally speaking by speech that is 
different from human speech ch. 15 
(refutation) one cannot say that God's speech 
cannot be qualified, or that it is not other than 
God ch. 16 
(refutation) discussion of the arguments the oppo-
nents bring into the field to prove that God is 
speaking by eternal speech ch. 17 
IV. GOD'S SPEECH is GOOD ch. 18-23 
the way we know God's speech ch. 18 
consequences of God's speech being good ch. 19 
how we can know what God wills by His speech ch. 20 
(appendix) about reproduction (hikâya) ch. 21 
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(appendix) God's speech and ihe Qur'ân are rightly 
called created (maklûq) eh 22 
(conclusion) the Qur'ân is created by God for the 
benefit of His servants, consequently, it is created 
after the creation of at least one of these servants ch 23 
Al-Majmû' fi 1-muhît bi-t-taklîf. The text concerning the essence of the 
Qur'ân and God's speech in general we find m 'Abd al-Jabbâr's Muhit, 
is probably the latest among the three texts which 'Abd al-Jabbâr 
dictated on this subject and which are still at our disposal 3') The 
Muhit as a whole is considerably shorter than the Mugni, one of the 
main reasons is that it gives less attention to disputes with and 
refutations of the opponents The argumentation in the Muhit appears 
to be not only more philosophical,40 but also more "quiet", more 
logical and clearly structured, and mainly centred upon 'Abd al-Jabbâr's 
own opinions and those of other Mu'tazilî theologians 4 1 
The text of the Muhit we are interested in is to be found in Muhit I, 
316-355, it consists of one entire section (introduced by 'Abd al-Jabbâr 
by the expression "al-kalàm /Γ'), which is divided into ten chapters 
(abnáb) The section bears a title which is nearly identical with that 
of the seventh part of the Mugni · "Al-kaiâm fi l-Qur'ân wa-sâ'ir kalâm 
Allah taâlâ" *2 
As he did in the Sarh and in the Mugni, 'Abd al-Jabbâr discusses 
God's speech in his treatise on God's Justice The context and the 
place this section has in the treatise on God's Justice is exactly the 
same as what we found in the Mugni; having dealt with acts in 
general and with the judgements on their value, 'Abd al-Jabbâr goes 
on to prove that first God's will, and second God's speech are really 
God's (good) acts, to continue afterwards with a demonstration that 
human acts are really human and not made in any way by God 4 1 
39
 СГ above in our discussions of the Muf-ni (pp 284-285) 
4 0
 When comparing, for instance, the definitions given of "speech" in the Mugni 
and the Muhit and the way this matter is dealt with, one surely gets the impression that 
the text of the Muhit is more "philosophical", less "physical', and that 
the use of terminology is more careful 
4 1
 Cf also Houben in his introduction to the edition of the Muhit Muhit I, 8 
(of the French part) which corresponds to page d of the Arabic part 
4 2
 Cf Muhit I, 316 The references given are- if not especially marked—to 
the Lebanese edition, edited by J J A M Houben In the Egyptian edition, 
edited by 'Umar 'A/mî, this text is found in Muhit I, 306-439 
4 3
 Cf Muhit I, 316 "Know that the reason why this chapter is joined to the chapter 
about the will is that speech, in our opinion, belongs to the totality of His acts, just as 
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The internal structure of this passage in the Muhit is more logical 
and consistent than the structures of he passages concerned in the 
Sarh and the Mugni. One can easily divide the text into some major 
parts. This division runs parallel with the one we discovered in the 
text of the Mugni : first, 'Abd al-Jabbâr deals with speech and the 
quality speaking in this world; in the second part, he discusses God's 
speech and His quality speaking, and in the third part, he draws his 
conclusions about God's speech, conclusions based on the fact that 
God's acts must be good. 
We are not confronted in the beginning of the text with a description 
of the opinions of 'Abd al-Jabbâr's opponents, nor with a description 
of his own doctrine; the text starts almost directly with the definition 
of speech in this world (chapter 1 ; here also some definitions of other 
theologians are discussed). Then he comes to the quality "speaking" 
and explains that it indicates that the qualified subject made speech, 
not that it is in a certain state, not that it is a substrate of speech, and 
not something else yet (chapter 2). He concludes this first part by 
discussing some judgements speech is entitled to, as, for instance, 
that it is sound, does not remain, that it is perceived in a certain way, 
that it is an indication under certain conditions, and that it exists in 
a certain way (chapter 3). 
In his second part, 'Abd al-Jabbâr shows that God not only is able 
to make speech we know in this world, but that He actually did make 
it and, consequently, is speaking (chapter 4). In this context, he refutes 
the theses that God is per se speaking, that He is speaking by eternal 
speech (chapter 5), or that He is speaking "neither per se nor because 
of a cause" (chapter 6). 
When 'Abd al-Jabbâr has established that God is speaking because 
He made speech, he can now conclude that this speech is necessarily 
good because all God's acts must be good. From this conclusion he 
derives some judgements about God's speech (chapter 7). 
In a kind of appendix,44 he deals with the reproduction and the 
the will" СГ also Muhit I, 227-228, where 'Abd al-Jabbâr at the beginning of his treatise 
on God's Justice states that four questions must be dealt with m this treatise first 
the acts, second the judgements on the acts, third the way in which God is served, and 
fourth what is ascribed to God and what is not About the first question 'Abd al-Jabbâr 
says "Sometimes there is some disagreement about it because we establish something 
to be an act whereas they (the opponents) deny it, such as will and speech for they say 
that He is essentially willing and essentially speaking " (Muhit I, 227) 
4 4
 We incorporated these appendices (that they really arc appendices for 'Abd 
al-Jabbâr becomes clear at the beginning of the chapters 8 and 9 Muhit I, 341 and 
THE TEXTS 291 
reproduced, with the name "creation" (kalq) as applicable to God's 
speech and the Qur'ân (respectively chapters 8 and 9), and, finally, 
with the arguments (subah : "sophisms") of his opponents (chapter 10). 
Schematically we summarize this as follows : 
I. SPEECH AND THE QUALITY SPEAKING IN THIS WORLD ch. 1-3 
definition of speech ch. 1 
the quality speaking is factual ch. 2 
some judgements about speech ch. 3 
II. SPEECH AND THE QUALITY SPEAKING IN THE OTHER 
WORLD ch. 4-6 
God is able to make the speech we know in this 
world and He actually made it (and is speaking) ch. 4 
God is not per se speaking, nor by eternal speech ch. 5 
God is not speaking "neither per se nor by a cause" ch. 6 
III. GOD'S SPEECH is GOOD ch. 7-10 
some judgements about God's speech as good ch. 7 
(appendix) reproduction and reproduced ch. 8 
(appendix) the term "kalq" (creation) ch. 9 
(refutation) arguments of the opponents refuted ch. 10 
Conclusions : 
In any one of the three texts discussed, the Qur'ân as being God's 
speech is treated in the same broader context : in the treatise on 
God's Justice (His 'adi). The reason is that God's speech is His act, 
and that He is qualified as speaking because He made speech. 
The link between the Qur'ân as God's speech and as a source of 
revealed knowledge, which is emphasized in the Sarh by treating 
both subjects together, receives less attention in the other two works, 
where both subjects are discussed separately. That can be the reason 
why in the title of this section in the Sarh only the Qur'ân is mentioned, 
whereas the other two works mention the Qur'ân in the context of 
God's speech. 
The three texts have in their argumentation the same basic structure : 
a discussion of speech and speaking in this world, a discussion of God's 
345) in the third part, though they are not directly related to this part. In the 
text of the Mugni they are incorporated in the last part by way of the final concluding 
chapter. 
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speech and His being speaking, and, finally, some conclusions drawn 
from His speech being good. 
The Mugni and the Muhit resemble each other in their structure 
of the discussion. It is quite acceptable to follow this structure in 
our own discussions. 
The text of the Mugni being the most elaborate, especially because 
of the ample disputes with the opponents, we can make it the basis 
of our discussion. But, since the Muhit seems to make some correc-
tions upon the statements and opinions adhered to in the Mugni, we 
surely have to take that text into account. The text of the Sarh is, 
in this context, of considerably less importance, and has to be used 
mainly for the sake of comparison. 
В. SPEECH IN THIS WORLD 
If we want to follow 'Abd al-Jabbâr in his discussion of God's 
speech, we have to start with a discussion of the essence of speech 
in this world, especially human speech.1 Only after acquiring real 
knowledge of this speech, can we try to make the jump towards the 
other world, and from indications found in this world deduce some-
thing about God and His speech. According to 'Abd al-Jabbâr and 
most of the Mu'tazila, God's speech belongs to the same genus as 
human speech;2 we deal with his argumentations therefore in the 
course of this chapter. 
In this paragraph on speech as we know it in this world and as we 
produce it in this world,3 we deal, subsequently, with four definitions 
of speech we find in 'Abd al-Jabbâr's works—four definitions he 
adheres to—with the further description of speech, next to the formal 
definitions, and, finally, with the opinions of 'Abd al-Jabbâr's oppo-
nents which are discussed and refuted 
In this paragraph one could deal also with the kind of substrate 
which speech requires to inhere in, with the question whether speech 
entails a stale for someone and other related questions. However, we 
postpone the discussion of these questions till the next paragraph 
about the quality speaking because of the relation they have with the 
questions treated in that paragraph. 
1. T H E DbUNiTioN O F 8 Р Ь Ь С Н 
Kalâm : speech.4 Besides the various ways in which 'Abd al-Jabbâr 
1
 According to 'Abd al-Jabbâr, angels and demons too produce speech though we 
normally cannot hear this speech The same holds true of God's speech when He 
talks to angles or demons Cf, for instance, M ugni VII, 16 
2
 Cf Mugni VII. 3 "The doctrine of our teachers is that God's speech is of the 
genus of speech intuitively known in this world According to them, it is not 
possible to establish eternal speech different from our (human) speech" Cf also 
'Abd al-Karîm 'Ulmân, i\a:cii!iat at-taklí/, 241 
3
 God's speech, loo, exists in this world because according to 'Abd al-Jabbâr 
God can only speak when talking to human beings, angels, or demons who can hear 
His speech Just as God's other acts, for instance the bodies He created, belong 
to this world and not to the other one, so His speech too belongs to this world 
(iis-sálutl), though our discussion on God's quality "speaking" and on the way He 
is speaking, are really discussions about the other world (al-gaih) 
* The Arabic term kalâm is, in a special technical sense, also used to indicate Islamic 
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describes speech, and which are sometimes called its "reality" (haqlqa),5 
and besides a number of definitions he rejects, one finds in his three 
theological works that survived four different definitions of speech 
which explicitly are thus called, and which can be said to be corre-
sponding in their great outlines and to be different only in some 
details. I mention these four definitions and compare their contents.6 
In the Sarh we find two definitions : 
1. "wâ ntazdm min harjayn fa-sa idem" : what is arranged from two 
or more letters ; 
2. "ma lah nizâm min al-hurûf maksûs" : what has a special arrange-
ment of the letters.7 
The third definition is found in the Mugni : 
3. "wá hasal fìh nizâm maksûs min hâdih al-hurûf ai-ma'quia, basal 
fi harfayn aw hurûf : in what a special arrangement of these 
intuitively known letters occurs; be it occurring in two letters or 
(more) letters.8 
The fourth and last definition is taken from the Muhit : 
4. "ma yahsul min al-hurûf al-ma'quia lah nizâm maksûs" : what occurs 
from the intuitively known letters and has a special arrange-
ment.9 
In these four definitions, which were all at a certain moment for 
'Abd al-Jabbâr the accepted definition, we distinguish four elements : 
first, the letters, the number of which in the first and third definition 
is explicitly said to be two or more; second, the arrangement; third, 
the mention of something being intuitively known (ma'qûl)', fourth, 
the mention that speech occurs or results {hasal). From these four 
elements the first two are mentioned in all four definitions, the third 
element is mentioned in the last two definitions and possibly alluded 
theology Cf pp 3-4. In the present context we use this term m its non-technical sense of 
"speech" 
5
 Cf. Sarh 528 and Mugni VII, 6 For the meaning of the term haqiqa, sec pp 78-79 
6
 Bouman, The Doctrine of 'Abd al-Djabbär, 72-73, mentions as a definition "that 
speech is a particular order of intelligible letters" and gives as a reference Mugni VII, 6 
This rendering of the definition is not quite correct because it is not the "order" which 
is speech, but the letters which are put in this order. Cf also 'Abd al-Karim 'Utmàn, 
Nazarhat at-takli/, 231-233 On ρ 232 the author mentions three out of the four 
definitions we shall give, the definition from the Mugni is missing. The references 
given in the notes are not accurate 
7
 Cf. Sarh 528 
" Cf Mugni VII. 6. 
9
 Cf Muhit I, 316 
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to in the second one, while the fourth element is only mentioned in 
the last two definitions. Subsequently, we now discuss these four 
elements of'Abd al-Jabbâr's definition of speech.10 
Harf (plural : hurûf) : letter. According to 'Abd al-Jabbâr, letters are 
intuitively known (ma'qut) and, consequently, known by necessary 
knowledge, a knowledge every sane person must have and nobody 
can banish from his soul;11 therefore, it will be superfluous to try 
to give a definition of what a letter is; most probably, this even is not 
possible, since no expression is possibly more clear and more revealing 
than the simple term "letter" (harf). 
When 'Abd al-Jabbâr refers in this way to knowledge every sane 
person has, we have to look for the meaning this word had for the 
Arabic-speaking people in his days; then we discover in the works 
of the Arab philologists and grammarians 12 a use of this term which 
is different from its use in a description of our modern European 
languages. For them a letter (harj) is what we call a consonant; the 
Arabic alphabet knows twenty-eight of these letters. The Arab philo-
logists do not know vowels which are—just as is the case in European 
languages—separate letters besides the consonants. What we call 
vowel is explained by them in the following way : a letter can occur in 
two basicly different ways, either moving (mutaharrik) or immobile 
(sâkin). A moving letter is what we call the sequence of a consonant 
and a short vowel, an immobile letter is only a consonant.13 This 
analysis of the Arabic language by the philologists and its division 
into separate letters coincides entirely with the Arabic writing system : 
only the letters, the consonants, are written; for clarity's sake one 
may, if one wants to do so, add above and beneath the letters some 
signs indicating their being immobile or moving in a certain way.14 
10
 1Γ the order of the three theological works really is as wc mentioned before, we 
can say that all four elements are present in 'Abd al-Jabbâr's two latest definitions, 
and that we can take these four elements as representative of his ripened way of thinking 
about the reality of speech. 
1
 ' That the letters are ma'qui, is mentioned explicitly in the third and fourth 
definitions of 'Abd al-Jabbâr For the meaning of ma'qui pp 82-84 
12
 Many Mu'ta/ilî theologians were also versed in matters of philology, and this 
part of the Mugni is, as will become clear, strongly influenced by philological arguments 
and considerations 'Abd al-Jabbâr has a great confidence in the structures of the 
Arabic language and of its writing system. Just as he has great confidence in the 
Arabic language corresponding with reality, he also considers the written text to be 
corresponding to the spoken speech. 
13
 See, for instance, Wright, Arabic Grammar, I, 8 and 13 
14
 A letter can be "moving" in three different ways, indicating the three different 
"vowels" that can be added 
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This writing system, most probably derived from the way Arabs saw 
their own language, in its turn again influences the doctrine of the 
essence of speech, both that of 'Abd al-Jabbâr and that of many other 
scholars, philologists and theologians. 
According to the philologists, letters result from the influence our 
articulatory organs exert on the sound that is in the breath, comes 
from the breast, and is going out through the throat and the mouth.15 
It is clear that the Arab philologists consider the letters to be a form 
of sound and 'Abd al-Jabbâr is in agreement with them : for him 
letters are only a special way in which sound comes into existence. 
This comes to the light when he describes the relation between letters 
and sound Л 6 "The way in which the genus sound comes into existence 
varies: it may be a fluent1T and non-articulated sound; it may be 
articulated in one genus; it may be articulated1 8 so that it is some­
times connected and sometimes separated ; it may come into existence 
so that it is a letter or (more) letters, and it may come into existence so 
that it is not qualified (described) in this way, for instance, the creaking 
of a door, although it belongs to the genus of one of the letters. 
Letters are only discovered because the sound (in that case) comes 
into existence in a special structure (binya) and in special orifices, 
such as, for instance, the structure of the mouth." 
" One of the greatest European scholars in the field of classical Arabic philology 
is, without any doubt, Henri Fleisch bor a description of the ideas of the older Arab 
philologists on letters, see. among the many works Heisch wrote in this field, especially 
his Traité de Philologie Arabe, from which work so far only the first volume appeared 
"Ibn Ginni, par son Sirr sinâ'at al-'i'ráb, précité, nous permet de presenter les notions 
de phonétique générale suivante (d'après la conception arabe) Les unités phonétiques, 
au sens propre, ne sont que d'une seule classe les hurùf L'alphabet arabe ne contient 
que des hurûf (sing Aar/) Le harf est le produit d'un maqla' (lieu de coupure), sur le 
sani (resonance emise de la poitrine), véhicule continuement par le nafas (souffle) en 
ascension dans la gorge, puis dans la bouche II y a harf, partout ou les organes 
articulatoires opposent ce maqta' au saHt en mouvement Ce qui constitue proprement 
le harf est un son particulier (gars), conséquence de l'appuiement des organes en ce lieu 
du maqta'. gars different suivant les différents maqâti', pour chaque maqia' un gars, 
un harf' (Fleisch, Traité, 204) Cf also Fleisch, Ihn Gmnî, 102 
" For the following quotation translated from the Arabic text of Mugni VII, 6-7, 
see also pp 138-139 
17
 Read here muqayyad (linked together) instead of mufîd (communicative, having 
a meaning) Cf note 160 on page 138 The meaning of this word must be "non-
articulated" as appears from the context One might also think of the root qyd, meaning 
"to flow". but in that case one has to change the text of the manuscript This word 
is the opposite of the word muqatta' in its literal sense (respectively "linked" and 
"cut") My translation is rather ad sensum 
18
 I suggest to delete the words/ïyms Cf note 161 on ρ 139 
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From this long quotation wc conclude that for 'Abd al-Jabbâr 
letters arc sound that occurs in a special way, and that sound only is 
called speech- but this is a matter of names —when it occurs in the 
human arliculatory organism.19 
This identification of letters and sounds was not self-evident, even 
not among Mu'tazila. One of the two Mu'tazilî scholars 'Abd al-Jabbâr 
often refers to as his "two teachers", Abu 'ΑΠ, advocated the opinion 
that speech is letters, but that letters are something else than sounds. 
Speech may occur together with sounds and then be audible speech, 
but it may also occur as written or memorized (mah/ûz), in which 
case no sounds exist together with it; in the three cases speech is 
letters.20 'Abd al-Jabbâr rejects this thesis, as we shall see when 
discussing the further description of speech. 
When speech consists of letters, one may ask how many letters are 
in fact required to constitute speech. 
One letter, be it moving or immobile (consisting of a consonant 
and a vowel or of a consonant alone), cannot in any case be speech. 
Some particles—adverbs, prepositions, or conjunctions—21 consist of 
one letter, but in the Arabic writing system they are joined to the 
word immediately following and written as one word. Therefore, they 
are not considered to be separate words or speech. There are, however, 
in Arabic a few words that only have one letter; these words are 
imperative forms of double weak verbs. 'Abd al-Jabbâr mentions the 
words '"/'" and "ι//".22 Various arguments are given to prove that 
these forms are not really speech. When the forms are used absolutely 
without being linked with something following, they are written respec-
1 9
 What 'Abd al-Jabbâr described is the normal use of this word in everyday 
language In his philosophical discussion, he deals in detail with the question whether 
speech and letters can exist in every substrale or only in specially structured sub-
strates 
20
 Cf. for instance, Mugni VII, 7. See also 'Abd al-Karim 'Utmân, Nazariyat 
al-laklif. 231 
In the text of Mugni VII, 7 the author or a copyist made a mistake, in line 19 we 
have to read li-ann al-kalâm huw al-hurûf 'mdah, "because according to him (se Abu 
'AH) speech is the letters" (and not • the sound, as-savrt, as the manuscript reads) 
Evidently, we have to read in the same line 19 yaqûl ("he, sc Abu 'AH, says") instead 
of nuqûl ("we say") 
21
 Cf Wright. Arabic Grammar, I, 279 (prepositions), 282-283 (adverbs), and 290-291 
(conjunctions) 
22
 Cf. Wright, Arabic Grammar, I, 93-94, where he mentions more double weak 
verbs the imperative forms of which consist of one letter, to which a h may be added 
when they are used in the waqf or pause position The two examples '/ and qi are 
mentioned in all three texts of 'Abd al-Jabbâr. 
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lively ""ih" and "qih", and thus consist of two letters. When they 
are used without the "A" they are only speech because this "A" is 
implied. Another argument, based also on the Arabic grammar, says : 
every word in Arabic must begin with a "moving" letter and, if it 
is absolutely used or at the end of a coherent composite of speech, 
it must end with an "immobile" letter. This proves that speech must 
consist of at least two letters. A third argument is an argumentum 
ad hominem; his opponents hold that speech must always communicate 
something, must have a meaning (it must be "wu/W"), and they 
will have to admit that the forms "V" and "#/"" cannot be said to 
communicate something and have a meaning.23 
But, though speech cannot consist of one letter, it can consist of 
two, even of twice the same letter.24 The number of meaningful forms 
in Arabic that consist of two letters is very large and need not be 
dealt with here. This is the reason why 'Abd al-Jabbâr mentioned in 
his first and third definitions that speech in fact can be two letters 
or more; this must be mentioned explicitly since the Arabic plural 
form indicates a totality of three or more, while the dual form indicates 
a totality of two. Apparently, in 'Abd al-Jabbâr's second and fourth 
definitions, speech consisting of two letters is excluded; this is, 
however, not the case since in those definitions it is emphasized that 
speech is something in which occurs a special arrangement of letters, 
the word arrangement being used for a combination of two or more. 
In these formulae not the word "letters" but the mentioning of the 
arrangement determines the number of letters needed. This implies 
that in the third definition the addition "be it occurring in two letters or 
(more) letters" is superfluous. 
An extra problem is presented by the fact that in the science of 
the Arabic grammar and its technical vocabulary the word harf is 
also used to indicate a "particle". Arab philologists divided speech 
into three parts (aqsâm) : "ism" (nouns and pronouns), "/Γ/" (verbs), 
and "harf ja !i-ma'nâ".25 The particle, to which belong adverbs, 
23
 Cf. Sarh 529, Mugm VII, 9-10, and Afuhit I, 317. The division of ihc text of the 
Mugni into paragraphs is very confusing; the argument of the opponent is found in 
Mugni VII, 9 lines 9-18; 'Abd al-Jabbâr's answer, introduced by qil lahum, is given in 
Mugni VII, 9 line 19 10, line 5. In Mugni VII, 9 line 13 we must read qál lakum 
instead of qâl lahum as the manuscript reads. 
24
 Cf. Sarh 530; Abu Hâsim seems to have excluded this last possibility in some 
places in his works. 'Abd al-Jabbâr shows that il is possible. 
25
 Cf. Mugni VII, 9 and Muhit I, 317. The Muhit reads "wa-harf hâ li-ma'nâ"; 
this has to be corrected. In the orthography of the edition one must read wa-harf jâ 
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prepositions, conjunctions, and interjections,26 sometimes consists of 
one letter only.27 It is however, not permitted to use this division, 
as 'Abd al-Jabbâr's opponents seem to do, as an argument showing 
that a single letter can be speech. For, 'Abd al-Jabbâr says, this is 
not what the philologists have in mind when giving this definition,28 
and—he adds in the Muhit -this division does not mean that the 
parts by themselves are speech, but only that speech can be divided 
into these parts, and that the parts through composition with others 
can become speech; also a noun cannot be speech by itself, and in 
the same way a particle becomes speech only by composition with 
something else.29 This is, however, not 'Abd al-Jabbâr's own argumen-
tation and opinion; he only explains what the philologists mean.30 
Ni?âm : arrangement. The second element, mentioned in all four 
definitions we recorded above, is the fact that the letters must be 
arranged or have an arrangement in order to constitute speech.31 
This arrangement evidently cannot be an accident, as, for instance, 
the accident "composition" (talif), which is an accident inhering in 
two substances together and causing them to be composed.32 But, 
since letters are sounds and, consequently, accidents,33 and no accident 
can inhere in another accident, this arrangement cannot be an accident 
li-ma'nâ For this rather cryptic expression harfja Ιι-ma'nâ. cf especially the discussion 
of the different views propagated in H Gatje, Die Gliederung der sprachliihen Zeichen 
nach al-Fáráhi, Isl 47 (1971), 1-24, especially 6-8 See also W Diem, Nomen, 
Substantiv und Adjektn bei den arabischen Grammatikern, Onens 23-24 (1974), 312-332, 
especially 321-322 
26
 Cf Wright, Arabic Grammar, I, 278 
27
 Cf ρ 297 and note 21 of this section 
2 8
 Mugnì VII, 9 'Abd al-Jabbâr draws the following conclusion "Nobody can say 
they (sc the philologists) call what is one letter- and not more letters -speech" 
This translation implies, however, that the words hurúf and harf (respectively in line 7 and 
line 8) have to change places (The printed text corresponds with the manuscript) 
29
 Cf Muhit I, 317 A verb by itself can be speech because it can have a meaning, 
so, for instance, an imperative The same cannot be said about nouns and particles 
This is the opinion of the philologists 
3 0
 According to "Abd al-Jabbâr, speech that has no meaning is nevertheless speech 
(cf Mugni VII, 10-11) But in the argumentation mentioned in the text he starts from 
the presuppositions of the philologists whose opinions he treats here 
31
 The first definition uses the verb ntazam. the other three definitions mention the 
noun mzâm The meaning of this mzäm is discussed in Mugni VII, 8, line 1 6 - 9 , line 3 
The division of the text into paragraphs has to be adjusted. 
32
 Cf pp 132-134 
3 3
 This is explicitly dealt with in chapter 5 of Mugnì VII, where 'Abd al-Jabbâr 
proves that speech cannot be a substance, in chapter 4 he proves speech to be sounds, 
and since sounds are accidents, speech must be an accident too 
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or qualifier. What is meant by this arrangement is that one letter comes 
into existence immediately after the other one, without interruption.34 
Therefore, no accident is needed. 
Ma'qûl : intuitively known. By calling the letters in the third and 
fourth definitions ma'qûl, 'Abd al-Jabbâr emphasizes the phenomenal 
character of these definitions ; he refers to something everybody knows 
through his own experience. The use of the article in the second 
definition has a similar function, and indicates that the letters concerned 
are known. 
Haçal : to occur or to result. Probably, .this verb is introduced in the 
third and fourth definitions to emphasize that speech does not remain, 
and also that speech is the result of the letters' being arranged; when 
letters are produced without interruption (and are thus arranged), 
speech results. 
To prove that his definition is correct, 'Abd al-Jabbâr appeals to 
human experience, to what every sane person necessarily knows. 
Everybody knows what letters are and what is arrangement, and also 
that both the letters and their being arranged are necessary to constitute 
speech.35 
2. FURTHER DESCRIPTION OF SPEECH 
When 'Abd al-Jabbâr in his introductory chapter to the seventh 
part of his Mugni mentions a number of characteristic's of speech 
as we meet it in this world, he starts with "that it belongs to the 
genus sound, and that it is possible (rnaqdûr) for man; it is a percep-
tible accident that does not remain...".36 Another aspect of speech 
that has to be dealt with, is its being communicative (mußd) : it has 
a meaning and can convey this meaning to someone else. A final 
3 4
 Cf Mugni VII, 8-9 · a comparison is mude with bodies which are so close to each 
other that they touch one another without there remaining any space between them 
They can be called in that case "arranged" This is not the "mode of being" (kawn) 
"combination" (унта), because the latter indicates the place where the body is in 
space: the bodies concerned are "combined", but that is not what is expressed by 
the term mzâm. 
35
 Cf Muhit I, 316, where 'Abd al-Jabbâr says among other things. "For, if one of 
us speaks at this moment a letter and then stops before the second letter and produces 
this one after some time, what he makes is not reckoned to be speech" Cf. also 
Mugni VII, 13 
36
 Vfugni VII, 5. 
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question to be answered is where, on which substrates, speech in fact 
exists.37 All these subjects will be treated in this section. 
Sawt: sound.38 Speech is a form of sound; it belongs to the genus 
sound. In this point 'Abd al-Jabbâr follows his teacher Abu Hâsim. 
The argumentation is very simple : if speech were something else than 
articulated sounds, articulated sounds could exist without speech 
and speech without articulated sounds. This is not the case. When 
two things cannot exist separately—without there being a connection 
between them which makes that they cannot exist separately—39 they 
must be one and the same genus.40 There is no such connection 
between sounds and speech;41 consequently, they must be one and 
the same genus. 
Speech belongs to the genus sound; therefore, every speech is 
sound, but not every sound is speech; only articulated sounds are 
speech.42 All counter-arguments which do not take this distinction 
into account, are easily refuted.43 
37
 This question and the way in which speech can be communicative arc dealt with 
in Muhii I. .123-326 together with the points mentioned in the Mugni. The Mugn! uses 
the term mujid to indicate that speech is communicative and conveys a meaning; 
the Muhit says that it is an "indication" (c/alil). 
3
' Cf. pp. 137-142. This matter is treated by 'Abd al-Jabbâr especially in Mugni 
VII, 21-23. the fourth chapter. 
3
'' There are a number of connections between two things which make that one 
of them cannot exist without the other. The Muhii gives no details, but the text of the 
Mugni mentions eight of these connections. These are : 
a) the first needs the second to exist (e.g., will needs life to exist); b) the connection 
between cause (sahab) and result (musabhub); c) the first includes (damman) the other, as 
substance the kawn; d) the connection between able subject and act; e) the connection 
between ability and act; f) the connection between knowing subject, precise act, and 
knowledge; g) who makes the first, necessarily also makes the second. Cf. Mugni VII, 
21-22. 
40
 Cf. Muhii I, 323 and Mugni VII, 21-22. The text of the Mugni does not speak 
about "two genera" but about "two things" (say'ayn), about which 'Abd al-Jabbâr 
tries to show that they arc one and the same. Only in his conclusion (Mugni VII, 22, 
line 2j he uses the word jins (genus). For, ultimately, he has to show that speech in 
general belongs to the genus sound in general, not that two concrete occurrences are 
identical. 
41
 With all connections mentioned in note 39, one of the two can exist in any form 
without the other. But speech can in no way exist without articulated sounds and 
articulated sounds without speech (Mugni VII. 21-22). In his discussions he always 
speaks about "articulated sounds" and thus makes an identification between speech 
and articulated sounds. He seems to deny this in Mugni VII, 7, line 13: "it may be 
thus (articulated sounds) and not be speech". The difficulty can be again that speech, 
which really is arranged letters, is not always called speech. 
42
 Therefore, sometimes the articulated sounds are mentioned in definitions of 
speech; 'Abd al-Jabbâr rejects these definitions. 
4 J
 Cf. Mugni VII, 22-23. Therefore, it is possible that one needs for speech 
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According to Abu 'AH speech is not sound because speech and letters 
can occur in writing and as memorized; but, 'Abd al-Jabbâr answers, 
a written text only is a sign (amara) of the letters, while memory is only 
the knowledge of how speech is.44 
Speech is said to be "articulated" sound (sawt muqatta'). About the 
meaning of this being articulated, the texts of 'Abd al-Jabbâr's theo-
logical works leave us in the dark. Once again we have to turn to the 
philologists for a further explanation. Literally, this word means 
"cut"; from 'Abd al-Jabbâr's discussions it becomes clear that this 
does not mean "cut into pieces" or separated.45 But the sound is 
articulated through passing by a "maqta'" (place of cutting, place of 
articulation), which is different for every letter. This maqta' "turns 
it away from its being extended and its being elongated".46 The sound 
that normally goes free and unhindered is now at a certain place 
obstructed and cut into a certain form. 
'Arad : accident. Speech is an accident.47 Since speech is sound, and 
sound is an accident, speech too must be an accident. 'Abd al-Jabbâr 
mentions five arguments to prove that speech cannot possibly be 
a substance, and that it, consequently since it is temporal—must be 
an accident. These five arguments48 have all the same structure: 
something one doeb not need for other forms of sound A baby can make sound but 
not speech, for he lacks the necessary knowledge and his instrument is not yet complete 
To make speech we need instruments which we do not need when making other 
forms of sound (In Mugni VII, 23, Ime 6 one better deletes the last word tlavh, which 
is found in the manuscript but does not belong to the text) 
4 4
 Xiugm VII, 23 
4 5
 Cf, for instance, Mugni VII, 6, where 'Abd al-Jabbâr makes a distinction between 
muqatta' and vanjasil 
4 6
 Cf Fleisch, Ihn Ginn!, 79 Fleisch quotes here an expression of Ibn Jinnî "On 
commence ce laiir depuis la partie la plus basse de la gorge (halq) Sur son chemin, 
gorge, bouche, lèvres, il peut rencontrer un maqta' (pi maqâti') proprement 'heu de 
coupure', 'qui l'infléchit de sa continuité' (tatnih 'an imtidâdih na ititâlatih ρ 6, I 3)" 
4
" There was some discussion about this subject Sec, for instance, al-As'ari. Maqâlât, 
425 "They disagreed about speech of man, whether it is sound or is not sound, and 
whether the sound is a body or an accident" Cf also al-As'arî's following lines, where 
he gives more details about the various opinions 'Abd al-Jabbâr discusses this subject 
in his fifth chapter {Mugni VII, 24-25) 
4 8
 These five arguments arc given in Mugni VII, 24-25 The division of the text into 
sentences and paragraphs should be based on these five arguments They begin, 
respectively, in line 6 and 10 of page 24 and line 8, 10, and II of page 25 The last 
argument continues up to the end of the chapter Also the interpunction has to be 
adjusted, one must replace the full stop in line 8 of page 24 by a comma, and the comma 
in line 10 by a full stop In general, a more accurate interpunction and division of the 
text into paragraphs would greatly facilitate the very difficult understanding of the 
text 
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they draw conclusions from the supposition that speech is a substance 
This, namely, implies that speech has the characteristics of substances 
and substances have the characteristics of speech, when the basic 
characteristics that all subcategories of a genus have in common are 
concerned Everything is perceived according to its most characteristic 
qualifications, as we saw,49 and, therefore, all substances must be 
perceived in the way speech is perceived Moreover, speech would 
remain just as the substances, but our perception tells us that this is 
not the case,5 0 accidents could inhere in speech as they do in sub­
stances , man 5 ' would not be able to produce speech since he is not 
able to produce substances, finally, speech would be perceived by 
transportation just as the substances,52 and in that case one could no 
longer discern from which side speech comes These five arguments 
show that speech cannot be a substance and must be an accident 
Mudrak : perceptible Since speech is sound, it must be perceptible as 
sound is and be perceived in the same way in the place where it is 
and not by being transported towards the instrument of the perceiving 
subject, in this case towards the ear Were that the case, then we 
could not know from which side speech we hear actually comes 5 3 
4 9
 Cf ρ 178 We cannot say that substances must have all the characteristics speech 
has (speech is according to the opponents only a form of substance) but since perception 
happens according to the most specific qualification all individuals of a given genus 
must be perceived in the same way So, the first argument 'Abd al Jabbâr gives is more 
complicated than the other four, the first saying that all substances must correspond 
with speech while the other four say that speech would have the characteristics of 
a substance 
, 0
 Read in Mugni VII, 24 line 11 bi kilaf instead of kilâf The manuscript has 
this reading and it is also grammatically necessary the word dalala being the subject 
of this sentence 
If speech were remaining a correct perception would no longer be possible (cf ρ 138) 
In that case the sequence of the letters would no longer be discernible One cannot 
say that it is perceived according to a transportation towards the ear (mtiqal) speech 
is not perceived by transportation (cf ρ 192) In that case all letters could remain 
in the car and again the sequence would no longer be discernible it would also be possible 
that speech was not transported to the ears of one person while it is transported to 
the ears of someone else, so that the first one does not hear it while the second one 
does This leads to a number of absurd conclusions Cf Mugni VII 25 
5 1
 Read li-l-'ibâd instead of// l-fanâ in Mugm VII 25, line II This reading is clear 
from the manuscript and necessary for a good understanding 
52
 Besides being perceived by transportation (hi l mtiqál)—when they namely, are 
perceived by touching— they are also perceived at the place where they are, namely, 
when they are perceived bv seeing Cf ρ 181 
5 3
 Cf ρ 138 about the accident sound and pp 192-193 about the perception 
of sounds See also Muhit I, 324 The problems arising from the supposition that speech 
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Là yabqâ : it does not remain We already proved that sound, and 
consequently also speech, is a non-remaining accident Were it 
remaining, then the sequence of the letters, necessary for the under-
standing of the meaning of speech, would no longer be discernible 54 
Maqdûr li-l-'abd : possible for man, man is able to produce it This is 
apparent from our direct self-experience, for we know that we some-
times produce speech 55 
Mufid : communicative 56 Speech can be communicative it can have 
a meaning and convey this meaning to someone else But speech is not 
necessarily and per se communicative, for speech can be divided, and 
actually is divided by the philologists, into speech that is "тиНтаГ' 
(inoperative) and speech that is "mustamar' (operative)5 7 The dif­
ference between these two categories, which in fact is the difference 
between speech that is not communicative and speech that is com­
municative, is said to be dependent upon one condition, which is 
described as "munâda'a" or "tawadu" (convention) 58 People must 
agree on the meaning of concrete combinations of letters, they must 
agree on a system that we call "language", and the letters they make 
must be corresponding to the laws of this agreement, of this language 
Only in that case speech becomes communicative and correct (sahlh) 
But also when it is not communicative, it is speech just as movement 
and writing, for instance, which can be communicative, are also move-
ment and writing when they are in certain cases not communicative 
'Abd al-Jabbâr summarizes "The Arabs agreed (tawâda) on speech, 
in consequence it became communicative by the convention (bi-
l-munáda'a) and speech (became) correct (sahih)" 59 
For 'Abd al-Jabbâr languages are made by man though God gave 
is perceived b> transportation towards the ear, arc discussed in Mugnì VII, 25 and 
Muh'it I, 324 See also note 50 
5 4
 Cf ρ 138 about sound in general See also Muhit I, 323-324 The consequences 
of the supposition that speech remains are discussed in the context of the discussion 
of speech as a substance Cf Mugn! VII, 24 Cf also note 50 
5 5
 Cf MugniVU, 25 
5 6
 Cf Wuhit I, 324-325 and Wugni VII, 10 and 182-183 
^ bor the term muhmal and its translation, see Cachia, The Monitor, 104 of the 
Arabic part 
5 B
 Cf Magni VII, 10 As the contrary of these terms one sometimes finds the term 
tauqif, indicating God's activity in the creation of language Cf, for instance. Fleisch, 
Traite, 17, Massignon, Passion, 711, and Arnaldez, Grammaire, 37 Arnaldez translates 
tauqif as "une institution venant de Dieu" 
5 9
 Most probably this is said by one of the philologists, but the phrase introducing 
this statement is not entirely clear Mugni VII, 10 
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him the possibility to make letters, only when people are agreed on 
a system that is a language, God can speak to them And just like man, 
God has to speak according to the laws of this system people are 
agreed upon, in order to make His speech communicative 60 
Mahall al-kalâm : the substrate of speech 61 This subject will be dis-
cussed below in more detail when we deal with the way in which 
speech is the cause of the quality speaking For the moment suffice it 
to sa> that we, human beings, can only produce speech by way of 
generating (taw lid) Our speech is mutawallid, and therefore it neces-
sarily exists in a substrate In fact, we even need a special instrument 
to produce speech, an instrument that has a special structure (bin\a), 
we need the organism of our "voice" (throat, tongue, lips, etc ) to 
produce the various letters 
3 Rfci ιτΛτιοΝ OF OPPONENTS 
After discussing in this section some definitions which qua intention 
of their authors roughly correspond with speech as 'Abd al-Jabbâr 
has defined it. we also give some attention to the opinions of those 
scholars whose doctrine on speech is evidently different from that of 
'Abd al-Jabbâr 
Other definitions 
The first definition discussed by 'Abd al-Jabbâr in his Mugni was 
used among Mu'tazila62 and also by the Karaite theologian Yûsuf 
al-Basîr 6 3 It runs "speech is arranged letters and articulated sounds" 
(Лиги/ manzûma wa-amât muqattaa) and is discussed in everyone 
of the three theological works used 6 4 For 'Abd al-Jabbâr this defini-
tion is not correct On the one hand, it does not mention enough 
6 0
 Cf Muhit I, 325, Mugm VII, 182 183 To the rules of the language system arc 
reckoned too for instance (hat the combinations vcrb-plus-vcrb particle-plus-partitle, 
or noun plus-particle are not communicative Speech, to be correct and to be 
communicative must be corresponding to these laws concerning the outward form 
(wru) of the language on which people are agreed 
61
 Cf Muhu I, 325-326 
62
 Cf Schh 528 529 Cf also Bouman, Le conflit, 14 "Ash-Shahrastânî nous rapporte 
que les Mu'tazihtes ont décrit le parler (al-kalâm) comme des mots arranges et des 
sons articules qui ont cte crees se trouvant dans un substrat temporel (\iha\a 288) 
6 3
 Cf Vajda, / a parole ireee, 61 "des sons articules et des lettres disposées en ordre, 
qui peu\cnt, par convention, exprimer (un sens)" and in a note the Arabic text "asuát 
muqattaa na hunt/ manzûma \asifih an tufitl bi I muuâda'a" 
6 4
 Sarh 529, Mugm Vil 7, and Muhit I, 317 
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speech consisting of two letters is excluded by this definition; but 
on the other hand, it mentions too much : the second half of the 
definition is superfluous,65 arranged letters necessarily being articulated 
sounds. And, according to the strict rules 'Abd al-Jabbâr uses to decide 
whether a definition is correct or not, it is not permitted to add some-
thing superfluous.66 One can add something that is superfluous for 
clarity's sake, and in order to make the defined object clearer for the 
one to whom the definition is given. So does, for instance, Abu Hâsim 
when he mentions this double definition, but even in that case the 
definition is less correct.67 A third argument against this definition 
seems to be less logical; though 'Abd al-Jabbâr rejects the thesis of 
Abu 'Ali that speech is something other than sound, he prefers a 
definition to be used among Mu'tazila which even includes the doctrine 
of Abu 'AH. The mention of arranged letters could be accepted as 
a definition of speech, even by Abu 'Alî; but he could not in any 
way accept a definition in which sounds are mentioned.68 
Other definitions are rejected by 'Abd al-Jabbâr because they do not 
circumscribe the defined object, speech, correctly. The definition 
that speech is "arranged letters when they occur as communicative", 
is rejected because it is too narrow; speech can be non-communicative 
—when it is inoperative— and nevertheless be speech.69 Also defini-
tions, stating only that speech is what is communicative,70 are not 
correct because on the one hand not every speech is communicative, 
6 5
 In Mugni VII, 7 'Abd al-Jabbâr apparently states that there can be articulated 
sounds which are not letters Cf note 41 
66
 Cf ρ 78 
6 7
 Cf Mugni VII, 8 According to Abu Hâiim speech really is the letters as appears 
from his statement "if in two or more letters this intuitively known kind of arrangement 
occurs, it must be speech, it cannot have these qualities (sifdt) unless it is articulated 
sounds" 
6 8
 All three arguments are mentioned both in the Mugni and in the Muhit This last 
argument is probably meant to show that this definition, used among Mu'tazila, 
could not be used as generally applicable to their doctrine 
6 9
 Cf Mugni VII, 10 "al-hurû/ al-manzûma idâ hasalat mu/uíalan" Cf pp 304-305 
For a good understanding of the argumentation given in the Mugni, one has to make 
some corrections into the text Mugni VII, 10, line 7 read yamun instead of tamma, 
as appears in the manuscript In line 17, one better reads nujib instead of yujab, page 11, 
line 10 read al-hudúd instead of al-hurûf (as appears from the manuscript and the 
context) "it is not possible to make an analogy between one definition (not letter) 
and another, but for everything one aims to define we have to look for an indication 
that is characteristic of it" 
70
 This definition is formulated in different ways Abu Hâsim is said to have used 
the definition ma yußd (Muhit I, 317) In the Mugni are recorded ma afâd murâd 
al-mulakallim and ma vufliam bih (instead of mmh, as appears in the manuscript) 
maqâsid ai-mutakallim (Mugni VII, 11) 
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and on the other hand not everything that is communicative is speech. 
So, for instance, writing and signs may be communicative, they even 
can be said to communicate what a speaking subject wills, but they, 
evidently, are not speech. 
A last category of definitions rejected in the Mugnî, is said to be 
incorrect because they contain something that it is not permitted to 
mention in the text of a correct definition, as, for instance, the place 
where the object to be defined is, something it needs, its cause, or an 
instrument by which it is made. For this reason, and also because 
they are only applicable to human speech and exclude God's speech, 
restricted as they are to speech that is made by the instruments we need 
to produce speech, the following definitions are rejected by 'Abd 
al-Jabbâr : "special movements",71 "movements that strike the breath 
and occur in the air with the articulation of the air so that it is heard 
as speech",72 "letters that go out from a special orifice",73 and 
"what comes into existence from a knocking in special orifices".74 
Other opinions 
Besides the disagreement that existed about the exact text of the 
definition of speech, a deeper disagreement existed among Muslim 
theologians, a disagreement about the essence of speech. While 'Abd 
al-Jabbâr considers it to be sound and, consequently, an accident, 
others held the opinion that speech is a substance, others again 
that it is an accident but not identical with sound, whereas a last 
thesis says that speech, as knowledge and will, is a qualifier in the 
soul.75 
71
 Mugnî VII, II In Arabic harakâl maksúsa This definition is discussed from 
ρ 11 line 16 up to ρ 12 line 6 One has to adapt the division of the text 
12
 Mugni VII, 12, lines 7-11 In line 9 read β l-jms instead of β l-hiss speech and 
movements are different in genus 
7 3
 This definition is rejected because speech, being an accident, cannot really be 
moving or going out, only substances can. Mugni VII, 12 
7 4
 In this definition the secondary cause {wbab) is mentioned 
7 5
 In the first chapter of Mugni VII 'Abd al-Jabbâr mentions the opinions of his 
opponents; but he restricts himself mainly to their opinions on the Quran and on God's 
speech, he only incidentally mentions speech m general Cf Mugni VU, 4-5 
Al-AS'arî, in his Maqâlâl, summarizes the different opinions propagated up to his 
own time "Some say speech of man is sound, and that is an accident, it may be on 
the tongue as heard, on paper as written, and in the hearts as memorized, it inheres m 
these places by writing, memory, and pronouncing (taláwa or loud reading) Others say • 
speech of man is not sound, it is an accident and sound too is an accident, it exists only 
on the tongue Others say sound is a thin body and speech of man is the articulating of 
sound and is an accident, this is the opinion of an-Nazzàm Others say it is a qualifier 
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In the course of our discussion we already saw how 'Abd al-Jabbâr 
refuted the theses that speech is a substance, or that it is an accident 
but something other than sound. What remains is the discussion and 
the refutation of the doctrine that speech is a qualifier in the soul. 
Ma'nâ qâ'im fi n-nafs: a qualifier existing in the soul.76 The termino-
logy used in this thesis is not chosen by 'Abd al-Jabbâr, but it is the 
wording of his opponents, a wording which varies;77 'Abd al-Jabbâr 
would probably call it a qualifier in the heart.78 This opinion is 
discussed in the Mugni because of its importance for 'Abd al-Jabbâr's 
further argumentation. It is his conviction—and upon this conviction 
his entire argumentation is founded—that speech can be nothing else 
but the speech we hear, but sounds. The acceptance of some other 
kind of speech takes away the foundation of this doctrine. When an 
opponent, therefore, tries to establish something in the human interior 
different from audible speech, and calls this "speech", he attacks 
'Abd al-Jabbâr's system in its very centre. 
The structure of the special chapter of the Mugni devoted to this 
refutation, can be summarized as follows : after a general introduction 
stating that one cannot establish the existence of something one does 
not know, 'Abd al-Jabbâr discusses four arguments brought into the 
field by his opponents, then he briefly mentions some arguments 
showing that the thesis of his opponents cannot be correct—arguments 
of the kind of "ilzâm" - 7 9 and he concludes with a final remark 
based on the Ijma, the consensus of the believers.80 
existing in the soul, not inhering in the tongue; it is an accident and something other 
than sound". (Mai/âlâl, 425) 
^
6
 Sarh 532-535, Mugni VII, 14-20 (the entire third chapter); Muhil I, 317-319. 
СГ, for instance, al-Bâqillânî, al-lnsáj, 96-98, where he gives his arguments for his 
thesis that speech is a qualifier in the soul. Besides some texts from the Qur'ân and 
the Sunna he mentions some sentences used by Arabs (in my soul was speech, a word, 
or talk: koläm. qawl. hadii) and-a verse from a poem by al-Aktal See also Allard, 
Le problème. 310, where he refers to another text of al-Bâqillânî (Tamhid, 251) 
77
 That the words used by 'Abd al-Jabbâr are the original ones of his opponents 
appears from al-As'ari's text (Maqâlât. 425, quoted in note 75), which has the same 
formula The Muhit mentions ma'nâ fi n-nafs, the Èarh also ma'nâ qâ'im bi-dâtih when 
God's speech is meant 
78
 Cf. Mugni VII, 15. 'Abd al-Jabbâr prefers not to use the verb qâm, cf. Sarh 535. 
7 9
 That is to say . he draws from the theory adhered to by his opponents conclusions 
which those opponents cannot accept. Therefore, they have to admit that their theory 
was wrong | Cf pp 74-75 
80
 In the text of the Sarh 'Abd al-Jabbâr starts with his general introduction about 
the way in which we can establish the existence of something, and then he discusses the 
arguments given by his opponents (Sarh 532-535) In the Muhit he starts with his own 
arguments, and then discusses those of his opponents (Muhil 1, 317-319) 
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In his introduction, 'Abd al-Jabbâr's starting-point is that "it is 
not possible to establish (the existence of) something to the knowledge 
of which there is no way, neither necessary nor acquired (knowl-
edge)".81 For, he argues, if that were possible, it would lead to a 
number of absurd consequences and make every argumentation im-
possible and unreliable,82 for it leaves the possibility open to every-
body to establish the existence of whatever he wants. 
Consequently, the opponents have to show whether and how one 
can know this speech in the soul. 
The first argument they give states that the knowledge of this speech 
existing in the soul is a necessary knowledge, and that it is known just 
as will and knowledge. But, 'Abd al-Jabbâr answers, in the case of 
will and knowledge we started from a state (Mi) everybody knows, 
and because of its being a transitory state we concluded to the existence 
of a qualifier. But in the case of speech, which is comparable with, 
for instance, movement, there is no such stale, and the only thing 
it indicates is that one is able, knowing, willing, etc.83 
The opponents' second argument maintains that every person who 
is compos mentis necessarily knows that there is in his soul something 
that corresponds [yutabiq) with the letters; he knows this from his 
own experience at the moment some idea occurs in him, or when he 
"talks in his soul" 8 4 what he wants to utter in speech. 'Abd al-Jabbâr's 
answer is that everything one discovers in this way is either hidden 
speech, which, however, is the same speech as audible speech, or 
thinking about speech.85 Also knowledge, intention, and similar 
acts of the heart may be confounded and considered to be "speech 
in the soul".86 The opponents answer, in their turn, that it is evident 
that people have this experience. To prove this, they appeal to a text 
of the Qur'ân "they say with their tongues what is not in their 
hearts"- 87 and to some expressions used in everyday language : "in 
my soul is speech that I will say or will not say", "in the soul of so 
"' MugniVU. 14. 
82
 In M ugni VII. 14, line 16 one better reads /; l-'ihûrâi ("about the expressions") 
instead of /;" l-'ibâdâi ("about the acts by which we serve God") This sentence 
introduces the next one about the reliability of names and words. 
" Cf M ugni VII. 15 See also Surh 533 and Afuhîi I. 318 
йі
 'Abd al-Jabbâr refers to the "talk of the soul" (haclit un-nafs): see pp 62-63. 
e 5
 In MugniVW. 16, line 7 read na-l-ta/kti fill (eventually one could read Ici/akkur) 
instead of hi-i-ta/akkur /ih Cf p. 62 
"'· Cf. Surh 533 and Uulul I. 318 
" ' Sural al-fath, verse 11 
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and so is speech that he hides and does not reveal"; one says that 
someone is speaking (mutakallimBB) even when he is actually silent;89 
one also says that somebody arranges speech in his soul, and then 
speaks it, and that somebody begins to speak without reflection. 
According to 'Abd al-Jabbâr's opponents, all these expressions indicate 
that people who know the Arabic language 90 know that there is speech 
in their interior. 'Abd al-Jabbâr's answer is rather simple; first, it is 
not permitted to deduce the existence of something from a terminol-
ogy used ; second, if this knowledge were necessary, as the opponents 
assert, he should have that knowledge too. Finally, he shows how the 
expressions used in fact must be understood and explained.1" 
The third argument postulates speech in the soul as a necessary 
medium between thought and its expression. Before expressing a 
thought we have, we have to reflect upon it and arrange it;92 only 
after doing so can we communicate it in expressions. But for 'Abd 
al-Jabbâr this is only either a second thought93—because the first 
was not exhaustive, or because we have to think about something else 
yet—or the talk of the soul, which is not different from audible speech. 
The last argument used by 'Abd al-Jabbâr's opponents entirely 
corresponds to the argument 'Abd al-Jabbâr himself used to establish 
the qualifier "ability" (qudra).9* Someone from whom speech actually 
comes must be difTerent from someone for whom this is not possible. 
This must be caused by a state the first subject is in, and this state 
8 8
 In Mugni VII, 16, line 17 read mutakalltm ("speaking") instead of yatakallam 
("he speakb") Cf Mugnl VII, 17-18. The word yaiakallam indicates that the subject 
actually speaks, whereas the active participle mulakallim ma> indicate that he is 
someone who easily speaks or who is disposed to speak. 
89
 Read in Mugni VII, 16, line 17 sâkit ("silent") instead of wkm ("immobile"). 
*
0
 These expressions are ascribed in the Sarh (533) to the ahi al-luga and in the 
Mugni to the 'uqala (VII, 16) This suggests that with the ahi al-luga not the philologists 
are meant but the people who use this language in a correct way 
" Cf Mugni VII, 17-18. the Qur'ân-text only says that they lie about that which 
is in their hearts, "in my soul is speech" means that I know something that I want 
to reveal in words, the participle "speaking" (mulakallim) may be used to indicate that 
someone easily speaks and is disposed to speak, the expressions indicating that someone 
arranges (rallab) speech before speaking it, mean that he arranges the ma'nâ (the 
meaning or contents) of speech, not speech itself. Finally, the reflection mentioned 
is either thought or hidden speech. (This last expression is discussed in Magni VII, 19). 
Cf also 5огЛ 533-534 and Muhil I. 318. 
^ In Mugni VII, 18, line 16 and also in Muhit I, 318, line 5, we read forms of the 
verb dahbar instead of the verb adâr, the verb dahhar meaning to reflect upon something 
and to arrange it. Cf. Lane. 844 
" Read ¡ani ("second") instead of lâmm ("complete") in Mugni VII, 18, line 18 
9 4
 Cf pp 196-197 and 200 
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must be caused by a cause ('ilia); the state we call "mutakallim" and 
the cause "kalâm". 'Abd al-Jabbâr's answer is that the first person 
can speak because he is able (qâdir) and knowing Çâlim) ; in this respect, 
speech is comparable with handicraft and building, which only suppose 
that the acting subject is able and knowing, and not that he is in a state 
and that a qualifier exists in his soul.95 
Among the counter-arguments 'Abd al-Jabbâr mentions to prove 
that the thesis of his opponents is untenable, the main argument that 
is mentioned and discussed in each of the three theological works 
at our disposition96 discusses the relation between speech on the 
one hand and dumbness (karas) and silence (sukût) on the other. 
Dumbness is attributed to an unsoundness affecting the instrument 
of speech, while silence is defined as "that one does not use the 
instrument of speech in a situation in which one has the ability to use 
it".97 If speech were something in the soul, it would no longer be 
impossible that someone is at the same time speaking and silent or 
dumb,98 for something concerning the instruments cannot prevent 
something else in the soul. 
A whole list of other short arguments is given by 'Abd al-Jabbâr 
to prove, mainly by ilzâmât, that speech cannot be something in the 
soul, and that the way his opponents argue to prove their position 
is not correct.99 The last argument mentioned in this series is based 
on the Ijmâ', the consensus of the Islamic community; the entire 
community agreed that God's speech is heard and read; who says 
9 5
 MugniWl. 19, lines 7-14. In line 14 the manuscript gives a full stop (three points) 
and an extra Urge space The printed edition only gives a comma Here the intcr-
punctton has to be adapted. 
** Sarh 534; in this work this argument is first given as an argument of the opponents; 
they establish the existence of speech in the soul as the opposite of dumbness and 
silence 'Abd al-Jabbâr answers that, if they had an opposite, this opposite would 
be the speech we hear Cf also Muhit I, 317-318 and M ugni VII, 19. 
41
 Cf Sarh 354 "шл al-marja' bi-l-karas ila fasâd valhaq âlat al-kaläm, na-s-sukût 
huw an là yasta'mil âlat al-kalâm fi (instead ofßh) hâlal qudratih 'aiâ sti'mâlth" 
^
8
 'Abd al-Jabbâr refers here to the actually being speaking of the subject, not to 
the way in which it can be used in non-technical language as we saw above (cf 
notes 88 and 91 of this section) In a broader sense the term mutakallim can be used as 
are the words indicating a profession : a carpenter and tailor are called by that name 
also at the moment they do not actually exercize this profession. (The words пацаг and 
kayyât m Muhil I, 318 are used to indicate someone who has the corresponding 
profession, they are not used as proper names) 
9 9
 One finds this list of arguments in Mugni VII, 19-20 In Mugni VII, 20, line 3 
read qascl instead of fasi, it is by intention (qasd) that speech becomes command or 
information Cf ρ 217 
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that God has other speech than that, places himself outside the 
community of believers.100 
100
 Cf. Mugnì VII, 20 A later disagreement after a former consensus leaves the 
consensus intact as 'Abd al-Jabbâr notices 
In the Muhli another formula for this opinion discussed here by 'Abd al-Jabbâr is 
mentioned : speech is mû qäm bi-1-mutakallim (Muhit I, 318). But in this way one cannot 
circumscribe speech, for many things are existing in the speaking person. Moreover, 
one first has to define something before ascribing it to someone, as is done in this case 
С THE QUALITY SPEAKING IN THIS WORLD 
After discussing the essence and the definition of speech as we 
know and produce it in this world, 'Abd al-Jabbâr touches upon the 
question of which subject has to be qualified by this speech as 
"speaking" (mutakallim), and why so. ' 
'Abd al-Jabbâr's opinion is that the subject who makes speech 
(Jâ'il al-kalâm) is qualified as speaking, and that he is qualified in 
this way because he made it. His main argument to prove this thesis 
is a direct one, and is based on the use of the term "speaking" (muta-
kallim) by the Arabs. Here again appears that for 'Abd al-Jabbâr 
a quality is a name, and also that he has every confidence in the truth-
fulness of the Arabic language and in its being conform to something 
in the reality. 
He mentions, however, an indirect argumentation too. By way of 
"taqsîm" (division and exclusion) he enumerates all possibilities for 
a connection between qualifier and qualified object; he excludes all 
these possibilities except one, which must be the correct one.2 Some-
thing can be qualified by a qualifier or cause (ma'nâ or 'ilia),3 either 
because the qualifier inheres in it or in a part of it, or because the 
qualifier necessitates it to be in a certain state (hai), от because it is 
a defect in the necessary instruments, or because it made the qualifier. 
Speech cannot indicate a defect in the instruments so that only three 
real possibilities remain.4 
Consequently, the question to be dealt with in this paragraph is : 
is the substrate in which speech inheres (or in a part of which it inheres) 
called speaking? Is a living being called speaking because of a state 
it is in? Is a living being called speaking because it made speech? We 
discuss these three questions successively. 
1
 Sarh 535-542, Mugni VII, 26-54, and MuMt I, 320-322. 
2
 The method of laqsim is described on pp 72-74 The Muhit does not give Chis 
argument What 'Abd al-Jabbâr does there, is to refute the other possibilities not as 
parts of a laqsim but as arguments of his opponents Cf Muhit I, 320 
3
 For the various connections between a qualifier and something that is qualified 
by it, see ρ 154 
* The opponents mention other possible connections upon which would be based 
the qualification, as, for instance, that the qualifier is existent in (mawjûd hi or qâ'im hi) 
the subject, that it needs the subject, or that it belongs to the subject 
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1. SPEECH M*Y INHFRE IN ANY SI'BSTRATE 
Speech inheres in a substrate, and it cannot exist without inhering 
in a substrate; it can inhere in any substrate; the substrate is not 
qualified by it as speaking (mutakallim).5 These are the items that 
have to be discussed in this section, and which may shed some light 
on the place of speech and speaking in 'Abd al-Jabbâr's system of 
qualities. 
"Know that speech is entitled to the same judgement as the other 
perceptible things are : it exists in a substrate and it cannot possibly 
exist 'not in a substrate', it does not necessitate its substrate to be in 
a state, nor a living being, and it is only ascribed to its maker (Jâ'il) 
because he made it ('ala ¡ihat al-fi'Hya : in the way of 'factuality')."6 
With these words 'Abd al-Jabbâr begins the discussion of this subject, 
in this way already indicating in advance the conclusions he will reach. 
Speech inheres in a substrate. It does not suffice to state here that 
speech is an accident, as we already saw, and, consequently, must 
inhere in a substrate; for, though accidents mostly do inhere in a 
substrate, their inhering does not belong to the characteristics of their 
genus, and accidents do not necessarily inhere in a substrate. 
'Abd al-Jabbâr gives two arguments to prove that speech, never-
theless, does inhere in a substrate. First, speech, as sound in general, 
is produced by us by way of generating; in fact we produce it by 
pressure and knocking (ïtimâdand musâkka) of one body upon another 
one. We already proved, that in this way the effect can only be produced 
in the second body.7 We conclude that speech which is produced in 
this way necessarily exists in a substrate. 
5
 The thesis that speech inheres in a substrate and cannot exist without a substrate 
or—as 'Abd al-Jabbâr says "not in a substrate" (là fi nuthalf), is treated in Mugni VII, 
26-30, the sixth chapter of this part of the Mtignî The division and structure of this 
chapter is not clearly indicated by its division into sentences and paragraphs This 
structure can be summarized as follows (interpunction and division of the printed 
text have to be adjusted accordingly) • 
I speech inheres in a substrate, two arguments are given ρ 26, lines 7-11 and ρ 26, 
lines 12-21 
Π speech cannot exist without inhering in a substrate; argumentation pp 27, line 1 -
28, line 6, follows an objection in ρ 28, lines 7-12. 
Two arguments that would prove 'Abd al-Jabbâr's thesis are rejected as incorrect 
pp 28, line 1 2 - 2 9 , line 9, and ρ 29, lines 9-16 Finally two counter-arguments of the 
opponents are refuted pp 29, line 17 30, line 7, and ρ 30, lines 8-11 
6
 Cf Miign! VII, 26 
Cf pp 135-137 about pressure (l'timâcl), the accident we have to use when producing 
something outside the substrate of our ability, and pp 206-208 about тиіанаііиі, acts 
produced by generating 
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The second argument states, appealing to the experience, that sounds 
are different according to the substrate in which they exist : sound 
existing in copper is different from sound existing in stone. Existence 
of speech in the echo is dependent upon the substrate; not in every 
place speech can exist as in echo. Also every letter needs its special 
structure and zone of articulation8 of the body, and letters are 
different according to the difTerence of those zones. Letters need breath 
to inhere in; otherwise the instruments could not have the influence 
they have and, moreover, speech could exist without there being any 
breath. 
And therefore, 'Abd al-Jabbâr concludes, sound and speech corre-
spond with colours and modes of being in their inhering in a 
substrate.9 
Speech cannot exist without inhering in a substrate. Even the fact that 
an accident—sometimes— inheres in a substrate does not prove that it 
cannot exist "not in a substrate" (laß mahall); we saw that a will 
can exist either in a substrate or "not in a substrate".10 To show that 
speech cannot exist "not in a substrate", 'Abd al-Jabbâr makes a kind 
of analogical reasoning in which he compares speech (and sounds) 
with colours. 
Colours cannot exist without a substrate; if it were possible, they 
could no longer be each other's opposite (didd). ' ' For if they only 
exclude each other in a substrate, they would no longer be opposite 
when one colour exists not in a substrate; and if the substrate is not 
a condition for their being opposite, they even would exclude each 
other when they existed in two different substrates. In both cases 
colours would no longer be each other's opposite in the way they 
really are. Therefore, colours must inhere in a substrate. Everything 
that corresponds with the colours in existing in a substrate, in not 
necessitating a living being to be in a certain state, and in existing 
in a lifeless substrate, must correspond with them in the impossibility 
8
 The word here translated by "zone of articulation" is the Arabic word makraj, 
plural makânj, literally translated, it stands for the places where something goes out 
As a technical term—and as such we discuss this term later—it is the place in the 
vocal organism of a human being where a given letter is articulated Therefore, 'Abd 
al-Jabbâr states that every letter has its own makraj, zone of articulation from which 
it "goes out" Cf Mugnì VII, 26 
4
 M ugni VII, 26 
10
 Cf. pp 273-276 
11
 About the concept of being "opposite" (didd) see pp 142-143 
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to exist not in a substrate That holds true of sounds and speech too.12 
The reason why 'Abd al-Jabbâr makes a detour via the colours is 
that, according to him, it is not self-evident that sounds and letters 
exclude one another so that he could formulate about them the 
argumentation he actually gave for the colours.13 
Evidently, objections we meet in this chapter try to make a com-
parison between speech and will, the will being the only accident we 
met hitherto that can exist without a substrate 14 
12
 Cf Mugni VII, 27 That speech and sound do not necessitate a living being to be 
in a certain slate and can exist in a lifeless substrate, is argued in the next two chapters 
of the seventh part of the Mugni Cf pp 139-140 
13
 Abu Häiim is said to have accepted the mutual exclusion and the being opposite 
of various sounds and letters and to have based his argumentations on this premise 
Cf Mugni VII, 27-28 
14
 The first objection made against 'Abd al-Jabbâr's thesis (cf note 5 of this section) 
runs one perceives sound without perceiving its substrate, perception of sound in 
a substrate or not in a substrate would not make any difference 'Abd al-Jabbâr answers 
that this is correct, but that his argumentation was not built on perception but on 
mutual exclusion Next 'Abd al-Jabbâr rejects two arguments that might be used to 
prove his own thesis the first one starts from the supposition that sound and speech are 
heard b\ the transportation of the substrate of that sound or speech towards the ear, 
this implies that sound and speech must exist in a substrate to be heard 'Abd al-Jabbâr's 
argumentation in rejecting this argument is threefold first, sound and speech arc not 
perceived by transportation (cf pp 138 and 303), second, even if sound and 
speech were perceived in that way, God, who does not use instruments, could 
nevertheless perceive it, third, one could say that this transportation of the substrate 
only is a condition for sound and speech which inhere in a substrate and not for speech 
which does not inhere in a substrate (read in Mugni VII, 29, line 4 ι а/сил instead of 
lakun the subject being rauf, there is no reason at all to begin a new sentence in line 4, 
let alone a new paragraph) 
The second argument in favour of 'Abd al-Jabbâr's theory, but which is never-
theless rejected, states that the existence of speech not in a substrate corresponds with 
us being non existent in as far as in both cases it is not entitled to any judgement at 
all (the two dashes in Mugni VII, 29 line 9, added by the editor are not correct and 
insinuate a misinterpretation of the text by making the four words between these dashes 
a parenthetic clause, which they actually are not literally translated, the text runs 
'its existence not in a substrate and (5c its existence) when и would not exist is in one 
situation in so far it has no ludgement") This implies that this accident in its being 
existent corresponds with how it is when it is non-existent This is not possible because, 
when being existent, it must be entitled to some judgements based on its genus 
to which it is not entitled when it is non-existent (cf pp 106-107) 'Abd al-Jabbâr's 
answer is that it is perceptible when it is existent and imperceptible when it is non-
existent This proves that it is entitled lo a judgement to which it is not entitled when 
it is non-existent 
1 inally 'Abd al-Jabbâr refutes two arguments of his opponents, based on a comparison 
made between speech on the one side and will on the other side The dilference between 
speech and will is, according to 'Abd al-Jabbâr, that the will necessitates the living being 
to be in a state, whereas speech does not Wills and non-wills also do not exclude one 
another under the condition ol a substrate Therefore 'Abd al-Jabbâr's conclusion is 
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Speech can inhere in any substrate 15 By adhering to this thesis 'Abd 
al-Jabbâr follows Abu Hâsim in his later works, after he abandoned 
the doctrine propagated by his father Abu 'Ali.16 This latter doctrine 
consisted in the assumption that speech, when heard and conse-
quently linked with sound,17 needs movement and a certain structure; 
some forms of sound need a special hardness of their substrate (thus, 
for instance, the sound of copper, which cannot exist in cotton). 
Sound in general can, however, occur in any substrate. 'Abd al-Jabbâr 
makes a distinction, following his teacher Abu Hâsim : when we, 
human beings, who have to use secondary causes and instruments to 
produce speech, actually produce speech, it needs movement and 
a certain structure. But when it is made by someone who needs no 
secondary causes or instruments (and so does God alone), it does 
not need movement or structure; only, 'Abd al-Jabbâr adds in the 
Muhit, when God uses nevertheless secondary causes. His speech too 
needs a special structure.18 Sound does not need hardness on its 
substrate. 
Speech does not need movement. When analysing 'Abd al-Jabbâr's 
argumentation in proving this thesis to be correct, there are two things 
th.it it is not correct to compare sound (read nv-rauf in Mttgni VII, 30, line 10, instead of 
as-timar. which is found in the manuscript) and speech with will 
l s
 This subject is discussed in \ftigni VII. 11-42, chapter 7 of this part of the Mugnl 
The structure of this chapter can be summarized as follows after a short introduction 
summarizing the positions of Abu 'Ali and Abu Hâsim, 'Abd al-Jabbâr first discusses 
the doctrine and arguments of ЛЬй 'Alî (pp Ή, line 14 32, line 20) The rest of the 
chapter is given to the doctrine of Abu Hâsim, which is adhered to by 'Abd al-Jabbar 
first, he proves that speech does not need movement (haiaka). next that it does not need 
a special structure (Amia), and, finally, that sound can exist in any substrate (these 
three subjects are treated respectively in pp 33, line I 36, line 3. pp 36. line 4 
42, line 8. and ρ 42, lines 9-11 Cf also Sarh 540-541 and Muhit I, 326 
1 6
 Cf Sai h 540, MugmWX, 36, and Muhit I, 326 The doctrine of Abu 'Alî is founded 
upon our experience in this world and does not take into account that God's speech 
may occur in a way which is different from the way in which our speech occurs His 
arguments are summarized b> 'Abd al-Jabbâr in M ugni VII, 31-32 For an accurate 
understanding ofthat text, one has to make two corrections in Witgni VII 32, line II 
read mahallthimâ ( their substrate") instead of mcihullcixliimâ ("their two substrates"), 
it is essential in the argumentation that the possibility is mentioned of two letters existing 
in one and the same substrate On the same page, line 15, read иа-\си/йІ ("and he, sc 
Abu 'Alî, says") instead ol wa-mu/ûl ("and we say") 
11
 I or Abu 'AH speech is not sound, but it can be linked with sound and in that 
case be heard, it can. however, also occur as written or as memorized Cf M ugni VII, 
31-32 and ρ 297 
1 8
 CI Muhit I, 326 'Abd al-Jabbâr does not speak in this context about this speech 
also needing movement, but we can assume thai this is the case too 
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we have to bear in mind. First, we have to pay attention to the way he 
describes and defines "movement" (haraka):19 it is "being" (kann) 
and in fact it is the being of a substance in a concrete place after it 
was in another place the moment just before, but, first of all, it indicates 
the concrete delimited place the substance is in at this moment. The 
second point to bear in mind is the meaning of the verb "to need" 
(ihtâj); this verb does not indicate here that something is needed as 
a secondary cause or an instrument, but that it is needed to exist 
(/7 l-wujûd); it is a necessary condition at every moment and in every 
form the "needing" subject exists. Against this background we have 
to read the arguments of Abu Hâsim which are used by 'Abd al-
Jabbâr.20 
The first argument holds : if a letter would need movement to exist, 
it could not exist with this movement and with its opposite (and we 
know that all movements are each other's opposite because they exclude 
each other in one and the same substrate).21 But, when a speaking 
person moves through space, the same letter exists with different 
movements; in every place he can produce all letters. Therefore, 
speech does not2 2 need movement to exist.23 
A second argument starts from the general thesis that, if something 
needs something else to exist, it does not need a certain concrete form 
of it, but any individual of the genus concerned in any way it can 
occur. (If knowledge needs life to exist, it can exist with any form of 
life.) And because movement is not a genus of its own, but belongs 
19
 CT ρ 130. where we discussed 'Abd al-Jabbâr's use of the term movement 
(haraka) 
20
 That the arguments given by 'Abd al-Jabbâr really are Abu Hâiim's, appears 
from the way they are introduced Cf Mugni VII, 33, line 1, 34, line 8 (one has to read 
here bay\an instead of bu\yin), 35, lines 4 and 6 
21
 Cf ρ 142 in our discussion of the term clidd (opposite) 
2 2
 In Mugni VII, 33, line 4 add the word la before yahtäj, the word is also missing 
in the manuscript 
23
 In the text (Mugni VII. 33) an objection is made, stating that the accident 
composition (fa'///) can exist with different "vicinities" (тщанагш) and nevertheless 
needs vicinity to exist We already saw that for 'Abd al-Jabbâr "vicinity" also is 
a "being" (kawn), just as movement (cf ρ 131 it is another name for "combination" 
or i/timâ') The composition remains, though the actual "vicinities" always change 
when the composed totality moves in space But, 'Abd al-Jabbâr's answer runs, 
composition (fa'///) does not need "vicinity", but only that the two substrates are 
"in each other's vicinity" {mula/áwiravn. "touching each other") whatever the concrete 
"vicinities" are Composition does not need vicinity, it only needs that there be vicinity 
It does not need a concrete vicinity, but only that the substrates concerned have any 
form ol vicinity 
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to the genus "being" (kawn), speech could exist with any kind of 
"being" and, consequently, also with immobility (sukûn), which is 
also one of the modes of being.24 
The third argument starts from our experience that human speech 
needs movement because this movement is analogous with a secondary 
cause (sabab). We produce speech by way of generating (tawlid), and 
the secondary cause we use is pressure (i'timâd); but we can only 
generate speech by pressure when it occurs as knocking (musâkka), 
and this implies that it is linked25 with movement. Consequently, 
though movement is not itself the secondary cause, it makes it possible 
that we generate through the secondary cause which is the pressure. 
Therefore, it is needed just as the secondary cause is needed. From 
such a connection between secondary cause and result, one cannot 
deduce that the result needs the secondary cause to exist. Moreover, 
if someone can produce speech without the use of secondary causes 
(and God can do so). His speech can exist without movement, and 
speech in general cannot need movement to exist. 
A fourth argument is in fact an argumentum ad hominem against 
Abu 'Ali, who, basing himself on the evidences of his world, came 
to the conclusion that speech needs movement to exist. His son, Abu 
Hâsim, asks him whether the force of the movement and the force of 
the sound correspond with each other. Does much sound need much 
movement and little sound little movement? If he gives a negative 
answer, he is in contradiction with the evidences of this world on 
which he based himself in his own argumentation. If he answers in 
the positive, he has to admit that God also can only produce speech 
by way of pressure and movement and needs secondary causes. More-
over, the general thesis that much of the "needing" needs much of the 
"needed" and little of the "needing" little of the "needed", is not 
corect since much or little knowledge only needs one and the same 
life to exist. 
24
 An opponent may object against the axioma used here that life needs a special 
composition to exist since it cannot exist in every substrate But. according to 'Abd 
al-Jabbâr, life does not need a special composition, nor does composition need 
a special vicinity But life only needs a special structure (binva). and that is to say that 
the substances touch each other (are in each other's vicinity) in a special way. 
Life does not need that structure to exist, but to give the totality a special characteristic, 
and when something makes it impossible for life to give that characteristic (because the 
structure is missing), it makes it impossible for life to exist 
25
 In Mugnì VII, 34, line 10 read muqârana ("being linked") instead of mufäraqa 
("being different"). 
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A last argument states that speech cannot exist with every concrete 
movement, but only with movement that occurs in a way in which it 
generates or makes possible that the pressure generates. Therefore, 
speech can only need it as a secondary cause and does not need it in 
general nor to exist. 
Speech does not need a special structure. It does not need it generally, 
because of its genus, but it may need it when it occurs in a special 
way as we saw above about movement. 
A first argument26 'Abd al-Jabbâr gives to prove this thesis, is 
founded on the principle that everything that is confined to (yaktass) 
a substrate and does not necessitate a living being to be in a state 
{hai), to exist only needs its substrate. To prove this principle, 'Abd 
al-Jabbâr refers to the colours, the modes of being, the tastes, and 
the odours; he discusses the examples adduced by his opponents to 
prove that this principle is not generally applicable, and he shows that 
they cannot be used as arguments.27 Speech is confined to a substrate 
(as we already saw) and does not necessitate a living being to be in 
a state (as we shall see below); therefore, to exist it does not need 
anything except its substrate. 
The second argument28 also starts from a general principle : if 
something needs something in its substrate, its opposite also needs it. 
'Abd al-Jabbâr proves that this general principle is correct by referring 
26
 Mugm VII, 36. line 4 - 37, line 19 
27
 'Abd al-Jdbbâr's opponents adduce four examples, four things that are, according 
to them, confined to a substrate, do not necessitate a living being to be in a state, and, 
nevertheless, need more than a simple substrate 
Composition (ta HI) needs vicinity 'Abd al-Jabbâr denies this. Composition does 
not need vicinity, but only two substances which touch each other and therefore behave 
like one substrate Cf note 23 of this section and also what is said on pp 132-134 
about composition 
Pressure (l'timàd) needs something else According to 'Abd al-Jabbâr, it only needs 
something else to be necessary and remaining in a given substance (like, e g , the 
pressure in the slope of a hill), to exist it does not need something else Cf pp 135-137 
Pain (a/am) needs to be perceived with an aversion of nature and therefore needs 
life on Us substrate 'Abd al-Jabbâr answers that only in that case we call it pain, but it 
can also exist on lifeless substrates. Cf pp 134-135 
Death (maní), (this argument begins in Mugni VII, 37, line 3 after the full stop 
The first half of this line belongs to the preceding paragraph) We cannot say that death 
needs a certain structure because it is not possible to establish death as a separate 
genus Nor can we say that a composite whole is dead; only the various atoms can be 
said to be so because they once belonged to a composite whole that was a living being. 
Cf ρ 174 
2 8
 Mugni VII, 38, line 1 40, line 3 
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to will and non-will ^ and to conviction and its opposites, and by 
refuting the arguments of his opponents who try to show, by adducing 
concrete examples, that the principle is not generally applicable 30 
Because sounds, according to 'Abd al-Jabbâr, are each other's opposite, 
every individual letter must need the same structure in its substrate 
as the other letters need This leads to the conclusion that all letters 
need the same structure in their substrate But we know that every 
letter we, human beings, produce, needs a special structure, different 
from the structure any other letter needs 
The third argument3 ' makes a distinction between three categories 
29
 It is not clear why the editor correctb the word na-1-karâha in the manuscript 
and reads na-1-karâlma (MugniWX, 38 line 3 and note 1 of thai same page) One better 
reads with the manuscript ла-1-karàha 
30
 Five examples are given by the opponents where according to them something 
needs something else on its substrate which its opposite does not need 
Knowledge of the slate in which something is needs the knowledge of the essence 
ofthat something, while its opposite (oblivion positive ignorance, or opinion) does not 
need it 'Abd al-Jabbâr answers thai the one knowledge does not need the other 
knowledge, but being knowing the state something is in supposes that one knows the 
essence of that something One can also give as an answer that knowledge of the state 
only needs knowledge of Ihe essence in order to be knowledge, not in order to exist 
(as its genus, conviction) To exist U only needs the conviction of the essence, positive 
ignorance and oblivion of the slate need the same conviction of the essence 
Necessary knowledge of the state something is in needs necessary knowledge of its 
essence, while its opposite does nol 'Abd al-Jabbâr's answer is similar to the preceding 
one the one knowledge docs not need the other one in order to exist, moreover, the 
knowledge ol the essence must be necessary in order that the knowledge of the state 
be necessary, not in order that it exists The knowledge of the state may even be 
necessary, though the knowledge of the essence is acquired, it can be necessary, though 
it cannol prevent m that case the banishing of the knowledge of the essence (for only 
necessary knowledge cannot be denied and banished Irom the soul cf pp 53-54) 
Death does not need the same things on its substrate as its opposite, life, does 
The answer is first, we cannot eslablish death (note 27 of this section) and, second, 
it is not the opposite of life (cf ρ 174) This argument is given in Mugni VII, 39, line 8, 
where it begins after the comma (the addition of Ihe preposition hi by the editor is not 
necessary), up to line 12 Interpunction has to be corrected here 
Annihilation (Jana') does need something else than its opposite, substance 'Abd 
al-Jabbâr's answer is lhat annihilation and substances do nol inhere in a substrate, 
whereas the principle explicitly mentioned the subslrate 
Separation (ijlirâq) does not need the same on its substrate as Us opposite, composition 
(tu'Uf) The answer is twofold first, separation (one of the akwän) is not the opposite 
of composition (the argument to prove this seems to have disappeared from the 
manuscript, cf Mugnl VII, 40, lines 1-2), second, just as separation, composition 
does not need anything on its substrate (cf note 23 of this section) 
31
 Mugni VII, 40, lines 3-11 The division of the text into paragraphs has to be 
adjusted 
As examples of the three categories of accidents can be mentioned, respectively, 
knowledge, movement, and sound 
322 THE QUR'ÂN AND GOD'S OTHER SPEECH 
of accidents : first, accidents that are confined to a composite body 
(jumla) because they necessitate it to be in a certain state; second, 
accidents that are confined lo a substrate and necessitate it to be in 
a certain state; third, accidents that are confined to a substrate and 
do not necessitate it to be in a state. Only the first category mentioned 
needs something in its substrate, in order to make the connection it 
has with the totality possible. The other two categories do not have 
any connection except with their substrate; therefore, they do not 
need anything except that substrate. 
A fourth argument32 starts from our knowledge that the acts of the 
heart need something in their substrate in order to exist; in fact, 
they need the structure of the heart and they cannot exist, either made 
by God or by man, except in a substrate structured as the heart is.33 
In this respect speech, however, cannot be compared with the 
acts of the heart. The reason why the acts of the heart can only exist in 
a specially structured substrate is that they need it to exist, while the 
reason why speech which we make exists only in specially structured 
substrates (the organism of our voice and the echo) is that only those 
places can function as an instrument (ala) to produce speech.34 There-
fore, we cannot produce speech in every substrate but only in substrates 
that can be structured to function as an instrument; we always have 
to produce it by generating (tawlîd), be it on the tongue or in the 
echo.35 
But because speech only needs a structure in its substrate when 
this substrate is used as an instrument, not because speech needs it to 
exist, God,36 who does not need the use of instruments or secondary 
causes since He is per se and essentially able, can produce speech in 
any substrate. 
The instruments we need to produce speech are described by 'Abd 
32
 Mugni П, 40, line 12-41, Ime 15 
3 3
 About the heart and its function as a substrate · pp. 166-167 
One cannot say that the heart lunctions as an instrument, for some acts of the heart 
are produced immediately in the substrate of the ability, (cf Mugni VII, 40) 
3
* If speech were not produced by us by means of instruments and secondary 
causes, we could only produce it in the substrate of the ability. The fact that we can 
produce speech outside that substrate shows that we produce it by generating (tawliJ) 
and by the use of instruments (alât) and secondary causes (asbâb). 
35
 In Mugni VII, 41, line 10 read an yafalah 'alayh ("the way in which he can make 
it") instead of an taj'alah 'illatuh ("its cause can make it"). 
36
 In Mugni VII, 41, lines 12 and 14 one has to read twice a third person (ум/к/ and 
yafal) instead of the first person of the plural. Evidently, not "we" can produce speech 
and writing without instruments and in any substrate, but only " H e " (God) 
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al-Jabbâr as, for instance, tongue (I¡sán) and uvulae (lahawât);31 also 
he frequently mentions the "makârij", the places where something 
goes out. Any letter is said to have its own makraj, which is structured 
in a special way different from the other makânj. This term is used by 
the philologists to indicate a certain zone in the organism of the 
human voice, a zone in which the letter concerned is articulated, and 
from which it "goes out".38 
The fifth and last argument39 is in fact directed against Abu 'AH, 
who held that speech, when pronounced, needs a special structure. 
The argument runs that if something needs something else to exist, 
it needs it because of its genus, not because of a special way in which 
this genus occurs. Therefore, any individual of that genus must need 
it. This implies that God's speech needs this special structure; that 
sound (the genus to which speech belongs) needs the same structure as 
speech ; finally, that speech, when written or memorized (for Abu 'AH 
that also is real speech), needs the same structures it needs when it is 
pronounced. Because Abu 'Ali must deny these conclusions, he must 
admit that his premise was not correct. 
Speech (and sound) does not need hardness. We already saw that 
speech can exist in any substrate; consequently, it cannot need 
hardness {salaba) or solidity of its substrate.40 
The substrate of speech is not qualified as speaking (mutakallim).*1 
If the substrate of speech would be qualified as speaking, not the 
human being but the tongue would be qualified as speaking and, 
consequently, also as informing, commanding, prohibiting;42 the 
tongue also should be praised or blamed for good or evil speech 
31
 Mugni VII, 40 
3 8
 For the use of the term makraj by the Arab grammarians, especially by 
Sîbawayhi, cf Fleisch, Traité, 208-209 "Pour mahrag nous disons "point d'articulation" 
Sibawayhi (et toute la tradition grammaticale) voit dans le mahrag une zone, une region 
à délimiter" Sibawayhi mentions sixteen diíTerent makânj in the throat, tongue, 
and lips Cf also Fleisch, La conception phonétique, 81 
3 9
 Mugni VII, 41, line 1 5 - 4 2 , Ime 8 It begins ¡η Ime 15 after the full stop 
4 0
 Mugni VII, 42, lines 9-11 
4 1
 Mugni VII, 50, line 10 - 51, line 10. Cf also Sarh 537 and Muhit I, 321 
4 2
 Informing (mukbir), commanding (âmir), and prohibiting (nâhî) are said to be 
"parts" (aqsâm) of speech, more correctly the corresponding masdar is called thus 
kabar, amr, nahy. It indicates a division of speech into several sub-categories 
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inhering in it. Moreover, nothing could be qualified as speaking 
because a substrate can only be the substrate of one letter—every 
letter needing its own structure—and one letter cannot be speech-; 
therefore at least two letters are needed, but two letters cannot inhere 
in one and the same substrate. Consequently, no substrate at all can 
be called speaking. 
Nor can we say that speaking is "he in a part of whom speech 
inheres" (man hall ba'dah) because also in that case the tongue would 
be called speaking since speech inheres in a part of it. 
In both cases (either when speaking is said to be the substrate, or 
a totality of which the substrate is a part), the echo would also be 
qualified as speaking, whereas God cannot43 be speaking since speech 
cannot inhere in Him nor in a part of Him. 
Similar expressions used to describe the subject who is qualified 
as "speaking" are also rejected by 'Abd al-Jabbâr; one cannot say 
that a subject is "speaking" because speech is "mawjùd bih"44 or 
"qaim bih".*5 
2. SPEECH DOES NOT NECESSITATE A LIVING BEING TO BE IN A STATE 
The thesis that speech necessitates a composite body and living 
being46 to be in a state, is refuted by 'Abd al-Jabbâr in seven argu-
ments, the first two of which prove directly that such a state is not 
possible and cannot be established, while the other five show the 
43
 In M ugni VII, 51. line 8, add the negation, which is found in the manuscript 
but missing in the printed text, read an la iura/. 
44
 The expression man/ûd bib can have a double meaning in Arabic, either "existent 
on" or "existent by" If the first interpretation is meant, it has to be rejected since that 
corresponds with inhering, the second interpretation can be seen as corresponding with 
'Abd al-Jabbâr's own opinion that he made it Cf Muhii I, 322 See also Sarh 538 
45
 The expression qâ'im bih is poly-mlerprelable (in Mugni VII, 51, line 14 one 
belter corrects muhtamal, "poly-mterprclable", cf also Mugni VII, 52, line 3 In Sarh 
538 read in line 13 qâ'im instead of qadim) It can be used to indicate that it inheres 
(is located in), or that it is remaining and permanent—but remaining and permanence, 
baqá' wa-dawám. are impossible for speech or it can be an equivalent for mm\/ûd bih, 
or it can mean that it is governed by someone-and that also is impossible for speech— 
or that it comes Irom someone, this last interpretation corresponds with 'Abd al-Jabbâr's 
doctrine But, since this expression is poly-interprctable, one cannot use it to describe 
the speaking subject 
46
 Both the composite body (al-)umla) and the living being (al-haw) are mentioned 
in the title of the eighth chapter of Mugni VII, "//" mm al-kalâm lä vújib li-l-jumla 
na-li-l-haw halan" (Mugni VII, 43) For 'Abd al-Jabbâr a composite body necessarily 
is a living being C( ρ 174 
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incorrectness of this thesis by way of ilzâm, by showing the impli-
cations of it, implications that cannot be accepted.47 We mention 
these seven arguments successively. 
'Abd al-Jabbâr's first argument states that there is no way to know 
this state the living being should be in. If we could have this knowl-
edge, it should be either necessary or acquired.48 It is not known by 
necessary knowledge : when we are speaking or when someone else 
is speaking, we know nothing by necessary intuitive knowledge except 
the speech coming from the speaking subject; we know no state, just 
as we do not know any state when someone is moving something, 
bringing to rest, or beating.49 Nor can it be known by acquired 
knowledge because the acts and the way in which they occur do not 
indicate such a state,50 and no other state the living being is in supposes 
this being to be in such a state. Consequently, because we cannot know 
such a state, neither by necessary nor by acquired knowledge, we have 
to deny it. 
The second argument51 has as starting-point the general principle: 
whenever a qualifier necessitates a living being to be in a state, the 
living being can be known to be in that state although one does not 
know the qualifier. This principle is proved by 'Abd al-Jabbâr by 
referring to the states "able" (qâdir)52 and "knowing" Çâlim), and 
by comparing speech with movement (haraka) and beating (darb). 
ίΊ
 СГ. M ugni VII, 43-47 (chapter 8), where the seven arguments are given. In 
Sarh 536-537 the first two arguments are mentioned; in Muhit I, 320-321 we find five 
arguments, corresponding with the first four mentioned in the Mugni. The third 
argument of the Muhit can be found in the first argument of the Mugni, in which 
the first and the third of the Muhit arc combined into one. 
4 8
 Thus the state of knowing ('álim) is known by necessary knowledge when our 
own stale is concerned, and by acquired knowledge when the stale of someone else 
is concerned. The state of able (qailir) is always known by acquired knowledge. In the 
Muhit we find a threefold division : a state can be known either by self-experience 
(wijtlân an-nafx), or on the basis of perception, or because of a judgement that indicates 
it. This last is the case, e.g., when from the fact that someone is entitled to the judgement 
that precise acts are possible for him, is deduced that he is knowing. Cf. Muhit I, 320. 
' " This is the third argument mentioned in the Muhit : if speech were to ncccssilate 
the living being to be in a slate, other acts he produces should necessitate the same 
(Muhit I. 321). 
50
 So, for instance, acts indicate that the acting subject was in the slate of being 
able; Ihe occurring of an act in a precise way indicates that the subject was knowing: 
the occurring of an act in special ways (e.g., as a command) indicates thai the subject 
is willing. We discussed all this in our paragraph about 'Abd al-Jabbár"s anthropology. 
51
 Mugni VII, 44, line I 45, line 9. 
52
 In Mugni VII. 44, line 2 read with the manuscript iva-lá na'lam αΙ-ψιώα instead 
of on· la na'lam al-quclra. 
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The examples adduced by opponents which are based on the works 
of Abu Hâsim, are discussed and rejected by 'Abd al-Jabbâr.53 
The third argument54 starts from the principle that everything that 
necessitates a living being to be in a state, cannot possibly exist in 
a lifeless substrate.55 'Abd al-Jabbâr cannot directly state that it 
must exist in a part of the subject that is in that state, for there is one 
exception : God's will, which necessitates Him to be willing, does not 
exist in a part of Him, but without a substrate. But the will also cannot 
exist in a lifeless substrate. Thus, a qualifier existing in a part of a 
living being necessitates that being to be in a state; when it exists 
without a substrate, it necessitates God to be in a state. Nevertheless, 
speech can exist in a lifeless substrate, such as the echo, the breath, 
and the air in the mouth. Consequently, it cannot necessitate a living 
being to be in a state. 
A fourth argument,56 which is said to have been used by Abu 
Hâsim, holds that God can create two instruments to speak in 
a human being (as He can create two hands and two eyes); in that 
case, the human being can speak with two opposite letters at the same 
time, and this again implies that he would be at the same moment in 
53
 Four examples are adduced by the opponents first, unconsciousness (гаЛи), 
which is said to necessitate a state without there being a way to know it 'Abd 
al-Jabbâr says that Abu Hâsim's opinion varied Sometimes he denied unconsciousness 
to necessitate a state, when he. however, affirms that it necessitates a state, it is said 
to be the opposite of knowledge, in that case it can be known Abu Ishaq even denies that 
it is anything at all The opponents adduce three other examples will (¡ràda), reflection 
(nazar), and inability ('a/r) do not necessitate the living being to be in a state though 
they need and are confined to living beings, always m the opinion of Abu Hâsim 
'Abd dl-Jabbàr's answer is twofold Abu Hâiim later held that will and inability do 
necessitate a state, and, moreover, the real question is entirely different, for the 
examples adduced by the opponents do not necessitate the living being to be in a state 
The states of being unconscious and of being unable can be known because they are 
the opposites of states known being knowing and being able As for reflection, 
according to Abu Hâsim it is an act and the quality reflecting is a factual quality, just as 
speaking is. for 'Abd al-Jabbâr it is a qualifier necessitating the living being to be 
in a stale, which is known by self-experience as we already saw (Cf pp 40-41) 
54
 Cf Mugni VII, 45. line 10-46 , line 8 
55
 'Abd al-Jabbâr's opponents try to make an objection against this principle 
on the basis of the divine will, 'Abd al-Jabbâr had already formulated his principle 
in a way that this ob|CCtion could not be valid Moreover, though he says that will 
existing without a substrate necessitates God to be in a state, his opponents will surely 
not affirm that speech existing in a lifeless substrate (such as echo and breath) necessitates 
God to be in a state 
" Cf Mugni VII, 46, lines 9-20 
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two opposite states, which is impossible, for both would characterize 
the whole person.57 
The fifth argument58 states that the speech of two persons can 
exist in one and the same body; this leads to the conclusion that a 
subject could be at one and the same moment in two opposite states.59 
The sixth argument60 concludes from the thesis of the opponents that 
no speech could exist after death; one knows, nevertheless, that this is 
possible ('Abd al-Jabbâr does not explain how).61 
The seventh and last argument is composed by 'Abd al-Jabbâr him-
self as he with some pride remarks;62 it runs : letters are different from 
each other, but they all belong to the genus sound. This implies that 
every letter would cause the living being to be in a different state, and 
that other kinds of sound we make (screeming or even clapping hands) 
would also necessitate us to be in a state. 
The quality speaking does not indicate the subject to he in a state.63 
It is not necessary to elaborate this statement; we saw above that there 
is no such state; consequently, the quality "speaking" cannot refer to 
and be based upon such a state. 
3. SPEAKING MEANS MAKING SPEECH 
When a given subject is said to be entitled to the quality "speaking" 
(mutakallim), and when this quality is applied to this subject, the 
reason must be that the subject is "making speech" (failkalâm) or "that 
speech existed from his side according to his intention and his will".6* 
57
 Cf. also Muhit I, 321, where one has to read in line 10 kuliqat instead of 
kulifal. 
58
 Mugni VII, 47, lines 1-2. 
59
 One might suppose that 'Abd al-Jabbâr here thinks of the echo, where the 
speech of two people can exist at the same time It is not clear which subject would 
be in a state because of this double speech. 
60
 Mugni VII, 47, lines 3-4 
61
 Perhaps this argument was originally made by someone who was an adherent of 
Abu 'All's theory that speech can also exist as written or memorized Otherwise. 
we have to think of speech which is still present the moment just after the death of 
the speaking subject, speech remaining longer than one time-atom 
62
 Mugni VII, 47, lines 4-12 (it begins in line 4 after the comma) After giving 
this argument he says . "this indication belongs to the strongest which are given in 
this chapter, I did not know it to be mentioned in the books". This remark may shed 
some light on the way 'Abd al-Jabbâr habitually works. In Mugni VII, 47. line 14, 
read with the manuscript ma dakarnâh instead of ma dakarah 
63
 Cf Mugni VII. 51 
^ This is the formula used in the title ol the chapter in the Mugni concerning 
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We already saw how 'Abd al-Jabbâr proves this thesis to be correct, 
arguing by means of a taqsim, by way of division and exclusion :65 when 
the connection between speech and the subject qualified as speaking 
cannot be that speech inheres in the speaking subject or in a part of 
this subject, nor that speech necessitates the subject to be in a state, 
the only remaining possibility is that the connection is the one between 
the acting subject and the act. Consequently, the speaking subject is 
qualified in this way because he made speech. 
Another argument, showing some similarity with the preceding one, 
makes also use of the method of taqsîm.66 It is an established and 
incontestable fact that there is speech in the echo. The substrate in which 
that speech inheres cannot be qualified as speaking, nor can the totality 
in a part of which it inheres. God also cannot be qualified by this 
speech since speech in the echo can be evil and God cannot be qualified 
by something evil. Therefore, only man can be qualified by it, and 
only the one according to whose intentions that speech occurs in the 
echo. He is qualified as speaking because he made that speech. 
this subject "//" ann haqiqat al-mutakallim annah yùjad al-kalâm mm jihatih •na-bi-havab 
qaidih на-trádatih" (Mugni VII, 48) 
The way in which 'Abd al-Jabbâr describes the connection between an act and 
its acting subject may be slightly different in his various works (Cf ρ 207 and note 249 
on ρ 207) In the present context the Sarh uses the expression 'alâ dawâ'ih (on his 
motives, Sarh 539), the Mugni gives a formula which is more elaborate than the one 
mentioned above bi-hasab qasdih ма-irádatih wa-da\\â'îh (according to his intention, 
his will, and his motives, MugnlWl, 48, line 5), the MuhU keeps to its own vocabulary 
and gives bi-hasab ahnálih (according to his states, Muhit I, 320) This subject is discussed 
in Sarh 535-539, Mugni VII, 48-54, Muhii I, 320-322 The three works all mention 
the argument based on the taqsim and the one based upon the use of the term 
mutakallim by the ahi al-luga, the Mugni and the Muhit also give the argument based 
on the "parts of speech" 
6 5
 We already discussed this taqsim on ρ 313 It is elaborated m Sarh 536-539 and 
in Mugni VII, 50, line 7-52, line 21 In the Muhit it is only mentioned (Muhit I, 320) 
To make the taqsim correct and valid, one has to show that it covers all possibilities 
Besides a number of instances adduced by the opponents, which according to them are 
not covered by this taqsim, and which are discussed by 'Abd al-Jabbâr in Mugni VII, 
52. one definition of "speaking" remains that we have not yet mentioned This definition 
has that speaking means "having speech" al-mutakallim man kalâm Iah {Muhit I, 
322, cf Mugni VII, 52 Iah kalâm, Sarh 538-539 al-kalâm kalâmuh aw kalâm Iah) 
This definition is rejected by 'Abd al-Jabbâr because it is poly-interpretable, the Muhit 
mentions three different meanings possession (mulk), contact (tttiçâl), and act (fi'l), 
the Sarh distinguishes in the contact between contact (ittisáí) and characterizing 
(iktisâs) As instances of possession are mentioned a servant and a horse, as 
instances of contact the parts of the body. One might draw the conclusion that 
"vision" (ra'y) and "governing" (sivâsa) are instances of "characterizing" (ikttsás) and 
that the text of Mugni VII, 52, line 5, has to be completed accordingly bt-ma'nâ 
l-iklisâs instead of bt-ma'nâ t-tajkir as proposed by al-Abyârî 
~
66
 MugnWW, 50, lines 1-6 
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Besides these two indirect arguments, 'Abd al-Jabbâr gives in the 
Mugni two direct arguments to prove his thesis.67 The first argument68 
appeals to the people who really have knowledge of the Arabic 
language, the ahi al-luga;69 they call someone speaking when they 
know that speech occurs according to his intention, will, and motives; 
when they do not know this, they do not call him speaking. They 
do not draw the conclusion that this implies that the subject to be 
qualified produced and made that speech. This conclusion supposes 
a refiection, and only people who have knowledge of reflection, the 
"O/J/ an-nazar", draw this conclusion. But the manner in which these 
ahi al-luga apply this name shows that they apply it to the subjects 
who made speech. They say, for instance, that a demon70 is speaking 
on the tongue of a possessed lunatic (masru). 'Abd al-Jabbâr denies 
this,71 but from this example it becomes clear how they use the 
word speaking : they perceive the speech coming from the lunatic, 
but they ascribe it to a demon because they are convinced that the 
demon,72 and not the lunatic, made it. 'Abd al-Jabbâr's last argument73 
is concerned with the "parts of speech" {aqsâm al-kalâm), the different 
ways in which speech can occur determined by the concomitant will, 
the intention. Speech can only occur as command (amr), prohibition 
(nahy), or information (kabar) because of the influence which the 
intention and the state of being intending have on this speech. This 
state can only have influence on the acts which the subject that is in 
this state performs.74 Therefore, the speaking (and commanding, 
prohibiting, and informing) subject must be the subject who made 
speech, and who made it belong to one of the "parts of speech" by the 
concomitant will. 
67
 These two arguments are both found in the Muhit But in that work the 
argument based on the vocabulary of the ahi al-luga is not mentioned among the 
arguments concerning the reality behind the names (al-ma'nâ), but among the arguments 
concerning the names (al-asmâ') Cf Muhii I, 320 and 322 
68
 Mugni VII, 48, line 7 49, line 20 Cf. also Muhit I, 322 and Sarh 535-536 
^ In this text ahi al-luga is used and also ahi an-nazar for people who really know 
the language and people who really know reflection, it is not clear whether he has in 
mind the respective scholars, philologists and philosophers theologians, or that the 
expression is broader. 
70
 In Mugni VII, 48, line 17 read with the manuscript al-jinn! instead of al-jinn. 
71
 Cf Mugni VU, 49 
72
 In the context it is not possible to read al-hayy in Mugni VII, 48, line 19; 
one evidently has to correct the text and read al-jmni 
73
 Mugni VII. 53, lines 1-3. Cf. Muhit I, 320. 
74
 Cf. Muhit I, 320 
D. GOD IS SPEAKING BY TEMPORAL SPEECH 
After discussing speech as we make it, and the quality speaking 
as it is applied to speaking subjects in this world, we must now take 
the step towards the other world, and try to deal with God's speech 
and His being speaking on the basis of what we came to know about 
the reality of this world.1 
For Muslims the Qur'ân is God's speech though some theologians 
make a distinction between God's eternal speech (the eternal Qur'ân) 
on the one hand and the Qur'ân which is revealed and which we hear 
and recite on the other.2 For 'Abd al-Jabbâr, the Qur'ân is God's 
speech, though not His only speech; God made other speech too.3 
Because 'Abd al-Jabbâr treats God's speech and the original Qur'ân 
together, we do the same in this paragraph. The Qur'ân we hear and 
recite is treated in the section about reproduction. 
In a first section we give a status questionis; we summarize the 
opinion of the Mu'tazila and of 'Abd al-Jabbâr, and mention the 
doctrine of the opponents with whom 'Abd al-Jabbâr goes into dis-
cussion.4 
After this introduction we discuss first the direct argument 'Abd 
al-Jabbâr gives to prove that God is speaking : the fact that He made 
speech. One could call this argument "a posteriori". 
In a third section we deal with his second argument, an indirect 
argument following the methods of the taqsîm. It is the same taqsim 
we already met when we discussed God's other qualities : God can be 
entitled to a quality either per se, or by a cause, or "neither per se nor 
by a cause"; when He is entitled to it by a cause, this cause is either 
eternal or temporal. In this way, too, 'Abd al-Jabbâr proves that God 
is speaking by a temporal speech. 
1
 The greatest part of Mugni VII is devoted to this subject, especially because of the 
attention given to the arguments of the opponents and their refutation Mugni VII, 
58-180 Cf also Sarh 530-545 and Muhit I, 327-336 and 349-355 See also 'Abd al-Karim 
'Utmân, Nazarivat at-takli/, 234-240. Bouman's article The Doctrine oj 'Abd al-Djabbâr 
is mainly devoted to this subject 
2
 Thus, for instance, the AS'arîya, who state that God has an eternal speech which 
is one and indivisible, and that the Qur'ân which is revealed and which we recite and 
hear is an expression Çibâra) of it Cf. ρ 282 
3
 Cf the title of Mugni VII . "al-kalâm fi I-Qur'än wa-ia'ir kaläm Allah subhânah 
wa-la'âlâ" 
4
 Mugni VII, 3-5. 
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Finally, in a last section of this paragraph we mention the arguments 
of 'Abd al-Jabbâr's opponents to prove their own theses in so far 
they are discussed and refuted by 'Abd al-Jabbâr; these especially are 
the arguments used by the adherents of Ibn Kullâb and al-As'arî. 
1. VARIOUS OPINIONS ABOUT GOD'S SPEECH 
The way 'Abd al-Jabbâr records the various opinions adhered to 
concerning the essence of God's speech and the Qur'ân,5 is not a 
historical survey or an exhaustive list of names. It is an enumeration of 
all the details about which there was disagreement, but only the most 
important opponents are mentioned by name.6 For the moment suffice 
it to compare the different doctrines in this one point, the one detail 
of God's speech and the Qur'ân. 
The first opponent mentioned is Hisâm bn al-Hakam.7 For him 
a quality (sifa) is an accident inhering in a substance. He distinguishes 
between the éternel Qur'ân and what we hear and recite on earth.8 
He states : the Qur'ân is God's quality and cannot have itself a quality 
(since an accident cannot inhere in an accident). Therefore, we can say 
nothing about it. 
Next mention is made of Ibn Kullâb and his theological school, 
the Kullâbîya,9 who apparently function as 'Abd al-Jabbâr's main 
opponents.10 For Ibn Kullâb, too, a quality is an accident. Speech is 
a quality of God, not created, and not produced. It cannot have the 
quality "eternity" because an accident cannot inhere in an accident, 
but it is eternal by God's eternity, by an accident not inhering in itself 
but in God's essence. God's speech is not identical with God, not a 
part of Him, and not something other than Him.11 God's speech is 
5
 Cf Mugni VII, 3-5 and also Sarh 527-528 
6
 For a survey of the various opinions adhered to up to the time of al-Aä'an, both 
in respect to the Qur'ân which we hear and recite and in respect to God's speech, cf 
al-Aî'arï, Maqâlât, 582-611, and for a discussion and rendering of this text, Prelzl, 
Attnbutenlehre, 27-35 Cf also Ibn Hazm, al-Fisal, III, 4-5 Bouman's book Le conflit 
autour du Coran also gives a good survey 
7
 Cf Mugni VII, 3 See also our ρ 22 and al-AS'arî, Maqâlât, 40 
8
 He knows a distinction between the eternal Qur'ân and what we hear in this 
world, this is a trace (rasm) of the Qur'ân, and since it is sounds, it is created Cf al-Aä'ari, 
Maqâlât, 40 
9
 Cf Mugni VII, 4 and Sarh 527-528 See also our pp 21-22 
10
 They are mentioned even in the title of chapter 15 of Mugni VII "against the 
Kullâbîya" (Mugni VII, 95) 
11
 Because the term Qur'ân is used to indicate both God's own speech and what 
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one and indivisible, the earthly Qur'ân, revealed by God, is a 
reproduction (hikâya) of it 12 
Among the followers of Ibn Kullâb is reckoned al-As'arî ' 3 As he 
makes a difference in this world between al-kalâm cm-nafsî (speech in 
the soul) and al-kalâm al-lafzî (pronounced speech), so he does in the 
discussion of God's speech God's "inner speech" is an eternal quality, 
inhering in His essence, the revealed Qur'ân is an expression ('ibâra) 
of it.14 God's eternal speech 15 is not God, nor something other than 
God, God is not His speech, nor something other than His speech 16 
In the same line of tradition we meet al-Bâqillâni, a contemporary 
of 'Abd al-Jabbâr (he died in 403 AH/ 1013 AD), who is not mentioned 
by name in 'Abd al-Jabbâr's summing up, but who certainly was very 
important among the As'arîya l 7 In his Insâf he states: "Know that 
—according to the AM as-Smha wa-l-jamaa—18 God is speaking, 
having speech, and that his speech is eternal, not created, not made, 
and not temporal,19 but His speech is eternal, one of His essential 
we hear when the text of the Qur'ân is recited, the texts sometimes are ambiguous 
In Mugni VII 4 'Abd al-Jabbâr mentions the Qur'ân, we have to understand this as the 
eternal Qur'ân, God s eternal speech The statement that the Qur an is not God 
Himself nor a part of Him is directed against the HaSwîya as we shall see below 
12
 Cf Sarhbll See also АПлта. Le problème, 147-152, Tritton, The Speech of God, II 
Van Ess, Ibn Kullâb, 110, describes his doctrine against the background of the doctrine 
about God's qualities as follows "(Ibn Kullâb) sieht alle Aussagen über den Koran 
im grosseren Zusammenhang der allgemeinen Attributenlehre, und hier liess sich kaum 
mit solchen ungelenken Termini wie 'Teil' arbeiten Namen und Attribute Gottes sind 
allesamt nicht von Gott verschieden, aber doch auch nicht mit ihm· identisch man 
musste ja sonst die Eigenschaften unter sich austauschen können, sein Wissen etwa 
mit seiner Allmacht gleichsetzen, und das geht doch nicht an Die Attribute sind 
weder gleich Gott noch nicht gleich Positiv ausgedruckt Gott und seine Attribute 
haben etwas gemeinsames, so wie jene unter sich etwas gemeinsames haben, sie sub-
sistieren allesamt in Gott (qäm billâh), ohne selbst noch einmal ineinander subsistieren 
7u können 'Gott redet' heisst in Gott subsislicrt das Attribut Rede', und so fur 
alle anderen Attribute, aber damit ist nicht gesagt, dass er nun mit seinem Willen oder 
mit seiner Allmacht rede" СГ also pp 105 and 106 of this article 
1 3
 Cf Mugni VII 4 and Sarh 528 See also pp 20-21 
1 4
 Cf especially Sarh 528 See also Ahmed A Surxey, 102 
1 5
 'Abd al Jabbâr (Mugni VII, 4) uses here the term 'al-Qur'ân" What is meant 
is not the worldly expression but God s own speech 
16
 Cf Tritton The Speech oj God, 13, also Laoust, Les schismes, 129-130, and the 
book of Allard about al-As'art 
'" Cf Se/gm, GAS I, 608-610, his full name and title are al-Qâdî Abu Bakr 
Muhammad bn at-Tayyib bn Muhammad al-Bâqillânî 
18
 Literally "the people of the Sunna and the community", al-Bâqillânî qualifies 
his own doctrine as that of the people who follow Muhammad and the doctrine of the 
great majority of Muslims 
" The three terms denied here (maklûq, mafûl muhdat) are the three terms used 
by the Mu'tazila and by 'Abd al Jabbâr to describe the Qur'ân Cf Mugni VII, 3 
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qualities, just as His knowledge, His ability. His will, and other similar 
essential qualities. It is not permitted to say that God's speech is an 
expression nor that it is a reproduction ;20 it is not qualified by some-
thing from the qualities of creation. It is not permitted to say : my 
pronunciation of the Qur'ân is created, nor that it is uncreated ; nor : 
I speak by God's speech."21 
This can be said to be a summary of the doctrine of the As'arîya, 
against which 'Abd al-Jabbâr has to defend the Mu'tazilî doctrine. 
A second category and historical line of opponents, besides the line 
which derived its name from Ibn Kullâb and al-As'ari, is called by 
'Abd al-Jabbâr that of the Haswîya.22 They are the strict traditionalists 
who are said to be related to the famous collector of traditions, Ibn 
Hanbal, who played an important part in the discussions about the 
Qur'ân during the period of the Mihna.23 'Abd al-Jabbâr makes the 
reproach that they identified the Qur'ân with God or called it a part 
of Him.24 We have to bear in mind, however, that they made a 
difference between the Qur'ân as God's speech existing with God, and 
the Qur'ân as the text we read, memorize, and recite here on earth. 
The Mu'tazila, in their attacks on this doctrine, did not always do justice 
to this distinction.25 About the Quran as God's speech "in heaven" 
they say that it is identical with God or a part of Him- this is denied 
by Ibn Kullâb and by al-As'ari in their expression that the Qur'ân is 
neither God, nor a part of Him, nor something other than God —26 
and some of them say that it is a body, others that it is neither body 
nor accident; some say that it exists in one place, others that it does exist 
in several places.27 Also about the Qur'ân as we know it in this 
20
 The term expression Çibâra) was used by al-As'ari to indicate the text of the Qur'ân 
in this world, the term reproduction (hikäya) was used by Ibn Kullâb and by some 
Mu'tazila, among whom 'Abd al-Jabbâr Cf also 'Abd al-Karîm 'Utmân, Nazarivat 
at-taUij, 239-240 
21
 Al-Bàqillânî, al-fina/. 62 See also pp 23-24 and 33 of the same work and 
pp 26-27 of al-Bâqillânî's al-Tamhid 
22
 СГ for a discussion of this name and the trend of Islamic thinking which is 
indicated by it pp 22-23 
2 3
 See our ρ I Laoust, La profession de /οι. 83 gives a list of some sources where 
the doctrine of the Hanâbila concerning God's speech and the Qur'ân can be found 
24
 Wugni VII. 4 
24
 This distinction is emphasized by van Ess. ibn Kullâb, 102-103 
26
 Cf Mugn! VII, 4 The expressions mentioned and ascribed to respectively Ibn 
Kullâb and al-As'ari do not make much difference Al-As'ari excludes explicitly the 
possibility that God were a part of the Qur'ân (His name being written in it), cf van 
Ess, ibn Kullâb, 109. basing himself on the text of al-As'arî's Maqâlât 
27
 Mugnî VII, 4 
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world they disagree with the Kullâbîya and As'ariya; according to 
them the Qur'ân we recite, write down, or remember is uncreated, 
non-temporal, but co-eternal with God.28 
'Abd al-Jabbâr does not mention the names of representatives of 
this doctrine,29 but we find these ideas in the traditionalist confessions 
of faith, the so-called "'aqâ'icT, which summarize the most important 
and disputed points of traditionalist Islamic faith.30 Further, we have 
to mention Ibn Hanbal, who gave his name to a trend of Islamic 
thinking where this doctrine was accepted.31 From among his followers 
we mention Ibn Batta;32 and though he does not belong to the Hanâbila 
(the followers of Ibn Hanbal), we have to mention here Ibn Hazm, 
who stands in the same line of tradition.33 He was younger than 'Abd 
2 8
 Cf Sarh 527 
2 9
 He only ascribes this opinion in Sarh 527 to a special category of adherents of 
Ibn Hanbal 
30
 About these short summaries of the main points of Islamic faith about which 
there was some difference of opinion among Muslims, we spoke already on ρ 0-0 
There we gave a translation of art 9 of the so-called Wa^ixal АЫ Hanifa, which was 
composed about 210 AH 825 AD during the lifetime of Ibn Hanbal Cf also al-Fiqh 
al-Akbar ¡I, which according to Watt, art 'Akïda, EP, I, 335, was composed in about 
350 AH' 961 AD In the second article of this creed we read "He speaks by virtue of 
His speech. His speech being an eternal quality" Cf Wcnsinck, The Muslim Creed, 
188, who made the translation 
31
 Ahmad bn Hanbal lived from 164 AH/ 780 AD to 241 AH' 855 AD He is famous 
as a collector of hadit (traditions), but besides this, a school of Islamic jurisprudence 
received his name, he became known as a theologian who opposed the Mu'tazila and 
the caliphs who supported them during the time of the Mihna Michel Allard translated 
a saying of his about the Qur'ân as it was recorded in the Tabaqâl al-Hanâbila I, 29 
"Le Coran est la parole de Dieu, celle qu'il a proférée, il n'est pas créé Celui qui 
prétend que le Coran est cree, est un gahmite et un infidèle Celui qui dit que le Coran 
est la parole de Dieu, mais qui ne va pas plus loin et ne dit pas qu'il n'est pas crée, 
son opinion est pire que la précédente Celui qui prétend que notre prononciation du 
Coran et notre récitation sont créées, alors que le Coran est la parole de Dieu, est 
gahmite Et celui qui ne traite pas tous ces gens-là d'infidèles est comme eux" Allard, 
Le problème. 100 
12
 About Ibn Batta, see Laoust, La profemon de fot Cf also his article in EI2, 
I, 734-735 Ibn Batta was a theologian and jurisconsult and a follower of Ibn Hanbal 
He lived from 304 AH/ 917 AD to 387 AH 997 AD In his credo we read "It (the 
Qur'ân) is knowledge of His knowledge, uncreated, and how it may be read, how it may 
be written, and where ever it is recited and in whatever place it may be, be it in heaven 
or on earth, be it guarded on the preserved tablet or drawn on the sheets of paper or 
the tablets of children, or carved out in stone, in all situations and in all places it is 
God's uncreated speech" Cf Laoust, La profession de /οι, ρ 0, where the Arabic 
text is given The translation of the credo on pp 83-87 is not entirely correct, one better 
takes the original text 
3 3
 Ibn Hazm lived from 384 AH 994 AD to 456 AH. 1064 AD and so was a younger 
contemporary of 'Abd al-Jabbâr Cf Arnaldez, Grammaire el théologie, and also his 
article m EP, III, 790-799 
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al-Jabbâr and lived in another part of the Islamic world, but we can 
quote his words as representative of the doctrine of this category of 
opponents. He summarizes : "When someone uses the word 'the 
Qur'ân' or the word 'God's speech', both sayings have the same 
meaning, the words are different; the Qur'ân really—and not meta-
phorically—is God's speech."34 "God's knowledge is eternal; it is 
God's speech; it is the Qur'ân; it is not created; it is in no way 
something other than God.... We say that God really has speech, and 
that He really and not metaphorically spoke to Moses and to prophets 
and angels to whom He spoke, with a speech to them (taklim, not 
kalâm, the usual word for speech35)".36 
The third and last line of opponents is that of the Naturalists,37 
who state that the Qur'ân cannot possibly be God's act. With these 
opponents 'Abd al-Jabbâr does not enter into discussion in the seventh 
part of the Mugni and in the parallel texts of the Muhit and the 
Sarh. He does this later when discussing the indications to distinguish 
real prophecy, and to prove that the Qur'ân really is God's speech.38 
If we compare the way in which 'Abd al-Jabbâr discusses the 
doctrine of his various opponents in the Mugni with the way he does 
so in the Sarh, we come to the conclusion that in the Sarh he is 
strongly' interested in the text of the Qur'ân on earth, whereas the 
Mugni has a broader field of interest but is mostly concerned with 
God's speech in itself, without paying much attention to its being 
recited, written down, or memorized on earth. 
When we now come to the doctrine of the Mu'tazila, we conclude 
with 'Abd al-Jabbâr that there is some clear agreement between 
Mu'tazila notwithstanding some difference of opinion in the way the 
general principles are elaborated.39 The general principles adhered to 
34
 Cf Kitâb al-Fisal. Ill, 7 
35
 The difference between kalâm and taklim, respeclively speech and speech directed 
to someone, plays a part in the discussion whether eternal speech is possible or not 
Some theologians admit that taklim requires the existence of a person who can be 
addressed, meanwhile urging that that is not required for kalâm 
3 6
 Cf Ibn Hazm, Kitâb al-Fisal, III, 9 Ibn Hazm's adhering to the literal text of 
the Qur'ân becomes apparent on the same page of his Kitâb al-Fisal where he says • 
"it is not permitted to say absolutely that God is speaking (mulakallim) since He did 
not call Himself such (sc in the text of the Qur'ân)" 
37
 Cf ρ 23 about this category of opponents 
3 8
 The prophecies and the proofs of the inimilabihty of the Qur'ân (the main 
argument to show that the Qur'ân really is God's speech) are discussed by 'Abd 
al-Jabbâr in the fifteenth and sixteenth parts of his Mugni 
39
 Cf Mugni VII, 3 See also al-As'arî, Maqâlât, 185-186 and 191-192, where a 
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by all Mu'tazila are very well summarized in the introduction to the 
seventh part of the Mugnî; all elements are gathered together, and 
expressed against the background of the discussions about this subject : 
God is speaking; He is so by temporal speech He made as His act 
and which can be called created; He made it for the benefit of 
mankind, and thus it is His good act Suffice it to quote that text here 
in full : "Among the adherents of the (God's) Justice there is no 
disagreement at all about the fact that the Qur'ân is created, produced 
(muhdat: produced or temporal), and made; that it was after it was 
not; that it is something other than God; that God produced it in 
accordance with the interests of mankind ; that He is able to produce 
similar things, and that He is qualified as informing, saying, 
commanding, and prohibiting by it, because He made it. All are 
unanimous in saying that God is speaking by the Qur'ân".*0 
2 GOD is SPEAKING SINCF HE MADE SPEECH 
The argument we discuss in this section is the one first mentioned 
by 'Abd al-Jabbâr in his Mugni;41 this argument can be said to be 
"a posteriori": from the fact that we know that God made speech, 
speech as we know it in this world and as 'Abd al-Jabbâr defined and 
described it, we conclude that God is entitled to the quality speaking 
{mutakallim) in the same way we are entitled to it. 
In the text of the Mugni this argument is divided into two sections, 
corresponding to two different chapters. In the first chapter 'Abd 
al-Jabbâr proves that God is able to produce speech, and in the second 
that He actually produced it and therefore is qualified as speaking.42 
He does not explicitly state why he makes this division, nor why he 
first proves that God is able to produce speech, though the only 
thing he needs in order to prove that God is speaking is the knowledge 
number of details is mentioned about which there was some disagreement among 
Mu'tazila 
40
 This text is found in Mugni VII, 3 Cf also Sarh 528 S^e also al-Bâqillânî, 
Kitâb at-lamhid, 253 and as-Sahrastâni, Kitâb al-milal на-n-nihal, I, 99 See also Tritton, 
The Speech o/God, 10-13 
4 1
 Mugni VII, 55-61 Cf also Muhii I, 327-328. 'Abd al-Karim 'Utmân, Nazariyai 
at-taklij, 234-235 takes the two arguments given by 'Abd al-Jabbâr together 
4 2
 The first chapter (the tenth of this part of the Mugni) is found in Mugni VII, 
55-57 and bears the title "The Eternal is able to produce speech the reality of which we 
explained", the second chapter (chapter eleven of this part of the Mugni) is found 
in Mugni VII, 58-61 and bears the title "The Eternal made speech and became 
by it speaking" 
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thai He made speech.43 There may be two reasons for including the 
first chapter and making it precede the second one.44 The first reason 
is that in this way he shows that God essentially, per sc, and eternally 
has the metaphysical possibility to produce speech and to become 
entitled to the quality speaking. It is like the difference between the 
qualities "basir" and "mubsir", "samV" and "sámi"'; in this case 
something is said about God's essence.45 The second reason is that 
he has to show that God's speech is possible for Him and not 
necessary, for, if it were necessary, the judgements "good" and "evil" 
could not be applied to it, and certainly not to God because of His 
speech.46 
We already saw that the quality "speaking" only means "making 
speech", and that it does not imply the use of secondary causes, 
instruments, or a special organism.47 If God is able to produce speech 
in any way, He can become speaking; if He actually produced speech 
in any way. He is entitled to the quality "speaking". 
God ¡s able to produce speech. To prove the correctness of this 
statement, 'Abd al-Jabbâr gives three different arguments. The first 
argument48 deduces from the fact that God is essentially able and, 
therefore, able to produce anything a subject that is able by an ability 
is able to produce—except the individual things someone else is able 
to produce—that He must be able to produce the genus speech since 
human beings are able to produce it. 
The second argument49 starts from the general principle that who 
is able to produce a secondary cause {sabab), is also able to produce 
its effect. Since God is able to produce pressure (i'timâd) and knocking 
4 1
 СГ Мицпі VII, 58 · "The method to establish that He is speaking, is the knowledge 
of the existence of speech from Him, and nothing else" 
iA
 Compare this structure with what 'Abd al-Jabbâr says in Mugni VI 1, 3 where 
he explains why he first shows that God is able to produce acts that would be evil if 
He produced them, to show afterwards that He actually does not produce such acts 
4 5
 Cf especially pp 180-181 and 191 
4 6
 Cf the definitions of evil and good mentioned on pp 87-88 In these definitions it is 
explicitly stated that the subject must be able or that it is his act, and we know that the 
term act indicates in itself the relation with an able subject (cf ρ 116) 
4 7
 Cf Mugni VII, 56-57 and also Muhit I, 327 In the Muhîi 'Abd al-Jabbâr 
mentions as an argument that instruments cannot be mentioned in the text of a 
definition Speaking cannot be "making speech by an instrument or by the tongue", 
but it can only be defined as "making speech" Cf also our pp. 77-78, about the conditions 
for a definition to be correct 
4 e
 Cf. Mugni VII, 55, lines 3-11 
4 9
 Cf Mugni WW, 55, lines 12-14 
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(musâkka)—the secondary causes of speech- 50 He is able to produce 
speech The third argument states that every indication indicating that 
God actually made speech, also indicates that He is able to make and 
produce it 5 ' 
When the opponents attack 'Abd al-Jabbâr's doctrine by comparing 
as they frequently do—speech with knowledge and the quality 
speaking with knowing, 'Abd al-Jabbâr emphasizes again the difference 
between the two qualities 52 
When the opponents state that the quality speaking cannot be 
applied to God since it implies the use of instruments or since other 
factual qualities, too, cannot be applied to Him, his answer runs 
that the quality speaking does not imply anything except the pure 
"factuahty" that the qualified subject made speech Therefore, God 
can be qualified as speaking when He makes speech 53 
God made speech and bv it became speaking 54 We saw above that 
5 0
 Cf ρ 114 
5 1
 This argument is given in M ugni VII, 56, lines 10 (after the full stop)-ll In this 
context 'Abd al-Jabbâr gi\cs an argumentum ad hominem The same opponent who 
denies that God can produce speech and become in that way speaking stales that 
God has power over (is able to) the acts of man, and, consequently, also his speech 
This opponent must be someone from the school of Ibn Kullab or al-As'arî as 
appears also from the mention of the "kash" 
52
 The opponents appeal to the fact that the Mu'tazila ьа> (read in Ifttgni VII, 55, 
line 16 tuhilim instead of )uhilûn) that God cannot produce His own knowledge, ability, 
and life because He is essenliallv knowing able, and living He is not able to produce 
those accidents In a similar way one can say that God is not able to produce speech 
since He is speaking per se or by (read in Mugni VII, 55, line 16 bi-kalâm instead of 
li-kalám) eternal speech in his answer 'Abd al-Jabbâr points to two diflerences between 
speech and knowledge first, knowledge must inhere in the subject who is qualified 
by it as knowing, whereas speech may inhere in any substrate because the acting agent 
is qualified by it, second, speech does not entail a state for the qualified subject so 
that there can be no chance that a subject would be at the same time in two different 
states, whereas knowledge does entail a state 
53
 Speech only needs a substrate as we saw before God can produce it in a substrate 
without using instruments When He produces it in a specially structured (read in 
Mugni VII, 57, line 6 al-mabnha instead of al-mubawana) substrate as the tongue, 
He does not need this as an instrument, although we do need this as such 
The opponents say that God cannot be qualified as "serving" ('ábid), "obeying" 
(kâdi') or "thanking" (sâkir) 'Abd al-Jabbâr replies, that these qualities do not indicate 
only (read lufid instead of la'clú in Yiugm VII, 57, line 11, this emendation is required 
both by the text of the manuscript and the sense of the context) the doing of an act 
but other things too That is not the case with the qualification "speaking", which 
only indicates the occurring of the act, consequently, God is able to become (read in 
Mugni VII, 57, line 14 анг instead of nasir) speaking 
5 4
 Mugni VII, chapter 11 (58-61) The chapter consists of two parts, the first part 
dealing with the way in which we can establish that God is speaking, the second 
part (which starts in Mugni VII, 59, line 15) actually establishing that God is speaking 
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the quality "speaking" belongs to the factual qualities, which indicate 
that the qualified subject did a given act. The only way we can establish 
that a subject is entitled to a factual quality is by establishing the 
existence of the act concerned as coming from this subject. The way in 
which the act is established is not important, be it based on intuition 
Çaqi) от on revelation (sam'), be it by truthful information, by 
perception, by argumentation, or by any other way;5 5 only by estab­
lishing the existence of the act in any way—there is no other method— 5 6 
can one establish that a subject is entitled to the quality concerned. 
Consequently, the only method to establish that God is entitled to 
the quality speaking, is to establish the existence of speech coming 
from Him. 
The next question arises : how can we know that God actually made 
speech? Because man is also able to produce speech, we can never be 
sure that God made it. 5 7 For 'Abd al-Jabbâr, one way remains to 
55
 Read in Mugnì VII, 58, line 8 nakbur (we know by experience) instead of 
nuji: (we admit). 
56
 Opponents mention two other possible ways to establish that God is speaking 
first, because other acts or qualities indicate that He is speaking, and, second, by denying 
that He is dumb and silent The first method is used to prove that God is able (based on 
His acts) and living (based on His being knowing and able), the second method is said 
to be used to prove that God is perceiving (by denying defects) and knowing (by 
denying the opposites) 'Abd al-Jabbâr's answer to the first suggestion is that God's 
being speaking docs not make any act possible nor any other quality His answer to the 
second suggestion is that this distinction is only applicable to living beings that speak 
with instruments and not (one has to add the negation là in Mugnì VII, 59, line 8, 
before the verbal form yaiib, the negation is absent from the manuscript too) to God, 
who does not need the use of instruments Moreover, a living being can be without 
any of the three qualities speaking, silent, dumb We shall see that later on, 'Abd 
al-Jabbâr says that he already explained this in his naqd al-luma' {Mugnì VII, 59, line 12, 
to correct in this way, instead of bad al-luma') This work of 'Abd al-Jabbâr is 
mentioned in Mugni XX/2, 258, where it is said to have been written before the 
Mugnì Probably it is an answer to al-AS'arî's Kitâb al-luma' Cf also 'Abd al-Karim 
'Ulmân, Qâdi l-Qudâl, 71 
31
 The argument is given in the form of an objection and the answer of 'Abd 
al-Jabbâr to that objection Al-Abyârî misunderstood the structure of this argument 
and added in Mugni VII, 59, line 19 the word qil to introduce the answer This is not 
correct since the answer is introduced by the word qil in Mugni VII, 60, line 14 
The objection can be schematized as follows You cannot know that something is 
God's speech since man is able to produce speech and speech always can be produced 
by man If you appeal to its (the Qur'ân's) extreme eloquence, I answer that God 
can make it possible for, e g , an angel to make it If you say that you know it by 
the words of the prophet and the consensus of the Muslims. I answer that you have 
to establish a chain of sure witnesses from the first one who really knew it was God's 
speech That is not possible 
The answer given by 'Abd al-Jabbâr, and which can be found in our text, is not 
as simple as the two suggested by his opponent 
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discover that some speech really is God's speech : when speech occurs 
in a miraculous, inimitable way, and when it indicates the trust-
worthiness of the prophet who informs us that it is God's speech and 
that God did not give him the knowledge necessary to make something 
similar.58 The Qur'ân fulfils all these conditions: it is inimitable59 
and informs us that God is speaking by it;60 it also indicates the trust-
worthiness of the prophet. The text we hear is, however, not God's 
speech, but only a reproduction of God's speech (hikâyat kalâm Allah); 
that does not contradict the fact that the Qur'ân, the original one 
directly made by God and given to the angel, is really God's speech, 
and that we through this reproduction really know God's speech.61 
This is the only way we can know that something is God's speech : 
a revealed text is revealed as a real miracle, fulfilling the conditions 
which have to be fulfilled to make a miracle a real miracle.62 There-
fore, to prove that God is speaking we cannot argue on the basis of 
the occurring of a "warning" (kâtir)63 in our soul, for we can never 
know that it comes from God and not from an angel.64 
3. GOD CAN ONLY BE SPEAKING BY A TEMPORAL SPEECH 
Besides the rather short direct argument, just discussed, to prove 
that God is speaking by temporal speech He made, 'Abd al-Jabbâr 
gives a second argument, much longer;65 this argument can be called 
"a priori" since it deals in an a priori way with the manner in 
which God can be speaking.66 
5H
 Cf Wugni VII, 60 C( also our pp 97-99, where we spoke about the way 
in which the Qur'ân can be said to be a miracle and about the meaning of the root 
'/; 
" We do not discuss this subject in the present study 'Abd al-Jabbâr postpones the 
discussion of the so-called Г/âr al-Qur'án till the sixteenth part of the Mugni 
60
 To prove this 'Abd al-Jabbâr mentions some verses from the Qur'ân, a tradition 
about Muhammad, and the consensus (¡¡та') of the Muslims Cf Mugni VII, 61 
" One cannot say that Muhammad, since his indicating the text of the Qur'ân on 
this earth as God's speech is metaphorically meant, (the addition of the particle /an by 
the editor in Mugni VII, 61, line 4 is the result of a misinterpretation of the text, it has 
to be deleted) can also mean something else by this and similar sayings It is clear 
that for Muhammad in any case the Qur'ân, be il a reproduction or the original, 
really was God's speech We discuss the relation between reproduction and reproduced 
later in this chapter 
^
2
 Cf our ρ 98 for the five criteria for real miracles 
6 3
 About this "warning" cf pp 63-65. 
6 4
 Mugni VII, 61, lines 1-2 
" Mugni VII, 62-94 
6 6
 There is in this argument an clement of a posteriori argumentation The argument 
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This second argument is the same we already met when discussing 
God's other qualities; it is structured according to the rules of the 
taqs'im method of division and elimination. 'Abd al-Jabbâr starts from 
the assumption that God is speaking and looks for the various ways 
in which He could be so. He comes to the conclusion that God could 
be speaking either per se (li-nqfsih; eventually: essentially, li-dâtih), 
or by a cause (li-'ilia; eventually : by a qualifier, li-mana), or neither 
per se nor by a cause. When the first and the third alternatives are 
eliminated, he concludes that God can only be speaking by a cause. 
This cause is either eternal or temporal. By proving that it cannot be 
eternal, 'Abd al-Jabbâr comes to his conclusion that God can only 
be speaking by a temporal cause. We now follow 'Abd al-Jabbâr in 
discussing the various alternatives in the logical order mentioned above. 
God cannot be speaking per л?.6 7 To bring some order in the many 
arguments and counter-arguments we find in 'Abd al-Jabbâr's dis-
cussions of this subject, we distinguish among four categories of 
arguments :68 the first category points to the fact that it is not possible 
to establish this essential quality "speaking"; the second shows that 
this quality speaking would be in contradiction with its definition if 
it were essential; the third category comes to the conclusion that 
God would in that case have the same qualities as speech, and 
considers the consequences of this conclusion; the last states that, 
being speaking per se, God would be speaking with all parts and kinds 
of speech anywhere, at any time, and to anyone. 
The first category : it is not possible to establish that God is per se 
speaking.69 The way we establish the essential qualities is by estab-
only shows thai Ihc only way in which God can be speaking is by temporal speech, 
it does not prove that He is actually speaking To prove that God is actually speaking 
by temporal speech, we have to establish that He is speaking as we did in the 
preceding section 
6
" This thesis is said to be adhered to by Muhammad bn 'îsâ al-Burgût (cf note 22 
on ρ 283). 'Abd al-Kanm 'Utmân adds (i\ci:ciri\at cit-lakli/. 235) and the As'ariya 
Most of the As'ariya held that God is speaking by eternal speech, not per se 
This subject is discussed in Mugni VII, 62-81 (chapter 12), the chapter can be 
divided into 12 different arguments I shall try to gather them together in some 
categories, to show the connection between various arguments and the great outlines of 
the argumentation Sec also Muh'tl I, 329-330 and Sarh 552-554 
6,1
 These four categories can be (ound both in the Xfugni and in the Muhii, the 
Éarh lacks the third category 
6 4
 In this category we take together three arguments from the Mugm, respectively 
the first ( M ugni VII. 62. lines 3-10), the eighth (Mugni VII, 64. lines 5-6), and the ninth 
( Ungili VII. 64. lines 7-16) See also Sarh 552 and Muhii I, 329 
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lishing that the subject is in a certain state, and by proving that he 
per se must be in that state. The quality speaking is not established in 
this way; it is not established as a state, but as the doing of an act; 
we already saw that speech does not entail a state. 
According to Abu Hâsim, there is only one way to establish God's 
essential qualities. The only way we can know God is through the 
acts He produced in this world. Consequently, we can only know 
essential qualities which are required by His acts, be it directly or 
indirectly. No such act can be found which would, directly or indirectly, 
require that the subject is speaking.70 
The second category also comes from Abu Hâsim.71 Being entitled 
to a quality per se or essentially, implies that there is no cause or 
qualifier; consequently, the assumption that God would be per se 
speaking implies the denial of speech, just as the knowledge that God 
is per se knowing implies the denial of knowledge. Since the definition 
of speaking is "making speech", the assumption that someone is per 
se speaking leads to a contradiction. 
The third category of arguments comes from Abu Ishâq.72 When 
a speaking subject is not in a state because of his being speaking, he can 
derive this quality only from actual speech ; if God is called speaking 
per se or essentially, it implies that His essence, which is the cause of 
His being speaking, must have the same qualities as speech.73 
This conclusion has several consequences which are all impossible 
to accept : God must be temporal (or speech in this world eternal), 
He must have opposite qualities since the letters are opposite,74 God's 
essence must have a certain order because only in that way speech 
can have its parts (aqsäm) and kinds {dumb). His essence also must 
come into existence in a certain order to make His being speaking 
communicative, and, finally, His essence must have a quality indicating 
70
 In Muhit I, 329, line 9 read far' instead of faz', in Mugnì VII, 64, line 16 
the full stop has to be removed after ufátih and to be placed at the very end of that 
line 
' ' This is the second argument Irom the M ugni {M ugni VII, 62. lines 10-16) Cf also 
Muhit I, 329 and Sarh 552 
~
2
 СГ Muhit I, 329 I made a combination of the arguments 3-7 from the \4ugm 
(Mugni VII, 62, line 16-64, line 4) 
"
3
 The texts in the Mugni and the Muhit are somewhat ambiguous I tried to render 
their argumentation, a correct translation of the passages concerned will not be easy 
"* The letters are opposite (duld) according to Abu Hâsim as 'Abd al-Jabbâr adds 
in Mugni VII, 63 According to himself, this being opposite of various sounds and 
letters is not evident Cf ρ 316 
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a defect75 since speech is useless when nobody has some profit of 
it, and we know that before the creation nobody would 
The fourth category contains the three longest arguments If God 
is per se speaking, there can be in Him 76 no restriction in His being 
speaking He can speak with all parts of speech (aqsâm al-kalâm, these 
are the various forms in which speech occurs, the examples mentioned 
are mainly information, command, and prohibition77) and all kinds 
of speech (durub al-kalâm, these are the various forms in which the 
relation between the parts of speech and the reality occurs information 
about some concrete object, command of something good or something 
evil, information as lie or as truth78) He can speak at any moment, at 
any place, and to anyone But in the case of an essential quality we 
have to add that what is possible is also necessary 79 Therefore, God 
not only can speak in all those ways, He even has to do so if there are 
no restrictions in the objecteo That God must be speaking in all those 
ways evidently leads to conclusions that cannot possibly be accepted 
A first conclusion is that God must be speaking by lie and truth, 
by a command of something evil and a prohibition of something good, 
moreover. He must inform us about anything informing about which 
is possible, and He must command us everything that can be com-
manded*1 We know that in fact He does not so as He confirms 
"^ The word transcribed by al-Ab>ârî in Mugni VII 63 line 18 as /a-\afruliih is 
the last one of the page in the irunuscript and rather vague I suggest to read mcmqu\a 
(a quality) indicating a defect ' the term naqi also being used in line 19 
76
 The restricting element in the qualified person is the ilia or ma ná When someone 
has such a quality per se or essentially, there is no restriction in himself though there 
may be a restriction in the object So for шьіапсе since one possible thing only tan 
be possible for one subject, God, who is per sc able nevertheless is not able to produce 
things which other beings are able to produce or things that cannot exist (cf pp 238-249) 
but these restrictions are restrictions in the object not in the subject In the same 
way God cannot speak the concrete individual speech somebody else is speaking, but 
He can produce similar speech and more than that 
7
 In Arabic kabar amr naln Cf lor instance Mugm VII 65 
7 8
 The term darb is translated by Frank Kaiam 356 as kind and by Brunschvig 
Mu tazihsme el optimum 14 by type While the aqtám or parts indicate the form 
of the sentence and what it is meant to be (according to Abd al Jabbâr speech becomes 
one of these parts by the concomitant will the intention), the dumb indicate the kind 
of relationship with the reality expressed bv this speech 
79
 Cf Muhu I 329 'ma sahh fi sifal an па/ч \ajib , "what is (metaphysically) 
possible in the essential qualities is necessary ' 
8 0
 The only restriction can be that a given speech is possible (mac/dûr) for someone 
else so that God cannot produce it But He is surely able to produce any part and 
any kind in any circumstance 
81
 In Wugm VII, 65 line 6 we probably have to delete the words from an hull till 
the full stop These words belong in line 4 and are by miblakc repeated here The 
correction proposed by al-Abyârî is in that case not necessary 
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Himself in the text of the Qur'ân "About some of them We told you, and 
about some of them We did not tell you" 82 
A second conclusion 83 would be that God is addressing (mukallim)8* 
per se and essentially, and that He, consequently, must address85 every 
one at every moment in every way Since addressing is one of the parts 
of speech (aqsâm al-kalâm), God must per se address if He is per 
se speaking We know that God does not address every one at every 
moment in every way so that we conclude that He is not per se 
addressing and, consequently, not per se speaking 
The opponents still have two ways to escape either they deny that 
addressing is one of the parts of speech—and they try to prove their 
point by comparing, for grammatical reasons, two forms of the verb 
"to speak", takallam and kallam, with two forms of the verb "to 
know", 'alim and 'allam, a comparison which is rejected by 'Abd 
al-Jabbâr86 —or they admit that God actually is per se addressing 
In this case, when they admit that God is addressing per se, they can 
82
 Cf rára/ Gáfir, verse 78 
" Cf Magni VII 66, line 3 - 71, line 9 (after the full stop), see also WA 552-553 
and UiMt I, 330 
"
4
 The word we translate by addressing is the Arabic word mukallim, the second 
form of the verb of which mutakallim (speaking) is the fifth form The similarity between 
the two forms as one finds it in Arabic, cannot be satisfactorily rendered in English 
Whereas the fifth form simply means "to speak", the second one implies that one 
speaks to something or someone, so that the participles could be rendered as, respectively, 
"speaking" and "speaking to ' The similarity between the two terms, especially in 
the Arabic writing, has caused some errors, both in the manuscript (errors probably 
due to the inattentiveness of a copyist) and in the edition of the text (in places where 
the manuscript is correct) 
^ Read in Mugni VII 66, line 3 mukallim instead of mutakallim (correct in the 
manuscript) and in Mugni VII, 66, line 4 al-mukallamm instead of al-mutakallimin 
(not correct in the manuscript) As for the interpunction in Mugni VII, 66, line 7 one 
has to remove the full stop, in line 8, one has to start with a new paragraph after 
the first comma 
86
 The argumentation of the opponent is as follows 'allam (the second form of the 
s erb) means "to teach" and is different from 'ahm (the first form of the verb) meaning 
'to know" The fact that God is essentially and per se "knowing" ('alim) does not 
imply that He is per sc "teaching" (muallim) In the same way the (act that God is 
per se speaking (mutakallim, filth form) does not imply that He is per se addressing 
(mukallim, second form) Evidently, 'Abd al-Jabbâr denies the possibility of making 
here a comparison, and he argues himself not on the basis of names, but on the 
basis of the reality behind these names 
In this argument the tollowing corrections have to be made Mugni VII, 66, line 16 
read mukallim instead of mutakallim (not correct in the manuscript), line 17 read 
na'lamidah instead of na'taddah, line 20 the word mutakallim is crossed out in the 
manuscript and has to be removed from the text, line 20 read yukallim instead of 
yatakallim (correct in the manuscript), in Mugni VII, 67, line 5 read at-taklim instead 
of al-mutakallim (not correct in the manuscript) 
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either try to show that God addresses every one at every moment in 
every way87 - and they will not succeed—or they can mention some 
restricting elements outside God which restrict His being addressing 
as, for instance, the existence or being understanding of the addressed 
object, just as the existence and the visibility of an object are condi-
tions for God's being seeing.88 'Abd al-Jabbâr will show that these 
arguments are not correct and also that they are not sufficient to 
explain the way in which God actually addresses people. His con-
clusion, therefore, is that a speaking subject only becomes addressing, 
commanding, or prohibiting by his intention and by nothing else, and 
that everything, be it living or lifeless, existent or non-existent, can 
be addressed.89 
A third conclusion 90 drawn by 'Abd al-Jabbâr from the supposition 
that God is essentially and per se speaking, is that He must be lying; 
87
 This is done in Mugni VII, 67, lines 11-20 Their examples are not complete, 
first, they say that God addresses everybody by imposing duties, by commanding, and 
prohibiting But. 'Abd al-Jabbâr replies, God must address everything at every moment 
in every way (lor instance, everything at every moment in the way He addressed 
Moses) He would also have to address him who is not compos mentis, though this 
addressing would be useless and, consequently, evil (Read in Mugni VII, 67, line 15 
yaqbuh instead of n/çniA) When the opponents say that God addresses everything with 
the creative word kirn (be) because He creates everything in this way, 'Abd al-Jabbâr 
denies that God addresses everything in this way (we shall see this later), and he 
remarks that God would also address everything with any other speech at any other 
moment 
e 8
 We distinguish four arguments of the opponents with 'Abd al-Jabbàr's answers 
a) Mugnl VII, 68, lines 1-17 the addressed object must be existent, the answer is 
twofold God would in that case address all existent things without making any 
difference (read in Mugni VII, 68, line 8 taksh instead of takassui), and in fact we can 
address non-existent things b) Mugni VII, 68. line 18 69. line 7 the addressed object 
must understand what is said (read in Mugni VII, 68, line 19 \ukallam instead of 
takallam), the answer again is twofold God would inform the understanding object 
about everything, command everything, etc , and, though it is useless and, consequently, 
evil (read in Mugni VII, 69, line 3 and line 6 Iwice yaqbuh instead of rasihh) to address 
something that docs not understand, it is possible c) Mugni VII, 69, line 8 - 70. line 4 
compare with the "message" (kitâb), which is only such when it is understood (In 
Mugni VII, 69, line 11 the word li-dálik has to be removed, it must be added after 
fahmih in line 10) According to 'Abd al-Jabbâr, this is a question of names when 
it is not understood, it is not called "message", but it does exist so that it cannot be used 
as an argument by the opponents d) Mugni VII, 70, lines 5-19 compare with a command 
(amr). which only becomes such by the existing of the commanded person or by ta'mir, 
the premises are rejected by 'Abd al-Jabbâr one can command when the person 
commanded does not (yet) exist, and there is no relation at all with the ta'mir (making 
someone commander) 
89
 Cf Mugni VII 70-71 
90
 This argument is given in Mugni VII, 71, line 9 (after the second full stop) till 81, 
line 7 (after the comma) The division and interpunction of the text is very confusing 
See also Sarh 553-555 and Muhit I, 330 
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in that case one can no longer trust God's words, His promise and His 
threat, and this can in no way be accepted.91 
In two entirely different ways 'Abd al-Jabbâr deduces from the 
thesis of his opponents that God must be lying. 
The first way can be summarized as follows : lie (kadib) is one of 
the kinds of speech (dumb al-kalám), being the kind of information 
that does not correspond with reality.92 If God is per se speaking, 
He must be per se lying (kâdib).9i 
'Abd al-Jabbâr's opponents try to refute this argument by stating 
that God is per se veracious (sâdiq) and, consequently, cannot be lying. 
They make a comparison with God's being per se knowing excluding 
the possibility that He is in positive ignorance. 'Abd al-Jabbâr's 
refutation of this argument is fourfold. First, they have no possibility 
to prove that God is veracious, let alone that He is per se veracious.94 
Second, he asks his opponents whether according to them God actually 
informs veraciously about everything about which informing is possible, 
or only informs about some things; the choices, both for the first and 
for the second possibility, imply that God can be lying.95 Third, one 
91
 In Mugni VII, 71. line 13 read bi-annah instead of mnah, as appears in the 
manuscript 
92
 Cf for a description of the quality "¡ying" (kádib) Mugni VII. 78 "that he gives 
information about a thing as it is not" (li-cmn haqiqat al-kadib /in» an \ukbir 'an as-sav' 
'ala ma la\ s bili 
43
 One of the parts of speech (aqsäm al-kalâm) is information, when il occurs 
corresponding with reality, it is called veracity (sidq), when it occurs not corresponding 
with reality, it is called lie (kadib) If God were essentially and per se speaking. He 
must be per se speaking by all parts and kinds of speech, besides being per se lying, 
He must also be per ье veracious. He must be commanding and prohibiting one and 
the same thing. He must command what is evil and prohibit what is good, etc Cf 
MugniVM, 71 
9 4
 Cf Mugni VII, 71, line 21 74, line 2 The opponents appeal to the text of the 
Qur'ân—which informs about facts we are able to verify so that wc know God is 
veracious in saying them, and which also directly states that God is veracious (sural 
Qáf, verse 29 and sural al-A'râf, verse 44) to the opinion of Muhammad, and to the 
consensus of the Muslims 'Abd al-Jabbâr replies that one must first know that 
God is veracious before one can prove that the sources mentioned are veracious 
and trustworthy The more so because the opponents concerned admit that God can 
do evil acts and, therefore, can guide us in a wrong way 
In this argument some corrections have to be made Mugni VII, 72, line 1 read na-an 
instead of на-іп, Mugni VII, 72, line 8 read al-qabaih instead of at-sâlih (cf also the 
manuscript), Mugni VII, 72, line 12 bi-sigalih instead of bi-vfatih (the manuscript 
seems to give our form, which fits better in the context), Mugni VII, 73, line 6 read 
nafs instead of ta'yin (see also for this correction the text of the manuscript) 
9 5
 Cf Mugni VII, 74, Ime 3 - 76, line 3 'Abd al-Jabbâr uses the method of taqiim 
to show that all possibilities are false and. therefore, the premise must be false 
If God is informing veraciously about everything informing about which is possible 
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cannot make a comparison with being knowing since being knowing 
entails a state which may exclude another state, but being veracious 
does not entail a state.96 Fourth, we know that concrete forms of speech 
can only exclude one another in a substrate; in this way speech must 
be compared with movement and not with knowledge; being lying 
and being veracious do not exclude one another when they are 
directed towards two substrates.97 
The second way 'Abd al-Jabbâr follows to prove that the thesis 
of his opponents implies that God is lying,98 is based on the text of 
the Qur'ân. In the Qur'ân God says that He did some things in the 
past using a verb in the past tense;99 if He were per se and, conse-
quently, in all eternity speaking. He would be lying in this kind of 
sentences since the fact described did not happen yet and He 
nevertheless informed that it did happen. Since, according to 'Abd 
al-Jabbâr, God did not create the Qur'ân before other things, but 
has created these parts of the Qur'ân after the event mentioned actually 
happened, and since God is able to change the Qur'ân, the argument 
cannot be directed against 'Abd al-Jabbâr himself as the opponents 
try t odo . 1 0 0 
because He is per se speaking, we conclude that He is also lying in His informing about 
everything informing about which is possible, using the same argument Moreover, 
we know that God does not inform in every way at every moment about everything 
informing about which is possible If God only is informing veraciously about some 
things, it is not excluded that He is lying about other things 
In this argument one has to make the following corrections Mugni VII, 74, line 4 
read yabqâ instead of yanfì, in Mugni VII, 75, line 5 read bi-kull instead of li-kull, 
in Mugni VII, 75, line 9 read taj-niz instead of lahnir 
94
 Cf Mugni VII, 76, lines 4-20 Two corrections have to be made in the text 
in Mugni VII, 76, line 14 the preposition /7, added by the editor, is superfluous and 
can be deleted, in Mugni VII, 76, line 17 read bt-kawmh instead of yakùnuh 
^ Cf Mugni VII, 77 Une 1 - 78, line 4 In Mugni VII, 77, line 17 add the preposition 
β at the end of the line (the preposition is found in the manuscript), in Mugni VII, 78, 
line 1 read ukrâ (with the manuscript) instead of âkar 
9 8
 Cf Mugni VII, 78, line 5 - 81, line 7 Since speech is nothing else but letters, 
one eannot say that the letters change according to the fact whether something 
happened, is happening, or will happen, but that the speech remains the same 
99
 The example given is the text from sural Nûh, verse 1 "We sent Noah to his 
people" 
100
 As an argument in this discussion is used the word of Muhammad "God was 
and nothing else, then He created the Dikr (explained as a name for the Quran)" 
This does not imply that He created the Qur'ân before anything else, we even 
know by knowledge based on intuition that, to be good, the Qur'ân can only be 
created when there is someone who can hear and understand it In Mugni VII, 78, 
line 11 read bi-millih instead of li-millih, in Mugni VII, 79, line 13 read qawlikum 
instead of qawmikum, in Mugni VII, 80, lines 5-6 the sentence continues no full stop, 
no new paragraph In Mugni VII, 80, line 6 one has to remove the full slop 
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'Abd al-Jabbâr concludes his chapter by stating once again that 
the only way in which we can come to know that God is speaking, 
is by establishing His speech; this makes it impossible101 that He 'is 
per se speaking. 
God cannot be speaking "neither per se nor by a cause".101 The 
only quality God is said to be entitled to "neither per se nor by a 
cause" (la li-nafsih wa-lâ li-'illa) is the quality "perceiving" (mudrik). 
God is entitled to this quality because of His being living on the 
condition that something perceptible is existent. Such a condition 
is not possible with reference to the quality speaking since this quality 
has no connection with something else. 'Abd al-Jabbâr proves this 
by way of a taqsim : God is either necessarily speaking in every state 
or He is speaking after He was not; in the first case He is per se 
and essentially , 0 3 speaking. In the second case God is either neces-
sarily speaking at the moment He becomes so, or He is not necessarily 
speaking but He only can be so; in the latter case He must be speaking 
by a temporal qualifier or cause. The other case is the one mentioned 
as "neither per se nor by a cause"; it implies that God is entitled to 
this quality according to the existence (and not entitled to it according 
to the non-existence) of something else. This supposes a connection l0A 
with something else, which speech actually has not. Therefore, God 
must be speaking by a temporal qualifier. 
Further, 'Abd al-Jabbâr refers to the arguments he used in the 
preceding chapter to show that God is not per se speaking, and to 
those in the next chapter to show that He is not speaking' by eternal 
speech; many of them can be applied here. The quality speaking is 
101
 Read m Mugnî VII, 80, line 8 yuhîl (with the manuscript) instead of mahall 
This last paragraph begins in Mugni VII. 80, line 7, after the comma The interpunction 
has to be corrected 
102
 Cf Magni VII. 82-83 (chapter 13), this chapter is divided into six arguments, 
beginning respectively in Mugni VII, 82, lines 3, 8, 11, and 17 and Mugni VII, 83, 
lines 9 and 14 Cf also Muhil I, 334-336 This chapter is somewhat broader in its 
concept It compares the quality speaking not only with the quality perceiving but 
also with the quality "willing" (murici), to which God is said to be entitled because of 
a cause but not because He made this cause This comparison loo is rejected by 'Abd 
al-Jabbâr 
103
 Read in Mugni VU, 83, line I dâtuh instead of adâtuh; this emendation is necessary 
for a logical context 
104
 In MugniVW. 83, line 6 both the manuscript and the printed text read la \ataatlaq\ 
this makes no sense in the context since the connection here has to be affirmed, possibly 
one has to read li-i-ia'alluq 
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established by establishing speech, the cause.105 To say that it is "not 
by a cause" implies a contradiction. If it is "not by a cause", it must be 
because of a state, but we know that being speaking is not a state. 
Speaking "not by a cause" implies that the subject must be speaking 
with all parts1 0 6 and kinds of speech and at every moment, so that 
he is no longer able to produce it. All this shows that God can only 
be speaking by a cause. That this cause can only be temporal is proved 
again by a taqsîm : in fact by showing that it cannot be eternal. 
God cannot be speaking by eternal speech.101 In this chapter 'Abd 
al-Jabbâr attacks those theologians who state that God is speaking 
by eternal speech which is, nevertheless, of the same genus as our 
speech; therefore, it is directed mainly against the Haswîya and not 
against the Kullâbîya, who assert that God is speaking by different 
speech 108 
To prove that this alternative in his taqsim is not correct, and that 
God, consequently, must be speaking by temporal speech, 'Abd 
al-Jabbâr gives five kinds of argumentation in the following order : 
first, he shows that God's speech, being of the genus of our speech, 
must be temporal; second, he shows that the Qur'ân (the original one, 
not the reproduction of it in this world) cannot be eternal, third, he 
discusses some verses from the Qur'ân which show that God's speech 
is temporal; fourth, he mentions some texts from the hadit; fifth, 
he discusses the consensus of the Muslims, and he concludes with some 
additional arguments. 
The first argument109 states that God's speech, belonging to the 
"
и
 Read in Mugli! VII. 82, Ime 6 хщиіиіг and \аГа!иІі (Не, sc God, produces and 
makes it, sc , the qualifier mentioned) instead of tù/iduh and lafaluh 
, ü 6
 In Uugnì VII, 83, line 9 add after hi-w'ir the word aqsàm In the manuscript 
the copyist first wrote hi-\á'ir duiûbih He added afterwards between the two words 
nl-kalâm на- Evidently, he forgot to add the other word 
'
0
" We have to prove that God cannot be speaking by an eternal cause ('///«) or 
qualifier (тч'на) Since such causes and qualifiers derive their names from the 
qualities concerned, we call this cause or qualifier 'speech" (kalâm) Cf pp 147-148 
This question is dealt with in Wiigni VII, 84-44 (chapter 14) Cf also Sarh 549-S51, 
where the order of the various arguments is similar to that found in the Witgni, and 
Muhil I. 410-'m See also 'Abd al-Karîm 'Ulniân, \azarhal аі-іакІЦ. 218-249 
, 0 8
 Al-As'arî does not assert that there is a différence between our speech and 
God's speech, but according to him also our human speech is not whal is heard, 
but something in the soul For the Haswîya God's speech is of the same kind as our 
human speech, but it is eternal Mainly against this doctrine 'Abd al-Jabbâr directs 
his arguments in (his chapter 
104 (_γ Wugni VII, 84 line 1 85, line 20 In this argument some corrections have 
to be made in Viugnì VII, 84, line 5 read //-ma instead of mim-mâ, in Mugn't VII. 84, 
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same genus as human speech, cannot be eternal when our speech 
is temporal since being eternal is an essential quality. That our human 
speech is temporal is apparent from our discussions of that speech : 
letters and sounds can be non-existent, they are non-remaining (as is 
evident in the perception of them), they need a substrate, and are 
ascribed to a subject because he made them Consequently, our human 
speech, and God's speech too, must be temporal. 
The second argument110 proves with rational arguments that the 
Qur'ân (not the reproduction of it here on earth but God's original 
speech) cannot be eternal. The Qur'ân consists of several and different 
parts, and this is impossible for something eternal.111 Moreover, God 
is able to produce speech; when He produces it, it is not something 
different from the Qur'ân, and it must be temporal.112 Moreover, God 
and the Qur'ân have different qualities;113 and, since being eternal 
is an essential quality and two things that have one essential quality 
in common must have all essential qualities in common, the Qur'ân 
cannot be eternal. If the Qur'ân is different from God and something 
other than Him, it must be temporal, and with this all Muslims 
agree ' ' 4 
The third argument113 can be called "samT, based on revelation; 
from the text of the Quran arguments are gathered to show that, 
line 15 fa-má instead of mim-mâ, in Wugni VII, 84, line 19 \abqa instead of ìantafì (the 
text of the manuscript is not very olear, our suggestion seems self-evident in the context), 
in Mugnì VII, 85, line 12 uhdil ("it is produced", the manuscript has a first letter 
ahf) instead of hudat 
, 1 0
 Cf ΜιιχηΙ VII, 86, line 1 87, line 8 
1 1 1
 In that case also a human being could be eternal, notwithstanding his being 
composed Vi ugni VII, 86 
1 1 2
 Read in Mugni VII, 86, line 4 bt-mill instead of li-mitl 
1 1 3
 God is said to be knowing, able, living seeing etc , whereas the Qur'ân is said 
to be, for instance, structured and composed, audible and perceptible, command, etc 
The qualities mentioned about God are not applicable to the Qur'ân and those 
mentioned about the Qur'ân are not applicable to God 
114
 Read in Мщпі VII, 87, lines 5 and 8 twice gaxran lah ("something other than 
He", sc, God) instead of genr ilâh ("not a god") Both expressions are written in 
the same way, but my suggestion fits better into the context and in 'Abd al-Jabbâr's 
usual vocabulary All Muslims are agreed that something which is different from 
God and something other than God cannot be eternal, they may disagree on the 
question whether the Qur'ân can be said to be something other than God 
1 , 5
 Cf M ugni VII, 87, line 9 91, line 9 In this argumentation the following 
corrections have to be made in M ugni VII, 89, line 6 read /ГЛ instead of mmh. in 
Mugni VII, 89, line 12 read hi-iuz' instead if χαβαζί. in Yfugni VII, 90. line 1 read 
yatakallam instead of mutakallim (the text evidently indicating something in the future), 
in Mugni VII, 90, line 2 the word ma has to be added after kán (cf the text of the 
manuscript) 
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according to this text, God's speech is not eternal but temporal. 
A first series of verses apply to the Qur'ân—by whatever name it is 
mentioned— I I 6 a number of judgements (ahkâm), all of them more 
or less directly indicating that it is temporal : it is said to be muhdat 
(temporal),117 mafûl (made),118 maqdûr (produced by someone who 
was able to do so),119 hadît (new),120 muhkam (precise), mufassal 
(divided), and muwassal (made to arrive).121 Other verses say in some 
way that God produced it: He arranges it (yudabbir),122 made it 
Arabic (ja'alah), and created it (kalaq).123 Other verses imply that 
it did not exist from all eternity : the book of Moses preceded it (min 
qablih),124 and it can be linked with something temporal.125 All verses 
implying that God is able to produce something similar, that He was 
able to produce the Qur'ân, that He is able to impose duties, that He 
can change the Qur'ân, or that He can challenge others to produce 
something similar, indicate that His speech is temporal.126 Also the 
verses saying that He commands or prohibits do so because speech 
becomes command or prohibition only by being produced together 
with a concomitant will, an intention. Other verses imply that God will 
speak in the future,127 or imply for grammatical reasons that God 
116
 It is called Qur'ân. dtkr, kttäb, or amr 
"
1
 Cf. sural al-anbiyâ', verse 2 and sural ai-iu'ara, verse 5 
"
8
 Cf sural al-ahzâb, verse 37. 
"
9
 Cf. sural ai-ah:áb, verse 38 
120
 Cf sural a:-zumar (not. ai-muzammil, as is mentioned in a note in Mugni VII, 
89), verse 23, and sural al-a'râf, verse 185 The word used here, badil, which means 
tradition, tale, or account, can also be used with the meaning "new", it is for this reason 
that 'Abd al-Jabbâr says it is even more clear than the word muhdat 
121
 These terms are mentioned without references to the verses in which thev 
occur For the related term "uhkimal". sural Hùd, verse I is quoted 
122
 Cf sural as sa/da, vers 5 
123
 Cf sural al-'alaq. verse 1. The verb kalaq is said to have as object, though 
not expressed, "ism rabbik" 
'
2
* Cf. sural Húd. verse 17 
125
 Cf. sural al-qasas. verse 30. 
^
6
 Cf sural al-kahf, verse 109, sural Luqmân, verse 27, sural a!-baqara, verse 106; 
sural at-Tûr, verse 34 
127
 Cf sural al-hijr, verse 92 and also sural an-nahl (not an-naml, as is mentioned 
in a note in Mugnì VII, 90). verse 40 The latter verse, which can be translated as 
"Our (sc God's) word to something when We will it. only is that We say to it 'be', and 
it will be", plays an important part in the discussions Here 'Abd al-Jabbâr says that 
the word's being linked with the will indicates that it is temporal, and that the 
grammatical form (both the preposition "when", ida, and the expression "that We say 
to it", "an naqúl Iah") indicates the future 'Abd al-Jabbâr, however, denies the 
existence of such a creative word "кип" (be) as we shall sec later on 
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produces His speech.128 But in all these cases the text of the Qur'ân 
itself witnesses that God's speech is temporal. 
The fourth argument129 appeals to some traditions about the 
sayings of Muhammad implying that the Qur'ân is created (maklûq),130 
and to the consensus of his companions, who considered the Qur'ân 
to be an act of God by which He distinguished 131 Muhammad from 
other people and indicated him to be a prophet. 
The fifth argument132 comes to the conclusion that all Muslims 
in some general consensus say that God is "the Lord of Tâhâ, Yâsîn, 
and the great Qur'ân".1 3 3 
An additional argument134 starts from the Qur'ân as we know it in this 
world. When this Qur'ân is said to be the speech of God itself, as 
the Haswîya say, God's speech must be produced in substrates and 
cannot be eternal.135 If this Qur'ân, however, is said to be a repro-
duction of God's speech, as the Kullâbîya and with a slight modification 
also the As'ariya say, 'Abd al-Jabbâr replies that the reproduced must 
be similar to the reproduction, and consequently be temporal when 
the reproduction is so. 
After all these arguments a last section is added;136 this section 
records other arguments from the Qur'ân, from the consensus of the 
'
2H
 Cf sMrof an-msâ', егье 164, the second form and the masdar used indicate that 
it is produced 
' ^ Cf Мицпі VII, 91, line IO 92, line 1 (up to the end of the line, this line 
belongs to the preceding paragraph) The manuscript has in Mugn! VII, 91, lines 12 
and 14 the form hadat, where the edition has hudût 
130
 For instance, the famous traditions "God was and nothing else, then He 
created the Dikr" and "God did not create in heaven or earth something greater than 
the verse of the throne in (furai) al-baqara" 
'
, 1
 Read \ubmah instead of yunbiah in Mugni VII, 91, line 19 The manuscript 
permits both readings, my suggestion fits into the present context 
1 , 2
 Cf Mugni VII, 92, lines 2-4 
133 " 7 a / , â "
 a n c j "Yâsîn" are the names for two chapters of the Qur ' ân 
1 3 4
 Cf Mugni VII, 92, lines 5-14 
115
 This doctrine is said to be in accordance with the Christian doctrine of the 
"tahaddâ" What is probably meant is the doctrine of the incarnation, the divine word 
inhering in a worldly substrate Possibly, we have to read (Mugni VII, 92, line 7) 
"at-tajaswd" or "al-ittihâd" (cf note 141) 
136
 Cf Mugni VII, 92, line 14 - 94, line 19 Read in Mugni VII, 94, line 6 
kilâba (writing) instead of kitâb (book) as also appears in the manuscript, the 
comparison is not between Gods speech and His book (the Qur'ân) but between His 
speech and His writing In Mugni VII, 94, line 14 the edition reads hudûtih, where 
the manuscript reads hadalih, in Mugni VII, 94, line 17 the edition reads hudút, where 
the manuscript reads hadat The rational arguments mentioned here are those based 
on the fact that it must be communicative, and that, to be good, it supposes that 
someone exists who has some benefit from it 
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Muslims, and also rational arguments, which partially had been men-
tioned before in some way or other. They appear to have been added 
without much order. Maybe this is a result of the compilalory way 
in which 'Abd al-Jabbàr worked. Anyhow, the arguments mentioned 
here do not contain any really new elements. 
One might suppose that 'Abd al-Jabbâr, having proved that God 
cannot be speaking by eternal speech, comes to the conclusion that 
God can only be speaking by temporal speech. He still has to cope, 
however, with the doctrine of the Kullâbîya, who assert that God 
is speaking by an eternal cause, a cause they call speech but which is 
entirely different from the speech we know in this world. In the 
chapter just discussed, 'Abd al-Jabbâr started from the assumption 
that speech can only be of the genus we know in this world (for 
'Abd al-Jabbâr this is evident), and that the text of the Qur'ân is 
really God's speech or a reproduction similar to it. It is because he has 
to take the arguments of his opponents into account, that he now must 
prove that God cannot be speaking by an eternal cause different from 
speech as we know it in this world. 
God cannot be eternally speaking by speech different from human 
speech.131 If one can deduce from the way 'Abd al-Jabbâr argues 
something about the opponents with whom he enters into discussion, 
we conclude that there is a clear distinction between those he attacked 
in the preceding chapter (the Haswiya) and those he attacks in this 
(the Kullâbîya). In the preceding chapter he made use of arguments 
from the revelation and from the sources authorized by the orthodox 
scholars in Islam. In this chapter he only uses rational arguments, 
his argumentation is clear and sharp, and the chapter clearly and 
strictly structured. The opponents in this chapter are much more 
similar to 'Abd al-Jabbâr in their way of thinking and arguing. 
The chapter in which 'Abd al-Jabbâr treats this question can be 
divided into five sections, according to the five arguments he mentions 
to refute the thesis of the Kullâbîya. Since this chapter has a distinct 
13
'' This point is discussed in Mugni VII, 95-116 (chapter 15) Cf also Muhit I, 
330-333 and 'Abd al-Karîm 'Utmân, Nazamat at-taklif. 237-238 According to the 
title of the chapter in the Mugni "Full 'alâ l-Kiillâbî\a fi ibiâl qawhhim amah la'âlâ 
mutakallim lam \azal hi-kalâm mukáli/ li-kalâmina", 'Abd al-Jabbâr enters into 
discussion with the Kullâbîya The formulation is not that God's speech is eternal, 
since according to Ibn Kullâb God's speech in itself cannot be eternal but it can only 
be such by God's eternity (cf ρ 331) 'Abd al-Jabbâr directs his argumentation in this 
chapter also against al-As'ari and his followers in Mugni VII. 99, the opponent 
who speaks there uses the word 'ibâra (characteristic for al-As'ari against Ibn Kullâb) 
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structure, it is possible to render its argumentation in a schematic 
way. 
The first argument138 states that it is not possible to establish the 
existence of speech different from human speech. The phrase "speech 
different from human speech" even contains a contradiction since 
speech cannot be different from what we established and defined 
above. 
First objection : that which communicates what the subject wills 
is speech. Answer : we already proved that being communicative is not 
a distinctive feature of speech. 
Second objection : God is a speaking subject different from other 
speaking subjects; consequently. He can have speech different from 
other speech. Answer : speaking means "making speech", "different" 
means in that case that His essence is different from the essence of 
other speaking subjects. Speech, however, means "arranged letters", 
and in this case there is no essence that can be different.139 
Third objection : speech consists of several genera (ajnâs), which 
are different; consequently, we can establish for God speech that is 
different from all speech we meet in this world. Answer : all forms 
of speech we find in this world correspond in being arranged letters; 
the establishing of speech different from all this would be the 
establishing of speech that does not have the characteristics of 
speech. 
Fourth objection : you admit that God is able to produce a colour 
different from the colours we know; you now have to admit that He 
can also have speech different from the speech wc know. Answer : 
that colour would correspond with the other ones in being an 
appearance (hay'a) for a substrate; since all colours are opposite, it 
is possible for God to produce more opposites. The difference between 
colours and speech is that we are able to produce speech, but not 
to produce colours. If other kinds of speech were possible, we would 
be able to produce them.140 
138
 Cf. MugniVU, 95, line 3 - 101. line 17. 
139
 To prove his position, 'Abd al-Jabbâr refers to other acts produced by God, 
for instance, his favours, which are not entirely different from favours produced 
by man. Mugni VII, 96. 
" ^ Just as all possible colours have to be "appearance" of a substrate, so all possible 
speech has to be arranged letters. We are able to produce letters and, since he who is 
able to produce something also is able to produce its opposite, we are also able to 
produce any other letter that is possible. Consequently, if there were speech different 
from what we actually make, we would be able to make it. since it would be arranged 
letters. Cf. Mugni VII, 97. 
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Fifth objection : one can establish something eternal that is not 
a substance, not a body, and not an accident; consequently, we can 
establish eternal speech different from our speech. Answer : we 
established God on the basis of indications and attributed to Him 
only known qualities. 
Sixth objection : I establish something known {ma qui) by an indi-
cation, and I call that speech though it is not arranged letters; but 
that is a matter of terms. Answer : what you want to establish is not 
ma'qui, not known by intuition, for in that case we should know it 
too, and in fact we do not.141 
Seventh objection : Abu Hâsim established that God in His essence 
is in a state which entails that He is eternally knowing, eternal, living, 
and having the possibilities to hear and to see; yet nothing is known 
by intuition except the indication. Answer : the entire argumen-
tation is analogous with the argumentation about essences in this 
world. We always start from known judgements (ahkâm) to deduce 
from them the qualities as we do in this world. 
Eighth objection : the expressions we hear are an indication of His 
speech just as the possibility to act is an indication of His being able. 
Answer. in that case the same would hold true in this world, and we 
already proved that that is not the case.142 
Ninth objection : the denying of dumbness and silence supposes the 
establishing of speech. Answer : in this way we can only establish 
something that is known by intuition ;143 the speech they try to establish 
is not known. One can never establish something that is not known 
by denying the existence of something that is known;144 if we were 
to admit this possibility, one could establish whatever one wants to 
establish.145 
141
 In that case one could establish whatever one wants to, even the incarnation 
of Jesus (al-ittihâd), and that God has a son who is His speech Mugni VII, 98 
142
 Cf pp 308-312 This thesis is advocated by the As'ariya 
'•^ The example discussed in this context is the establishing that somebody is 
perceiving (mudrtk) when he is living and defects have to be denied But in that case 
perceiving is a known quality 
^
4
 Read in Mugni VII, 100, line 9 bi-nafy instead of nafy, the preposition is not 
found in (he manuscript. In Mugni VII, 100, line 11 one has to read bi-nafy instead 
of bi-abât, which the manuscript and the edition read 
145
 'Abd al-Jabbâr gives a list of examples, also from the doctrine of the 
Christians and the anthropomorphists Two corrections have to be made in Mugni VII, 
101, line 2 add after 'alò wajh la yu'qal, these words are missing in the manuscript and 
the edition In Mugni VII, 101, line 7 the particle на before 'ala (found in the 
manuscript too) has to be removed 
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The second argument l 46 shows that the speech which is established 
by the Kullâbîya cannot be communicative (mufìd), cannot convey 
a meaning. To prove this point, 'Abd al-Jabbâr mentions four argu-
ments. 
The first proof:147 speech can only become communicative through 
a convention (muwâda'a), because people agreed about a concrete 
meaning to be given to certain signs. This implies that it must be 
produced since one can only make a convention about something 
one will produce later on. When there is not a conventional language 
according to which speech is produced, it cannot be communicative. 
The second proof:148 since God's speech as the opponent has 
defined it is one and indivisible, it cannot communicate the various 
parts (aqsâm) of speech since one indivisible thing cannot be at the 
same time command, prohibitiorf, and information. The outward 
(grammatical) form of the command 149 cannot become a prohibition 
without losing its quality of being a command.150 Speech becomes 
command, prohibition, and information through the intention, the 
concomitant will; through this intention the grammatical form of 
a command can also be used metaphorically as a prohibition. This 
intention is the only condition for speech to occur as command, 
prohibition, or information.151 
The third proof152 states that speech can only occur as command, 
prohibition, or information when it occurs as "arranged things" 
(a.sya manzûmd); this is not possible for something indivisible.153 
" ^ Cf M ugni VII, 101, line 18 105, line 19 At ihe beginning of this argument 
the intcrpunction of the printed text has to be changed The argument is divided into 
four proofs, each of them introduced by the term "mm-hä" 
" ^ Cf MugniVW. 101, line 18 102, line 19 In this section read in MugniVW. 102, 
line 3 "¡aqd al-aim al-arabi li-mmâcia'at al-fars" instead of "faqd al-'¡Im al-'arabi 
munâda'at al-/ars", the preposition /; is found in the manuscript, the alif of the word 
'álim not In M ugni VII, 102, line 14 read vata/addad instead of yatahaddad and in 
line 11 with the manuscript HHI/IÎ' insttad of qu In M ugni VII, 102, line 16 one probably 
better reads bi-dikr instead of la-dakar 
14H
 M ugni VII. 102, line 20 104. line 3 
1 4
' 'Abd al-Jabbâr lias here in mind the so-called amr (command) as grammatical 
term the imperative form of the verb 
1 . 0
 'Abd al-Jabbâr compares in this respect speech with other indivisible qualifiers, 
such as knowledge and ability, which also cannot communicate different things Read 
in Magni VII, 103, line 4 bi-manzda instead of h-manzila (the difference between these 
two words is not easily discernible in the manuscript). 
1 . 1
 The existence of the object commanded, the person to whom the command is 
directed, or the ta'mir. is not a condition for speech to become a command The same 
holds good of the other parts of speech. 
' ^ Xfugni VII. 104, lines 4-20 
'^
1
 When the opponents object that one letter can also be speech, 'Abd al-Jabbâr 
replies that that is not true (cf ρ 297); even if it were true, a single letter is not indivisible 
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The fourth proof:154 speech can only be communicative—contrary 
to, for instance, writing 155 by coming into existence in a certain order, 
one part after the other. If God's speech would be existent156 and 
not coming into existence, it could, consequently, not be com-
municative. 
The third argument:157 after proving that God's speech -as the 
Kullâbîya describe it—cannot exist and that it, if it could exist, could 
not be communicative, 'Abd al-Jabbâr again takes one step backwards : 
even if it could be communicative, it could not communicate the 
various things we find in the Qur'ân, and about which they say that 
God communicates them. This speech would correspond with speech 
which only occurs in one special way, and which, therefore, can only 
communicate one kind of things since on such a speech only one 
convention is possible.158 
since it has a beginning and an end Moreover, the opponents will not admit that 
God's speech is one letter (read in Mugni VII, 104, Ime 11 harf instead of hurûj, 
which the manuscript and the printed text have), and if they were to admit that, 
God's speech could only be a command since the only examples given for an eventual 
speech consisting of one letter are imperative forms Moreover, 'Abd al-Jabbâr already 
proved that such an imperative is only communicative since something else is implied 
and not expressed (read in Mugni VII, 104, line 19 with the manuscript al-muqaddar 
instead of vuqaddar of the printed text) The suggestion of al-Abyârî to read in Mugni 
VII, 104, line 5 allodi instead of dâhk appears to be correct 
'
5 4
 Mugni VII, 105, lines 1-12, the argument is concluded in Mugni VII, 105, 
lines 13-19 (a misprint in Mugni VII, 105, line 16 gives mitât instead of mill) 
155
 Writing (kitâba) is communicative, but in another way than speech, writing 
can be communicative when it exists, not only when it comes into being, since 
a reading subject can see the totality and distinguish its order In this context 'Abd 
al-Jabbâr has a strange but very characteristic argument Speech can only be commu-
nicative when coming into existence, in writing it can even be so that what comes 
into existence is not communicative, and that what remains (al-bâqi) is communicative 
In this statement he has in mind the carving of a stone in such a way that the 
background of the letters is cut away (this is something new, something coming 
into existence), whereas the letters which appear now on and above the back-
ground of the stone are what remains, untouched, nothing happened with them, 
nevertheless they are what is communicative Read in Mugni VII, 105, line 11 al-muhaddaf 
(what is cut away) instead of al-muhdat (in the manuscript both readings are possible), 
in Mugni VII, 105, line 10 the correction of 'alayh into 'aia\hâ, suggested by al-Abyârî, 
is not correct 
156
 I suggest to read in Mugni VII, 4, line 4 mawjûda instead of wa-huddidat The 
text of the manuscript is somewhat vague here, a letter is, however, discernible before 
the first »an, it can be a mim The last letter of the word seems to be a ta, and above 
the second ион (it seems to be а иаи and not a dal) we find a sadda, which can be of 
a later date than the original text of the manuscript 
1 5 7
 Mugni VII, 105, line 20 108, line 17 
1 5 e
 Therefore, speech is the most apt medium for conventions, since it can be 
divided into so many forms according to what one wants to communicate In Mugni 
VII, 105, line 8 read al-a'râd instead of al-agräd, in Mugni VII, 105, line 13 at-tafsil 
instead of at-tafdil. 
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The fourth argument:159 even if that speech of God could com-
municate all those things, we could in no way know what it com-
municates, and God would not be able to teach us its meaning. What, 
according to the Kullâbîya, indicates the existence of this speech does 
not indicate that it is communicative and surely not what it com-
municates.160 
First objection : it must be communicative since the speaking 
subject is wise. Answer : that is true in this world since here the 
speaking subject chooses his speech, and, when he is wise, he will 
choose it in a way that it is not evil161 and therefore useful. In the 
opinion of the opponents, God does not freely choose His speech. 
Moreover, even if it is communicative, we do not know what it 
communicates. 
Second objection : God's speech cannot be useless and, conse-
quently, evil. Answer : this only applies to speech that is freely 
chosen.162 
Third objection : we know what it communicates through other 
speech. Answer: this other speech can only be speech God produces; 
this implies that He is speaking because He made this speech; and 
this refutes the argument of the Kullâbîya to prove that God must be 
speaking by speech different from ours.163 
Fourth objection : we know what it communicates by expressions 
{'ibârât) which are not speech. Answer : we showed that only these 
"expressions" are real speech.164 Moreover, what would be the 
connection (ta'alluq) between the expression and the eternal speech 
which necessitates that the expressions are an indication of that 
speech?165 
^ " Mugni VII, 106. line 18 110, line 4. 'Abd al-Jabbâr mentions seven objections, 
the interpunction of the text has to be adjusted accordingly 
'^
0
 Speech is not per se communicative, cf pp 304-305 
161
 Read in Mugni VII. 107, line 8 \aqbuh instead of yaiihh 
^- This objection is made with reference to God's justice ('udì) 'Abd al-Jabbâr 
replies that in that case too we have to start from God's just acts which we can know 
(In Mugni VII, 107, line 18 read 'adii instead of 'tu/D 
' " Their argument was that God must be speaking by speech different from ours 
since He cannot be speaking by temporal speech (In M ugni VII, 108, line 9 add the 
word нщйЬ after the preposition ilâ, this word is found in the manuscript) 
'^
4
 Cf pp 308-312 The "older ones" (in fact the Kullâbîya) are said to agree. 
whereas the "later ones" (the As'ariya) are said to disagree with 'Abd al-Jabbâr about 
the essence of speech in this world 
' ^ Cf pp 66-67 about the various possible connections between indication (dtilif) 
and object indicated, without one of these connections no real indication is possible 
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Fifth objection : we know what it communicates through writing. 
Answer : here also there is no connection between this writing and 
the alleged speech; the only thing writing can be an indication to is 
letters. And the opponents deny that God's speech is letters. 
Sixth objection : we know what it communicates through a gesture 
(isâra). Answer : making gestures is not possible for God.166 
Seventh objection : we know what it communicates through necessary 
knowledge. Answer: then we should know it too; moreover: if the 
knowledge of God's essence is acquired, the knowledge of His speech 
probably also has to be acquired. 
Through these four arguments 'Abd al-Jabbâr showed that his 
opponents cannot establish the existence of speech in God different 
from human speech, and which, nevertheless, would be real speech. 
Therefore, he compares this speech as something that cannot be proved 
and is only asserted without any real argument, with the "kasb" 
of an-Najjâr,'67 the "nature" of the Naturalists, and the "trinity" 
of the Christians. 
In his other five arguments 'Abd al-Jabbâr proves with rational 
arguments that God's speech cannot be eternal. 
The fifth argument168 starts from the general principle that two 
things which have one essential quality in common must have all 
essential qualities in common and, therefore, be similar.169 If God 
166
 Gestures characterize the hands or similar things (in M ugni VII, 109, line 12 
one probably must read bi-avdi, certainly not bi-lláh because this results m a non-sense) 
Moreover, in a gesture the intention can be known by necessary knowledge Both 
things are impossible for God 
" ^ The text-edition has al-bihâr We surely have to read here "an-Najjar", one of the 
earlier, non-Mu'tazilî theologians, who held the doctrine of the "kasb" (acquisition 
of the acts made by God, by the responsible human being), cf Watt, Fi>rmati\c' Period, 
199-201 about Husayn an-Najjâr, and especially p. 201 about his doctrine of "kasb". 
168
 Mugni VII, 110, line 5 - 113, line 18. 
" ^ We discussed this principle on pp 263-264 The counter-arguments directed 
against the validity of this principle which are discussed in the present context, arc 
all concerned with qualities which by 'Abd al-Jabbâr are said to be not essential. 
Thus, for instance, the real prophet and the one who only claims to be a prophet 
cannot be said to be both prophets since being a prophet is not an essential quality 
(in Mugni VII, 112, line 12 read /a-ita/ab instead of mû/ib) Other examples are rejected 
since being living is not for living beings in this world an essential quality 
When the opponents deny this general principle, they have no way to prove that there 
cannot be a second eternal being besides God which is unable ('άμζ) They cannot 
say that this quality indicates a defect since we only know that it indicates a defect 
in this world, nor can they say that this is only possible for temporal beings since the 
most they can assert is that this temporal form is only possible for temporal beings. 
not an eternally being unable. Even if they can make objections against the wording 
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and His speech, consequently, both are eternal, 1 7 0 and being eternal 
is an essential quality, God and His speech must have all essential 
qualities in common 1 7 1 so that His speech is a second god besides 
Him. which the Kullâbîya and any other Muslim—cannot possibly 
admit.172 
The sixth argument :1 7 3 speech only becomes command, prohibition, 
or information by the influence of a concomitant will; since the will 
can only have influence on things coming into being, and God's will 
itself is temporal, God's speech must be temporal too. 
The seventh argument 1 7 4 speaking without there being anybody 
who can hear it and gain profit from it is useless and, consequently, 
evil. Therefore, God cannot be speaking before the creation of other 
living beings, and His speech cannot be eternal. 
The eighth argument175 recapitulates the various alternatives of the 
taqsîm concerning the ways in which speech might be ascribed to 
the speaking subject, and comes to the conclusion that it can only 
be since the speaking subject made it. Therefore, it cannot be eternal. 
A ninth and last argument,1"'6 used by the teachers of'Abd al-Jabbâr 
but not accepted by him since it is concerned with terminology and 
not with the reality behind this terminology, states that speech is 
something other than God, and that all Muslims are in agreement that 
something that is other than God cannot be eternal. The difficulty, 
however, is found in the first premise.177 
Now 'Abd al-Jabbâr can conclude that God must be speaking 
of Ihe argument (in Mugni VII, 113, line 17 read with the manuscript as-siga instead 
of as-saha), they have to admit the accuracy of its contents 
110
 In Vitigni VII, 110, line 6 read ¡ani instead of báqi 
' " ' The corrections proposed by al-Abyârî in Wugni VII, 111, line 6 are not 
necessary and do not improve the course of the argumentation The text must be 
^•ла-киІІ cjálik yajib kann al-kalâm al-qadim 'ala\h" "the eternal speech must have all 
those (qualities)" In Mugni VII, 111, line 5 one has to add \ajib alter the word 
man/ûd, the word is found in the manuscript 
1 , 2
 Evidently, this argument can only be used when the term "qadim" is used as 
meaning "essentially existent" and not when it is used to convey that something is 
old As an example 'Abd al-Jabbâr mentions "the old (qadim) palmtree" in iura/ 
Yâsin, verse 39 
173
 MugniVn, 113, line 19-114, line? 
'^ MugniVW, 114, lines 8-14 
175
 MugniVW, 114, line 15 116, line 3 Cf pp 313-329 In MugniWl, 115, line 3 
read yahulluh instead of mahalluh, in Mugni VII, 116, Une 1 read ja-yunbi' instead of 
ja-yubnâ 
176
 Mugni WW, 116, Unes 12-19 
177
 About the meaning of the term "other" (gayr) or "else" 'Abd al-Jabbâr will speak 
in his following chapter Cf also pp 143-144 
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by a temporal speech if He is speaking; He cannot be essentially 
speaking. He cannot be speaking "neither per se nor by a cause". He 
cannot be speaking by speech like ours but eternal, and He cannot 
be speaking by speech different from ours. Therefore, the only con-
clusion that remains is that God must be speakirg, if He is speaking, 
by a speech like ours, temporal like ours. What 'Abd al-Jabbâr will 
now discuss are two opinions which in some way or other deny that 
this conclusion must be drawn, either because it is not possible to 
qualify God's speech in whatever way—the doctrine of Hisâm bn 
al-Hakam—or because God's speech cannot be said to be something 
other than God—the doctrine of Ibn Kullàb and al-As'ari and their 
followers - . 
One cannot say : God's speech cannot be qualified. ' 7 8 This argument is 
directed against Hisâm bn al-Hakam and his followers, among whom 
also Ibn Kullâb seems to be reckoned. According to Hisâm, God's 
speech, just as His other qualities, cannot be qualified since this would 
lead to an endless series of qualities of qualities of qualities, and since 
a quality cannot inhere in a quality. 
We already saw that an endless scries is not necessary since the 
quality of a quality corresponds with an information about an infor-
mation; moreover, qualities are for 'Abd al-Jabbâr not accidents but 
names.1"19 These arguments are recapitulated by 'Abd al-Jabbâr 
together with some arguments from the preceding chapter. 
He also argues with an argumentum ad hominem that the followers 
of Hisâm do qualify God's speech, for instance, as promise and threat, 
command and prohibition. Moreover : everything that is existent must 
be qualified either as eternal or as temporal; no third alternative can 
exist. 
In this context 'Abd al-Jabbâr also recapitulates a thesis ascribed in 
his introduction to Ibn Kullâb, that something eternal is eternal by 
an eternity inhering in it. This is refuted. 
One cannot say: God's speech is not something other than God.i80 
178
 Cf Mugni VII, 117-119, line 17, this is the first section of the sixteenth 
chapter In this chapter 'Abd al-Jabbâr takes two theses together, since both deny that 
we can say something about God's speech, and since he considers both to belong to the 
same "school" The first thesis is ascribed to Hisâm, the second one to al-As'ari and 
Ibn Kullâb (Mugni VII, 3-4) Cf also 'Abd al-Karîm 'Utmân, Nazarîyat at-laklîf, 237. 
179
 Cf pp 150-154 about the sifát (qualities). 
1 β 0
 Cf. Mugni VII, 119, line 18 132, line 6 See also pp 143-144 about the term 
gayr and pp. 331-332 about the doctrine of Ibn Kullâb and al-As'ari. 
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We already saw that one can treat the "being other" of two things in 
two difTerent ways, either giving attention to the meaning of the word 
"gayr" in language, or by penetrating into the reality behind this word 
When we first take the word gavr as it is used in the Arabic language, 
it can be defined as follows "when in any pair of mentioned things 
one of them distinguishes itself from its companion by a 'mention' 
which characterizes it, each of them must be other than its com-
panion" " " Since the name "God" cannot be applied to His speech 
and the name "speech" not to Him,182 each of them must be some-
thing other than its companion 
The objection that the name "God" {Allah) can be applied to God's 
speech, is easily refuted by 'Abd al-Jabbâr by drawing a number 
of conclusions from that statement which the opponent cannot possibly 
accept one could no longer say that God is one (nâhid). He could be 
called "speech" and be addressed as "speech",183 since what is said 
about His speech can also be said, and is said, about His other 
qualities. He would consist of many things {ma âni), either His speech 
in itself would be entitled to worship,184 or His speech in combination 
with His essence and His other qualities as a totality, which again 
would imply that God has a structure {binya) and, consequently, must 
be a body, everything that is necessary for God would be necessary 
for His speech (and His other qualities), finally, there would be no 
reason why the qualities were the qualities of God and not He 1 8 5 
a quality of them 
To a second objection, saying "when He .only becomes god {ilâh) 
since He is characterized by qualities which He only gets by these 
qualities, they must fall under our term 'god'",1 8 6 'Abd al-Jabbâr 
replies that the reason why one is entitled to a quality does not fall 
under its definition In this case, when they define the concept of 
"being other" as they do, the opponents cannot prove that speech is 
something other than the Creator and something other than the 
essentially knowing person 
A second argument, based on the works of Abu Hâsim,187 says 
181
 Cf MugniVH, 119 and the translation on ρ 143 оГоиг text 
1 8 2
 In Mugn! VII, 120, line 13 the inverted commas evidently have to be closed after 
the word Allah, not after al-kaläm 
1 8 î
 In Mugni VII, 121, line 3 read la-sahh instead of \asihh 
184
 This is the meaning of the word "god", cf ρ 240 
1 8 5
 Read m M ugni У \\, 121, Ime 13 \akûn (He is) instead of takûn (they arc) 
186
 Cf MugniVU, 121 
187
 M ugnimi, 122. line 6 (after the first comma) till 123, Ime 5 Here the interpunction 
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that two things which are different (muktahf) in their essence, must 
also be "other" (ga\r) I 8 8 Since God and His speech are different, 
He must be other than His speech 
So far we dealt with the term '"other" or "something else" as it is 
used in the common language, which knows a division into three 
possible relations other than, a part of, and identical with I 8 9 
If we look, however, into the reality behind the names, we meet 
only two alternatives two things either are identical or they are other 
In this respect 'Abd al-Jabbâr says "every qualified object about 
which one knows that it is characterized by a judgement and quality 
the other qualified object is not characterized by, or that it is possible 
for them, must be other than its companion and vice versa" 190 Since 
God's speech is entitled to judgements God is not entitled to, and 
since God is entitled to qualities and judgements His speech is not 
entitled to, His speech must be something other than He and He 
something other than His speech 
A final conclusion of this long section is that God, when He is 
speaking, can only be speaking by a temporal qualifier He made, 
this qualifier, which can be qualified and is something other than God, 
is speech as the speech we know and produce in this world 
4 ARGUMfcNTS OF THE OPPONENTS 
At the end of his own discussions, 'Abd al-Jabbâr pays much 
attention to the arguments of his opponents, especially the arguments 
they bring into the field to prove that God's speech and the Qur'ân 
has to be changed in the printed text, moreover in Mugm VII, 122 lines 7 and 9 the 
dashes have to be removed since they suggest an incorrect reading of this text in Mugni 
VII, 122 line 14 the suggestion to add a letter ahf has to be rejected since the sentence 
continues as follows ' mm ann yad al-msân la yajib an takun ga)ran lah' This 
argument (two things which are différent are other) cannot be used as a definition since, 
according to Abd al-Jabbâr two things which are similar can also be other 
188
 The addition 'in their essence is made by Abd al Jabbâr to exclude the possibility 
of two things, the one being a part of the other being different and yet not being other 
In these arguments 'Abd al-Jabbär deals with the term ' other" (gayr) as used in 
common language, in this case there are three possibilities 
, e
' There can even be said to be a fourth possibility, as appears in Mugni VII, 122, 
lines 20-22 A thing can be identical with a second thing, it can be other than it 
it can be a part of it, or it can be a totality of which the second one is a part Therefore, 
one cannot say that "other" is everything that is not the thing concerned and not 
a part of it 
"
0
 Cf Mugni П, 123 
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are eternal.191 He does not mention anywhere the sources he used 
nor does he give many details about the opponents whose arguments 
are discussed and refuted; in the M ugni he refers to them with an 
impersonal form in the heading of the chapter concerned by saying 
"about the mention of their sophisms that He is speaking by eternal 
speech" ; in the Muhit they are referred to as "the people" (al-qawm).192 
In both works we find a reference to another book by 'Abd al-Jabbâr, 
"Naqd al-luma"\l9i which may suggest that the argument concerned 
is directed against al-As'arî and his school. Moreover, in the Muhit 
al-As'ari is once mentioned as opponent.194 More information, though 
still not very much and not very concrete, is found in the Sarh; 
in this work 'Abd al-Jabbâr gives two series of arguments, the 
first series being related in some way or other to the followers of Ibn 
Hanbal, the other to the As'arîya.1*5 
When we compare the arguments we find in the three mentioned 
works, we easily come to the conclusion that the Mugni is the most 
complete and mentions most arguments : against the nine arguments 
found in the Mugni we only find five in the Sarh and three in the 
Muhit. We distinguish in these arguments six categories, which are 
summarized as follows : 
a. Since God cannot be silent or dumb, He must be speaking from 
all eternity (the first argument of the Mugni, the first one of the Muhit, 
the first one of the second series—ascribed to the As'ariya—in the 
Sarh). 
b. A taqsim : since God cannot be essentially speaking nor by 
temporal speech. He must be speaking by eternal speech (second and 
' " These arguments are called subah (sophisms) by 'Abd al-Jabbâr. who by using 
this term already gives his judgement on their value They are discussed in Mugni VII, 
133-179 (chapter 17) after he has proved that God is speaking by temporal speech He 
made In the Uuh'tt we find these arguments in I, 349-355 at the very end of 'Abd 
al-Jabbâr's chapters on God's speech and the Qur'ân In the Sarh we find two series of 
arguments, the first concerning the being eternal of the Qur'ân in this world (pp 542-545), 
the second concerning the being eternal of the Qur'ân in the other world (pp 555-563) 
See also Bouman. The Doctrine о/ 'Ahd at-D/ahhâr, 75-84, where he discusses the passage 
concerned from the Mugni Badawi, Histoire, 254-255, discusses as usually the text of 
the Sarh, but only gives his attention to the first series of arguments 
1 , 2
 Mugni VII, 133 "Faslßdikr ¡ubahilum annuh la'aid mutakullim hi-kalâm qaclim" 
The title of the preceding chapter has also an impersonal form in its wording, only 
in the heading of chapter 15 a name is mentioned the Kullâbîya Cf Muhit I, 349 
"Bah fi фкі suhah al-qanm на-hallihâ" (not ¡allihâ as the Lebanese edition reads) 
l4i
 Mugni VII. 14« and Muhit I, 351 The title of this book is "Naqd (not : ba'd or 
naqs)al-luma"" Cf also note 56 on ρ 339 
' ^ Muhit I, 352, cf notes 228-229 of this section 
1 , 5
 Cf. respectively. Sarh 544 and 558 
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third arguments of the Mugni, second one of the Muhît, second one 
of the second series in the Sarh). 
с The name " G o d " is mentioned in the Qur'ân; consequently, it 
must be eternal (fourth argument in the Mugni, first one of the first 
series—ascribed to the followers of Ibn Hanbal—in the Sarh). 
d. God's creative word "be" {кип) makes it necessary that God's 
speech is eternal (fifth argument of the Mugni, third argument of the 
second series in the Sarh). 
e. Not being speaking is a defect for a living being and, consequently, 
has to be denied about God (arguments six, eight, and nine from 
the Mugni; third argument of the Muhif). 
f. Some texts from the Qur'ân suggest that God's speech and the 
Qur'ân arc eternal (seventh argument of the Mugni, second one of 
the first series in the Sarh). 
From this summary one can deduce that in the text of the Muhif 
only arguments of the As'ariya are discussed, whereas in the Mugni 
both kinds of arguments (to prove that the revealed Qur'ân is eternal 
and to prove that the Qur'ân which is in the other world is so) are 
intermingled. 
When we compare this with some texts from the As'ari tradition, 
we notice that the arguments al-As'ari uses in his "Kitâb al-luma'" 
are the same three arguments discussed by 'Abd al-Jabbâr in his 
second series of the Sarh : the categories a, b, and d.I96 In his "¡bona" 
Al-As'ari mentions more arguments, among them also the other three 
categories;197 evidently, he comes in this work much closer to the 
opinion and arguments of the Hanâbila. When we look into the works 
of al-Bâqillânî,198 we see that the arguments given by him are similar 
to those discussed by 'Abd al-Jabbâr, though he mentions more 
arguments than 'Abd al-Jabbâr discusses in the present context. 
I deal with the nine arguments mentioned and refuted in the Mugni, 
in the same order in which 'Abd al-Jabbâr deals with them, paying 
most attention to the way in which he refutes them. 
The first argument199 
The first argument the opponents use to prove that God is speaking 
by eternal speech, states "If He were not speaking in eternity, He must 
""' CT m the cdilion of McCarthy, pp 17-22 
™~ CT Ibána. 20-33 
'"" CT al-lnsûl. 62-63 and al-TamhUI, 26-29 and 237-251 
' ^ This argument is Icnind in MugniWX. 133-150. \luMi I, 349-352, and Sarh 555-558 
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be dumb (akras) or silent (sâkit) since a living being, if it has no defect, 
must be speaking or silent, just as it, if it has no defect, must be seeing 
the existent visible things ... and when it is not possible that He is 
speaking per se or with temporal speech, He must be speaking by 
eternal speech".200 
'Abd al-Jabbâr first tries to show in four arguments that their 
premise saying that a living being, if it has no defect, must be speaking 
or silent, is not correct.201 
First :202 dumb (akras) is someone in whose instrument to speak 
inability fq/r, the opposite of qudra) inheres, or whose instrument is 
attained by an unsoundness (fasâd) which prevents its use. Silent is 
someone who refrains from making speech with his instrument not-
withstanding the fact that he is able to do so. Against this background, 
'Abd al-Jabbâr remarks that ability always must precede the act;203 
this implies that in that very first moment of our being able we are 
neither speaking, nor silent, nor dumb since speaking is not yet 
possible, although the living being has no defect. Consequently, the 
opponents cannot take their premise for granted.204 
The structure of the section concerned in the Mugni can be summarized as follows 
having described the argument of the opponents (Mugni VII, 133, lines 4-18), 'Abd 
al-Jabbâr gives four arguments to show that the premise his opponents use is not 
correct (Mugni VII, 133, line 19 142, line 11), next, he mentions three arguments 
showing that the argumentation of his opponents is not correct (Mugni VII, 142, Une 12 -
148, line 10), to end with six ihâmâi (argumenta ad hominem) which were used by 'Abd 
al-Jabbâr's teachers (Mugni VII. 148. line 11 150, line 5) 
2 0 0
 Mugni VU, 133, lines 4-6 In Mugni VU, 133, line 7 the addition of an suggested 
by al-Abyârî is superfluous and breaks the grammatical order of the sentence, in Mugni 
VII, 133, line 8 add (with the manuscript) la after the word mim-man At the end of the 
argument 'Abd al-Jabbâr adds that some of these opponents come to the conclusion 
that the audible speech cannot be eternal and that therefore God's speech must be 
different from it 
201
 The four arguments are introduced in a similar way 'Abd al-Jabbâr remarks 
every time that the opponents restrict themselves to the giving of an allegation (da'wâ) 
without any proof on which the) build their argumentation 
202
 Mugni VII, 134, line 1 135, line 9 
2 0
' Cf pp 201-202 
2 0 4
 Other formulations of this premise arc rejected by 'Abd al-Jabbâr since the 
formulation itself is not correct a) a living being without a defect must be speaking, 
this leaves the possibility open that it is silent, b) a living being without a defect that 
is not dumb and silent must be speaking, this is not correct since the denial of dumbness 
is already implied in the denial of the defects, c) a living being that is neither dumb 
nor silent must be speaking, a baby has another defect by which he cannot speak, 
d) a living being that is not crying (like a baby), not dumb, and not silent must be 
speaking, someone who is totally unable ('ά/ιζ) cannot be called dumb, but is not 
speaking Consequently, the only correct formulation they can choose, though the 
contents will be rejected, is the one mentioned in the text 
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Second :20S the opponents have to admit that their taqsîm is only 
valid when the subject concerned can be speaking. Therefore, they 
first have to prove that God can be speaking in eternity; and this 
is what 'Abd al-Jabbâr denies. They cannot say that it must be possible 
for God in eternity since it is possible for Him now,206 for some 
qualities are always necessary for Him (as knowing or living), others 
are always impossible for Him (as being immobile or moving), and 
others are impossible for Him in eternity (before the creation) and 
possible now (from the moment of the creation). To this last category 
all God's acts belong. Consequently, it does not suffice to prove that 
God can be speaking; one has to prove that He can be speaking in 
eternity.207 And proving that is not possible. 
Third :208 a living being does not necessarily have one of a series 
of opposite qualities: it can lack all of them; it is possible that a 
living being is neither willing nor non-willing, neither knowing nor 
characterized by its opposites. The present qualities are not comparable 
with seeing, where one can say that a living being, when it is living 
and has no defects and something visible is existent, must be seeing. 
The reason is that being living supposes being perceiving and seeing 
under certain conditions which are known; being perceiving can be 
said to belong to the essence of being living. Something like this 
cannot be said about speaking; speaking does not belong to the essence 
of being living, and is not supposed by it under some known conditions. 
Another difference between speaking and perceiving is said to be 
that speaking is the result of a free choice, and that one does not 
necessarily speak with all parts and kinds of speech, whereas per-
ceiving is necessary, and one necessarily perceives all that can be 
2 0 5
 Mugni VII, 135, line 10 - 137, line 10. Cf. Bouman, The Doctrine of 
'Abd al-D/abbár. 76 His translation of yasihh by "is suitable" instead of "is possible" 
and his translation of \astahU by "is absurd" instead of "is impossible" is, to say the 
least, confusing These words are used by 'Abd al-Jabbâr to indicate metaphysical 
possibility and impossibility. 
2 0 6
 In MugniWX, 136. line 5 add instead of the на proposed by al-Abyârî 'Vci-Zan· 
kan yastahil fi-má lam ναζαΓ' This addition is necessary to get a, qua meaning, correct 
sentence 
2 0 7
 If it would be sufficient to prove that God can be speaking without making any 
difference between eternity and time, we could argue in the same way that a dead man 
must be speaking since he can be speaking (sc. in the slate of being living) and silence 
and dumbness have to be denied about him. In Mugni VII. 136, line 15 read wa-lam 
abm instead of wa-lam ubayym My suggestion corresponds with the manuscript 
2 0 e
 Mugni VII, 137, line 11 - 139, line 18. 
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perceived. Summarizing : the connection between living and perceiving 
is different from the connection between living and speaking.209 
Fourth:2 1 0 dumbness and silence are related to the instruments, 
not to the living being as we saw in the definitions mentioned above. 
Also, speech characterizes and requires a substrate. Therefore, they 
cannot exclude each other and be each other's opposite in the living 
being. If the opponents say that they exclude each other and are each 
other's opposite, not in a living being, but in a substrate, 'Abd 
al-Jabbâr shows that they do not exclude each other in this way : when 
someone is dumb or silent, and his tongue does, consequently, not 
function as an instrument, speech can exist in his tongue, either 
because one nevertheless can make a little bit of it, or because God 
made it there since He does not need instruments or a specially 
structured substrate.211 If they were each other's opposite in a sub-
strate, they would be perceived in the same way; we know this is not 
the case. In that case lisping would be the opposite of a letter and, 
consequently, the opposite of all letters since the opposite of some-
thing's opposite is also the opposite of the thing concerned. The fact 
that one usually is not both speaking and dumb or silent at the 
same moment does not have to be caused by a being opposite, either 
in a living being or in a substrate;212 it may have other causes too. 
Moreover, we know that we can be dumb and speaking, or silent and 
speaking, at one and the same moment, either since it is possible that 
God gives a man two tongues so that he can be silent or dumb with 
one tongue and speaking with the other one,213 or because we can still 
be speaking with speech we made in the echo while at the same 
moment we are already silent or even dumb. 
2 0 9
 'Abd al-Jabbâr adds that the quality "knowing", with which they compare 
speaking in this respect, supposes that the'knowing subject knows what he can 
know, therefore, God knows everything 
2 1 0
 Mugni VII, 139, line 19 142, line 11. Cf Bouman, The Doctrine oj 'Abd 
al-Djabbár, 76-77;'he did not understand correctly the passage he translated here; 
consequently, he misunderstood the construction of this sentence and translated sihha 
by "health" (instead of "possibility") and 'aj: by "weakness" instead of "inability". 
211
 In Mugnl VII, 140, line 9, where the printed text reads didd al-man', the alif 
belongs to the first word, so that one has to read dtddan la-mana'; in Mugni VII, 140, 
line 14 the particle la after wa-mnamâ, found both in the manuscript and in the printed 
text, has to be removed to get a correct sentence; in Mugni VII, 140, line 19 read 
muqâranatuh instead of muqârabatuh. 
212
 For the two kinds of being opposite (dtdd) : p. 142. 
213
 In Mugni VII, 141, line 19 add the conjunction iva before yatakallam instead of 
the addition proposed by al-Abyâri. 
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Having rejected the premise on which his opponents founded their 
argumentation, 'Abd al-Jabbâr now attacks the argumentation itself, 
especially the way in which they argue by an analogical reasoning 
(í/níh) He does so in three arguments 
First 2 1 4 the argumentation of the opponents is entirely based on 
the supposition that the subject is speaking through an instrument, 
he can either make speech through it, or refrain from using it while 
it is nevertheless possible to use it,or even be prevented to use it by an 
inability or unsoundness that affected the instrument Since God 
does not speak through instruments, this analogical reasoning is not 
possible 
Second 21^ in the argumentation of the opponents the living being 
is said to be speaking when he is neither dumb nor silent, in this case 
speaking means making speech as we already saw before and also in 
the immediately preceding argument An analogical reasoning would 
lead to the conclusion that God in eternity is making speech, and every-
body has to admit that this is not possible 
Third 2 1 6 the analogical reasoning of the opponents is m itself not 
correct, what they establish in this world is that the known kind of 
speech (al-kalám al-ma'qûf), the known kind of dumbness, and the 
known kind of silence are opposites and exclude each other in the 
living being 
The older Kullâbîya establish in God an unknown kind of speech, 
different from the speech we know on earth Therefore, the analogical 
reasoning is not correct, and could be used to establish in God 
whatever one wants to "in a different way" To make this clear 
'Abd al-Jabbâr uses a taqsim the different kind of speech they 
establish can2 1 7 either exclude dumbness and silence of a different 
kind than we know in this world, or exclude dumbness and silence of 
the same kind, or exclude both the different and the same kind If 
one says that it excludes silence and dumbness of the same kind, 
one can reply that one cannot prove this, and that God in such 
a case can nevertheless be silent and dumb by silence or dumbness 
2 1 4
 Mugm VII 142 lines 12-16 Cf Bouman, The Doctrine oj 'Abdal Djabbár, 77 
2 1 5
 Mugm VII 142 line 17 - 141, line 21 Cf Bouman, The Doctnm of 'Abd 
al Djabbar 77 
216
 MugmVW 144 linei 148 line 10 Cf Bouman, The Doclrme of'Abd al-Djabbâr, 
77 his transldlions are however nol entirely correct 
217
 In MugmVW 144 line 14 the edited text reads with the manuscript lt-tujib I suggest 
am yûjib which fits better into the context 
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of a different kind than we know in this world.218 If one maintains that 
it excludes silence and dumbness of a different kind, one can reply 
that there is no way to know that they exclude one another,219 and 
that God in that case can be silent and dumb by silence and dumbness 
as we know them in this world. If one says that it excludes both kinds, 
one can reply that it is not possible to make an analogical reasoning 
between something known and something unknown which is dif-
ferent.220 
About something unknown, different from what we know in this 
world, one could say whatever one wants to, even that such speech 
would require silence and dumbness.221 The opponents cannot object 
that speech, silence, and dumbness are opposites, for they admit that 
God is able to produce opposites;222 they cannot object either that 
it would be contrary to the essence of its genus, for they admit that 
God is able to produce even that; nor can they object that these things 
are different from the things we know in this world, for they also 
establish speech different from the speech in this world. 
The later Kullâbîya. however,--probably the As'ariya—did not 
establish in God a speech different from human speech, since for 
them human speech too is a qualifier in the soul; against them 'Abd 
al-Jabbâr objects that then dumbness and silence do not exclude 
speech, even in this world, for speech in the soul does not exclude 
dumbness or silence in the tongue. When they in their opinion estab-
lish dumbness or silence in the soul, they establish something un-
known, about which we cannot prove that it excludes speech. More-
over, the establishing of unknown things which are different from 
the things we know in this world makes it possible to establish 
whatever one wants to, unknown and different from what we know 
in this world.223 
2>a
 In Mtignl VII, 144, line 17 the addition made by al-Abyâri is superfluous 
^ ' In Mugni VII, 145, line 4 read ma na'qiluh instead oî ma yafaluh 
2 2 0
 Each whiteness excludes each blackness in a substrate if the whiteness and 
blackness arc not entirely different from the kind of whiteness and blackness we know 
in this world Otherwise, we cannot know that In Mugni VII, 145, line 15 the edition 
reads ио-/аи sâr bih, the first паи is not found in the manuscript and the entire 
expression does not make any sense I suggest to read on dâddath, it is possible to read 
this in the manuscript 
2 2 1
 In MugniWl, 145, line 19 the printed text reads (with the manuscript) al-hauàst, 
probably, we have to read al-kars 
222
 In Mugni VII, 146, line 7 the printed text has al-qidam, this docs not correspond 
with the manuscript, the last letter evidently being а га Therefore, one must read 
al-qudar (a plural of qudra1) or make a slight correction in order to read al-qudra 
2 2 3
 'Abd al-Jabbâr ends by saying that many arguments can be given yet to refute this 
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Having proved that both the premise and the argumentation of the 
opponents are not correct, 'Abd al-Jabbâr completes his discussion 
of this first argument with six ¡Izâmât which had already been used 
by his teachers. These ilzâmât use the same argumentation which is 
used by the Kullâbîya and try to show, by the absurdity of the 
conclusions to which they lead, that it cannot be correct.224 
First ilzâm : God must be acting in eternity since leaving behind 
(tark) must be denied about Him.225 
Second ilzâm : God must be avaricious (bakil) in eternity since in 
eternity giving favours must be denied about Him. 
Third ilzâm : God must be sterile ('aqim) in an unknown way since 
the having of a child must be denied about Him. 
Fourth ilzâm : God is in eternity unable Çâjiz) since in eternity 
acting and leaving behind (tark) must be denied about Him. 
Fifth ilzâm : God must be crying (sâlh) and screaming (sârik) in 
eternity since silence and defects must be denied about Him, and 
crying and screaming are opposites of dumbness and silence. 
Sixth ilzâm : God must be unjust (Jâ'ir) in eternity since justice 
must be denied in eternity.226 
The second argument227 
This argument, which is ascribed to the As'ariya but apparently 
also to the older Kullâbîya,228 takes the form of a taqslm though 
it does not have the same strict structure as the one we saw before 
in 'Abd al-Jabbâr's own demonstration that God can only be speaking 
by temporal speech of the same genus as our speech; but it is possible 
to compare both argumentations. 
theory, for those arguments he refers to his book "Naqd al-luma" Cf also note 56 
on ρ 339 
2 2 4
 Mugni VII, 148, line 11 - 150, line 5 
2 2 5
 The opponents reply that leaving behind is also an act and, therefore, cannot be 
its opppsite, in fact, they are opposites, 'Abd al-Jabbâr replies again, since someone 
who is able either can be acting or leaving behind In Mugni VII, 148, line 14 read 
yudádd al-fi'l instead of yudâf al-fi'l, which al-Abyârï reads meanwhile suggesting to 
correct it into yudâf h-l-fi'l. In Mugni VII, 148, line 16, the addition mm made by 
al-Abyârî is superfluous since the manuscript reads here bi-itbâtih In Mugni VII, 148, 
line 17 the word hâdâ is not found in the manuscript 
2 2 6
 In Mugni VII, 150, line 4 read yuhilû instead of mkayyalû 
2 2 7
 Mugni VII, 150, line 6 - 163, line 12 Cf also Sarh 558-560 and Muhii I, 
352-354 See also Bouman, The Doctrine of 'Abd al-Djabbâr, 78-80 
2 2 8
 Cf Sarh 558 In Muhit I, 352 Ibn Abi Bisr (a name for al-A5'ari, cf for instance 
Sezgin, GAS, I, 603) is said to belong to the later ones who used this argument, this 
implies that it was used by the older Kullâbîya too 
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The argument runs, schematically, as follows : 
God is speaking by speech. 
God's speech is either temporal or eternal. 
If it were temporal, it could not exist without a substrate since it 
is an accident and accidents can only inhere in substrates. 
If it were temporal, it could not inhere in God since God is not a 
substrate in which accidents can inhere. 
If it were temporal, it could not inhere in a substrate since in that 
case this substrate—or the totality of which it is part229—must have 
a name derived from that speech and be called speaking, commanding, 
prohibiting.230 
It even must be called by its most specific qualification.231 
The only alternative that remains is that God is speaking by eternal 
speech and, since our speech cannot be eternal, it must be different 
from our speech. 
As 'Abd al-Jabbâr does himself, we deal with the various parts of this 
argument in the order mentioned above. 
"God is speaking by speech" 2 3 2 This starting-point of the taqsim 
is not correct since it is not complete. The opponent first has to prove 
that God cannot be per se speaking nor "neither per se nor by a 
cause".233 Concerning this latter alternative they cannot say that this 
absolutely and a priori is impossible. Concerning the first alternative 
they cannot say that it is not possible that God is per se speaking 
since every argument proving that God cannot be per se speaking 
also can be used to prove that He cannot be speaking by eternal 
speech. One can even say : when someone says that God is per se 
speaking, he deviates in one aspect from the known reality in this 
world; when someone says that God is speaking by eternal speech, 
he does so in many aspects since many characteristics of speech are 
329 çp Muffi/ ι 352 This is said io be an addilion made by аІ-АГагі (Ibn Abi Bisr) 
Cf the preceding note 
-
1 0
 Read in Мицпі VII, 150, line 16 \αϊίαζμι instead of \asbaq 
2 3 1
 As these most specific qualifications (akass al-ansáf) are mentioned speech, 
command, and prohibition (Mugni VII, 150. line 15) 
2'- Vlugni VII. 151, line 1 152, line 13 A similar argument is mentioned in Sarh 
558, where 'Abd al-Jabbâr remarks that a correct taqsim must mention and discuss also 
the theses of the opponents This taqsim does not do this 
2 1 1
 In Magni VII. 151. lines 1-2 we have to keep to the reading of the manuscript, 
"annah law bi-mittakalhm li-nafsih »a-Iâ là Іі-па/чііі на-lä Ιι-'ιΙΙα", two alternatives have 
been omilled by the opponent God is per se speaking and God is speaking "neither 
per se nor by a cause'- In the note al-Abyârî omitted one la from this formula, while in 
the text he suggests to abridge it 
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no longer applicable.234 One also cannot say that God cannot be 
qualified by essential qualities at all since we proved that He is 
qualified by a number of essential qualities. 
"God's speech is either temporal or eternal".235 In 'Abd al-Jabbâr's 
eyes this taqsim is not correct since the temporal speech mentioned 
in this formula is something we know in this world, whereas the 
eternal speech is something entirely different and unknown.236 To 
make such a taqsim correct one first has to know the thing concerned 
and to know that it exists; only then can one ask whether it is 
temporal or eternal; only in such a case this taqsim will be correct.237 
But in fact, the opponents bring together in this taqsim two different 
things which cannot be compared. 
"If it were temporal, it could not exist without a substrate since it 
is an accident and accidents can only inhere in substrates".238 If an 
accident is temporal, it must either inhere in God, or in a substrate, 
or exist without inhering at all. The opponents discuss subsequently 
these three alternatives. 'Abd al-Jabbâr already proved in his treatise 
on God's will that accidents can exist without inhering in a substrate. 
Moreover, when they say that God's speech is different from our 
speech and can be eternal, it can also be an accident different from 
other accidents, and exist without inhering in a substrate Our speech 
cannot exist without inhering in a substrate, but possibly speech that 
is different can 2 3 4 
2 , 4
 In M ugni VII, 152, line 11 read with the manuscript на-1-qa»/ instead of 
fa-l-qan I 
2 3 5
 /мсш VII, 152, line 14 154, line 2 The translation of a sentence from this 
argument by Bauman (The Doctrine of 'Alni al-D/tihhàr 78-79) is not entirely correct, 
this is caused b> a misinterpretation of some words in this sentence and by the fact 
that it is noi complete as we show in our next note 
2i
'' In Muttni VII, 152. line 15 read kalâmih muhdai muitahil instead of kalâmih 
mustahil A correct translation gives "Their establishing that He has an eternal speech 
which is one qualifier since it is not correct to state that His speech is temporal, is 
impossible, for what cannot be said correctly to be temporal (always according to the 
opponents) is the speech we know (by intuition) to be speech, command, and prohibition" 
^ " Here also the translation of Bouman (The Dmlrme of 'Abd al-D/ahhár 78) has 
to be corrected, especially where it adds the word "eternal" temporal and eternal are 
the two ways in which something can be existent (тст/шп 
2 3 8
 Milani VII, 154. Ime 3 I 55. line 9 (at the end also the next part of the opponents' 
argumentation is included) Sec also note 239 
2 3 4
 The text of M ugni VII, 155, lines 1-9 constitutes one long sentence, which is 
structured as follows "namalâqil na-kaijùlik fa-Ian qälqail lam \akun ha\n qanlih 
\\a-ha\n má qálíih fa\l " In this way the alternative we discuss here and the next one 
are grammatically connected This interpretation of the text supposes that one reads in 
4ugni VU. 155, line 3 tala'allaqûn instead of •¡ata'allaqûn and that the addition of the 
conjunction η« in Mugiii VII, 155, line 7, made b) al-Abyârî, should not be made 
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"If it were temporal, it could not inhere in God since God is not 
a substrate in which accidents can inhere".240 The speech we know 
in this world cannot inhere in God, but possibly speech that is different 
from this speech can inhere in Him, as, according to the opponents, 
also God's knowledge inheres in Him, though they may use another 
term to indicate this inhering.241 
"If it were temporal, it could not inhere in a substrate since in that 
case this substrate— or the totality of which it is a part—must have 
a name derived from that speech".242 This thesis of his opponents is 
discussed by 'Abd al-Jabbâr in detail since here his own doctrine 
evidently is attacked. 
'Abd al-Jabbâr begins by attacking his opponents; they give one 
argument to refute his opinion, but he gives many arguments to refute 
their opinion ; since the refutation of both opinions would lead to the 
conclusion that God has no speech at all, one of these opinions must 
be correct. When comparing the arguments against both opinions, 
'Abd al-Jabbâr concludes that his own opinion must be correct.243 
Next 'Abd al-Jabbâr makes some remarks on the doctrine of the 
opponents that God's speech would be eternal. The only manner to 
establish God's speech is by establishing speech as we know it in this 
world and proving that the way it occurs makes it impossible for 
beings which are able by an ability. There is no other way to establish 
God's speech, and this makes it impossible that His speech is eternal. 
Moreover, this eternal speech must, according to the opponents, be 
reproduced in letters. Since reproduction and reproduced must be 
similar, and something eternal cannot be similar to letters, God's 
speech cannot be eternal.244 
After attacking his opponents directly in this way, 'Abd al-Jabbâr 
also refutes the argument they gave to attack his doctrine. He does so 
in a number of separate arguments.245 Some qualities are caused 
2 4 0
 MugniVU, 155. lines 4-9. 
2
' " This argument is mentioned in Sarh 559. The opponents иье the term qâ'im hi 
instead of hall hi 
2 4 2
 Mugnl VII, 155, line 10 - 162, line 3 This part of the argumentation receives 
a great deal of attention in the MuhU\ cf. I, 352-354 
2 4 3
 The opponents say that what 'Abd al-Jabbâr actually proved is that the speech 
we know in this world cannot be eternal; therefore, they established a different kind 
of speech which can be eternal 'Abd al-Jabbâr replies that in the same way they only 
prove that speech as we know it in this world cannot inhere in a substrate ; by proving 
this, they never can establish a different kind of speech. 
2 4 4
 In Mugni VII, 156, line 19 read as-siga instead of as-san'a 
2 4 5
 Mugni VII, 157, line 2 - 1 6 2 , line 3 
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by the inhering of a qualifier, others by the subject's being in a state, 
and others again by the fact that the subject made something.246 
Consequently, not every accident gives its substrate a name. 
Moreover, one can never prove the presence or absence of some-
thing by starting from names; first, the realities have to be proved, 
afterwards names can be given. It is possible that the people who gave 
these names were mistaken or had some reason or other not to give 
a certain name, though it was possible, the giving of names being 
a matter of free choice, not of necessity.247 
When we make a comparison with human speech, we notice that the 
tongue, the substrate of speech, is not called "speaking", nor the heart 
by those who say that speech is something in the heart or the soul.248 
Some qualifiers give a name both to the substrate and to the one who 
made it, while others only give it to one of them, according to Abu 
Hâsim.249 When some aspects of a qualifier give a name to its sub-
strate while others do not, it must also be possible that the qualifier 
does not give a name at all.250 Other acts of God give only a name to 
Him; this can also be the case with His speech.251 
The reason why the substrate does not receive a name from the 
speech inhering in it, is that it is perceived together with the speech 
--according' to Abu Ishâq—so that the giving of a name is not 
necessary. Thus, it may be ascribed to some substrate without that 
substrate being qualified by it.252 
The opponents must admit that what 'Abd al-Jabbâr says is correct 
as regards what they call the reproduction or expression of God's 
speech; but in fact, that is God's speech. 
2 4 6
 Cf. for instance, ρ 153 In Mugni VII, 157, line 11 one probably must add the 
negation la before the verb yasiaqq 
2 4
" Cf also Muhit I, 353 
2 4 8
 The opponents cannot make a difference between this world and the other world 
since this would then be possible in the giving of all names The doctrine that 
speech is a qualifier in the soul, has already been refuted 
2 4
' ' According to him the qualifier "sound" (vani) gives a name both to its substrate 
and to the one who makes it 
2 , 0
 In Mugni VII, 161, line 1 one probably has to read ¡lia li-l-fá'il instead of la 
h-l-jail 
2 5 1
 As an example he gives that God is said to be "doing good" (muhsin) by 
creating (bi-kalq instead of yakluq in Mugni VII 161, line 4) bodies, such as instruments 
and possessions, whereas nobody else is qualified by it 
In Mugni VII, 161, line 6 add with the manuscript the preposition /Î before 
al-iïnqâq This makes the addition of ilâ an, which is made by al-Abyârî, superfluous 
2 5 2
 In Mugni VII, 161, line 17 one probably must add the negation ma before 
и asa/û 
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When it іь possible that some qualifiers give two names to the same 
substrate (blackness, for instance, gives it the names coloured and 
black), it is possible that other qualifiers do not give any name at 
all to their substrate 
With all these short arguments 'Abd al-Jabbâr proved that the 
argument of his opponents to exclude this alternative is not correct, 
and that God can be speaking by temporal speech inhering in a 
substrate 
"It even must be called by its most specific qualifications", and 
these qualifications are speech, command, and prohibition 2 5 3 We 
know from our experience that this is not true, substances are called 
"moving" though this is not the most specific qualification of move-
ment 2 5 4 Moreover, the word speech too docs not belong to the most 
characteristic descriptions since command and prohibition are more 
characteristic than speech But this again is a question of terminology 
and of words, by which nothing at all can be proved about the 
reality 2 5 5 
Finally, 'Abd al-Jabbâr compares speech with writing the substrate 
of writing does not receive any name from the writing inhering in 
it, and even if it were called "combined" (mujtami), this surely is not 
the most characteristic qualification of writing 
The third argument256 
The opponents state that God, if He had become speaking after He 
was not, would need an instrument, which implies257 that He is a 
body 'Abd al-Jabbâr replies that we need an instrument, not because 
we become speaking after we were not, but because we have to use the 
substrate of our ability in acting since we are able by an ability. God 
is essentially able and cannot need an instrument If it were necessary 
for the act itself that the substrate of an ability is used, God could not 
act at all in eternity through lack of such a substrate 
2 5 3
 Mugni VII, 162, line 4 163, line 12 
2 , 4
 In Mugni VII, 162, line 5 the printed text has h-allâ, the manuscript is not very 
clear at this place, we may safely assume that it begins here with h-cmnah, what follows 
is very difficult to decipher, and it even is possible that it is crossed out For sure, 
one may replace Ii-allá by li-annah 
2 5 5
 In Mugni VII, 162, line 16 read with the manuscript ио-/а yamtam' instead of 
и a-lâ yamna' 
2 , 6
 Mugni VII, 163, line 13 164, line 6 
2 5 7
 In Mugni VII, 163, line 16 read with the manuscript yûpb instead of aityaA 
GOD IS SPbAKING BY TEMPORAL SPEECH 377 
The fourth argument258 
This argument is ascribed to the Hanâbila, but it is used by the 
As'ariya too;2 5 9 it runs: if the Quran were temporal and created, 
while in the Qur'ân (the word) "God" is found, God, consequently, 
must be temporal and created too. 'Abd al-Jabbâr replies that in the 
Qur'ân God is not really present since His name is entitled to many 
judgements He Himself is not entitled to, and vice versa.260 
When the opponents advocate the general principle "the name is 
the named" (al-ism huw al-musammâ), he replies that it evidently 
is not true, neither with regard to God - since He is one and has many 
names which can be on many tongues—nor with regard to other 
beings—"fire" we pronounce does not burn our mouth .2 6 1 If God's 
name were Him, we could say the same about His acts. Moreover, we 
could also argue that the Qur'ân must be temporal and created 
since262 in it the names of many temporal and created things are 
found. 
The fijth argument263 
In this argument the opponents refer to two verses from the Qur'ân : 
"When He willed something. His command only was that He says 
to it 'Be' (кип), and it will b e " 2 6 4 and "Our word to a thing when we 
will it only is that We say to it 'Be' (кип), and it will b e " . 2 6 5 If 
the Qur'ân and God's speech were created, the word "'кип' would be 
created too, and it would be created by another kun,26b which leads 
2 , 9
 Mugni VII. 164, line 7 165, line 15 See also Sarh 542-544, where 'Abd al-Jabbâr 
also mentions and discusses the arguments of his opponents which they use to prove that 
"a name is the named" They base themselves, for instance, on the formula of an oath, 
where the name of God can be mentioned while God is meant 
2 5 9
 Cf pp 364-365. 
2 6 0
 The correction suggested by al-Abyâri for Mugni VII, 165, line 2 (cf note 1 of that 
page) is preferably not accepted, the original text being better · God's name, like any 
speech, only remains a moment and then falls back into non-existence (it becomes non-
existent in the second moment) In Mugni VII, 165, line 3 read with the manuscript 
kalima instead of kulluh 
2 6 1
 In Mugni VII, 165, line 10 add the negation la between innah and gayruh. This 




 In Mugni VII, 165, line 13 I suggest to delete the word wa before li-ann; 
evidently, the interrogation-mark has to be removed too. 
2 6 3
 Mugni VII, 165. line 16 - 176, line 13, see also Sarh 560-563. Cf. Bouman, 
The Doctrine of 'Abd al-D/abbâr, 82-84. 
2 6 4
 Sural Yâsin, verse 82 
2 6 5
 Sural an-nahl (not an-namt), verse 40. 
2 6 6
 Read in Mugni VII, 165, line 19 bi-kun âkar and not bi-kawn äkar. 
378 THE QURAN AND GOD'S OTHER SPEECH 
to an endless series. Therefore, one кип must be eternal and uncreated ; 
and from this conclusion one deduces that all God's speech is eternal 
and uncreated. 
'Abd al-Jabbâr's answer is that the expression "that We say to it 
'кип " has to be interpreted as : that We make it be and will its coming 
into existence. He proves his point by five kinds of argument : first, 
he proves that it is not necessary to understand the expression con­
cerned literally; next, he argues that a literal interpretation of the 
text leads to the conclusion that God needs instruments; moreover, 
the literal interpretation and grammatical analysis of this text rather 
leads to the conclusion that God's speech is temporal; then he dis­
cusses the possibility of the existence of such a creative word as кип, 
and finally, he asks his opponents whether God created by the word 
кип itself or by something of which the word кип is a reproduction 
or expression. 
It is not necessary to understand literally this expression "that we 
say to it 'кип' ". To prove this, 'Abd al-Jabbâr refers to a verse from 
the Qur'ân where we read that heaven and earth "say",267 and to 
some examples from the Arabic poetry and other expressions where 
the verb "to say" (qâf) cannot be understood literally.268 
A literal interpretation of the expressions concerned leads to the 
conclusion that God must use the word кип as an instrument in 
producing things, while we, human beings, who normally need instru­
ments in acting while God does not, do not need the word кип as an 
instrument in producing.2 6 9 One cannot object that God does not 
produce by (Ы-), but at ('ind) the word кип, since in that case there is 
no evident connection between that word and the things produced 
by God. 
'Abd al-Jabbâr also gives a taqsîm : if someone states that God 
produces "at" the word кип, he has to admit that this word is either 
eternal or temporal ; when it is eternal, it corresponds with His ability 
and will in as far as God produces by it; when it is temporal, it is 
either said at everything God produces—and that makes it to be 
useless and evil when there is not yet something which can hear it— 
or it is only said at the production of some things and not at the 
2 6 7
 Sural fussilat, verse 11. 
2 6 8
 Cf. Sarh 561-562, where some examples are mentioned in which the verb qâl 
is used to indicate quickness of response 
2 6 9
 Mugni VII, 166, line 14 - 167, line 15 
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production of other things—and this is in contradiction with the 
literal interpretation of the verse from the Qur'ân. 
An analysis of the two verses from the Qur'ân used by the opponents 
in their argumentation leads to the conclusion that 'Abd al-Jabbâr's 
interpretation of these verses must be correct, and that they indicate 
that God's speech is temporal rather than that it is eternal. 
In this argumentation 'Abd al-Jabbâr uses the verse "Our word to 
a thing when We will it only is that We say to it 'Be' ('кип), and 
it will b e " . 2 7 0 
If this verse were to be taken literally, 2 7 1 we should have to conclude 
that kun is a command, directed by God to the things and imposing 
upon them the duty to produce themselves. The absurdity of this con­
clusion proves that this verse cannot be understood in its literal 
sense.
2 7 2 
Moreover, the opponents' interpretation of this verse seems to imply 
that God has a defect 2 7 3 since the being eternal of this word makes 
it impossible for Him to make His own choice; 'Abd al-Jabbâr's inter-
pretation, on the contrary, implies that this verse praises God for 
His might. The conclusion must be that it is better to accept 'Abd 
al-Jabbâr's interpretation, which makes it a praise of God, than a 
literal understanding implying that it indicates a defect in God.274 
Moreover, a grammatical analysis of this verse leads to the con-
clusion that God's speech is temporal rather than that it is eternal, 
though, according to 'Abd al-Jabbâr, it has to be interpreted in a way 
2 7 0
 Mugni VII, 166, line 14 - 170, Ime 12 The text from the Qur'ân, quoted here, 
is sural an-nahl, verse 40 Cf also Bouman, The Doctrine o/ 'Abd al-Djabbár, 82-83 
See also Éarh 561, where especially the grammatical arguments discussed below are 
mentioned Another argument is given too, which as such is not found in the Mugni 
if God's word кип were to have an influence on the coming into existence of His acts. 
our word кип would have a similar influence upon the coming into existence of our 
acts 
2 7 1
 The addition al-kalq in Mugni VII, 167,line 14, made by al-Abyâri, is not correct, 
no addition at all is necessary, since the sentence indicates that the verse in its totality 
—or the word кип—is understood literally, if one wants to add something for clarity's 
sake, it will be better to add an yaqûl Iah кип 
2 7 2
 For, either they can obey, which implies that they can produce bodies (which is 
not the case since God alone can do so), or they cannot obey and God commands 
something the subject addressed cannot do, and this leads to the conclusion that His 
command is evil (cf note 269 on ρ 88 The translation made by Bouman (The 
Doctrine of 'Abd al-Djabbâr, 83) is not entirely intelligible and needs some correction 
2 7 3
 In Mugni VII, 168, line 6 read an-naqs instead of al-ba'd 
2 7 4
 The correction of ikrâjah into akrajah in Mugni VII, 168, line 9, which is 
suggested by al-Abyâri, does not fit into the grammatical context of the sentence 
(fa-¡dâ awjab hamluhum ikrâjah . ), and has to be rejected 
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that it does not indicate at all that God has speech, let alone that it 
indicates that this speech has a certain quality. Five of these gram-
matical arguments are mentioned by 'Abd al-Jabbâr : 
First : God's word кип is made dependent upon His will; His being 
willing is introduced by the conjunction "when" (idâ); this conjunction 
cannot indicate something remaining that also was before; it can only 
indicate something that comes into being, and it is mostly used to 
indicate the future. Consequently, the will and also the word кип 
must be temporal. 
Second : we proved that God's will is temporal; in this verse God's 
word кип is linked with His will and so must be temporal too. 
Third : the use of the conjunction "that" {an) with the present tense 
indicates, according to a general agreement of the linguists, the 
future. 
Fourth : the form "we say" {naqûl) indicates, according to some 
linguists, the future; according to others, either future or present; 
both suppose that the thing mentioned comes into existence. 
Fifth : the conjunction "and" used here (the Arabic "/a") indicates 
that what is mentioned after it immediately follows what is mentioned 
before; in fact, the "being" of the things immediately, in the very 
next moment, must follow the word кип. This is not possible if кип 
were eternal. 2 7 5 From these arguments one might deduce that God's 
creative word кип is temporal ; 'Abd al-Jabbâr does not do that since 
he denies the possibility of such a creative word. 
An eternal creative word кип is not possible.2^6 Such a word would 
be necessitating (mûjib) the things to come into existence. The assump-
tion that God creates by such an eternal necessitating word, leads to 
a number of absurd conclusions : 
all things produced would be eternal, since they all are linked with 
an eternal necessitating word;277 
we know three ways in Which something can necessitate something 
else : first, by being its ΊΙΙα, but this necessitates a state, which here 
^ ' According to 'Abd al-Jabbâr. we would find between what is eternal and what 
is temporal an endless amount of moments, if there were moments before the creation. 
'Abd al-Jabbâr does not use this verse as an argument to prove that God's speech 
is temporal He only tries to refute the argument used by his opponents 
2 7 6
 Mui-ni VII, 170. line 13 - 172, line 19 
27
" When the necessitating cause and the necessitated effect can exist together, 
they must exist together, only when they cannot exist together, the effect must come 
into being the moment just after the disappearance of the cause this is the case of 
reflection generating knowledge or one pressure generating another pressure 
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is not the case; moreover, it causes without delay, which leads to the 
conclusion that an eternal 'ilia causes an eternal ma lui; second, by 
generating at the moment itself the cause becomes cause; this would 
lead to the conclusion that the bodies would be eternal if God's creative 
Word were eternal ; third, the cause generates the moment just after its 
own existence : this is not possible in eternity and there is no reason 
for such a delay;278 
since there would be no reason why this word would necessitate 
at one moment and not at another moment, it would either necessitate 
in all eternity or necessitate never;279 
no earlier and later would be possible in the production of things; 
there would be no reason why only a given amount of things would 
be produced and not more (or less); 
no addition or reduction would be possible afterwards so that God 
could not be called "able" (qâdir). 
From all these arguments one can deduce that God cannot possibly 
bring the things into existence by an eternal creative word. 
Finally, 'Abd al-Jabbâr asks his opponents whether they assume 
that God produces things by a word кип, as we know it in this world, or 
by something else of which this word кип is said to be a reproduction 
or expression.280 If they say that God creates by the word кип itself, 
'Abd al-Jabbâr replies that, if it were eternal, it could not have this 
outward form.281 Nor would there be a reason why it would be "кип" 
and not "пик". If they were to say that only the first letter, the "kâf\ 
is eternal while the second letter, the "nun", is temporal, they cannot 
constitute together one word.282 Morover, the question then becomes : 
how did the nun come into existence, by the kâf (which is against the 
2
"' In M ugni VII. 172. line 1 read tû/ibahâ instead of nùiihahâ. the subject of this verb 





 In M ugni VII, 172. line 6 read bi-aimah instead of fa-umah 
21,0




r e d C iy discussed similar subjects when dealing with the impossibility of 
speech being a substance or being remaining Cf ρ 303 In Sarh 560, 'Abd al-Jabbâr 
makes concrete what he says here in the Mugm if this word were eternal, there could 
be no earlier or later, which is necessary to constitute this word, the kâf could not fall 
into non-existence to make the nun to come into being after it, one could not come 
forward with the same word afterwards In Sì ugni VII, 173, line 7 the word la'alâ, 
which is found in the printed text, was crossed out in the manuscript since the 
word al-qadim used here docs not apply to God alone, but to everything eternal, 
everything one might suppose to be eternal 
2 Я 2
 Read in M ugni VII, 173, line 16 hi-sigci instead of hi-sifa, which form is found 
in the manuscript and the printed text 
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literal meaning of the verse), by a кип (which gives the same difficulty 
concerning the nun of that word), or by something else (and then 
they leave the literal understanding of the verse).2 8 3 
If they say that God creates the things by something else of which 
our word кип is a reproduction or expression, 'Abd al-Jabbâr asks 
them which indication they find in the verse concerned to assume 
a reference to such an eternal thing2 8 4 of which, moreover, the word 
кип would be a reproduction or expression. Evidently, this verse in 
itself cannot be used as an argument. 2 8 5 
When they try to escape the assumption of an endless series of кип 
by saying that things are not created by кип but by something of which 
кип is an expression, 'Abd al-Jabbâr replies that they in that case 
leave the literal understanding of this verse and that they, therefore, 
cannot prohibit him to do the same. 'Abd al-Jabbâr's interpretation, 
moreover, is the more logical one since it corresponds with what we 
know about the reality in this world.286 
The sixth argument287 
This argument resembles the first one discussed by 'Abd al-Jabbâr, 
but is more general in its wording. It says that God must be speaking 
since He is perfect and every defect has to be denied about Him. 
For the refutation of this argument 'Abd al-Jabbâr refers mainly 
to the things he already mentioned in his refutation of the first 
argument. Moreover, one can say that the assumption that God 
would be speaking in all eternity implies a defect, since speaking is 
useless when there is nobody who can hear it and take some profit 
from it.288 
283
 In MugniVU, 173, line 20 read yakûn instead of bi-kawn; in M ugni VU, 174, line 3 
read yukaHHinuha instead of hi-kun bi-há 
2 8 4
 In M ugni VII, 174, line 10 read with the manuscript 'ala before annah 
285
 In Mugni VII. 174. line 20 the addition \\a-hu\\ suggested by al-Abyârî is 
grammatically not correct, the sentence running "wa-an \akun dikruh la-lid 'abat 
(or better 'abatan) " When the opponents say that they establish this other eternal 
speech by another argument, 'Abd al-Jabbâr replies that the mention of this text 
from the Qur'ân is useless since it does not prove anything at all 
286
 In Mugni VII, 175, line 7 read with the manuscript la instead of /ait, in 
Mugni VII, 175, line 9 read with the manuscript fi-hâ (sc in the verse) instead of 
fi-himâ 
287
 Mugni VII, 175, line 14 - 176, line 5 Cf Muhit I, 354 
288
 The last argument is the only one mentioned in Muhit I, 354. 
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The seventh argument289 
This argument is ascribed in the Sarh to the Hanâbila, but it was 
used by al-As'ari and al-Bâqillânî too. To prove that God's speech and 
the Qur'ân are not created, two texts from the Qur'ân are quoted : 
"Has He not the creation and the command?"290 and "Ar-Rahmân 
taught the Qur'ân and created man".291 From the way in which God's 
speech is mentioned, separately from something created or the creation, 
the opponents deduce that it is not created. 
'Abd al-Jabbâr replies first that, if a literal interpretation of these 
verses as they explain them does indicate anything, it indicates that 
the Qur'ân we know in this world is uncreated; the opponents deny 
this. But their argumentation in itself is not valid, as appears when 
we treat in the same way other texts from the Qur'ân; it is clear 
that one can mention something separately without indicating that it 
is something else; one may do that for some purpose. An analysis of 
these verses also elucidates why they cannot base themselves upon 
them; the expression "He has the command" means that He made it; 
the word "awr", here rendered by "command", is also used to indicate 
some other act; one cannot base oneself on these two verses, while 
many other texts say that God's command is temporal;292 according 
to some theologians there is a difference between "creation" {kalq) and 
"created" (maklûq),291 the expression "ar-Rahmân taught the Qur'ân" 
indicates that it is temporal, and when we want to glorify God by it, it 
must indicate that He and not someone else produced and made it.294 
The eighth argument295 
Being speaking characterizes a living being; the qualities of a living 
being which do not indicate a defect must be used for God, since 
He is entitled to them in eternity. 
2
"* Mugni VII, 176, line 6 - 1 7 8 , line 7 СГ Sarh 544-545. 
2 9 0
 Sural al-a'râ/, verse 54 
2 , 1
 Sural ar-Rahmân, verses 1-3 
292
 Cf ρ 351, where some of these texts have already been mentioned 
2 9 3
 We already saw that for 'Abd al-Jdbbär there is no such difference of meaning, 
just as there is no difference between the words /77 (act) and maj'ûl (made) 
2 9 4
 According to the text of the Sarh one can only leach something temporal, 
according to the Mugni the ta'zim (making great) of God supposes that He produced 
it Himself 
2 9 5
 Mugni VII, 178, line 8 179, line 7 
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To this argument 'Abd al-Jabbâr replies that speaking indicates that 
the subject made speech; since this is not possible in eternity, God 
cannot be speaking in eternity. God is entitled to some of His 
positive qualities because of His essence, and this implies that He 
is so in eternity; but to other positive qualities He is entitled since 
He made something by which He deserves praise. To these qualities 
He cannot be entitled in eternity. We already saw that the quality 
speaking belongs to the second category.296 
The ninth argument291 
This last argument also states that it would be a defect when God 
were not speaking in eternity. The difference is that this argument 
starts from the assumption that in this world speech is a qualifier in 
the soul. 
'Abd al-Jabbâr replies that he has proved in much detail that 
speech is not a qualifier in the soul so that the starting-point of this 
argument is not correct. 
2 9 6
 Cf pp 327-329 
2 9 7
 MugniWl, 179, lines 8-21 
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Speech belongs to the genus sound and consists in arranged letters. 
it is not a qualifier in the human interior Only the living being who 
actually made speech is entitled to the quality "speaking", he is 
entitled to it because he made it 
Since God made speech of the same kind as the speech human beings 
make, He is entitled to the quality "speaking", He is neither essen-
tially speaking, nor by eternal speech, nor by speech different from 
human speech 
What remains to be done in this last paragraph, is to apply the 
general principle that God's acts must be good (hasan), and draw 
the conclusions for His speech God's speech, about which 'Abd 
al-Jabbâr proved in much detail that it cannot be but His act, must 
be good speech 
In the discussions of this subject we follow again 'Abd al-Jabbâr's 
argumentation as we find it in the Mugni - the Muhit runs parallel 
with it — after discussing the being good of God's speech 'Abd 
al-Jabbâr discusses in two appendices the relation between our 
reproduction of God's speech and His speech as He made it Himself, 
and the question whether His speech can be called "created" {maklûq) 
In a short final chapter he resumes some of his conclusions ' 
1. GOD'S SPEECH IS COMMUNICATIVE 
Arriving at the central question of his discussions on God's speech, 
'Abd al-Jabbâr first, before dealing with the conditions that have to 
be fulfilled in order that God's speech be really good, recapitulates 
what he already said before about the way in which we can distinguish 
God's speech, and know that speech we hear is really His speech 2 
This speech must occur with such a purity of language and such an 
eloquence of style {fasâha wa-balâga) as is not found among the real 
Arabs, who are the masters of language. When someone in whom 
1
 For the structure of the Mugni, Sarh, and Muhit pp 279-291 
2
 Mugm VII, 180-181 (chapter 18 of Mugni VII), cf Muhit I, 337 'Abd al-Jabbâr 
discussed this before the long treatise on the doctrines of his opponents, cf pp 338-340 
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this speech appears claims to be a prophet and states that this speech 
is God's speech, it must be true. 
Next, 'Abd al-Jabbâr comes to the question of how God's speech 
can be good.3 Speech, to be good, must be useful for someone who 
benefits by it. This may be either the speaking person himself or some-
one else. The speaking person may benefit by his own speech since 
it can help him memorize a text, prevent him from forgetting it, or 
habituate him to perform what he says. Someone else may benefit by 
it if this speech communicates him something that is useful for him. 
Only in these two ways can speech be good.4 
It is evident that God's speech cannot be useful for Himself in one 
of the ways mentioned above; consequently, to be good His speech 
must be communicative {mufid) and communicate to some hearing 
subject something the knowledge of which is useful for him.5 
The principle that God's speech must be communicative leads to two 
conclusions : 
First, since we cannot know by necessary knowledge what God wills 
by His speech, we have to know this by acquired knowledge; since, 
moreover, God cannot make gestures to elucidate the meaning of 
His speech, we can only know what it means by this speech itself.6 
This implies that He must speak in a language which is already known 
and which, consequently, must be made by convention {muwâdaa) 
between men.7 As a consequence, at least one language is not made 
by God; when human beings made one language by convention, God 
can teach them all other languages through the one they made. 'Abd 
al-Jabbâr rejects the absolute "tawqîf' (God made Himself all lan-
3
 To this subject "Abd al-Jabbâr devotes two chapters, both of them very short 
Mugni VII, 182-186 (chapters 19 and 20), cf Muhit I, 337-340 and Sarh 528 and 530-531 
4
 'Abd al-Jabbâr gives some examples to prove this statement if speech were not 
communicative, it would be like making sound (tasnit), like speech that cannot be 
understood since no convention about it is made, like speaking to someone in a language 
he does not know, there could be no command, prohibition, or information in it 
Mugni VII, 182, cf Muhit I, 338-339 
5
 One cannot turn this argument the other way round and say that what is 
communicative is per se good, one also has to exclude the other "aspects" (ии/û/i) that 
can make an act evil, as, for instance, lying Moreover, if God were lying, this would 
make His speech cease to be communicative since it would become unreliable 
' God cannot communicate it by other acts, nor by speech in general or a form 
in which it occurs, He only can do so by the speech itself This implies that this 
speech is in itself communicative, which supposes a conventional language 
7
 Mugni VII, 182-183 See also what we already said on pp 304-305 about mufid 
and munâda'a 
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guages) and is an adherent of the theory of "muwâdaa" (man comes 
to a convention and in this way makes a language).8 
Another consequence is that God's speech has to be interpreted 
according to the rules of that convention, the rules of the language.9 
If God's speech has no context (qarina), it must be interpreted according 
to the rules of languages; if it has a context, it must be interpreted 
in that context. In matters of revelation we first have to try to interpret 
the text concerned against the background of the entire revelation; 
if this is not possible, we have to use linguistic arguments in the inter-
pretation ; if this too does not lead to a result, and there are indications 
that it has to be interpreted metaphorically, we have to interpret it 
according to those indications. 
Second, God can only speak when there is someone who can hear 
His speech and benefit by i t I 0 (and a substrate in which it can inhere l i). 
Otherwise, His speech would be useless and, consequently, evil. 
If the question is asked at which moment God made the Qur'ân,12 
one can answer basing oneself on human intuition ('aqf) that He must 
have made it either at the moment He sent it down to His prophet or 
before that moment, but not before making someone who can hear 
it and benefit by it. Revelation narrows the conclusions reached by 
reflection upon the intuition, by stating that God created it before He 
sent it down. 
8
 For a survey of the discussions between Muslims about the origin of language and 
a description of the various positions adopted, see Bernard G Weiss, Medieval Muslim 
Discussions of the Origin of Language, ZDMG 124 (1974), 33-41 Besides the "conven-
tionalist" view (first advanced by Abu Hâsim, who in this respect was followed by 'Abd 
al-Jabbâr) and the "revelationist" one (the tawqif, adhered to by both Abu 'Ali and 
al-A5"ari), the author mentions—following the use of Islamic handbooks—a "naturalist", 
a "revelatiomst-conventionalist", and a "non-committal" theory. He points to the 
connection between the doctrines of the etermfy or createdness of the Qur'ân and God's 
speech on the one hand and the theories about the origin of language on the other, 
this connection was brought to an end by the later AS'ariya, who redefined God's 
speech and made it "an abstract quality inhering in the divine nature" (p 41) 
9
 Mugnî VII, 185-186 (chapter 20) 'Abd al-Jabbâr himself states that he restricts 
himself in this chapter to some remarks on the subject, and that he will deal with it later 
in the course of his work 
10
 Mugni VII, 184 and also the last chapter of this part of the Mugni (VII, 224). 
See also Muhh I, 337-338 
11
 This argument, which falls outside the present context but is also used to prove 
that God cannot have created the Qur'ân before all other things, is only mentioned in the 
Muhit (I, 338) 
12
 Muhit I, 337-338, see also Mugni VII, 224 
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2. THE REPRODUCTION OF GOD'S SPEECH 
The reason why 'Abd al-Jabbâr comes to speak about the relation 
between reproduction and reproduced (al-hikâya wa-1-mahkí) ' 3 is the 
disagreement among Muslims, and even among Mu'tazila, about the 
question whether what we hear in this world is really God's speech or 
something else that has the same form as His speech.14 
In this way it also becomes clear what 'Abd al-Jabbâr understands 
by this reproduction; God's speech and the Qur'ân, which have been 
discussed until now, are for him the audible speech God Himself made 
and which cannot remain What we hear in this world, what the angel 
revealed to Muhammad, and what we recite ourselves is a reproduction 
of God's speech. When this reproduction is called by Muslims "the 
Qur'ân" and "God's speech", 'one must look for the relationship 
between this reproduction and what is reproduced, sc, the speech God 
once made. 
Abu 'Ali is said to have adhered successively to two different theories.15 
First, he supported the opinion that the reproduction is identical with 
the reproduced. The reproduced being the letters alone, which ac-
cording to him can remain, it can be linked with something else,16 
sound, writing, or memory, and in this way exist in many places, even 
at one and the same moment in one and the same place, since sound, 
writing, and memory do not exclude one another.17 Consequently, 
13
 Mugni VII. 187-207 (chapter 21) Cf Wuhit I, 341-344 and Sa>h 551 See also 
'Abd dl-Karîm 'Utmân, Nazarhat at-takñf, 239-240 For a list of some opinions (prior 
to 'Abd al-Jabbâr), sec dl-AÇ'arî, Maqâlàt, 193-194 The structure of this chapter is 
rather simple having discussed the doctrines of, successively, Abu 'Ali and Abu Hâsim 
with their arguments, he concludes by describing his own doctrine 
F-or the translation of the term hikma, sec. for instance. Watt, Fórmame Period, 
284, who renders it as "imitation or rather reproduction" We use the English term 
"imitation" to translate the Arabic word ihlidä 
, 4
 CI" Muhii I, 341 
и
 Mugni VII 187, line 3 191, line 14 deals with Abu 'All's theories Both in the 
Mugni and in the Muhit 'Abd al-Jabbâr states that the information about the two 
theories of Abu 'AH comes from his son Abu Häsim According to 4ugm VII, 191 and 
Muhit I, 341, the same doctrine as Abu 'Ali held first was propagated by Abu 
1-Hudayl and his followers 
16
 The word hi-garnh. mentioned by al-Abyârî in a note in Mugni VII, 187, belongs 
in the text (line 6 after h-'a\mh) notwithstanding the fact that at the end of the line it 
is written above the other words, this is not unusual 
'^ In Mugni VII, 187, line 9 read lâkinn instead of ¡i-kadib (the manuscript is not easy 
to read) Abu 'Alî compares speech with substances, which can be in different places 
"by something else", but since these "something else" are opposite and exclude each 
other, a substance cannot be at one and the same moment in different places The 
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what we pronounce, write, or memorize is really the act of the 
subject who originally (ibtidaan) made it, and whose speech we intend 
to reproduce; it is linked with sound, writing, or memory, which are 
produced by the reproducing subject. 
To prove this, Abu 'Ali gives four arguments : 
first, if it really were the act of the reproducing person, he could make 
something similar to it, for instance, something similar to the Qur'ân 
or to a poem of Imru' al-Qays; 
second, the Qur'ân 18 and the Ijmâ' (consensus of the Muslims) tell 
us that what we hear is really God's speech ; 
third, the Qur'ân cannot be evil, but the recitation can be evil; this 
implies that there is a difference between the recitation (the sounds) 
and what is recited (the letters); 
fourth, since human beings would be able to produce something 
similar to the Qur'ân, the Qur'ân would not be inimitable and the 
prophet could not challenge the unbelieving Arabs to make something 
similar to it. 
In this first period, the presence of the reproduced speech in the 
reproduction was for Abu 'Ali dependent upon the intention of the 
subject to reproduce or not. In a second period he discovered that the 
intention can have no influence upon the relation between a cause 
(sabab) and its effect.19 Therefore, the intention to reproduce cannot 
prevent that the organism of speech really produces letters, just as it 
does when such an intention is not present. Abu 'Ali comes to the 
conclusion that in the case of reproducing we find in the reproduction 
both the speech (and for him speech is letters) of the reproducing subject 
and the speech of the subject whose speech is reproduced. We can 
summarize this by saying that the reproduction is the reproduced plus 
speech of the reproducing person. 
'Abd al-Jabbâr concludes that, though Abu 'Ali maintains that the 
second theory is based upon the first one, the arguments given to 
prove the first one contradict the second one;20 consequently, both 
theories have to be rejected. 
"something else" by which speech is in difTerent places knows no mutual exclusion. 
so that speech can be at one and the same moment in different places 
19
 The text quoted is шга/ al-lmtba. verse 6 "Grant him asylum so that he may 
hear God's speech" 
" In M ugni VII, 188, Ime 19 read miisabhab instead of sabab 
2 0
 One would be able to produce something similar to God's speech, the thesis 
is not in correspondence with the Qur'ân and the Consensus, which do not admit that 
what is heard is both God's speech and human speech, the reproduction can be e\il, 
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But, since the four arguments mentioned above can also be used 
against 'Abd al-Jabbâr's own doctrine, he has to show that they are 
not correct and cannot be used against him. 
The first argument : 'Abd al-Jabbâr replies that one can only produce 
something similar by way of imitation, not by producing it originally. 
To show that this is true, he compares it with weaving, building,21 
and writing; as a consequence of Abu 'AH's theory we even could not 
make speech at all, since every word we produce is in some way or 
other a reproduction of what the Arabs made. 
The second argument : to this one he replies that the expression 
"God's speech" (kalâm Allah) means that God produced it, but it is 
also used for a reproduction of the speech He made. 
The third argument :22 what is similar to something good (the 
Qur'ân God made), nevertheless can be evil (our reproduction of 
the Qur'ân). 
The fourth argument : the inimitability of the Qur'ân and the 
challenge to produce something similar are concerned only with the 
production of something similar originally and not reproducing or 
imitating. 
Abu Hâsim.23 For Abu Hâsim, who disagrees about this subject with 
his father Abu 'Ali, the reproduction is not the reproduced, for speech 
is only sound, what is heard from a reproducing subject is his act, and 
no difference can be made between the recitation (qiräa · the sound) 
and the recited text (maqru : the letters).24 Since speech is sound, 
it cannot remain or exist m more places. Since speech is sound, writing 
the Qur'ân would not be inimitable, the challenge by the prophet would be impossible 
Cf M ugni VII, 189 
2
 ' In Miign! VII, 189, line 17 read al-bäni instead of al-tâni 
22
 In the Mugni first the fourth argument is treated and afterwards the third one 
We changed the order to adapt it to the order in which Abu 'AH's arguments were given 
first 
23
 Cf Wmfwi VII, 191, line 14 200, line 23, cf also Muhii I, 341 The same doctrine 
was propagated by other Mu'tajila, as both Ja'far's, Abu Ja'far al-Iskâfî (Mugni VII, 
191). Abu 1-Qâsim al-Balkî and the Iksidîya (Muhii I, 341) (For the Iksîdîya Ibn 
al-Murtadâ, Tabaqál al-Mutazila. 100, 107, and 114-115) 
2
* The distinction between reproduction and reproduced (hikáva and mahki) is not 
the same one as the one between recitation and recited (qiraa and maqru") To emphasi7c 
the difference one can say thai in the reproduction (hikáya) one can distinguish between 
the recitation and the recited, if one wants to make a difference—as Abu 'Ali does— 
between what comes from the reproducing subject in the reproduction and what comes 
from the subject whose text is reproduced Consequently, for Abu 'Ali reproduction is 
identical with reproduced and recitation is different from recited, for Abu Hâsim the 
reproduction is not the reproduced and recitation is the recited 
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can only be a sign (amara) of speech, memory only the knowledge 
how speech was and how it was arranged. 
To prove this, Abu Hâsim gives ten arguments, numbered in the 
M ugni from one to ten. 
First : speech is nothing else but sound since speech cannot occur 
without articulated sounds and sounds articulated in a certain way 
cannot occur without speech. We already saw this before. Three 
objections, stating that either letters or sounds are entitled to judge-
ments the others are not entitled to, are refuted.25 
Second : speech is nothing else but sound since speech is perceived 
by hearing and something written or memorized cannot be perceived 
in that way. Two objections, stating that speech is not perceptible or 
that it is only perceptible when linked with sound, are refuted.26 
Third : there is no real difference between speech that is made 
originally and speech that is made by way of reproduction, since what 
is heard is the act of the speaking subject alone. The secondary cause 
being necessitating (mûjib), intention, free choice, or knowledge cannot 
have any influence on its generating its effect. Therefore, reproduction 
contains only one speech, the speech of the reproducing subject.27 
Fourth : there can be no speech in writing; since similar secondary 
causes generate similar effects and the intention can have no influence 
upon this generating, and since the written signs for some letters are 
25
 This argument i& given in Mugni VII, 192. line 1-193, line 13, cf also our 
ρ 301 First objection the delicacy of the voice and purely of the throat appear 
in the sound, not in speech Answer the letters are also described in this way, 
moreover, one must not base oneself on names and words but on the reality, and there 
sounds and speech are not different Second objection sound is one genus, speech arc 
more genera Answer Abu Hâsim says that sounds and letters correspond in the way 
they are similar to each other and exclude one another 'Abd al-Jabbàr proved this 
by a comparison with colours (cf pp 315-316) The division into genera does not add 
something to this Third objection letters can be moving or immobile, sounds cannot 
Answer this also is a question of names, of terminology Letters are not really moving or 
immobile, these terms only indicate that something is or is not added to it (we would 
say a vocal is or is not added to the consonant) 
26
 This argument is given in Mugni VU, 193, line 14 194, line II First objection 
speech is not heard, only sound is heard Answer this does not correspond with 
perception, where we perceive the difference between two letters just as we perceive 
the difference between two sounds Second objection speech is only heard when it is 
linked with sound (Read in Mugni VII, 194, line 1 vuqârm instead of vu/ânq) Answer 
no such condition is possible in perceiving, onl) the things concerned have to be existent, 
but existence is not something linked with it 
27
 Mugni VII, 194, line 12 - 195, line 4 Objection in the reproduction we also find 
the speech of the person whose speech is reproduced Answer there is no difference 
at all in what we hear 
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similar in the old Arabic writing system, they cannot be the cause of 
different letters; one has to know the convention before being able to 
read it.28 
Fifth : there can be no speech in writing. A written letter consisting 
of many dots, one may ask by which dot the real letter is generated. 
If it is the first one or the last one, the remainder of the written letter is 
superfluous. Nor can one say that all dots together generate the letter, 
since one secondary cause (sabab) can only generate one effect, and one 
effect cannot be generated by more secondary causes.29 One cannot 
say that the first dot 3 0 generates the real letter, but that the remainder 
is also necessary either to make the generating possible or to make 
the written letter a sign, since such a condition is not possible in 
generating; it is possible for a sign, but this leads to the conclusion 
that a written letter is really a sign, which is denied by the opponents. 
This argument is based on the supposition that a real letter is one 
thing, not consisting in parts, whereas the written letter consists of 
many dots 
Sixth : there can be no speech in writing. To generate speech, writing 
has to come into existence, but we already saw that writing does not 
always come into existence.31 Moreover, if the letters were to come 
into existence on the paper by the moving of the pen and its pressure 
on the paper, they also would come into existence when someone 
writes without using ink; if the letters were to come into existence 
in the ink, one could write on a surface of water too.32 Consequently, 
no speech comes into existence, writing only is a sign. 
Seventh : there can be no speech in writing. Speech becomes com-
municative by coming into existence in a certain order; writing can be 
communicative too when its totality comes into existence at one and 
the same moment, or when it comes into existence in the inverse 
order.33 
29
 Mugni VII, 195, lines 5-13 In Mugni VII, 195, Ime 8, add after ilayh the word 
ar-ra, which is missing both in the manuscript and in the printed text 
" Mugni VII, 195, line 14 - 196, line 8 In Mugni VII, 195, line 17 read with the 
manuscript an âkinh instead of na-äkinh This argument is based on the principle 
that one cause only has one effect, just as one ability has only one maqdûr and vice 
versa 
30
 In Mugni VII, 196, line 3 delete на-l-âkir, found in the manuscript and the printed 
text, since it does not fit, qua meaning and grammatically, into the structure of this 
sentence 
31
 Cf note 155 on ρ 357 
3 2
 Mugni VII, 196. line 9 197, line 21 
3 3
 Mugni VII. 189, lines 1-9 
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Eighth there can be no speech in writing In speech every letter 
needs its own specially structured substrate, in writing some letters 
need one and the same structure in the same writing system, and one 
letter needs different structures in different writing systems If speech 
does not need specially structured substrates, such as throat and 
tongue, any sign can be said to be linked with speech 3 4 
Ninth the reproduction is not the reproduced 35 If we reproduce 
the speech of two subjects, there is no reason why the speech present 
would be the speech of one of them, so it must be the speech of both 
of them, and the letters must be double and stronger than speech 
we made originally or we reproduced from only one subiect Since 
there are only single letters, we could not reproduce the speech of two 
subjects Abu Hâsim36 also proved this by a taqsîm when we make 
a child repeat a verse that is used both by the poet Imru' al-Qays and 
by Tarafa without telling him who made it, whose speech will be 
present in the child's recitation of the verse9 It cannot be the speech 
of both of them, since that leads to the assumption that two subjects 
produce one and the same act If it is the speech of one of them, there 
must be a reason why it is the speech of the one poet and not of the 
other It cannot be the one whom the teaching person had in mind, 
for he can have someone else in mind, or himself, or none of them, 
or even both, this would imply that, if he has the one in mind and 
the child intends to reproduce the speech of the other, the child would 
not be able to do that Neither can it be the one whom the child 
intends, since the child does not know whose it is and does not intend 
to reproduce Thus, no alternative is left, and we must conclude that 
the reproduction cannot be the reproduced 
Tenth the reproduction is not the reproduced, for this would imply 
that God and we could not make speech, since He and we always 
reproduce speech that was already made by the old Arabs who made 
their convention on the Arabic language 37 
34
 Mugm VII, 198, line 10 - 199, line 6 The letters are difTerent according to the 
exact place in throat or mouth where they are articulated In the old Arabic writing 
system, there was no difference, for instance, between the m and the zâ', the säd 
and the dad, the sin and the ún (these examples are mentioned by 'Abd al-Jabbâr others 
may be added), in two different writing systems (the Arabs knew different systems for 
different purposes) the same letter can have a different form 
3 5
 This argument (Mugni VII, 199, line 7 - 200 line 15) and the next one are 
directed against Abu 'All's thesis that the reproduction is the reproduced 
36
 There is no reason to correct на-qâl (and he, sc , Abu Hâsim) in Mugni VII, 
199, line 15 into иа- ш/а/ 
^ Mugni VII, 200, lines 16-23 An objection is made stating that the reproduction 
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After these ten arguments, numbered by 'Abd al-Jabbâr from one 
to ten, two other arguments follow which are also ascribed to Abu 
Hâsim.38 
The first argument proves that speech cannot remain. If speech were 
one genus and would remain, it must remain when it is produced 
audible as it remains when it is produced written; and just as speech 
when it is written remains, though it may be recited afterwards and 
the recitation disappears, in the same way it would remain when 
it is first made as audible speech, the sound disappears,39 and it is 
written down afterwards. 
The second argument says that it does not make any difference with 
regard to what a subject makes or someone else hears, whether he 
makes speech originally or he reproduces the speech of someone else. 
If somebody says that, nevertheless, there is the speech of the other 
person together with the speech of the reproducing subject, one could 
say in a similar way about someone who imitates a movement or the 
way of walking of someone else, that in his movement or way of walking 
we find also the movement or way of walking of the other person. 
Next we find in 'Abd al-Jabbâr's text four objections with their 
answers It does not become clear whether these answers are also 
ascribed to Abu Hâsim.40 
First objection : God's speech is on the "preserved tablet" (al-lawh 
al-mahfûz); this implies that it is written and remains. Answer: God 
once made speech for the angels and afterwards wrote41 it down on a 
tablet. Metaphorically, one can say that He writes His speech on that 
tablet.42 
is only concerned with the totality, not with the words 'Abd al-Jabbâr replies that 
possibly the totality is not from one person, but it can be from them all together A second 
objection runs that God docs not intend to reproduce 'Abd al-Jabbâr replies that 
to make the intention a condition in reproducing is in contradiction with their doctrine 
:,e
 Mugni VII, 201, lines 1-16 That they are ascribed to Abu HâSim becomes clear 
in the introduction of the first one na-qad qâl (and he, se , Abu Hâsim, said) 
^ In Mugni VII, 201, line 4 read with the manuscript naqad instead of baqi, cf 
line 3 of the same page 
40
 Mugni VII, 201, line 16 - 204, line 6 
41
 In Mugni VII, 201, line 19 read vaktubuh instead of takiubuh, since in the next 
line God is said to have written the Qur'ân on the preserved tablet 
42
 Mugni VII, 201, line 16 - 202, line 8, after the comma That it can be understood 
metaphorically is proved by some examples from the Qur'ân and the common language, 
so, for instance, the texts of the Quran (sural al-a'râf, verse 104 and sural ai-qasas, 
verse 38) rendering in Arabic what Moses and the Pharao said in Hebrew At the end 
of this answer we find as a final remark that someone who reproduces a command 
is not necessarily commanding, for he only becomes so by intention and will This 
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Second objection :43 when someone reads aloud an insult someone 
else wrote down, the reading subject is not called "insulting"; it must 
be the person who wrote it down. This proves that there is speech in 
writing. Answer : speech can be similar to an insult without being an 
insult since the subject does not intend it to be an insult.44 The 
writing person is called "insulting" since he made a sign of an insult 
which , when it is read aloud, becomes an insult In a similar way, one 
calls someone "insulting" when he makes other signs to which is given 
a similar meaning.45 
Third objection : if the reproduction is the act of the reproducing 
subject, man can make similar things and even make something similar 
to the Qur'ân. Answer : we already said that this is possible by way 
of imitating, not by producing originally 4 6 
Fourth objection : the challenge by the prophet to produce some-
thing like the Qur'ân would not be possible. Answer : this argument 
too has been refuted before; the challenge is not concerned with 
imitation but with original speech, as was the case when the bedouins 
challenged each other to make poems or public addresses 47 
'Abd al-Jabbâr,48 who follows Abu Hâsim in this matter, adds some 
remarks to clarify his own position : 
Memory {hifz) is the knowledge of how speech was described and 
of its arrangement.49 Who knows this is qualified as "AÔ/ÎZ", who does 
not know it is not qualified in this way. Knowledge is only called 
"memory" when it is possible for us to re-produce what we know; 
consequently, the knowledge we have about persons is not called 
remark, which has to be separated in the text from the preceding objection and its 
answer, seems to function as an introduction to the second objection 
4 3
 Mugni VII, 202, line 8 (after the comma) - 203, line 6 
4 4
 Read in Mugnì VII, 202, line 16 sâtim instead of mukbir, which word is found 
both in the manuscript and in the printed text 
4 5
 For instance, by cutting parts of a tree away so that what remains has the form 
of letters forming an insult The interpunction has to be changed here, the full stop in 
Mugni VII, 203, line 1 has to be removed 
4 6
 Mugni VII, 203, lines 7-12 In Mugni VII, 203, line 12 read bi-n-msâja instead of 
bi-s-sâja, since weaving was the example given СГ ρ 390 
4 7
 Mugni VII, 203, line 13 - 204, line 6 
4 8
 Cf Mugni VII, 204, line 7 - 207, line 21 From this moment on 'Abd al-Jabbâr no 
longer uses the third person of the verb but the first person, he once explicitly mentions 
Abu Hâsim, finally, he opens here with the word t'lam, often used to introduce his 
own thesis (See, e.g , Mugni VII, 14 and 26) 
4 9
 In Arabic this definition runs "al-'ilm bi-kayfìyal was/ al-kalám wa-tartibih" 
(Mugni VII, 204) 
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"memory".50 Therefore, in memory there is no speech, but memory 
makes it possible for us to produce speech.51 
Something similar can be said about writing : no speech is in it, but 
the knowledge of its conventions makes it possible for us to produce 
real speech. 
Though one may say that someone is reproducing when he produces 
a famous text already made by someone else, or when he renders the 
meaning of a text in his own words, reproducing in the strict sense 
means to make the same letters someone else made52 and in the same 
order, meanwhile intending to reproduce that speech of someone else. 
'Abd al-Jabbâr ends this chapter by discussing three objections. 
First objection : though our speech cannot remain or exist in more 
places, God's speech can. Answer : God's speech being of the same 
genus as our human speech, this cannot be possible. If a text from 
the revelation in its broadest sense implies that God's speech remains 
or exists in more places, this text has to be interpreted according to 
the indications we found by reflection upon the data of human intuition. 
Second objection : letters are not speech, they become speech only 
by the inhering of the accident composition (taltf) in them. Answer : 
since letters are accidents, no accident can inhere in them.53 
Third objection : if the Qur'ân heard by the contemporaries of 
Muhammad were the act of the prophet and not God's act, the 
challenge would not be possible. This challenge has to prove that the 
Qur'ân is a miracle and, therefore, God's act. Answer : in this respect 
no difference can be found between God's speech and a reproduction 
of it; with a reproduction, too, this challenge is possible. This is con-
firmed by a text from the Qur'ân itself: "this surely is the word of 
a noble prophet".54 When the Qur'ân can be called God's speech and, 
nevertheless, can be the word and the act of the prophet, it can be God's 
, 0
 In M ugni VII, 204. lines 10-11 the preposilion 'alò once has to be removed 
51
 Evidentlj, we must have the possibility to produce speech our organism to 
produce speech must be sound 
52
 According to Abu Hâsim, it is permitted to add something, but not to change 
something Therefore, one can add a tannin, but not change or omit a haraka (vowel), 
since a moving letter (a consonant plus vowel) is different from an immobile letter 
(a consonant without vowel), and a letter with vowel a is different from the letter with 
vowel ; or и Assimilation, melody, doubling of letters, their beauty or power (described 
as the number of atoms of which the letter consists) are not something outside the 
letters or added to them, so that they could be mentioned separately 
ъ і
 Cf the way in which we explained the arrangement of the letters on pp 299-300 
5 4
 Sural al-takwir, verse 19 
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speech and, nevertheless, our act and our speech when we recite it. 
We make it, intending to reproduce God's speech and producing the 
same letters in the same order; this makes it possible to call it God's 
speech. 
3. GOD'S SPEECH IS CALLED "CREATED" 
'Abd al-Jabbâr lays much emphasis upon the fact that to call the 
Qur'ân and God's speech in general "created" (maklûq),5^ does not 
add something new to the discussions of the Qur'ân; it is only a matter 
of terminology. Therefore, 'Abd al-Jabbâr does not enter again into 
discussion with all those opponents who deny that the Qur'ân is God's 
act, produced by Him, and who state that the Qur'ân is eternal : he 
already refuted their statements. The discussion held in this chapter 
is with those opponents who agree with 'Abd al-Jabbâr that the Qur'ân 
and all God's speech is His act and is temporal, but who deny that the 
Qur'ân can therefore be called "created" (maklûq). 
Having established the definition of "created" as "the act which is 
determined {muqaddar) by the purpose and the motive which correspond 
with it in a way that nothing is added to it and nothing is lacking from 
it",56 or "what happens in the way of determination", and having 
refuted other proposed definitions of this term,57 'Abd al-Jabbâr is 
going to discuss the arguments his opponents bring into the field to 
show why they do not apply the qualification "created" to the Qur'ân 
and God's speech.58 
First objection :59 one cannot call the Qur'ân and God's speech 
" Cf M ugni VII. 208-223 (chapter 22), Sai h 545-549. and Miihii I, 345-346 See 
also 'Abd al-Karim 'Utmân, IViizaiirat al-lakl'if, 240-242 See also our pp 117-119. where 
we discussed the meaning of maklûq This chapter is not concerned with the contents 
of the term "created" these have been discussed before but only with the name 
The discussion, therefore, is not between the adherents of an eternal Qur'ân and the 
adherents of a temporal Qur'ân, bul it is a discussion among adherents of a temporal 
Qur'ân concerning the question whether this temporal Qur'ân. made by God, can 
be called created or not 
56
 This first definition is the one given in the Smh, which is the most elaborate 
and explains the word muqaddar (determined) The second definition mentioned is the 
one gncn in the M ugni 
"•' We discussed this on pp 118-119 It can be found in Magni VII, 208, line 4 215, 
line 2 
5
" Magni VII, 215. line 3 223, line 5 
, 9
 Magni VII, 215. line 3 216, line 2 
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"created", since the sources of our revealed knowledge (as-sar') do 
not use this term for it. Answer : the use of terms is not dependent 
upon its use in revealed texts; a term has a meaning and can be applied 
to every object that is characterized by it. Moreover, this term is 
mentioned in the sources of our revealed knowledge and applied there 
to the Qur'ân. We read in the Qur'ân : "Creator of every thing".60 
Three traditions about the prophet give respectively : "God was and 
nothing else', then He created the Dikr", "God did not create in heaven 
or on earth something greater than the verse of the throne", and 
"God created the Qur'ân Arabic".61 When we come to the next source, 
the Ijmä, we discover that those among the first generations62 of 
believers who believed the Qur'ân to be God's act called it "created", 
whereas those who believed it to be eternal did not call it created. 
But there was no one who believed it to be temporal and God's act, 
and who nevertheless did not call it created.63 
Second objection :64 the use of the term "created" for God's speech 
can suggest that it is a lie; therefore, it is better not to use it. To 
confirm this statement the opponents use several arguments, which 
are discussed again by 'Abd al-Jabbâr. 
First argument : the text of the Qur'ân says "you create falsehood".65 
Consequently, the use of the verb "create" suggests that the object 
of this verb is a lie. Answer : the meaning of "falsehood" in this verse 
is not "lie" but the idols they made.66 Moreover, since created means 
determined (muqaddar), both lie and truth can be called created; the 
use of other verbs (as "to say", "qal") to indicate a lie, is no reason not 
to use them in describing God's speech. 
Second argument : in the Arabic language one uses kalaq and the 
eighth form of this verb, iktalaq, to describe that one "makes" a lie. 
Answer : there is no reason to say that it can only be used in that way. 
6 0
 "Kâliq kuil Coi "' \ùrat ar-ra'd, verse 16 
61
 Also traditions which are based on the authority of onl> one person, and which 
only are admitted when they deal with human acts, have to be accepted here since 
the applying of names also is an act 
62
 In MugniVU. 215. line 18 read mima instead of cimmâ, this also makes the addition 
in line 19. suggested by al-Abyârî, superfluous 
6 3
 The interpunction of the text in Mugnî VII, 215, line 18 216. line 2 is very 
confusing, anyhow, the full stops in Mugnî VII, 215, line 19 and 216, line 2 have to be 
removed 
6 4
 M ugni VII. 216, line 3 218. line 8 
65
 "Takluqûn ifkcm" lürat al-'ankabüt. verse 17 
6 6
 'Abd al-Jabbâr refers to vûraf wi-sâffâl, verse 86 (not 76 as we read in the printed 
text) In MugniVH, 216, line 5 read with the manuscript \аиш'йініИ instead of uisi/ûnah 
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Third argument · you now have to call all informations and all other 
things which are determined {muqaddar) "created" Answer · so we 
do, though this qualification is not used very often (just as, for instance, 
the qualification "made" for information67) 
Fourth argument when a poem is said to be "created" (maklûq), it 
must be a he 68 Answer the expression is abridged, fully it would run 
"the poem is created or determined as a he" This expression can also 
be used when the contents of the poem are true (its "information"), 
but when it is attributed not to the poet who made it but to someone 
else 
Fifth argument the eighth form of this verb, iktalaq, per se means 
to lie 69 Answer · even if this were true, there is no reason why the 
first form of the verb, kalaq, would be pejorative too 70 
Sixth argument the Qur'ân says "this only is the kuluq of the first 
ones",71 meaning their lies Answer what is meant is their fate, the 
way they are born, die, and are not revived 
Seventh argument the linguists use it only in this way Answer 
very great and famous linguists apply it to the Qur'ân, without intending 
to say it is a he al-Akfas, Abu Zayd, Qutrub, and al-Mubarrad 72 
Third objection 73 the majority of the Islamic community does not 
apply the qualification "created" to the Qur'ân Answer it is not 
a duty to follow the majority, only to follow a general consensus 
Moreover, many scholars, even most of them, do apply it in this way 
Fourth objection 74 if one calls the Qur'ân created, one may be 
suspected of unbelief, therefore, it is better not to use this term 
Answer on the contrary, who says that the Qur'ân is not created 
may be suspected of unbelief, since this statement suggests that he is 
a dualist, believing in a second eternal being besides God 
Fifth objection 75 the companions of Muhammad and the believers 
of the second generation did not use this qualification for the Qur'ân 
Answer they also did not call it "temporal" (muhdat), "made" 
67
 In Mugni VII, 217 line 3 read mafula instead oí ma'quia 
6 8
 In bfugm VII 217 line 9 read bih instead of//A 
6 9
 To show this, the opponent refers to sûrat Sâd, verse 7 (not verse 38 as is 
mentioned in the edition) 
70
 So, for instance, the forms laqau wal and if ta'al may be said to be pejorative, whith 
does not imply that the verbs qâl dndfa'al are also pejorative 
71
 Sural αν-TO''ara verse 137 
7 2
 About these famous Arab grammarians, see, for instance. Fleisch Trane, 30-32 
7 3
 MugniVn 218, lines 9-13 
"* Mugni VII 218, lines 14-21 
" Wugm VII 219 lines 1-17 
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(mafûf), or "being after it was not". But they said it was God's act, 
and they were agreed that all God's acts were created. The only reason 
why it is not mentioned in some text or other, is that there was no 
disagreement at all about this subject. Moreover, Muhammad himself 
did say that the Qur'ân was created.76 
Sixth objection :77 the definition of "maklûq" as ^muqaddar" leads 
to a number of false conclusions : we can determine {qaddar) an act of 
someone else, two persons can determine the same act, one can determine 
something non-existent, one even can determine the creation (al-kalq)y7e 
this last conclusion leads to an endless series. 
Answer : 'Abd al-Jabbâr gives two answers, one on the authority 
of Abu Hâsim, the other on the authority of Abu 'Alî; 'Abd al-Jabbâr 
does not try to decide which is the correct one since both refute the 
objection. 
Abu Hâsim's answer : since he, just as 'Abd al-Jabbâr, holds that 
the measuring of leather to cut it is the original meaning of the term 
kalaq, he answers that man can "create" leather which was already 
created (made) by God, and that two people can "create" the same 
part of leather. To create is to determine something existent, and this 
term cannot be used for something non-existent.79 Creation80 is not 
created since creation is for Abu Hâsim the will, which cannot be 
willed. 
Abu 'All's answer : no qualifier "creation" (kalq) exists. The quali-
fication rnaklûq only says that the qualified object came into existence 
from its acting agent as determined. The use of "create" for leather 
has to be understood metaphorically. By the way in which he defined 
the qualification "created" the objections are made to lose their 
conclusive force. 
Seventh objection:81 the Qur'ân makes a distinction between to 
16
 СГ 'Abd al-Jabbâr's answer to the first objection. 
77
 Mugni VII, 219, line 18 - 220, line 20 
7,1
 Read in Mugni VII, 220, line 1 al-kalq instead of al-kâhq, which is found in the 
manuscript and the printed text. The course of the argumentation requires this 
correction. 
79
 "Determine" is only called "create" when the object is something existent; in the 
same way—to give an example—"will" is only called "determination" ('azm) when the 
object is non-existent. (Cf. p. 221). Read in Mugni VII, 220, line 8 'azm instead of 
'adam. 
80
 Read in Mugnì VII, 220, line 11 bi-kalq instead of yakluq. 
81
 Mugni VII, 221, lines 1-9. 
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create and to determine by mentioning them separately.82 Answer: 
the conclusion cannot be drawn as one can explain with other verses 
from the Qur'ân where, for instance, Qur'ân and Dikr are mentioned 
separately while they nevertheless are one and the same.83 
Eighth objection : 8 4 applying the name "created" to the Qur'ân 
would imply that it could die. Answer (on the authority of Abu 'AH) : 
in that case also death would die and also the death of death, which 
leads to an endless series. But also accidents, lifeless matter, and 
people in hell or heaven either would die or would not be called 
created. 
Ninth objection :85 the Qur'ân is eternal and cannot be called 
created. Answer : this has been refuted before and does not belong 
in this chapter. 
Tenth objection :8e which is called created, the separate letters or 
only the totality? A separate letter cannot be called "determined", but 
one also cannot call the totality created without calling the parts 
created. Answer : each letter is called created since it is determined 
together with the other letters. To this extent God's speech corresponds 
with His other acts. 
Eleventh objection :87 we do not find it mentioned with reference to 
the prophet and the first generation of Muslims. Answer : the reason 
is that it was evident. 
Twelfth objection :88 our speech would be called created, since it 
too is determined. Answer : it can be called created though this quali-
fication is not much used. 
A final remark is made by 'Abd al-Jabbâr at the end of this chapter, 
where he mentions another text from the tradition, in which Mu-
hammad says : "God created the Тога with His own hand". This 
implies that He also created the Qur'ân with His own hand, the 
addition "with His own hand" being made to give it more emphasis. 
82
 Cf. .sdrai al-furqân, verse 2 and sûrat 'abasa, verse 19. In Mugní VII, 221, line 3 
delete the letter iva of ііо-Лш at the end of the line; this letter is found both in the 
manuscript and in the printed text, but has to be removed in order to arrive at a correct 
sentence. 
8 3
 Sûrat Yâsin, verse 69. 
•* Mugni VII, 221, line 10 - 222, line 2. 
"
s
 Mugni VII, 222, lines 3-5. 
86
 Mugni VU, 222, lines 6-15. 
87
 Mugni VU, 222, lines 16-21. 
88
 Mugni VU, 223, lines 1-5. 
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4. CONCLUSION 
We can do no better here than to translate in its entirety the very 
short final chapter of the seventh part of the Afugni, a chapter which 
—after all that has been said before—proves to be a good conclusion 
of 'Abd al-Jabbâr's treatise on the Qur'ân and God's other speech.89 
"Chapter about : He created the Qur'ân and produced it for the 
benefit of the (sc. His) servants. 
Know that we already explained that, if He had spoken by that 
(sc. the Qur'ân) and produced it without there being a responsible 
person (who could be addressed by it), it (sc. the Qur'ân) would have 
been useless. Therefore, He must produce it when there is someone 
who benefits by it in one of two ways : either by taking it upon 
himself90 and bringing it to someone else so that that becomes an 
imposing of duties (taklif), or because he understands its meaning and 
obeys it since he is addressed by it and it will be useful for him, or 
because of both things together. But His producing it (sc, the Qur'ân) 
when both ways are lacking would be useless, and God is far above 
that. Therefore, one must conclude that He produced the Qur'ân 
when there was someone, be it an angel, human being, or demon, 
who had the quality we mentioned". 
89
 Mugni VII, 224 This short chapter appears to be a good conclusion of this part 
of the Mugnî, every detail has been dealt with, also when we compare it with the 
texts from the Sarh and the Muhit For arguments which are used to prove that originally 
this was not the end of this part of the Mugnî, cf ρ d and h oí the edition of 
Mugni VII, these arguments are, however, not entirely convincing 
90
 I read in the manuscript yatahammalah instead of yahmilah For the meaning 
of the text this does not make much difference Cf also Mugni VII, 3 what 'Abd 
al-Jabbâr has in mind is the fact that an angel brings the Qur'ân (or better 
a reproduction of it) to the prophets 
CHAPTER FOUR 
SOME MAJOR CHARACTERISTICS OF 
'ABD AL-JABBÂR'S THEOLOGY 
It is quite impossible to summarize in a few final pages all the 
conclusions we have drawn in the course of the present study, every 
short passage in which we discussed a philosophical or theological term 
and concept had its own conclusion, our third chapter aimed, moreover, 
at analysing 'Abd al-Jabbâr's style of arguing about a concrete subject, 
and this also is very difficult to summarize 
The important task of making a comparison between 'Abd al-
Jabbâr's thought and that of other Muslim and non-Muslim thinkers 
theologians and philosophers—requires a thorough investigation 
and a profound knowledge of their ideas, or even the writing of a 
monograph on those ideas, all this was beyond the scope of the present 
study 
Thus, the best thing we can now do to conclude this study and to sat-
isfy the interested reader, is to give a general survey of some major 
peculiarities of 'Abd al-Jabbâr's theology, and to gather them together 
in a synthetical view During our study some general trends became 
apparent throughout 'Abd al-Jabbâr's works, these constitute the 
basis of this final chapter 
1 CHARACTERISTICS OF 'ABD AL-JABBAR'S METHOD 
Theological 
First of all, 'Abd al-Jabbâr's method of thinking should be called 
theological This qualification is used to indicate a kind of human 
reflection which, next to other subjects, deals with God or whatever 
name might be given to the Supreme Being If the term theological is 
understood in this way, 'Abd al-Jabbâr's way of thinking is rightly 
called theological he amply discusses God, His qualities, and His 
acts, and these discussions are given a great and central place in 
his works More appropriately it can be called theological since the 
divine element is not added as a kind of crowning touch to a "philo-
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sophical" system, but it plays its part from the very beginning. The 
divine element appears to be given not only the ontological priority 
—God is the creator of all bodies in this world— but also in certain 
cases a kind of logical priority—one has to know God before being 
able to discuss and to know, in all implications, a number of qualities 
in this world. 
This is apparent when 'Abd al-Jabbâr—describing the human being — 
takes him as a primarily theological being, as the person upon whom 
God has imposed duties and who is bound to perform them. This 
is 'Abd al-Jabbâr's theological starting-point in his discussions on the 
essence and the qualities of man; from this point he deduces the 
various qualities of the human being.1 At the very beginning of his 
works he already shows that human reflection, which actually is a 
necessary condition for every form of theological and philosophical 
thinking, is the first and basic religious duty imposed by God on 
every adult human being.2 
If one takes, however, the qualification "theological" as implying 
reflection on the data of a divine revelation, 'Abd al-Jabbâr's works 
are still entitled to this qualification. In this respect, too, his method 
is truly theological. He accepts the Islamic revelation and reflects on 
its sources and on its contents; he uses it in his argumentations. 
But one has to bear in mind that the Islamic revelation is not as 
"exclusive" as the Christian revelation pretends to be. No real mys-
teries are revealed and not much entirely new knowledge is supplied 
to mankind. As wc saw, for 'Abd al-Jabbâr the revelation is above all 
a confirmation of things which one can know by reflection, without 
any information through that revelation.3 
Phenomenal 
When we use this rather modern term to describe 'Abd al-Jabbâr's 
theology, this can suggest a contradiction in terms. If one lakes 
"phenomenal" as "phenomcnalistic", one may with good reason ask 
the question whether such a doctrine can be theological. In the strict 
sense of the word, this evidently is not possible since God is not 
a phenomenon, not an immediate object of perception. 
Nevertheless, I keep to the term phenomenal in order to emphasize 
1
 СГ ρ 59 
- CT ρ 61 
1
 CT pp 95-102 
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the importance of perceived reality in 'Abd al-Jabbâr's theology as 
well as his conviction that perception necessarily leads to (he calls it 
"a way to") true and certain knowledge.* Hence, perception and 
knowledge based on perception are most frequently used as founda-
tions even for strictly theological arguments, and the whole of 'Abd 
al-Jabbâr's theological system is firmly based upon the foundation of 
human perception. Our perception of this world and our reflection 
upon the knowledge based on this perception lead us to the knowledge 
that the bodies in our world are produced by someone whom we 
call God.5 
This is not incompatible with the basically theological character of 
'Abd al-Jabbâr's doctrine, nor with his theological views on man 
and cosmos. Knowledge which is based on perception is divine and 
directly given by God ; this knowledge is not caused by perception, nor 
the result of human efforts, but it is a gift from God, created in the 
human heart. Thus, phenomenal knowledge is truly divine and 
guaranteed by God Himself.6 Moreover, perceived reality is full of 
indications which point to God and which guide us in our thinking 
about this world. God Himself intentionally made this world to be 
an indication to Him in order that a thinking human person, by 
perceiving these indications and by reflecting upon them, can finally 
arrive at a sure knowledge of God. 
Consequently, it even is the combination of the theological and the 
phenomenal and the intertwining of both these elements, which 
constitute one of the main features of 'Abd al-Jabbâr's way of 
thinking. 
Intuitional 
Besides the knowledge which is based on perception, God creates 
other forms of knowledge in the human heart. This knowledge, which 
is not based upon something else, but is as it were "immediate", can 
be called "intuition" in the strictest sense of the word. This intuition, 
to which belong, for instance, the principles of argumentation and 
general ethical axiomata, is directly created and guaranteed by God 
and used by 'Abd al-Jabbâr in his argumentations.7 
* Of pp 93-95 
' Cf pp 231-235 
6
 СГ pp 53-55. 
' Cf pp 92-93. 
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Discursive 
Thus, the basic human knowledge is given knowledge; this knowledge 
is either given immediately—intuition in the strict sense of the word— 
or given on the basis of perception, or transmitted by prophets—the 
revelation—, but all three forms are gifts from God. On this basic 
knowledge reflection is possible, through which man by his own efforts 
acquires further knowledge. 
Reflection is possible since God does not directly give knowledge of 
everything which exists and can be known : there are things man does 
not know yet. But, on the other hand, God has placed in this world 
a great number of "indications", things which, if they are known, 
point to something else that is not yet known, and by following these 
indications one can proceed from one knowledge to another. Thus, 
this world in itself has a structure in which things point to other 
things and ultimately to God. The reflecting human person has nothing 
to do but to follow the indications he perceives and knows to be 
indications; he follows a route which is mapped out for him, and 
finally he will arrive at a sure knowledge of God and this world.8 
God made this reflection not only a possibility for man, He made 
it an obligation. Reflection is man's first and principal duty. Since 
not everything is known through given knowledge, man is bound to 
make efforts to arrive at fuller knowledge, and above all at knowledge 
of God. Knowledge of God, which is necessary and obligatory, cannot 
by any means be given knowledge; it necessarily is acquired knowl-
edge, reached by discursive thinking. Therefore, reflection to arrive 
at this knowledge really is a religious duty.9 
We conclude, first, that human beings in their reflection and argu-
mentation do not arrive at a knowledge which is really new; they only 
follow indications, and if they do it correctly, they will arrive via an 
alrady beaten track at the knowledge which they find at the end of this 
road; 
second, reality—both God and the cosmos—can be known through 
argumentation and reasoning which are based upon some kind of given 
knowledge. It can be known, blind faith is not necessary. It is man's 
duty to think, to reflect, and in that way to know, to know even God 
Himself. God does not demand implicit and blind faith, but He 
demands man's effort in order to arrive at real knowledge. 
8
 Cf. pp. 65-68. 
» Cf. p. 61. 
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A last question to be answered here is whether 'Abd al-Jabbâr's 
way of thinking should be called Islamic Evidently, Islamic thinking 
is not uniform, nor does it consist in a uniform method Its charac-
teristics rather have to be looked for in some underlying general trends, 
both in matter of contents and in its methods At the end of this 
chapter we deal with the contents of 'Abd al-Jabbâr's theology, 
here we can restrict ourselves to his method 
This method surely should be called Islamic, for not only is the 
revelation which is accepted, discussed, and used as a source of 
knowledge actually the Islamic revelation, but 'Abd al-Jabbâr's views 
on the essence of revelation—not so much as a revelation of mysteries, 
but as a confirmation of human knowledge and a religious exhor-
tation -has to be called Islamic too 
Moreover, the way m which his thinking on God and His acts 
penetrates the whole of his theology, together with his confidence in 
the truthfullness of this world and the perception of it, is also truly 
Islamic Consequently, 'Abd al-Jabbâr's theological method of thinking 
is entitled to the qualification "Islamic" 
2 UNITY OF ALL EXISTENT THINGS 
The cosmos of'Abd al-Jabbâr, as one discovers it in his books, might 
give the impression of being rather fundamentally divided and atomized. 
All bodies in this world consist of atoms -the smallest possible and 
indivisible parts of matter—which apparently do not show much co-
herence with each other Time also appears to be divided, and to 
consist of separate moments, which simply follow upon each other 
as a kind of time-atoms Moreover, the whole universe of existent 
things seems to be divided into two quite different worlds, the present 
one and the absent one, our world and the world of God. 
Nevertheless, this duality in the existent reality and this splitting 
up of our world into separate atoms find their place only inside 
a fundamental unity, which characterizes all existent things 
The Ino worlds 10 
'Abd al-Jabbâr himself does not speak about two different "worlds"; 
he does not use the term world, but only mentions "the present" and 
10
 Cf pp 226-227 
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"the absent", the absent being God and God alone as He is in Himself, 
the present including the whole of our world with all its lifeless things, 
its plants, animals, people, and also angels and demons. God's acts, 
too, belong to this present world. 
If we look for the difference between both these worlds, we discover 
that our world is characterized by materiality, whereas God is not 
characterized by it, but is purely immaterial. Fundamentally, this is 
the one and only difference between God and this world. In this 
world everything is material or bound to materiality—even angels and 
demons are material beings ; God, however, is immaterial. In actual 
fact, this is what causes the distance between God and man. Since man, 
as being part of this world, is material, he cannot be, or become, divine 
or immaterial. It also is absolutely impossible that God would be or 
become a human being: any form of incarnation -in the Christian 
sense of the word—is excluded, since incarnation would make God 
material; this would make Him cease to be God, for being immaterial 
is God's characteristic quality and the basis of all difference between 
Him and the world. 
But notwithstanding all this, matter as such is not evil. Matter is not 
the principle of evil, immateriality is not the principle of good. Matter 
and the material world are fundamentally good; they are good from 
the very beginning and have never turned evil, not even through the 
sins of human beings. Therefore, the Christian concepts of the Fall, 
original sin, and redemption cannot have a place in the theological 
system of 'Abd al-Jabbâr, as they are rejected in the general belief of 
Islam. The human person, too, is fundamentally good, and sins are 
not caused by a principle of evil in the human interior; sins are 
explained mostly by a lack of knowledge in the sinning subject. ' ' 
Thus, matter is not evil; it even is not pure imperfection. Matter is 
a positive principle, the principle of division and individualization. 
The difference between God and this world is fundamentally the 
difference between what is immaterial and what is material ; apart from 
this difference, God and this world can be said to be similar.12 God 
is not absolutely different, though materiality causes an unbridgeable 
gap which prevents the one to become like the other. But, if we 
take into account all consequences of materiality and immateriality, 
a complete analogy can be drawn between God and this world : in 
1
 Cf. pp. 269-270. 
2
 Cf. pp. 229-231. 
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both cases the same argumentations hold true, and similar conclusions 
must be drawn from similar premises This analogy is based on the 
fundamental unity of all existent things, God included, this analogy 
makes it possible that we know God and discuss His qualities and His 
acts God forms part of the reality, which as a fundamental unity is 
knowable for reflecting human beings 
A tomism 
Everything existent is either an atom, or an accident, or God This 
implies that the whole of our material world consists of atoms and 
accidents All atoms are similar and identical, the number of different 
accidents is restricted 1 3 To produce something really new is impossible, 
since to produce or to make is nothing else but to bring into existence 
something—a substance or an accident—that was non-existent To 
change something is to bring an accident from non-existence into 
existence, which causes a former accident to fall back into non­
existence This leads to the conclusion that there is a basic uniformity 
in this world, that variations and changements are possible, but that 
the number of possibilities is restricted and finite, moreover, the 
creation of something really new is impossible Consequently, the term 
creation is not understood as indicating the production of something 
new out of nothing, but as indicating the bringing into existence of 
something non-existent, and that in an intentional way Thus man is 
able to create, although this verb usually is not employed for human 
acts 1 4 
Besides this uniformity, there is also a kind of unity in this 
world, the fragmentanzation is bridged, man, for instance, is more 
than a number of separate atoms with their inhering accidents But 
how can this be true when the whole of this world consists only of 
atoms and accidents7 
A first form of unification and coherence is caused by the accident 
"composition" Unlike other accidents, composition does not inhere 
in one separate atom but in two atoms together, in this way, this 
accident is the principle of material coherence m this world ' 5 But m 
no way can this accident produce a composite whole which is 
1 3
 Cf pp 119-121 and 127 
1 4
 Cf ρ 119 
1 5
 Cf pp 132-134 
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essentially different from the atoms of which it is composed. A compo-
sition of atoms cannot produce a living being. 
Therefore, 'Abd al-Jabbâr advances his theory of the "states". States 
are not something existent—they are neither substances nor accidents— 
but they are only a state something is in, and as such they can charac-
terize a composite whole.16 A composite whole can be in a state in 
which the separate atoms cannot be, e.g., the state of being living. Such 
a state, which is also a principle of unification and coherence, is said to 
need a composite whole composed in a strictly defined way, in order 
that the composite whole can be in that state. 
Finally, the atomism in time is bridged, because the atoms constitute 
an element of permanence; they are remaining and are not created anew 
at every moment. Also some of the accidents remain for a longer time 
than one single moment, in fact untili they are brought back into 
non-existence. Moreover, the fragmentarization of time is overcome 
by the so-called tawlîd, which makes real causality in this world 
possible.17 
Man 
In his discussions of man, 'Abd al-Jabbâr affirms again and again 
that man is a unity. It is with much emphasis that he rejects every 
form of dualism, every duality in the human being; man does not 
consist of two elements, spirit and body, nor of higher and lower 
levels in his person; he is an absolute unity. And this unity is entirely 
material.18 Man is a material unity without any immaterial element, 
for immateriality is a quality proper to God alone. 
Man also has no separate "faculties", such as intellect and will—as 
they are understood, e.g., in Scholastic theology—but it is the entire 
person who thinks, wills, perceives; it is the entire material unity. 
Thus, whenever 'Abd al-J.abbâr mentions the human heart as the 
seat of knowledge or will, he definitely means the material, organic 
heart, in the atoms of which the accidents knowledge and will inhere.19 
Consequently, man is not divided in himself; no struggle between 
body and spirit, between good and evil takes place in his person; 
he only experiences in himself opposite desires which push him in one 
16
 CT. pp. 145-148. 
^ Cf. pp. 206-208. 
'" Cf. pp. 160-164. 
'" Cf. pp. 166-167. 
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direction or the other, but never does this lead to a splitting up or 
a division of his person. 
It also is unthinkable that man should struggle to rise above his own 
materiality, for he is nothing else but materiality; to rise above 
materiality would mean to rise above his own essence. Man essentially 
is part of this world; he is not in this world, he is of this world. 
Therefore, he must accept this world as part of his life without trying 
to free himself from it. 
As part of the material universe, man has a fundamental openness 
towards all other material things; this openness is called perception. 
Things present themselves to the human person—some things do 
not present themselves and are called imperceptible—and then he 
necessarily perceives them. Thus, in perception the initiative is with 
the things perceived, the perceiving subject is purely receptive.20 
God 
For 'Abd al-Jabbâr—just as for all other Mu'tazila—God is an 
absolute and immaterial unity. This is one of their basic principles. 
This principle implies that there can be no second god, no principle 
of evil or darkness besides God as the principle of good and light. 
God is unique. But it implies also that there can be no division at all 
inside God : thus the concept of a Trinity in God has to be rejected 
since it affects the fundamental unity of God.21 For the same reason, 
there can be in God no knowledge, no will, nor can there exist in 
Him an eternal word or speech. The idea of God's word existing in 
Him from all eternity and revealed later on to mankind, is in-
compatible with the belief in God's absolute unity. Just as all God's 
acts are done outside Himself, in this world, because acts inside God 
would affect His unity, so God's word, too, is created in this world. 
We conclude that 'Abd al-Jabbâr's theology—in spite of the im-
pression of great division it may give at first sight—is characterized 
by an idea of unity which pervades the discussions of the various 
subjects treated in his theological works. The affirmation of this unity 
appears to be one of 'Abd al-Jabbâr's main objectives. 
20
 СГ pp 175-180 
2 1
 Cf ρ 265. 
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3. DETERMINISM 
One of the major problems which every form of theological thinking 
has to cope with, is the relationship between the notion of God's omni-
potence on the one hand and the notion of man's responsibility for his 
acts on the other. For, if man is really responsible for the acts he 
performs, and if God, consequently, rightly rewards and punishes 
man for those acts, man must be truly free in the choice of his acts. 
But how can this free choice be compatible with God's omnipotence? 
The theological school of the Mu'tazila, to which 'Abd al-Jabbâr 
belongs, risks to over-emphasize human freedom to the detriment 
of the notion of God's omnipotence. One of their main principles is 
the belief in God's justice : all God's acts necessarily are just and good. 
God's reward and punishment can be good only when the person 
rewarded or punished really was responsible for his acts. Consequently, 
the Mu'tazila strongly reject the principle of God's absolute pre-
destination of all events happening in this world, human acts included. 
'Abd al-Jabbâr's point of view appears to be somewhat ambiguous. 
He keeps to the general principle of the Mu'tazila and affirms that 
God is just, and that man must be responsible for his own acts. 
But if we try to analyse his notions about the essence of acts, the 
way in which they happen, how they are caused and performed, or if 
we analyse his notions about the will both human and divine , 
we cannot help receiving the impression that he risks to be rather a 
determinist; he himself appears to be aware of this risk, and to try 
to keep, nevertheless, to the principle of human free choice. 
Human acts 
Before discussing the way in which acts are performed and the 
reason why, we have to take into account the fundamental difference 
between our notion of "act" and 'Abd al-Jabbâr's. For him an act 
is cither a substance or an accident which has been brought into 
existence by an acting subject; it is not the activity but the result of 
this activity : namely the substance or the accident concerned in their 
being existent. To act. consequently, simply means to bring something 
non-existent into existence. This implies a great, but finite, potential 
of non-existent things—"possible" things - which can be brought into 
existence.22 But a subject cannot bring into existence any non-
22
 CT. pp. 204-206. 
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existent thing he would like to ; to bring into existence is possible only 
because the acting subject already had a relation with the thing 
concerned in its non-existence. This relation is expressed by the term 
"being able" to (bring into existence) something. Thus, each able 
subject has his proper relations with his proper non-existent things, 
which he, and he alone, can bring into existence Non-existent things 
which are "possible" for the one subject are impossible for any other 
subject. This already implies a kind of determination and limitation 
of free choice; the things to which a given human being is able, are 
determined beforehand, and he is not able to perform an act which 
somebody else is actually able to perform 23 
Man does not bring into existence all things he can bring into 
existence, he does not perform all acts he can perform Why certain 
acts are performed while other acts are not, is determined by the 
motives which urge the able subject to perform a given act, or hold 
him back from performing it A motive is knowledge, conviction, or 
assumption that a given act has some benefit for the subject concerned 
These motives are either created by God in the human heart the 
"given knowledge" is necessarily created by God—or produced by 
man himself The strength of the motive to perform a certain act, 
the strength of the motive to do the opposite act, and the strength of 
the motive to abstain from performing the act, in fact determine which 
act the subject will perform 2 4 
All these motives are related to what we would call the intellectual 
faculties ('Abd al-Jabbâr does not use a similar term or a similar 
division), and they are concerned with the benefit of the able subject 
himself They determine, moreover, the performing of an act without 
any real intervention of the will. This exclusion of the will from the 
process of human acting leads to determinism, acts are not chosen 
by the human will, but determined by knowledge, assumption, and 
conviction 
Human mil25 
In 'Abd al-Jabbâr's theology, the will does not make a choice between 
two (or more) possible acts, we saw that the will has no function at all 
in the decision which act will be performed, the more so because will 
2 1
 СГ pp 218-239 
2 4
 Cl pp 218-219 
2 4
 O pp 215-218 
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—as also intellect—is not a "faculty" of the human person Will 
is an act performed, an imperceptible accident brought into existence 
Thus, 'Abd al-Jdbbâr's notion of the human will is quite different from 
the notion of that will in the European Scholastic tradition, it is, 
however, not so easy to define what it really is 
In fact, we can best describe it as a wish, not an impossible wish 
which cannot be fulfilled—'Abd al-Jabbâr explicitly excludes this kind 
of wish from the will26—but as a wish which can be fulfilled There-
fore, one can will the act of someone else, just as one can will one's own 
act The will, consequently, is not making a comparison between the 
motives, but the same motives which urge to the act or hold back from 
it, also urge to the will or hold back from it, when the act itself is 
impossible for the subject moved by the motives- -for instance, because 
it is the act of someone else—, the motives still make him will the act 
concerned There is one case in which the will can have some influence 
on the act performed, not on the choice of the act but on the way it is 
performed This is the case when the subject wills an act while 
performing it 'Abd al-Jabbâr then calls the will intention, such an 
intention can give to an act an extra qualification, such as an extra 
ethical qualification 27 
Human respomibility26 
How can 'Abd al-Jabbâr in this context still speak about human 
responsibility9 His answer is that a motive does not cause the act, 
there is no causal relationship between the motive and the act There-
fore, motives do not necessitate, nor determine For, if there is a 
stronger motive against the act. the first motive does not cause anything 
at all, and the subject does not perform the act Moreover, motives may 
vary and change If we have to look somewhere for some kind of human 
freedom, we have to look for it in these motives and in the fact that 
they do not necessitate a given act But the question remains whether 
there really is some free choice m the motives—and if so, how can it 
be made, when a will has no influence upon it9—and whether the 
combination of two or more motives must not be said to be as 
necessitating and determining as could be a single motive Anyhow, 
'Abd al-Jabbâr does not make clear where exactly in the process of 
human acting free choice and responsibility can exert their influence. 
26
 Cf pp 221-222 
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 Cf ρ 221 
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Ethics24 
What we have said just now evidently has its consequences for 'Abd 
al-Jabbâr's doctrine of ethics. Since every act is either a substance or 
an accident, and since the whole of our world fundamentally is not evil, 
no act in itself will be evil. Acts become good or evil and have some 
ethical qualification because of the way they are brought into existence. 
This rather vague term "way" mostly indicates a kind of relationship 
between the act and something else in this world; thus, for instance, 
an information which is in accordance with the reality is good, but 
an information which is not in accordance with the reality is a lie and, 
consequently, evil. Since the will does not have much influence upon 
human acts, it is evident that ethical qualifications are given more 
on the basis of the acts themselves and the way in which they are 
performed than on the basis of human will. Only in some minor cases 
in which will and intention do have some influence on the acts 
performed, the will can add something to the ethical qualification of 
the act concerned. 
Moreover, in a system in which God's acts are determined too—as 
we shall see below—ethics will be rather objective and not subjective : 
acts performed will be good or evil in themselves and not because God 
commanded or forbade them. The terms good and evil indicate the 
place an act has in the whole of reality; they do not indicate in the 
first place a relation between the act and the will of God. 
Divine acts 
Taking into account that God is immaterial and human beings 
material—man's possibility of acting is restricted because of his being 
material—we can say that God's acting is analogous to man's. God's 
acts, too, are determined by His motives, His being knowing the 
benefits of all possible acts. This benefit cannot be a benefit for Himself 
since He Himself is self-sufficient and does not need anything at all 
for Himself; therefore, it must be the benefit of someone else, man, 
angels, or demons. Since God is omniscient, He knows the benefit of 
every possible act, and thus the act He performs will be the absolutely 
most beneficial act possible. Because God knows everything and does 
not need anything at all for Himself, His acts necessarily are good; 
otherwise, He would not perform them.30 
29
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Against this background it becomes clear that God's acts are pre-
dictable : somebody who would know all possible acts and all motives 
concerned could predict all God's acts. Thus, 'Abd al-Jabbâr states 
that certain acts are obligatory for God; He must perform them. 
One of his conclusions is, for instance, that God is bound to reveal 
what He actually revealed. God's revelation is not His free act, but, 
since He knows that this revelation is for the benefit of mankind, 
He necessarily must give it to them.31 
In this way we can say that God's acts are determined. Moreover, 
when 'Abd al-Jabbâr mentions God's omnipotence, he means by this 
term that there is no restriction in God Himself concerning what He 
can bring into existence; but there is a restriction in the objects He can 
bring into existence. These objects are limited; God also has His own 
potential of non-existent things which He can bring into existence. He 
has no power at all over things possible for other able beings. God 
cannot perform acts which a given human being can perform; He 
can perform similar acts, but not these acts themselves.32 
Divine will 
There is no fundamental difference between human and divine will; 
they function in exactly the same way. God, too, cannot do everything 
He wills; there are acts which are possible for human beings and, 
consequently, impossible for Him. His will, too, is rather His wish 
and not a choice between various possible acts.33 
Divine freedom 
God, just as human beings, is not really free in his acting. Since 
He knows everything—also the benefits of all possible acts -, He is 
entirely determined by the whole of the existent and non-existent 
reality. For not-knowing some benefit or assuming that in some 
act there is a kind of benefit which actually is not in that act, is 
impossible for God. His acts are determined by what really is the 
most beneficial for beings in this world. 
Determinism 
We conclude that 'Abd al-Jabbâr's determinism is not an attempt 
to defend the notion of God's omnipotence or to uphold the theory 
31
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32
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of absolute predestination; God is as determined as human beings 
and other acting beings in this world. This determinism has to be 
explained through 'Abd al-Jabbâr's desire to create a coherent system. 
In this system, in which both God and the world find their place, 
everything is fundamentally knowable and predictable. Thus, it is 
in order to create this coherent and logical theological system, in 
which nothing escapes the laws of logic and which leaves no room 
for mysteries, that 'Abd al-Jabbâr arrives at this doctrine, which 
involves an actual determinism, although he in principle denies that 
acts are entirely determined. 
4. GOD'S SPF.F.CH AND HIS REVELATION 
God's speech 
God's speech is one of His acts, and just as all His acts, God brings 
it into existence not in Himself—that would affect His unity—but in 
this world. Since God's speech is really speech existing in this world, 
it must be of the same genus—the same kind—as other speech 
existing here, human speech (and the speech of angels and demons). 
Consequently, it is audible spoken speech and it belongs to the 
accident sound.34 Speech, in the strict sense of the word, is only what 
is spoken and heard, not what is written down or what is memorized. 
This implies that speech is not something remaining; sound and 
spoken words are produced and disappear again, the latter taking 
place without any intervention of an acting subject. Therefore, God's 
speech can be neither a book—a written text is not speech, but only 
a sign of speech once spoken—nor a person ; it is neither an eternal 
law, nor God. God's speech cannot be eternal.35 
When God performs an act, He must do it because of some benefit 
He finds in the act concerned. This cannot be His own benefit; hence, 
it must be the benefit of other beings. Consequently, whenever God 
makes speech, He necessarily does so for the benefit of human beings 
or for the benefit of other understanding beings (angels or demons); 
this implies that God cannot speak before the creation of at least one 
of those beings or without one of them at least listening to Him.36 
34
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Moreover, to be good and have some benefit, God's speech must be 
communicative and understandable for human beings; therefore, God 
must speak in an accepted human language. Such a language cannot 
have been created by God, for in that case it would be impossible 
for Him to teach man this language; consequently, language has been 
composed by man—'Abd al-Jabbâr calls it a convention—in order 
that God might use it in His speech and in His revelation to mankind.37 
Revelation 
For 'Abd al-Jabbâr revelation is speech; it is not the self-revealing 
of a divine being, not some form of emanation or incarnation, but 
pure information and exhortation expressed in human language. The 
fact and the contents of this revelation form an integral part of 'Abd 
al-Jabbâr's theological system. Most objects and structures of this 
world -and God Himself—are known by man through given knowl-
edge, knowledge directly given by God—be it on the basis of 
perception or not—and through acquired knowledge, knowledge 
resulting from further reflection upon the data of given knowledge. 
But some minor details are not known and cannot be known through 
this twofold knowledge. Because these are, nevertheless, of some 
importance for the human being, God is bound to reveal them in 
another way, in fact through his prophets. The things concerned are 
not real mysteries, but rather some ethical details which are contained 
in religious prescriptions and laws. Besides these, revelation contains 
some other information, —such as the fact that knowledge inheres 
in the heart and not in some other part of the body—which cannot be 
discovered without the assistance of this revelation. Besides this 
aspect of giving additional information, God's revelation shows an 
aspect of confirmation : it confirms the knowledge we already had 
about other things. Finally, revelation contains religious exhortations 
which can function as a kind of motives in our acting.38 But anyhow, 
in any form revelation must be for the benefit of mankind and, conse-
quently, understandable for human beings. 
Evidently, when 'Abd al-Jabbâr mentions God's speech and His 
revelation, he thinks first of all of the Quran, God's revelation 
transmitted by the angel to His prophet Muhammad, but he explicitly 
mentions also the other sacred books (such as the sacred books of 
^ СГ pp 304-305 
J
" CI" pp 100-102 
'ABO AL-JABBÂR'S THEOLOGY 419 
Jews and Christians) as also other ways in which God can speak to 
human beings.39 
Knowledge and revelation 
Revelation can lead to real knowledge, but in itself it cannot give 
this knowledge ; it needs the assistance of knowledge which is based on 
intuition (in the larger sense of the word, knowledge based on per-
ception included) and reflection upon it. For in order to be able to 
use revelation as a source of knowledge, one has to be sure that this 
concrete revelation is true and authentic. This cannot be proved by 
the revelation itself, but only by reflection upon intuitional knowledge. 
By this reflection one discovers that a miracle is needed to make the 
distinction between true and false revelation. By this reflection, too, 
one analyses the conditions which have to be fulfilled to make some-
thing a genuine miracle and the way in which it has to occur to prove 
the authenticity of a given revelation. Only if one has established that 
a given assumed revelation fulfils all conditions, one can rightly 
conclude again by this reflection—that this revelation is genuine and 
can be used as a source of knowledge.40 
A problem for every kind of theological reflection is the relationship 
between "reason" and "belief, in 'Abd al-Jabbâr's terminology 
between intuitional knowledge and revealed texts. What to do when 
these two are in contradiction with each other? For 'Abd al-Jabbâr 
this is no real problem : such a conflict can only seem to be a contra-
diction, for both intuitional knowledge and revelation are given by 
God and guaranteed by Him. In order to solve such an apparent 
contradiction, one has to interpret one of the two contradicting data. 
Intuitional knowledge is not capable of more interpretations, while 
revelation, which is language, text, can as such be interpreted in 
various ways. Therefore, in the case of such an apparent contradic-
tion 'Abd al-Jabbâr interprets the revealed text according to its context 
and according to the laws of the language system. In this way every 
conflict between intuitional knowledge and revelation can be solved.41 
Knowledge or belief 
In a theology without real mysteries, a theology in which only a 
small part of the truth is reserved for revelation, belief does not play 
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an important part. God docs not demand blind submission nor implicit 
belief. 'Abd al-Jabbâr strongly reacts against what we called traditio-
nalism and uncritical belief, two forms of accepting dogmas without 
further inquisition and proof. Such kind of belief is not according 
to God's will.42 
God demands that we reflect and thus come to real knowledge of 
Him, ourselves, and this world, for everything is fundamentally 
knowable. Revelation is proved by reflection and fits into the whole 
of the knowable system. Belief without argument or proof has no 
place in this theological system. 
The submission of man to God, his "Islam", is not found in the 
submission of his knowledge, but in his submission to God's will in 
all his acts. 
5. CONCLUSIONS 
The entire reality, both God and this world with its human beings, 
its angels, and its demons- -who as material beings form part of this 
world—constitute a closed system which forms a fundamental unity 
and obeys the "natural laws" of the system. If a reflecting person 
discovers these laws during his philosophical and theological thinking, 
he can know the structures of the system, and if he could know all 
details, he could predict everything that will happen in it. Everything 
has its place in this all-embracing system, even revelation. It is the 
task of man to reflect on what he knows of this world, and to know 
God through this reflection. Through the same reflection he can try 
to understand the whole system. 
Knowledge plays a central part in 'Abd al-Jabbâr's theology. Real 
knowledge is guaranteed by God Himself and is, consequently, abso-
lutely certain. Knowledge is proved to be true by the so-called tran-
quillity of the soul, which forms an absolute, but subjective, criterion 
of real knowledge.43 Because of the great esteem in which 'Abd al-
Jabbâr holds knowledge, it is understandable that natural theology 
—knowledge of God and reflection upon that knowledge without 
any assistance of a revelation—in 'Abd al-Jabbâr's opinion is very 
well possible. 
In 'Abd al-Jabbâr's method the perceived and known reality has 
Cf pp 43-45 
Cf pp. 47-49 
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absolute priority This reality is known to human beings, the most 
fundamental things in this world are known by everybody through 
direct experience, and can form the basis of 'Abd al-Jabbâr's system 
without demanding definitions or further explications44 Knowledge 
of God, however, does not belong to these direct experiences, God 
has to be discovered through reflection 
In the course of 'Abd al-Jabbâr's argumentations we find many 
arguments which are based on the conclusions of the science of Arabic 
grammar or on the structures of the Arabic language, language func-
tions as a kind of mirror for reality. 'Abd al-Jabbâr has great confidence 
in the structures of language as presenting an image of the structures 
of reality He is even convinced that the Arabic writing system is an 
adequate reproduction of the language itself, and thus of reality.45 
Thus, language and writing system can play their part m his argu-
mentation 
Finally, 'Abd al-Jabbâr's theology is truly Islamic Evidently, it is 
different from the Christian Scholastic theological systems, it shows 
a great number of features which are truly Islamic. The unity of 
God and His unicity, which are firmly adhered to and strongly 
defended by 'Abd al-Jabbâr, form a central theme in the Islamic 
revelation 'Abd al-Jabbâr's notion of revelation as a reminder and 
exhortation and not as a revelation of mysteries, is consistent with the 
message of the Qur'ân and with the Islamic tradition In Islam, just 
as in 'Abd al-Jabbâr's theology, man forms part of this world and 
does not belong to another world, while the divine penetrates every-
thing in this world and all acts of man, consequently, there is no 
fundamental difference between the field of God, religion, theology, 
and the field of worldly matters and philosophy. The importance of 
language, too, can be mentioned as an Islamic feature, because of the 
central rôle of the Qur'ân in Islam, much attention has always been 
given to the study of the Arabic language and language in general. 
Muslim readers may object that some of the theses adhered to by 
'Abd al-Jabbâr and the Mu'tazila are not orthodox; I ask them to 
study 'Abd al-Jabbâr's theology as an honest attempt to reflect upon 
the Islamic revelation and upon his own personal convictions, the 
convictions of a believing and convinced Muslim. 
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261, 320 
7Λ ilâh (god) 240, 263, 264, 265, 362 
Allah (God) 16, 214, 224-225, 227, 
231-235, 240-241, 324, 355, 362, 365, 
374,375, 377, 411 
'mm ¡mama 34 
'mr amr (command) 214,217,219,221, 
271, 272, 329, 343, 345, 351, 356, 360, 
376, 383 
amr bi-l-qabih (commanding evil) 88, 
269 
al-Mubarrad 19, 399 
Muhadditûn 1, 6 
Mujbira (Jabrîya) 11, 117, 118 
al-Mutawakkil 6 
Mu'tazila 4-7, 25, 29 
Nader, A 128, 201 
an-Nauâr 283, 359 
Nawâbit 23, 282 
an-Nazzâm 112, 135, 164, 252, 307 
Peters, F 56, 57 
Qutrub 399 
Rosenthal, F 42, 49, 69, 113 
as-Sàhib cf Ibn 'Abbâd 
aS-Sahhâm 18 
as-Saqqâ, M 8 
Sî'a 6, 7, 22 
Tntton, A 110, 113, 153 
•Utmân, Abd al-Karîm 8, 9, 10, 11, 13, 
55, 85, 120, 151, 160, 161, 212, 215, 
258-259, 294 
Vajda, G 25, 42, 43, 45, 49, 57, 58, 60, 
188-189, 190, 199, 259, 305 
Watt, W 20, 21, 113, 156 
Weiss, В 387 
Wensinck, A 2, 334 
Yûsufal-Basîr 24-25,182,305 
Zaydîya 7, 26 
amr bi-l-ma'rûf (the command to do 
what is approved) 5 
umûr ad-dunyâ (matters of this world) 
58-59 
umûr ad-din (matters of religion) 58-59, 
61 
amara (sign) 46, 64, 302, 390, 392, 393, 
395 
amir (commanding) 336, 345 
'ml la'ammul (contemplation) 57, 58 
'ns msân (man) 16, 159, 160-164, 402, 
404, 410-411, 415 
'hi ahi al-luga (philologists, grammar-
ians) 161, 295, 296, 297, 298, 299, 302, 
310, 313, 323, 329. 379-380, 399 
ahi an-na:ar (people who have knowl-
edge of reflection) 58, 329 
'и/ Ô/Й (defect) 176, 179, 204, 259, 313, 
339, 355, 365, 366, 382, 383, 384 
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'и/ ala (instrument) 78,82,154,166-167, 
168, 177, 183, 191, 192, 202, 207, 208, 
259, 268, 302, 305, 307, 313, 315, 317, 
322, 326, 337, 338, 339, 366, 368, 369, 
376, 378 
M'iti/ (interpretation)· 257, 277, 387, 
419 
bht baht (investigation) 57 
bkt rabUt (uncritical belief) 43-44, 46, 
"47, 56,"420 
ЬсГ ibnda (initiative) 94, 389, 390, 391. 
394. 395 
mubtada (immediate) 205-206, 208 
brd hurûda (coldness) 125,127,128,163, 
178, 179 
6fr mubâsara (directly) 116, 203, 204, 
205-206, 207. 208, 234, 268 
/nr basir (having the metaphysical possi-
bility to see) 1Ю-181, 191, 243, 244 
mubsir (seeing) 181-Ì91, 244 
btl bullan (incorrectness) 80 
ibtâl (demonstration that something is 
incorrect) 80 
bâiil (incorrect) 79-50 
al-bätil (the ontological untruth) 79-80 
b'd mubaada (being distant from) 132 
bud (distance) 187, 189, 194 
b'd bad (part) 143-144, 150, 265. 324, 
332, 333 
bqy là yabqâ (does not remain) 300, 304, 
394, 417 
bâqi (permanent, remaining) of sub-
stances 123, 124, 247, 303, 394, 396, 
410, of accidents 124. 125-126, 138 
big balága (eloquence) 339. 385 
bnv btnva (structure) 139, 140, 167-168, 
172, 173, 174. 183, 296, 305, 317, 319, 
320-323, 362 
hnh muhâh (permissible) 31. #6, 88 
byn ba\ \an (explain) 70-71 
baimi (explanation) 70 
tbt labal (be certain) 69 
albal (establish) 69, 84 
iibát (establishing) 309. 341-342, 354-
355, 374 
lâbit (certain) 84, 247 
my [am (second) 263-265, 275, 360, 399 
là ¡ani Iah (He is second to none) 263-
265, 267, 41 1 
ΠιΛ fan ab (reward) 33,271,272 
jdd ta/aíldad (become, originate) 115, 
137, 147, 232 
jz juz· (atom) 120, 121-122, 146, 190, 
191, 265, 407, 409 
pm уши (body) 112, 113, 115, 120, 121, 
122-123, 173, 206, 232, 233, 234, 256-
257, 302. 303. 407 
jmd jamad (lifeless matter) 275, 326 
jm' Ijmâ' (Consensus) 67 68, 91, 100, 
102, 103-104, 277, 311-312, 339, 340, 
346, 352, 389, 398, 399 
ijtima (combination) 73-74, 131, 133-
134, 209, 300 
jml jumla (aggregate, composite body) 
82, 123, 126, 146, 161, 162, 163, 164, 
166, 172. 173, 174, 177, 196, 200, 201, 
203, 320, 322, 324-327, 410 
jm jinn (demons) 189, 193, 194, 287-288, 
293.329.402,408,415,417 
jns jms (genus) 124, 125. 237, 239, 301, 
318, 349, 354, 391, 394, 396 
/A/ jahl (positive ignorance) 43, 46, 56, 
88, 269, 321, 346 
/иг mujâwara (vicinity) ¡31, 133, 134, 
318, 320 
jwz jâz (be permitted, factual possibility) 
280, 283 
tajwiz (admitting that it may be other-
wise) 46, 75 
jMhr janhar (substance) 82, 119-121, 
122, 123, 165, 178, 179, 181, 182, 187, 
197, 203, 206, 210, 232, 256-257, 259, 
307, 321 
hbb mahabba (love) 220 
hdd hadd (définition) 58, 70, 76-78, 79, 
294. 305-307 
hdi hadit an-na/s (talk of the soul) 62-6J, 
194 309, 310 
hudui (coming into existence) 111, 115, 
202 205. 233 
/At/of (bringing into existence) 198, 204, 
402,409, 412 
hádil (coming into existence, temporal) 
106, 110-113. 114. 116. 117. 119, 147, 
198, 219, 275, 357, 392 
muhdil (producer, bringing into exis-
tence) 113, 114-115, 116, 232, 233, 
235, 246, 249, 268 
muhdal (produced, brought into exis-
tence, temporal) 106. 110. 113-115, 
116 117, 119. 232, 233, 245, 246, 256, 
275, 332, 336, 351, 352, 373, 397, 399 
hd» fuW«r//"(challengc) 389-390,395,396 
Α(Λι ihlulâ' (imitation) 388. 390. 394, 395 
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/in haiwci (warmth) 125, 127, 128. 161, 
178, 179 
Ar/ har/ (lellcr) 294, 295-299, 300-107, 
316. 318. 321. 324. 326. 327. 350 354. 
357. 359. 368. 374, 385. 388, 389. 391. 
392. 393, 396. 397. 401 
hrk Ишака (movement) 113, 130-131, 
136. 139, 141, 304, 307, 309, 317-320, 
325, 347 394 
Ли Aima (sense) 82. 179, 245, 258, 260 
Аш hemm (good) 31, 67, 85, SS. 219, 
221, 266, 270-271, 282, 286, 287, 288, 
290. 336, 337, 385. 3S6-3S7, 412, 415 
iAfâ;i (doing good) S6 
hsl basai (originate) 110, 116, 147, 294, 
300 
A/r A//.- (memory) 302, 388, 389, 391, 
395-396 
mahfùz (memori/ed) 297. 302, 323, 391 
AÍ/Í/ hat/q li (be entitled to) 240 
islahaqq (deserve, be entitled to) S5-S6, 
87, 88, 152-153, 240 
haqiqa (reality) 58. 77, 7S-79, 118, 294 
hkm hukm (judgement) 71-72,89,115, 
155-156, 158, 169, 230, 254, 255, 316. 
325. 351 
muhkam (precise) 102, 215, 241, 351 
hb hikáva (reproduction) 99, 282, 283, 
286, 287, 290. 332, 333, 340, 352. 353, 
375, 382, 3SS-397 
mahki (reproduced) 388, 389, 390, 393, 
394 
A// hall (inhere) 123, 124, 259, 313, 
314-317.324,331,361 
halâl (permitted) 86 
mahall (substrate). 121, 123, 126, '27-
128. 132, 139, 142, 154, 167, 168, 
172. 186, 187-188, 191, 203. 215, 
257-258. 275-276, 287, 288, 301, 305. 
313. 314-324, 326, 328, 352, 368, 373, 
374, 375, 376, 393 
hmd Muhammad 214,276,339,340,352, 
388, 396, 400, 401 
Any ihiáj (need) 318 
häja (need) 260-262, 269-270 
muhlâ/ (needing) 260-262 
An/ hai (state) 114, 116, 117, 125, /45-
148, 154, 171, 175, 195, 196, 197, 207, 
210, 213, 214, 228, 235-248, 251, 252, 
253, 266, 286, 309, 313, 314, 320, 321, 
322, 324-327, 328, 329, 338, 342, 347, 
349, 374, 410 
hyy ha)y (living) 126,127-128,134,135, 
159, 160, 162. 163. 164. 168-173. 174, 
175, 243, 244, 247, 249, 254, 275-276, 
313, 324-327, 348. 355. 366. 367, 368, 
410 
Ama/(life) 127, 128. 164, 168-173, 174. 
177. 181. 192. 319, 320, 321 
haxawân (animili) 159, 160, 168-169 
Air liihciMii: (being spatial) 120, 121, 
172. 178. 257. 258 
mutahawi: (spatial) 110, 112. 120. 122, 
123, 145, 256, 257 
khi kabar (information) 34. 214, 217, 
219. 221, 269, 271, 272. 329, 343. 356, 
360. 398, 399 
mukhir (informing) 336, 346 
kr/ makraj (/one of articulation) 296, 
307, 315, 323 
krs karas (dumbness) 151.311,355, 368, 
369, 370 
ukras (dumb) 339. 364. 366, 368. 369. 
370 
kr' iklira (direct immediate production) 
99, 116, 118. 203, 204, 205. 206, 234, 
237, 238. 256. 267 
fççv ikia\s (be confined to, characten/e) 
320, 322, 328, 362, 368. 383 
akass al-awsâf (the most characteristic 
qualification) 77, 178. 303. 376 
aka\î al-'ihârâl (the most characteristic 
expression) 77 
ktb kitáh (message) 99, 102, 271, 276, 345 
kir kálir (warning) 63-65, 194. 218, 340 
kl/ mukâlif (different) 353-360 
'klq kalq (creation) 117-119, 198, 291, 
383,400, 401, 409 
kâhq (creator) 119,268 
makluq (created) 110, 117-119, 283, 
287, 289, 332, 333, 336, 351, 352, 383, 
397-401 
fcii/ kan/ (fear) 46 
k\r iktnâr (free choice) 67, 101, 220, 
221, 367, 391,414,416 
muklâr (choosing) 212 
dhr tadabbur (consideration) 57 
drk la yudrak (imperceptible) 260 
idrâk (perception) 54, 93-94, 164, /75-
/77, 224, 303, 316, 325, 405, 407, 411, 
420-421 
mudnk (perceiving) 159, 160, 162, 164, 
170, /75-/Í0, 243-244. 246, 247, 249, 
250, 254, 260, 275, 348, 355, 
367, 411 
mudrak (perceptible) 106, 124-125. 138, 
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145, 178-Ì79, 224, 244, 246, 260, 300, 
303, 391, 404-405 
if и da'nâ (allegation) 366 
dâ'i (motive) 65, 67, 114, 199, 205, 
207, 210, 212, 216, 218-219, 222, 228, 
270, 272, 328, 329, 413, 414, 415 
df daf ad-darr (repulsion of harm) 91, 
216, 218, 260-261 
dll daìl (indicate) 65, 70, 71 
isladall (infer) 65, 68, 81, 92, 229, 270 
dalil (indication) 46, 59, 60, 65-68, 69, 
70, 75, 81, 84, 92, 99, 100, 101, 102, 
103, 224-225, 229, 230, 270 276, 290, 
301, 355, 358, 359,405, 406 
datala (indication) 59, 65-68, 91, 99 
madlùl (indicated) 59, 60, 65, 66, 68, 
70, 81, 84 
dkr tadakkur (remembrance) 62 
dmm damm (blame) 85, 86, 87, 88, 89, 
269, 271 
¿и dai (essence) 148, 254, 264, 274, 321 
li-dâtih (per se, by its essence) 147, 
148-149, 153, 233, 237, 242, 243, 244, 
250, 252, 253, 256, 261, 262, 263, 
341-348 
r'\ là \urâ (invisible) 25Ä-260 
ru'va (inspection, seeing) 71, 94 
mtr'ât (mirror) 183, 184, 186, 259 
rai (seeing) 178, 180, 181-191, 243, 244, 
259 
r:q nzq (sustenance) 32 
rsl rasûl (prophet) 95 
rsm rasm (trace) 331 
rdy rida (contentment) 220 
rib rutûba (wetness) 127,128,165 
rqq nqqa (subtlety) 165,189,190 
raqiq (subtle) 190 
ruh ruh (spirit) 164-165, 410 
räiha (odour) 125, 127 128, 178, 179, 
320 
rnd irâda (will) 127,128,206 207, 2Г2, 
213,214-218. 220, 221, 222, 228, 266-267, 
272, 273-276, 315, 316, 326, 327-328, 
329. 360, 380,400,413,415,416 
irádat al-qabih (willing evil) 88 269 
murid (willing) 159, 160, 162, 211-215, 
246 249. 250, 266-267. 271-273, 274-
276 348 
murad (willed) 216, 217, 218, 219-220, 
274, 287 
shh sabab (secundary cause) 78,133,134, 
136-137, 141, 149, 197 204, 205, 206-
207, 208-209, 217, 228, 236, 301, 307, 
319, 322 337 381, 389, 391, 392 
sir sâtir (concealing) 186,187,188,189 
ski sakat (detestation) 222 
irr surûr (happiness) 91, 261 
ski suküt (silence) 142, 311, 355, 368, 
369, 370 
sâkit (silent) 310, 339, 364, 366, 368, 
369, 370 
skn sukún (immobility) 49, 129, 130, 140, 
319 
sukûn an-nafs (tranquillity of the soul) 
43, 45. 47, 48-50, 52, 59, 166, 180, 241 
•ilm islam! (Islamic) 407,421 
sm ism (name) 30, 157, 160, 161, 162, 
251, 266, 298-299, 310, 374-376, 377, 
391, 397, 398 
smi samt (straight line) 183,185,189 
sm' sam (revelation) 15, 35, 91, 92, 
95-100. 215, 224, 225, 276-277, 387, 398, 
404, 407, 416, 417-420 
vam'i (known by revelation) 91, 100, 
101, 258, 276-277,350,404 
•¡ami (having the metaphysical possi-
bility to hear) ¡91, 244-245 
samt' (hearing) 178, 180, /92-/94, 245 
sun Sunna (the '"way" of the prophet) 
6, 67, 91, 100, 102-103, 104, 277. 339, 
346, 352, 398 
шппі (related to the Sunna) 6, 20 
ІАИ sahn (unconsciousness, oblivion) 
321, 326 
sbh iubha (sophism) 59, 75, 94, 364 
mulasâbih (obscure) 11, 102, 276-277 
flm îâtim (insulting) 395 
φ taks (person) 160,161,162,164 
tri san (condition) 244, 245, 248, 255, 
275, 345, 348, 367 
fr' «jr'í (related to divine legislation) 
34,66. 71,96, 155 398 
Г sua (rays) 183-191, 259 
iqq i4taqq (get a name) 375-376 
чкк sakk (doubt) 42, 45, 47, 94 
slid ai-iâhid (this world) 72, 226, 243, 
293, 407-409 
fAn KïAita (desire) 127, 128, 213, 216, 
221-222, 223, 261,262, 272 
mu f labi (desiring) 213,261-262 
íiir ішга (gesture, pointing) 161, 359, 
386 
H ' say' (thing) /06,144,219 
SÌ к sai к (teacher) 16-17 
shh sahh (be correct, be possible) 80, 280, 
286 
sihha (correctness, possibility, sound­
ness) 59 66, 67, SO, 94, 170, 195, 
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196, 197, /99, 202, 235, 236, 254, 337, 
368 
чаИіИ(correct) 9,60,80-81,182,188, 192, 
304 
laMh (demonstration that something is 
correct) 80 
sdq fädiq (veracious) 346-347 
fdv sadâ (echo) 315, 322, 324, 326, 327, 
328, 368 
skk mumkka (striking) 141, 307, 314, 
319, 337-338 
sib salaba (solidity, hardness) 139, 140, 
317, 323 
slh salâh (advantage) 89, 90, 91 
snt imif (sound) 125, 126, 127, 128, 
¡3&-142, 178, 179, 191, 192-194, 206, 
238, 286, 287, 288, 290, 296, 297, 299, 
301-302, 303, 305, 306, 314, 315, 316, 
317, 319, 321, 323, 327, 350, 375, 385, 
388. 389, 390, 391, 394, 417 
snr sura (shape) 161-162 
ddd didd (opposite) 111, 133, 142-143, 
173, 202, 238. 257, 264, 315, 316, 318, 
320, 321, 339, 342, 354, 367, 368, 370 
drr darr (harm) 89, 91, 223 
4rb darb (kind) 343, 346, 349, 367 
trq fari? (way) 93, 94, 180 
I'm tarn (taste) 125, 127, 128, 178, 179, 
320 
tw' tata* ни' (voluntary good deed) 86 
islitá'a (faculty) 32, 201 
twq làqa (capability) 201 
zlm zulm (wrongdoing) 88, 269 
zulma (darkness) 185-186 
znn zann (assumption) 45-47, 56, 127, 
128, 206, 216, 218, 238 
¿arm sandali (melancholic assumption) 
46 
zhr zâhir (self-evident) 84 
'bt 'abat (uselessness) 88, 89-90, 269, 
282, 288, 343, 345, 358, 360, 382, 387, 
402 
'br 'ibára (expression) 282, 283, 330, 332, 
333, 358, 375, 382 
'jz 'ajz (inability) 326, 366, 368 
i'jáz (immitability) 99, 285, 340, 389, 
390, 395 
mujiz (miracle) 96,97-99, 276,340,419 
'dd 'adad (number) 203, 237, 238 
'di 'adi (justice) 4, 5, 29, 30, 31, 32-35, 
37, 269, 276, 280, 281, 285, 289, 291, 
412 
'dm ma'dum (non-existent) : 106, 707-
109, 111, 116, 147, 198, 204. 209, 219, 
275, 316, 345,409, 412-413 
'rd 'arad (accident) 111, 119, 123-128, 
145, 149, 150. 157, 191. 197, 203, 206, 
207, 208-209, 210, 232, 234, 257, 258, 
259, 287, 288, 299, 300, 302-303, 307, 
314, 331, 373, 396, 409 
'rf ma'nfa (cognition) 51, 56, 82 
ma'rûf (known) 82 
'zm 'azm (decision) 221 
'qd l'iiqâd (conviction) 41-56, 82, 89, 
127, 128, 206, 211, 216, 218, 238, 321 
mu'taqid (convinced) 40-42 
'ql 'aql (intuition) 15, 82-83, 86, 91, 
92-93, 211,224,405,419 
hujjat at-'aql 67, 91, 100 
'aql! (based on intuition) 66, 67, 71, 91, 
100, 101, 258, 276-277, 405 
'áqil (compos mentis) 54-55, 83-84, 93, 
94, 180, 211 
ma'qui (known by intuition, reason-
able) 82-84, 90, 152, 294, 500, 355, 
369 
'11 i'lall (to mention as the cause) 65-69 
'¡lia (cause) 41, 66, 67, 68, 71, 115, 
126, 148, 149-150, 155, 156, 182, 208-
209, 215, 229, 230, 231, 274, 275, 311, 
313, 342, 343,380, 381 
h-'illa (because of a cause, per accidens) 
148, 153, /56-/5«, 171, 200, 233, 234, 
349 
ma'lûl (effect) 68, 69, 149-150. 381 
lq taalluq (connection) 41, 209, 210, 
246, 264, 301, 322, 348. 358, 359 
'Im 'ilm (knowledge) 15, 47-56, 57, 74, 
82, 83, 89, 167, 173, 209, 211, 216, 218, 
241, 242, 251, 301, 309, 321, 338, 391, 
405, 406, 420 
'ilmdarwi (necessary knowledge) 55-55, 
91, 92, 93, 218, 227, 228, 229, 309, 
310, 321,325,359,405,406,418 
'dm muklasab (acquired knowledge) 53, 
55, 91,95, 229, 321, 325, 406, 418, 419 
'ahm (knowing) 50, 159, 160, 162, 169, 
179-180, 211, 213, 215, 241-243, 245, 
246, 249, 250, 254, 270, 301, 325, 338, 
346 
malum (known) 81-82, 108, 242 
ma'lûm bi-1-id/irâr (necessarily known) 
81 
ma'lûm bi-1-iklisâb (known by acquired 
knowledge) 81 
'md ítimad (pressure) 127, 128, 135-137, 
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138, 141, 190, 206. 208, 209. 238, 314, 
319, 320, 337 
'ml mustämal (operative) 304 
'ny wane (meaning) 12,30,117.196,298 
mano (qualifier) 42, 50, 94, 112. ПО, 
/Тб-Ш, 171, 172, 175, 200, 215, 236, 
242, 246. 247, 252, 262, 267, 274, 275, 
307-312, 313, 325, 342, 343, 349, 356, 
374, 375, 384 
'\\d 'âda (usage) 98 
'wel 'iwad (compensation) 33 
grd garad (objective) 218,272 
gny ^«/'(self-sufficient) 262-265,270,415 
gyb al-gayb and al-gâ'ib (the other 
world) 72, 101, 226-227, 243, 293. 330, 
407-409 
'ilm al-ça\b (knowledge of the other 
world) 227-231. 270 
gyr gatr (other) 143-144, 331, 332, 336, 
350, 360, 361-363 
fr' jar' (derivative) 54, 71 
frq mujäraqa (separation from) 132 
ijlirâq (separation) 132, 134. 135, 137, 
209, 321 
fid f asad (wrongness, unsoundness) SO, 
311, 366 
/asid (wrong) 80 
fir laf sir (commentary) 12, 78, 102 
fsh faiáha (purity of language) 385 
Jil mfasal (separate oneself from) 183, 
184-185, 190 
idi tafaddul (favour) 33, 86, 281 
ƒ / / r / ( ac t ) 31, 114, 115-117, 123, 127, 
195. 196, 197-198, 199, 203. 205, 209, 
216, 217, 219, 249. 266-27/, 289, 291, 
298-299, 301, 325, 328, 337, 339, 342, 
360,374,383,397,412-413,414,415,416 
ftlmuhkam(precise act) 51-52, 241, 254, 
301, 325 
afâl al-jauánh (acts of the limbs) 127, 
132, 166, 203 
afâl al-qulûb (acts of the heart) 127, 
166, 203, 215, 216, 221, 322 
filiva ("factuahty") 314, 338, 339 
fail (acting subject, doer, maker) 114, 
116, 154, 196-197, 198, 204, 205, 209-
2/0, 232. 233, 235, 266, 267-268, 287, 
288, 291, 313, 314, 327-329, 337, 338, 
342, 369, 375 
bi-1-fâ'il ("by the doer", because of the 
acting subject) 147, 153, 234, 245, 
246, 247, 262 
ma/d/imade) 110, ¡15-117, 119, 331-
332,336, 351, 383,400 
fkr fikr (thought) 58. 62 
lafkir (thought) 57, 62, 309, 310 
ta/akkiir (thought) 62 
Jn\ /ana (annihilation) 108.127,321 
/li/ fa ida (meaning) 282,298,301.304 
mu/id (communicative) 298, 300, 301, 
304-305. 306, 307, 354, 356, 357. 358, 
359. 386-387, 392, 418 
qbh qabih (evil) 31, 85, 87-88, 219, 221, 
266, 272, 337, 345, 358, 360, 389, 399, 
415 
là ) afal al-qabih (He does no evil) 269-
27/ 
qbl muqâbala (being in front of) 259 
qdr qudra (ability) 127, 128. 164, 173, 
198, 200-204, 209, 234, 237, 238, 310, 
366, 376 
qadir (almighty) 237, 239 
taqdtr (determination) 118. 397, 401 
даЛг (able) 31, 141, 159, 160, 162, 163, 
164, 169, /95-200, 201-205. 209, 213. 
215, 230, 234. 235-240. 243-250, 254, 
263, 264-267, 274 301, 325, 336, 337, 
338, 351, 366, 370, 381,413,416 
maqdm (possible) 202, 203, 204-206, 
218. 219. 237, 238, 264, 300, 304, 
351,413,416 
muqaddar (determined) 118-119, 268, 
397, 398, 399, 400 
qdm qadim (eternal) 110,112,113,114, 
116, 232, 233, 235, 246-247, 248, 256, 
257, 261-262, 263, 264, 275, 282, 284, 
334, 335, 349-353, 354, 355, 359, 360, 
361, 364. 365, 373, 374. 378, 401 
qr' qiraa (recitation) 389. 390, 394 
Qur'än 99-102, 104, 115, 257, 271-272, 
276, 277, chapter three 
Qur'ân (discussions about its being 
created) 1-3, 37-38, 117-118, 286. 
397-401 
maqru (recited) 389. 390, 394 
qrb qurb (nearness) ¡31, 187, 188, 189 
muqâraba (proximity) / J / 
qrn qar'ma (context) /02, 387 
qsm qism (part) 298, 299, 329, 343, 344, 
346, 349, 356, 367 
qnma cf taqslm 
laqsim (division) 71, 72-74, 79, 88, 313, 
328, 341 
qsd ^(«(/(intention) 89,114,205,207,212, 
214, 218, 22/, 228, 272, 309, 327-328, 
329, 345, 351, 356, 389, 391, 396, 397, 
414 
qâsid (intending) 212, 214, 272 
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ql' maqia' (place of articulation) · 296. 302 
muqaiiä (articulated) 138-139, 296. 301, 
302, 305, 391 
q'd qauki (basis) 183, 186 
qlb í/íjft(hcarl) 49,166-167, 172, 215, 287, 
308, 322. 410 
qld taqlici (traditionalism) : 43-44, 46. 47, 
56, 420 
qwy. qúwa (might, faculty) 82, 201 
qvs qivâs (analogy, deduction through 
analogy). 71-72. 100, 155, 229, 230-231, 
369, 370, 408, 409 
ktb kitaba (writing). 295, 296, 302, 304. 
357, 359, 376, 388, 389, 390-391. 392, 
393, 394. 395. 396,421 
maktûh (written)· 297, 302, 323, 391, 
394 
it// kalif (thick, compact) · 190-191 
kdb kadib (lie): 88, 269, 343, 346-347, 
386, 398, 399.415 
kâdib (lying) : 345-347, 386 
krh karâha (non-will). 127, 128, 206, 222, 
266-267 
ikráh (compulsion) 89 
kánh (non-willing) 212, 222, 249, 250, 
266-267. 274 
ksh kasb (acquisition) : 31, 204, 338, 359 
kfr kufr an-m'ma (ingratitude) · 88, 269 
klf taklif (imposing duties) : 8, 32-35, 40, 
96-97, 159, 161, 162, 195, 202, 211, 215, 
224, 225. 266, 271, 272, 345, 351, 402 
taklif 'aqli wa-taklif santi 33, 39 
laklif ma là yulâq (imposing unat-
tainable duties). 88, 269, 379 
mukallaf (responsible). 103, 159-164, 
194, 195. 202-203, 211, 402, 404, 414 
klm kalâm (speech) • 100, 125, 126, 137, 
142, 157, 178. 238, 267, chapter three, 
411,417-420 
kalâm (speculative theology) 3-4, 10, 
11, 15, 39, 224 
kalâm kafi (hidden speech): 62-63, 193, 
309 " 
kalâm nafû wa-kalâm lafzi : 332, 349 
taklim (addressing, speech to someone) : 
335, 344. 345 
mukalhm (addressing) : 344, 345 
mulakallim (speaking). 158, 210, 267, 
278, 279, 283, 284, 286, 287, 290, 
291, 310, 311, 312, 313-329, 330, 336, 
337, 338, 339, 340-348 
km! • kamâl al-'aql (completeness of the 
intuition) : 55. 92-93, 227 
it и·« кип (be1)· 345, 351, 365. 377-382 
kann (mode of being) 109-110, 111-114, 
120. 122, 125, 127, 128-130, 131. 132, 
133, 140, 172, 206, 209, 232, 233, 238, 
256. 301.318-320 
makân (place). 186. 187, 333 
kâ'm (being in space). 109-110. 120, 154, 
247, 256 
α таГак (angel) · 159, 189, 190, 193, 194, 
287-288, 293, 340, 388. 402. 408, 415, 417 
lbs. dubas (ambiguity, vagueness)· 94, 
180, 190 
//'. djà' (constraint) : 89, 220 
lijd ¡adda (pleasure). 91, 134, 261 
hm ilzäm (argumentum ad hominem) · 71, 
74-75, 228-229,371 
Im hsán (tongue) : 322, 323-324, 368, 393 
/// luif (divine assistance) 33 
" /orí/(thin)· 183, 186, 190-191 
Ohi higa (language) 109, 295, 304, 305, 
356, 362-363, 386, 387, 418, 421 
IH h. ІанИ (tablet): 394 
Лги- /min (colour)· 125, 127, 128, 138, 
178-182, 187-191, 315-316, 320, 354 
mdh madh (praise) 85-89, 271 
mss • mimuissa (touching). 132-133, 137, 
208. 234 
mn man (hinder): 60. 61, 196, 199-200, 
203, 204, 209, 237, 238 
tamanu' (mutual hindering) 264-265 
mâm (hindrance)· 176, 179, 182. 185-
186, 188-191. 192, 193-194, 199-200, 
207, 258, 259, 260. 272, 273 
mn»· tamanni(wish): 221 
mn-t ma» I (death) : 173-174, 175, 320, 321, 
327, 401 
mayyii (dead) • 173-174 
nbw nabi (prophet) · 95, 190, 225, 386 
nubûwa (prophecy) · 95-100 
ndb nadh (recommended) • 31, 86-87 
nzl al-manzila bayn al-manzdatayn (the 
intermediate position). 5, 155 
nzh tanzih (de-anlhropomorphism) 12 
nzr nazar (reflection): 15-16, 55, 57-61, 
62, 64, 68, 71, 92, 127, 128, 206, 208, 
209, 229, 238, 326, 404, 406, 419, 420 
näzir (reflecting) : 40, 41, 52, 57, 406 
nzm mzâm (arrangement). 241, 294, 298, 
299-300, 392 
manzûm (arranged) : 305, 306, 356 
n'm ¡nam (benefaction) : 56 
φ- najra (aversion): 127, 128, 134-135, 
216, 223, 261, 320 
nufûr : cf. nafra 
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nji nafs (soul) 49, 148, ¡65-166, 287, 308, 
384 
h-nafsih (per se) 147, 148-149, 153, 
166, 171, 246. 264, 341-Ì4H, 372 
là h-nafsih wa-lá li-illa 348-349, 372 
nafas (breath) 165,315,326 
nf naf (bencFit) 88-90, 91, 213, 216, 218, 
221 260-261, 386, 387,413 
manfa'a (benefit) 91 
nfl na/1 (supererogation) 87 
nf) lanâ/î (mutual exclusion) 142, 347, 
368, 369. 370, 388 
nql mliqál (transportation) 138, 183, 
192-193, 232, 303, 316 
nhv nahy (prohibition) 329, 343, 345, 
351, 356, 360, 376 
nâhî (prohibiting) 336, 345 
hml muhmal (inoperative) 304, 306 
wjb wujûb (necessity) 66, 195, 197, 199, 
375, 380-381, 391 
ijâh (reductio ad absurdum) 75 
и âjib (obligatory) 31. 33, 87, 416 
wâ/ib mukavyar wa-nâjtb mudayvaq 31, 
87 
Hjd и ajad nafsah (to find oneself) 41, 45, 
54-55, 57, 146, 147, 169, 195, 211-212, 
309, 325 
Mijdân mm an-nafs (direct self-expe-
rience) cf и ajad najsah 
wujûd (existence) 107, 145, 153 
ijád (making existent) 198, 206, 268 
maHjûd (existent) 106-107, 108, 110, 
117, 119, 145, 147, 153, 198, 245-246, 
247-250, 254, 259-260, 324 
Hjh jiha (direction, place) 129,136,206, 
209 
на/Л (way, aspect) 52-53, 87, 89, 269, 
386,415 
и Ы toHhid (belief in God's unity) 4, 5, 
29, 34,251,411 
illihâd (incarnation) 352, 355, 408 
иáhid (one, unique) 265 
HSHS Mas»as (whispering, temptation by 
a demon) 64 
nsf sifa (quality) 31, 144, 145, 151-155, 
155-158, 170, 180, 230, 248-255, 331-
333, 361, 374-375, 384 
as-sifa ad-dàtiya (the essential quality) 
252 
si/ai ad-dât (essential quality) 31, 171, 
248-249, 256, 263, 264, 266, 341, 342, 
343, 350, 359-360 
sifat al-fi'l (factual quality) 31, 210, 
248-249, 266, 338, 367 
sifat an-najv (negative quality) 262 
sifäl ar-rasûl (qualities of the prophet) 
102-103 
n<H/(qualification) 67,/5/-/54,250,251 
mawsûf (qualified) /50,313 
HSI ittisál (contact) 137, 183, 186, /57-
188, 193, 328 
udh avidah (elucidate) 70, 71 
»d muHÛda'a (convention) 304, 305, 
356, 357, 386-387, 392, 393, 396, 418 
n'd иa'd (promise) 5,101 
vi a M (threat) 5, 101 
и«?/ ytaqt (time-atom) 129-130,197 
»qf taviqif (creation of language) 304, 
386-387 
и W taw lid (generating) 32,60-6/, 116, 
133,134,137,138,197, 203, 204, 206-208, 
228, 234, 267, 305, 319, 322, 381, 
391,392,410 
munallid (generating) 268 
mulawallid (generated) 197, 203, 205, 
2 0 6 - m 228, 236, 305, 314 
и/> и ilâya (pietas) 220-221 
»hm tauahhum (suspicion) 46 
whw wahâ (cleavage) 134-135 
ybs -yubûsa (dryness) 127,128 







acts of the heart af âl al-qulub 
acts of the limbs af âl al-jawânh 
acting subject fail 
actor fail 
admitting that it may be otherwise tajwiz 









animal haya» an 
annihilation /ana 




articulation (place of) maqia' 
assistance (divine) lut/ 
assumption zann 
assumption (melancholic) zann sawdâwi 
atom juz' 
atomism 121,129-130.131,409-410 
aversion nafra, nufûr 
basis qâ'ida 
be ' кип 
become tajaddad, basal 
being in space kam 
belief (uncritical) tabk'n 
benefaction mam 




bring into existence ihdâl 
cause 'ilia 
cause (secondary) sabab 
certain lábil 
challenge tahaddi 









coming into existence hâdit, hudût 
commanding âmir 




compos mentis 'âqil 





















creation of language /o» qif 
creator kâliq 
darkness zulma 
dead m a m / 
de-anthropomorphism tanzih 



























entitled to (to be) haqq ft, istahaqq 
essence dal 
establish atbat 




etymology 98, 109 
evil qabih 







faculty (/мча, iitiiaa 
favour tafaddul 
fear kimf 
free choice iktivár 
generated mutawallid 















hindering (mutual) tamânu' 
hindrance mam' 
ignorance (positive) jahl 
immediate mublada' 
immobility sukûn 
imperceptible la \udrak 






indication dalli, datala 
infer isladall 
information kahar 




















knowledge (necessary) 'dm daruri 
knowledge (acquired) 'i/m muktasab 
known ma'lûm, ma'rûf 






linguists ahi аі-іица 
356, living hay\ 
love mahabha 
lying kâdih 
made maf HI 
make existent í/ád 
maker fad 
man imán 
meaning ma'nâ, faida, haqïqa 
memori/ed mahfúz 
memory hif: 








name (get a) iMaqq 
nearness qwb 
necessary darin i 
necessity » u/ùb 
need ihlai 
neutral acts 86, 88-89, 270 






odour râ ilia 
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person kik ч 
pietas \\ilá\a 
phenomenal 404-405 





possible (metaphysically) τσΛΛ 











prophet nabi rasii/ 
proximity muqâraba 
purit\ ol language /asâha 
qualification »atf 




















seeing га"?, mubsir, ru'ya 
self-evident zâhir 
self-experience и ijdän mm an-najs 
self-sufficient gani 
sense HcLssa 
separate oneself from mfaial 








sound гаи / 





straight line samt 
striking musâkka 
structure b¡n\a 







tablet Um h 
talk of the soul hadît an-nafs 
taste ta'm 




thick kat if 
thin latif 
thing ray' 
thought fikr, tafkir, tafakkur 
threat H a'id 
time-atom и tiqt 
touching mumâssa 
traditionalism taqlid 












value acts 88-89 
vicinity ти/ан ara 
voluntary good deed taiawwu' 
warmth harära 
warning kânr 







world (this) aS-sâhid 





zone of articulation makraj 
D INDEX OF TEXTS QUOTED, TRANSLATED, OR DISCUSSED 
MugniW, 8 156,261 
II 261 
14 91 
15 91, 135 
33 153, 179, 180 
36 177, 181 
50 182 
58 183 
59 156, 183 
61 185 
64 184, 186 
66 186, 186-187, 187 




81 93, 177 
83 178 









MugniV, 210 240 
259 29 














Mugn! VII, 3 293, 336 
4 20 
5 285, 286 
6 70, 72, 76, 112, 122 
6-7 296 
7 70,78,78-79,301 
8 70, 78, 157, 306 
9 299 
10 304, 306 
11 306, 307 
12 80-81,307 







34 140, 141 
36 132, 133, Π 7 




























MugniVUl, 63 205 





MugniXl, 64 89,90 
191 90 
















Mugni XII, 4 58,77,79, 153 








20 49, 50 
22 49, 166 
23 49, 51 


















Mugni XIV, 35 90 
461 33 
Mugni XV, 17 97 
19-21 96 
Mugni XVI, 433 33 
Mugni XVII, 4 34 
92 34 
94 101, 102 
153 103 
280 71 
Mugni XX/2, 255-257 15 
259 34 
262 28 




33 109, 129, 130, 131, 132 
38 84 











107 203, 237 
113 51.241 
121 169, 173 
121-122 170 
126 127 









209 188, 189, 190 
212 261 
227 290 
229 116, 117 
230 117 
230-231 89 
269 272, 273 
274 273 
312 169 








366 132, 134 
367 132, 205 
368 205-206 




45 57, 58, 59, 79 
46 48, 77 
46-47 48 


























167 181, 191 
168 175 








220 121, 167 













395 45, 46, 199 
396 202 











54 281 826 281 
531 157 Tan:ih al-Qur'än 3-4 11-12 
538-539 328 dl-As'arî Maqálál 172 151,251 
539 328 173 251 
542 283 425 302 307-308 
548 117,118 al-Bâqillânî Tamhid 262 250 
549 283 /ліа/62 332-333 
558 283 Ibn Hd/m al-Fiwl III. 7 335 
564 96-97 9 335 
569 98 Ibn dl-Murtddâ Tabaqât 112 7 
570 98 113 8 
573 103 105-107 17-19 
576 103 dt-Tdbdri Annales III, 1112-1113 2-3 
600 102 Washal Ahi Hanîja. article 9 2 
F INDEX OF EMENDATIONS SUGGESTED 


















MugniVl 1, 38 
43 
M ugni VI 2, 58 














































































































80 347, 348 
82 349 
82-83 148 
83 348 349 






































































































MugmlX, 60 135 
141 136 






MugmXXn, 187 268 
190 268 
255 15 
Muhitì, 33 131 




168 (Egyptian edition) 230 
198 123 
208 189 
209 189, 190 
230-231 89 
265 (Egyptian edition) 272 









324 138, 192 SurA, 129 252 
329 342 219 120 
349 364 220 121 
351 (Egyptian edition) 137 257 190 
367 137 354 311 
393 200 538 324 
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STELLINGEN 
I 
Voor de vervaardiging van een correcte editie van oude, onvolledig van 
diacntische punten voorziene, Arabische manuscripten is het noodzake-
lijk, dat de bewerker de inhoud van de te editeren teksten volledig 
begrijpt, alvorens hij een begin maakt met de reconstructie ervan 
II 
De bestudering van 'Abd al-Jabbâr en zijn œuvre binnen de Perzische 
religieus- en cultuurhistorische context kan een zeer waardevolle bijdrage 
leveren tot een vollediger begrip van deze auteur en van de latere 
Mu'tazila, deze studie dient echter gebaseerd te zijn op een nauwkeurige 
terminologische en inhoudelijke analyse van zijn werken 
(Cf Guy Monnot, Penseurs Musulmans el religions iramennes, 
Paris-Le Caire-Beyrouth 1974 ) 
III 
De toepassing van een literair-stilistische analyse op het oeuvre van 
al-óazdlï — en dat van andere moslim-auteurs — om de authenticiteit 
van bepaalde werken te toetsen zal het meeste resultaat hebben, wanneer 
deze zich concentreert op het consequent en accuraat gebruik van het 
technische wetenschappelijke vocabulaire in de betreffende werken 
(Cf H Lazarus-Yafeh, Studies m al-Gltazzalt, Jerusalem 1975) 
IV 
Voor een goed begrip van de traditie betreffende al-As'arï's bekering 
en de verschillende fasen daarvan dient in de beschrijving van de drie 
verschijningen van de profeet Muhammad het woord dalli te worden 
verstaan in de technische betekenis van « rationeel argument » 
(Cf Ibn 'Asdkir, Tab\ in kadib al-muflari fi-mö nusib lia l-imâm 
АЫІ-Hasan al-As ari, Dimaíq 1347 AH, 40-41 ) 
V 
De ideeën van Mohammed Arkoun betreffende de mogelijkheid en 
noodzakelijkheid van een «toegepaste islamologie » (islamologie appli-
2 
quée) bieden een goede basis om het samenspel tussen westerse islamo-
logen en moslim-theologen opnieuw te doordenken en vorm te geven. 
(Cf. Mohammed Arkoun, Essais sur la pensee islamique. Paris 
1973.) 
VI 
Een adequate vertaling van klassieke Arabische poëzie blijkt vaak 
onmogelijk, wanneer men ook het spel met de Arabische wortels en hun 
semantisch spectrum tot zijn recht zou willen laten komen. 
(Cf. bijv. A. J. Arberry, Poems of al-Mutanabb!, Cambridge 
1967, 110-111.) 
VII 
De mogelijkheden die de Arabische taal biedt tot verregaande toe-
passingen van de methoden van de computer-linguistiek wijzen op haar 
sterk formaliseerbare karakter en op de mogelijkheid haar op een 
relatief eenvoudige wijze in haar morfemen te ontleden. 
VIII 
Aangezien de Nederlandse termen « barmhartigheid » en « erbarmer » 
te zeer het idee van zonde en vergiffenis oproepen, verdient het aan-
beveling — tegen de achtergrond van de tekst van de Qur'ân en de 
betekenis van de wortel rhm in het oude Arabisch — in religieuze teksten 
rafyirn te vertalen als « goed » en rahma als « goedheid ». 
IX 
Het blijkt niet mogelijk de analyse van het gebruik en de functie van 
de verdubbelingsstam (fa1'al), zoals deze door Jenni voor het Hebreeuws 
is ontwikkeld, toe te passen op de Arabische tekst van de Qur'ân. 
(Cf. E. Jenni, Das Hebräische Pi'el, Zürich 1968.) 
X 
Het feit dat de liturgie van de Maronieten is doordrenkt van zonde- en 
schuldbesef en dat gebeden om vergiffenis een zeer grote plaats erin 
innemen kan mede worden verklaard vanuit de sociale en politieke 
situatie waarin deze christenen in vroeger eeuwen hebben geleefd. 
3 
ΧΙ 
Het Aramees van de Qumrân-targum van het boek Job (llQtg Job) 
staat in het gebruik van status emphaticus en status absolutus nog zeer 
dicht bij het Rijks-Aramees; van een vervaging van het verschil tussen 
beide status is nog niet of nauwelijks sprake. 
(Ct. Le Targum de Job de la Grotte XI de Qumrân, édité et traduit 
par J. P. M. van der Ploeg O.P. et A. S. van der Woude, Leiden 
1971, 4.) 
XII 
Louis Gardet blijkt met zijn eigen, « inlevende » benadering van de 
Islam in staat te zijn de geloofsinhoud van de Islam en van islamitische 
religieuze teksten in te voelen en over te dragen; zijn benadering loopt 
echter tevens het risico de eigenheid van het islamitische denken uit het 
oog te verliezen. 
XIII 
De Université St. Joseph te Beyrouth heeft de afgelopen eeuw ook еел 
belangrijke positieve rol vervuld binnen de Libanese maatschappij, waar 
zij in theorie en praktijk een centrum van œcumene en menselijke samen-
leving is geweest, zowel tussen de diverse christelijke confessionele 
groeperingen als tussen christenen en moslims. 
XIV 
De rol van de ergotherapie, die zich binnen het revalidatieproces uit-
drukkelijk richt op de mens als totaliteit en die als zodanig binnen dat 
proces een centrale functie kan vervullen, dient met name in een acade-
misch ziekenhuis en binnen de opleiding van toekomstige medici ook 
structureel te worden erkend. 
XV 
Naast andere vormen van religieus leven dienen ook kleine experimen-
tele leefgroepen een eerlijke kans te krijgen, aangezien deze met hun 
eigen mogelijkheden van openheid en gastvrijheid eigen aspecten van 
christelijk leven kunnen vertolken. 
Stellingen behorende bij het proefschrift van J. R. T. M. Peters. 



